Trend in Military Satellite Communications. Mar SKY Perfect JSAT Corporation RADM (Ret.) Hitoshi TAKAHASHI

Transcription

1 Trend in Military Satellite Communications Mar SKY Perfect JSAT Corporation RADM (Ret.) Hitoshi TAKAHASHI 1

2 Today's content ASAT LASER THREAT JAMMING Trend in MILSATCOM Sanctuary EMP CYBER Space asset HEO,GEO,MEO,LEO Communication, Earth observation, Navigation, Reconnaissance, Military Communication Satellite Congested Contested Competitive Deterrence theory (by punishment) (by denial) Resiliency (Mission Assurance) SSA (identify, characterize and attribute all threatening actions in space) Disaggregation Distribution Diversification Proliferation Protection Deception 2

3 Classification of military satellite communications WIDEBAND DSCS/WGS + Commercial Command & Control,Information sharing Predator/Reaper/Global Hawk Air ISR relay Tactical Protected Required UNPROTECTED PROTECTED : secure, survivable(nuclear resistant), anti-jam and low probability of detection / interception (LPD/LPI) (EHF) communications for high priority strategic and tactical users. The president and the national command authority to communicate and direct strategic operations in a nuclear. WIDEBAND : High Capacity, High Data Rates, Rain resilience and governmental use(x). Used for mission critical, sensitive command and control, Information sharing. BROADCAST : High-capacity product dissemination (Imagery, UAS full-motion video, large data files) for missionessential situational awareness NARROWBAND : Main for mobile users, High availability for jungle foliage, extreme weather and urban terrain. 3

4 Situation of the Major countries (Except U.S.) Japan SUPERBIRD-B2(X) SUPERBIRD-D (X) SUPERBIRD-C2(X) Kirameki 1(PFI) Kirameki 2(PFI) Depending on the mission and characteristics of the military, the core part of satellite communication is developed and operated on its own, but the others are supplemented by utilizing commercial and international cooperation. Considerations: Sovereignty, autonomy, Security Keyword: Resiliency, Affordability, Flexibility, Availability, PPP/PFI, International Partnership. U.K.: Skynet 5A,5B,5C,5D (X,UHF) [PFI], AEHF(EHF)[US Partner] France : Syracuse 3A, 3B (X,EHF), Athena-Fidus (Ka, EHF),Sicral 2(X,UHF) [French-Italian Coop] Italy : Sicral 1A, 1B(X,UHF,EHF), Athena-Fidus (Ka, EHF),Sicral 2(X,UHF) [Italian-French Coop] Germany : COMSAT Bw1,Bw2 (X,UHF) Spain : XTAR-EUR(X), Spanisat(X, Ka) Luxembourg : GovSat-1(X, Ka), WGS(X,Ka)[US Partner] Australia : Optus C1(UHF, X, Ka), Intelsat22(UHF), WGS(X, Ka)[US Partner] Canada : WGS(X, Ka), AEHF(EHF)[US Partner] 4

5 International Partnerships Build geopolitical Partnership Sicral2 Athena-Fidus Achieve economy of scale Promote interoperability WGS Share technologies and best practice s AEHF Heightened resilience Strengthens stability, safety and security in space 5

6 Current space environment and Resilience The current and future strategic environment is driven by three trends space is becoming increasingly congested, contested, and competitive. Congested : testing of China s destructive anti-satellite (ASAT) system Contested : space systems face a range of man-made threats that may deny, degrade, deceive, disrupt, or destroy assets. As we invest in next generation space capabilities and fill gaps in current capabilities, we will include resilience as a key criterion in evaluating alternative architectures. Both Russia and China continue to pursue antisatellite (ASAT) weapons as a means to reduce US and allied military effectiveness. Russia and China aim to have nondestructive and destructive counterspace weapons available for use during a potential future conflict. We assess that, if a future conflict were to occur involving Russia or China,either country would justify attacks against US and allied satellites as necessary to offset any perceived US military advantage derived from military,civil, or commercial space systems. Russian and Chinese destructive ASAT weapons probably will reach initial operational capability in the next few years. Definition:Resilience is the ability of an architecture to support the functions necessary for mission success in spite of hostile action or adverse conditions. An architecture is more resilient if it can provide these functions with higher probability, shorter periods of reduced capability, and across a wider range of scenarios, conditions, and threats. Resilience may leverage crossdomain or alternative government, commercial, or international capabilities. 6

7 U.S. Effort (Examples of the major things) Risks & Threats Requirments U.S. Effort Space debris, Solar flare etc. kinetic Physical Attack direct-ascent ASAT co-orbital ASAT Ground stations Non-kinetic Physical attack high-powered laser high-powered microwave EMP ELECTRONIC ATTACKS uplink jammer downlink jammer Spoofing CYBER ATTACKS Data Intercept/Monitoring Data Corruption Seizure of control Coverage Capacity Availability Flexibility Protection Anti-Jam LPD/LPI (EMP) Resiliency Affordability Interoperability Build resilient and affordable architecture Protected Tactical Waveform Development Improve anti-jamming and LPD/LPI feature of Wideband satellite communication Commercial Pathfinder Efficient and flexible use of commercial satellite communication Wideband Communication Services(WCS) Analysis of Alternatives(AoA) Determine the best mix of military and commercial SATCOM and allies/international partners 7

8 Protected Tactical Waveform(PTW)Development The PTW is designed with frequency-hopping spread spectrum (FHSS) to provide greater anti jamming capability, featuring a mix of the current protected waveform and the commercial waveform. PTW provides secure, anti-jam, low-probability-of-intercept capabilities and Beyond: The Next Generation of Protected Tactical Communications Developing affordable, protected, and interoperable satellite communications systems are goals of tomorrow s space and ground architectures. by Jo-Chieh Chuang, Joseph Han, and Bomey Yang 2010: forecasted the timeframe Requirements 2012 :developed prototypes for a new protected tactical communications system. 2016: contracted for Protected Tactical Service Field Demonstration (PTSFD). PTSFD will demonstrate the ability to provide wideband anti-jam communications to tactical users using WGS constellation and commercial SATCOM. 2018:PTW Remote Modems field testing with WGS terminals. 2023:Early fielding over WGS satellites. 2025:Fielding over Commercial satellite. 2028:Fielding Protected Tactical Satellite(PTS) Protected Tactical Service(with PTW) provide affordable, resilient and flexible communication against harsh operating environments. It is possible to integrate WGS, commercial satellite, and future new satellite (PTS), construct resilient global wideband satellite communication system. 8

9 Commercial Pathfinder Symposium/1-Miller_SATCOM.pdf The United States Government (USG) is pursuing a series of five (5) Pathfinders in support of future Commercial Satellite Communication (COMSATCOM) procurements. The COMSATCOM Pathfinder series is developing the business and technical capabilities necessary for the USG to more effectively access available satellite communication (SATCOM) resources for the warfighter worldwide. Commercial pathfinder s goal Stabilize the price of satellite communication, Secure the flexibility of communication operation, Build a hybrid architecture that shares satellite communication capacity of US dedicated satellite, commercial and international partners. Build capacity pool structure in which the US, allies, coalition partners share capacity Provide capacity according to mission needs under centralized resource pooling and aggregated situational awareness. The choice of satellite to use greatly expands. Access to robust global satellite communication capacity is possible. As a result, not only affordable, flexibility but also resilience would be greatly improved. 9

10 Wideband Communication Services(WCS) Analysis of Alternatives(AoA) The AoA to determine the best mix of military and commercial SATCOM and allies/international partners to ensure the SATCOM architecture is resilient in a future contested environment. The AoA provide an analytical comparison of operational effectiveness, resiliency, suitability, and life-cycle costs to enable the full consideration of possible trade-offs among cost, performance, and schedule for each alternative examined. Areas of Specific Interest (RFI) 1) Wideband Transport (Space and Air) Segment 2) Operations Management 3) End-User Equipment and Platform Capability 4) Ground Infrastructure 5) Resiliency, Mission Assurance and Cybersecurity International Invitation Our vision for this effort includes, to the extent our partners which to participate, interoperability with allies and international partners. We will soon begin an Analysis of Alternatives(AoA) to guide our future Wideband SATCOM program. The AoA will assess a combination of architecture options including purpose-built platforms, commercial SATCOM services, hosted payloads, and contributions from international partners. Our aim is to balance capability, resiliency, and affordability. 10

11 WCS AoA International Partnerships WGS CURRENT WCS AoA 15 Nations + NATO accepted participation in the AoA FUTURE Resiliency Affordability Interoperability Operational Flexibility Operational Superiority unknown unknown unknown 11

12 CONCLUSION Ways to achieve resiliency Protection Solution e.g. FHSS Waveform commercial The best mix of? Protected Tactical Waveform Commercial pathfinder Disaggregation International Partners LEO/MEO Wideband AoA GEO,HTS Distribution Small SAT LEO,MEO constellation Diversification Hosted Payload PFI/PPP Quantum communications Proliferation New Technologies Laser communications Deception Multi Domain High-altitude platform Aerial Layer Network 12