Your Apps and Evolving Network Security Standards

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Transcription:

Session System Frameworks #WWDC17 Your Apps and Evolving Network Security Standards 701 Bailey Basile, Secure Transports Engineer Chris Wood, Secure Transports Engineer 2017 Apple Inc. All rights reserved. Redistribution or public display not permitted without written permission from Apple.

BEAST FREAK CRIME POODLE Sweet32 SLOTH LogJam FLAME SHAttered Lucky13 Mis-issuance NOMORE Factoring BREACH DROWN 3HS

BEAST FREAK CRIME POODLE Sweet32 SLOTH LogJam FLAME SHAttered Lucky13 NOMORE Factoring BREACH DROWN Mis-issuance 3HS

Best practices

Best practices App Transport Security update

Best practices App Transport Security update Transport Layer Security

Best Practices

Best Practices

Best Practices No set and forget

Best Practices No set and forget Standards bodies, academic research, and industry best practices

Best Practices No set and forget Standards bodies, academic research, and industry best practices Update libraries

Best Practices No set and forget Standards bodies, academic research, and industry best practices Update libraries OS removes insecure options

Best Practices No set and forget Standards bodies, academic research, and industry best practices Update libraries OS removes insecure options ATS enforces best practices

Best Practices No set and forget Standards bodies, academic research, and industry best practices Update libraries OS removes insecure options ATS enforces best practices Worth the maintenance cost

Best Practices BEAST FREAK CRIME POODLE Sweet32 SLOTH NOMORE FLAME SHAttered Lucky13 LogJam Factoring BREACH DROWN Mis-issuance 3HS

Best Practices Encryption BEAST FREAK CRIME POODLE Sweet32 SLOTH NOMORE FLAME SHAttered Lucky13 LogJam Factoring BREACH DROWN Mis-issuance 3HS

Best Practices Encryption BEAST FREAK CRIME POODLE Cryptographic hashes Sweet32 SLOTH NOMORE FLAME SHAttered Lucky13 LogJam Factoring BREACH DROWN Mis-issuance 3HS

Best Practices Encryption BEAST FREAK CRIME POODLE Cryptographic hashes Sweet32 SLOTH NOMORE FLAME Public keys SHAttered Lucky13 LogJam Factoring BREACH DROWN Mis-issuance 3HS

Best Practices Encryption BEAST FREAK CRIME POODLE Cryptographic hashes Sweet32 SLOTH NOMORE FLAME Public keys SHAttered Lucky13 LogJam Factoring Protocols BREACH DROWN Mis-issuance 3HS

Best Practices Encryption BEAST FREAK CRIME POODLE Cryptographic hashes Sweet32 SLOTH NOMORE FLAME Public keys SHAttered Lucky13 LogJam Factoring Protocols Revocation BREACH DROWN Mis-issuance 3HS

Best Practices Encryption BEAST FREAK CRIME POODLE Cryptographic hashes Sweet32 SLOTH NOMORE FLAME Public keys SHAttered Lucky13 LogJam Factoring Protocols Revocation BREACH DROWN Mis-issuance 3HS

Encryption

Encryption RC4 3DES-CBC AES-CBC

Encryption RC4 3DES-CBC AES-CBC Future removal: RC4 and 3DES

Encryption RC4 3DES-CBC AES-GCM ChaCha20/Poly1305 AES-CBC Future removal: RC4 and 3DES

Cryptographic Hashes

Cryptographic Hashes MD5 SHA-1

Cryptographic Hashes MD5 SHA-1 New removal: SHA-1 signed certificates for TLS

Cryptographic Hashes MD5 SHA-2 Family SHA-1 New removal: SHA-1 signed certificates for TLS

Public Keys

Public Keys <1024-bit RSA

Public Keys <2048-bit RSA

Public Keys <2048-bit RSA New removal: <2048-bit RSA for TLS

Public Keys <2048-bit RSA 2048-bit RSA Elliptic Curves New removal: <2048-bit RSA for TLS

Protocols

Protocols http:// SSLv3 TLS 1.0 TLS 1.1

Protocols http:// SSLv3 https:// TLS 1.2 TLS 1.0 TLS 1.1

Protocols http:// SSLv3 https:// TLS 1.2 TLS 1.0 TLS 1.1 New addition: TLS 1.3 (draft)

Revocation

Revocation No checking

Revocation No checking OCSP Stapling

Revocation Online Certificate Status Protocol Certificate Authority Server Client

Revocation Online Certificate Status Protocol Certificate Authority Server Client

Revocation Online Certificate Status Protocol Certificate Authority Server Client

Revocation Online Certificate Status Protocol Certificate Authority? Server Client

Revocation Online Certificate Status Protocol Certificate Authority? Server Client

Revocation Online Certificate Status Protocol

Revocation Online Certificate Status Protocol Additional network connection

Revocation Online Certificate Status Protocol Additional network connection Compromises user privacy

Revocation Online Certificate Status Protocol Additional network connection Compromises user privacy Requires app opt-in

Revocation OCSP Stapling Certificate Authority Server Client

Revocation OCSP Stapling Certificate Authority Server Client

Revocation OCSP Stapling Certificate Authority? Server Client

Revocation OCSP Stapling Certificate Authority? Server Client

Revocation OCSP Stapling Certificate Authority? Server Client

Revocation OCSP Stapling

Revocation OCSP Stapling Slow adoption

Revocation OCSP Stapling Slow adoption Does not protect against malicious servers

Revocation Enhancement Apple

Revocation Enhancement CT Log Apple

Revocation Enhancement Certificate Authority CT Log Certificate Authority Apple Certificate Authority

Revocation Enhancement Certificate Authority CT Log? Certificate Authority? Apple? Certificate Authority

Revocation Enhancement Certificate Authority CT Log Certificate Authority Apple Certificate Authority

Revocation Enhancement Certificate Authority CT Log Certificate Authority Apple Certificate Authority

Revocation Enhancement Certificate Authority CT Log Certificate Authority Apple Certificate Authority Client

Revocation Improvements

Revocation Improvements Reduced privacy compromise

Revocation Improvements Reduced privacy compromise Automatic updating

Revocation Improvements Reduced privacy compromise Automatic updating Faster connections

Evolving Standards

Evolving Standards Encryption RC4, CBC modes AES-GCM ChaCha20/Poly1305

Evolving Standards Encryption RC4, CBC modes AES-GCM ChaCha20/Poly1305 Hashes MD5, SHA-1 SHA-2 family

Evolving Standards Encryption RC4, CBC modes AES-GCM ChaCha20/Poly1305 Hashes MD5, SHA-1 SHA-2 family Public Keys <2048-bit RSA 2048-bit RSA Elliptic curves

Evolving Standards Encryption RC4, CBC modes AES-GCM ChaCha20/Poly1305 Hashes MD5, SHA-1 SHA-2 family Public Keys <2048-bit RSA 2048-bit RSA Elliptic curves Protocols http://, SSLv3, TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1 https://, TLS 1.2+

Evolving Standards Encryption RC4, CBC modes AES-GCM ChaCha20/Poly1305 Hashes MD5, SHA-1 SHA-2 family Public Keys <2048-bit RSA 2048-bit RSA Elliptic curves Protocols http://, SSLv3, TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1 https://, TLS 1.2+ Revocation No checking Certificate Transparency OCSP Stapling

TLS Trust Removals

Trust Removals

Trust Removals SHA-1 signed certificates for TLS

Trust Removals SHA-1 signed certificates for TLS Certificates using <2048-bit RSA for TLS

Trust Removals

Trust Removals Does not affect

Trust Removals Does not affect Root certificates

Trust Removals Does not affect Root certificates Enterprise-distributed certificates

Trust Removals Does not affect Root certificates Enterprise-distributed certificates User-installed certificates

Trust Removals Does not affect Root certificates Enterprise-distributed certificates User-installed certificates Client certificates

Trust Removals sha1-intermediate.badssl.com

Trust Removals sha1-intermediate.badssl.com

Trust Removals

Trust Removals InvalidCertChain (-9807) SSL errors with URLSession

Trust Removals InvalidCertChain (-9807) SSL errors with URLSession Servers to upgrade to new certificates

Trust Removals InvalidCertChain (-9807) SSL errors with URLSession Servers to upgrade to new certificates https://support.apple.com/kb/ht204132

What to Do Now?

What to Do Now? Check your implementations, libraries, and servers

What to Do Now? Check your implementations, libraries, and servers Server Developers

What to Do Now? Check your implementations, libraries, and servers Server Developers Replace any SHA-1 certificates or weak RSA keys

What to Do Now? Check your implementations, libraries, and servers Server Developers Replace any SHA-1 certificates or weak RSA keys Upgrade servers to TLS 1.2 and authenticated encryption ciphers

What to Do Now? Check your implementations, libraries, and servers Server Developers Replace any SHA-1 certificates or weak RSA keys Upgrade servers to TLS 1.2 and authenticated encryption ciphers Use OCSP Stapling

What to Do Now? Check your implementations, libraries, and servers Server Developers Replace any SHA-1 certificates or weak RSA keys Upgrade servers to TLS 1.2 and authenticated encryption ciphers Use OCSP Stapling Check that your certificates are in CT logs

What to Do Now? Check your implementations, libraries, and servers Server Developers Replace any SHA-1 certificates or weak RSA keys Upgrade servers to TLS 1.2 and authenticated encryption ciphers Use OCSP Stapling Check that your certificates are in CT logs App Developers

What to Do Now? Check your implementations, libraries, and servers Server Developers Replace any SHA-1 certificates or weak RSA keys Upgrade servers to TLS 1.2 and authenticated encryption ciphers Use OCSP Stapling Check that your certificates are in CT logs App Developers Avoid ATS exceptions

App Transport Security Update Chris Wood, Secure Transports Engineer

App Transport Security Current standards

App Transport Security Current standards From HTTP to HTTPS TLS 1.2 Strong cryptography AES and SHA-2 Forward Secrecy ECDHE

App Transport Security Current standards From HTTP to HTTPS TLS 1.2 Strong cryptography AES and SHA-2 Forward Secrecy ECDHE Exceptions per-domain, narrow

Exception Updates

Exception Updates Expansion beyond WebKit AVFoundation loads WebView requests Local network connections

Exception Updates Expansion beyond WebKit AVFoundation loads WebView requests Local network connections Certificate Transparency requirement

ATS-Compliant Services Practice what you preach APNs iwork FaceTime Spotlight Game Center iad Apple Services itunes icloud Services (Mail, CloudKit) Software Update

ATS on the Rise

ATS on the Rise ATS adoption is increasing

ATS on the Rise ATS adoption is increasing Still more work to be done

ATS on the Rise ATS adoption is increasing Still more work to be done Minimize or reduce exceptions

Transport Layer Security

SSL and TLS Lineage A long road

SSL and TLS Lineage A long road TLS 1.0 1999

SSL and TLS Lineage A long road TLS 1.0 TLS 1.1 1999 2006

SSL and TLS Lineage A long road TLS 1.0 TLS 1.1 TLS 1.2 1999 2006 2008

SSL and TLS Lineage A long road TLS 1.0 TLS 1.1 TLS 1.2 TLS 1.3 (draft) 1999 2006 2008 2017

TLS 1.3 Best practice by design

TLS 1.3 Best practice by design Strong cryptography and Forward Secrecy by default Legacy options, ciphers, and key exchange algorithms removed

TLS 1.3 Best practice by design Strong cryptography and Forward Secrecy by default Legacy options, ciphers, and key exchange algorithms removed Overall simpler specification

TLS 1.3 Best practice by design Strong cryptography and Forward Secrecy by default Legacy options, ciphers, and key exchange algorithms removed Overall simpler specification Improved network efficiency

TLS 1.3 Overview Improved efficiency TLS 1.2 TLS 1.3 Client Server Client Server Time

TLS 1.3 Overview Improved efficiency TLS 1.2 TLS 1.3 Client Server Client Server SYN SYN SYN+ACK SYN+ACK ACK ACK Time

TLS 1.3 Overview Improved efficiency TLS 1.2 TLS 1.3 Client Server Client Server SYN SYN SYN+ACK SYN+ACK ACK ACK CH SH Time CH, KEX SH, KEX CH - Client Hello SH - Server Hello KEX - Key Share

TLS 1.3 Overview Improved efficiency TLS 1.2 TLS 1.3 Client Server Client Server SYN SYN SYN+ACK SYN+ACK ACK ACK CH SH KEX Time CH, KEX SH, KEX DATA CH - Client Hello SH - Server Hello KEX - Key Share KEX

TLS 1.3 Overview Improved efficiency TLS 1.2 TLS 1.3 Client Server Client Server SYN SYN SYN+ACK SYN+ACK ACK ACK CH SH KEX Time CH, KEX SH, KEX DATA CH - Client Hello SH - Server Hello KEX - Key Share KEX DATA

How to Enable TLS 1.3 Beta?

How to Enable TLS 1.3 Beta? It is not on by default

How to Enable TLS 1.3 Beta? It is not on by default You can install a profile on ios https://developer.apple.com/go/?id=tls13-mobile-profile

How to Enable TLS 1.3 Beta? It is not on by default You can install a profile on ios https://developer.apple.com/go/?id=tls13-mobile-profile You can enable system-wide TLS 1.3 on macos defaults write /Library/Preferences/com.apple.networkd tcp_connect_enable_tls13 1

TLS 1.3 Outlook

TLS 1.3 Outlook IETF standardization (2017-2018)

TLS 1.3 Outlook IETF standardization (2017-2018) Third-party collaboration

TLS 1.3 Outlook IETF standardization (2017-2018) Third-party collaboration Enterprise preparation

Takeaways

Takeaways Implement best practices

Takeaways Implement best practices Avoid new and future algorithm removals

Takeaways Implement best practices Avoid new and future algorithm removals Continue upgrading to modern TLS configurations

Takeaways Implement best practices Avoid new and future algorithm removals Continue upgrading to modern TLS configurations Minimize or remove App Transport Security exceptions

Takeaways Implement best practices Avoid new and future algorithm removals Continue upgrading to modern TLS configurations Minimize or remove App Transport Security exceptions Try out TLS 1.3

More Information https://developer.apple.com/wwdc17/701

Related Sessions Privacy and Your Apps Executive Ballroom Tuesday 11:20AM Advances in Networking, Part 1 Executive Ballroom Wednesday 3:10PM Advances in Networking, Part 2 Executive Ballroom Wednesday 4:10PM

Labs Security & Privacy Technology Lab D Tue 1:50PM-3:50PM Security & Privacy Technology Lab J Wed 1:00PM-3:30PM Networking Lab Technology Lab D Thu 9:00AM-11:00AM Networking Lab Technology Lab J Fri 1:50PM-3:50PM