CHIME and AEHIS Cybersecurity Survey. October 2016

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Transcription:

CHIME and AEHIS Cybersecurity Survey October 2016

Fielding and Reponses Responses: 190 Survey fielded: Approximately a month (8/29-9/30)

Demographics

In what state or U.S. territory do you currently work? Answered: 189 Skipped: 2

Responses Evaluated by Bed Size Less than 100 beds, Other Care Providers w/ Inpatient beds: 36 respondents 100 to 399 beds: 48 respondents 400 or more beds: 78 respondents All respondents: 190

What best describes your organization type?

What is the total number of employees across your entire organization, including all of its branches, divisions, and subsidiaries?

What is your organization s annual revenue?

What is your total number of IT staff?

Responses on Threats and Vulnerabilities

Q 8. Thinking about your own organization, please rate the following potential security threats on the degree of concern you have for each. Scale: 1 being your top concern, 5 being no concern at all 3.50 Threats 3.00 2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 Less than 100 beds 100 to 399 beds 400 or more beds All Respondents Social Engineering 1.91 2.08 1.68 1.88 Cyber Terrorism 2.56 2.46 2.29 2.38 IoT 2.67 2.52 2.84 2.77 Organized Crime 3.03 2.94 2.78 2.83 Insider Threat 2.79 2.46 2.34 2.36 Data Theft 2.50 1.67 1.71 1.75 Social Engineering Cyber Terrorism IoT Organized Crime Insider Threat Data Theft

Q 9. Thinking about your own organization, please rate the following potential security exploits on the degree of concern you have for each. 3.50 3.00 2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 Exploits Scale: 1 being your top concern, 5 being no concern at all Less than 100 100 to 399 400 or More All Respondents Botnets 2.53 2.46 2.3 2.38 Hacking 2.47 1.94 1.94 1.99 Back Doors 2.66 2.3 2.26 2.28 Malware 2.25 1.71 1.64 1.65 Insider Threat 2.71 2.38 2.29 2.33 Ransomware 2.18 1.44 1.41 1.49 Denial of Service 2.88 2.65 2.5 2.63 Botnets Hacking Back Doors Malware Insider Threat Ransomware Denial of Service

Q 10. Thinking about your own organization, please rate the following potential security vulnerabilities on the degree of concern you have for each. Scale: 1 being your top concern, 5 being no concern at all 3.50 Vulnerabilities 3.00 2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 Less than 100 beds 100 to 399 beds 400 or more beds All Respondents Poor Authentication Session Management 2.55 2.19 2.21 2.23 Security Misconfiguration 2.59 2.00 2.10 2.09 Buffer Overflows 3.12 2.65 2.86 2.82 Injection Vulnerabilities 2.88 2.31 2.44 2.47 Data Exposure 2.35 1.63 1.85 1.77 Poor Authentication Session Management Security Misconfiguration Buffer Overflows Injection Vulnerabilities Data Exposure

Q 11. Please indicate how common each of the security threats listed below are Threatsfor your organization 4.00 Scale: 1 being very common, 5 being very uncommon 3.50 3.00 2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 Less than 100 Beds 100 to 399 beds 400 or more beds All Respondents Social Engineering 1.80 2.10 2.26 2.31 Cyber Terrorism 2.50 3.50 3.54 3.55 IoT 2.47 2.65 3.08 3.12 Organized Crime 2.80 3.73 3.81 3.77 Insider Threat 2.52 2.90 3.16 3.09 Data Theft 2.69 3.08 3.22 3.19 Social Engineering Cyber Terrorism IoT Organized Crime Insider Threat Data Theft

Q 12. Please indicate how common each of the security exploits listed below are for your organization Scale: 1 being very common, 5 being very uncommon 4.00 Exploits 3.50 3.00 2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 Less than 100 beds 100 to 399 beds 400 or more beds All Respondents Botnets 3.00 3.03 2.96 3.05 Hacking 3.00 3.10 2.93 3.05 Back Doors 3.00 3.28 3.28 3.3 Malware 3.00 1.90 2.01 2.01 Insider Threat 3.00 2.87 3.13 3.1 Ransomware 3.00 2.40 2.50 2.52 Denial of Service 3.00 3.55 3.46 3.55 Botnets Hacking Back Doors Malware Insider Threat Ransomware Denial of Service

Q 13. Please indicate how common each of the security vulnerabilities listed below are for your organization Scale: 1 being very common, 5 being very uncommon 4.00 Vulnerabilities 3.50 3.00 2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 Less than 100 beds 100 to 399 beds 400 or more beds All respondents Poor authentican 2.67 2.60 2.66 2.71 Security Misconfiguration 2.33 2.58 2.70 2.68 Buffer overflows 3.33 3.40 3.44 3.52 Injection Vulnerabilities 3.00 3.45 3.13 3.31 Data Exposure 3.33 3.08 2.89 2.96 Other Application Vulnerabilities 2.67 2.58 2.59 2.64 Poor authentican Security Misconfiguration Buffer overflows Injection Vulnerabilities Data Exposure Other Application Vulnerabilities

Q 14. Please rank: In your opinion, why does the business strategy not drive the security strategy? 1 = Top Reason, 7 = Very Little Reason 6.00 Business Strategy vs. Security Strategy 5.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 Less than 100 beds 100 to 399 beds 400 or more beds All Respondents Budgets or Staffing 2.90 3.00 2.80 5.1 Pace of change for the business (Too Many other Initiatives) 2.93 3.00 2.84 5.05 Security is not considered a patient care or quality of care issue 4.26 3.69 3.83 4.08 BYOD/BYOA 5.30 5.24 5.29 2.72 Regulatory Landscape is too complex 4.67 4.67 4.86 3.4 Threat landscape changes too quickly 4.23 3.95 4.43 3.72 Changing delivery of care models and workflows don't address security until after the fact 3.71 4.33 3.92 3.95

Q 15. Compared to a year ago, please indicate how your organization would perform if its systems or data were compromised by a targeted attack? Scale: 1 = Better, 3= Worse 1.35 Organization's Performance vs. One Year Ago 1.30 1.25 1.20 1.15 1.10 1.05 1.00 0.95 Less than 100 beds 100 to 399 beds 400 or more beds All Respondents Having systems in place to prepare for a security incident 1.10 1.18 1.14 1.16 Discovering a security incident 1.32 1.23 1.20 1.22 Recovering from a security incident 1.32 1.28 1.26 1.28 Having systems in place to prepare for a security incident Discovering a security incident Recovering from a security incident

Q 16. How confident are you that Federal legislators understand the importance of security enough to support your key information security initiatives? Confidence in Federal Legislators to Understand Security Initiatives 0.68% 5.40% 39.46% 25.17% 29.25% Very Confident Neither Confident nor Unconfident Don't know Somewhat Confident Not Confident at All

Q 17. What do you think the Federal Government could do to help you share cybersecurity information more easily and faster? Pick your top 3. Percentage of overall respondents. Disclosures of confidential information shared by providers within an ISAO must be done in a way that does not jeopardize reputational harm (i.e. use of non-di2losure agreements and protections for providers participating in ISAOs against federal actions Mitigate costs of participation in ISOs/ISAOs since many providers have limited resources and costs should not be a barrier to entry (i.e. manufacturers should help share the burden of these costs in order to increase HDO participation). Actions to Share Easier and faster 34.41 36.73 Establish a hotline for providers to call should they enter barriers with manufacturers who insist they cannot remedy an uncontrolled risk without additional FDA clearance. 23.81 Require ISOs/ISAOs to communicate threats in a common format / language 27.21 Require manufacturers to have to report cyber risks directly to providers, not just US-CERT. 44.22 Create Patient Safety-like (PSO) organizations for sharing cyber information and threats. Incentivize participation in Information Sharing Organizations(ISO) and Information Sharing Analysis Organizations (ISAO). (i.e. shielding against audits for providers who mentor / help less resourced providers) 29.25 55.1 Create and distribute tools aimed at providers of different sizes and levels of resources (i.e. resources for small providers could vary from those needed by 1 resourced, larger providers) 51.02 More education and outreach 34.01 0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Q 17. What do you think the Federal Government could do to help you share cybersecurity information more easily and faster? Pick your top 3. 100 or less beds Actions to Share Easier and faster Disclosures of confidential information shared by providers within an ISAO must be done in a way that does not jeopardize reputational harm (i.e. use of non-di2losure agreements and protections for providers participating in ISAOs against federal actions Mitigate costs of participation in ISOs/ISAOs since many providers have limited resources and costs should not be a barrier to entry (i.e. manufacturers should help share the burden of these costs in order to increase HDO participation). 9 18 Establish a hotline for providers to call should they enter barriers with manufacturers who insist they cannot remedy an uncontrolled risk without additional FDA clearance. 7 Require ISOs/ISAOs to communicate threats in a common format / language 9 Require manufacturers to have to report cyber risks directly to providers, not just US-CERT. 10 Create Patient Safety-like (PSO) organizations for sharing cyber information and threats. Incentivize participation in Information Sharing Organizations(ISO) and Information Sharing Analysis Organizations (ISAO). (i.e. shielding against audits for providers who mentor / help less resourced providers) Create and distribute tools aimed at providers of different sizes and levels of resources (i.e. resources for small providers could vary from those needed by 1 resourced, larger providers) 7 13 24 More education and outreach 9.00 0.00 5.00 10.00 15.00 20.00 25.00 30.00

Q 17. What do you think the Federal Government could do to help you share cybersecurity information more easily and faster? Pick your top 3. 100 to 399 beds Actions to Share Easier and faster Disclosures of confidential information shared by providers within an ISAO must be done in a way that does not jeopardize reputational harm (i.e. use of non-di2losure agreements and protections for providers participating in ISAOs against federal actions Mitigate costs of participation in ISOs/ISAOs since many providers have limited resources and costs should not be a barrier to entry (i.e. manufacturers should help share the burden of these costs in order to increase HDO participation). 8 16 Establish a hotline for providers to call should they enter barriers with manufacturers who insist they cannot remedy an uncontrolled risk without additional FDA clearance. 10 Require ISOs/ISAOs to communicate threats in a common format / language 8 Require manufacturers to have to report cyber risks directly to providers, not just US- CERT. 19 Create Patient Safety-like (PSO) organizations for sharing cyber information and threats. Incentivize participation in Information Sharing Organizations(ISO) and Information Sharing Analysis Organizations (ISAO). (i.e. shielding against audits for providers who mentor / help less resourced providers) Create and distribute tools aimed at providers of different sizes and levels of resources (i.e. resources for small providers could vary from those needed by 1 resourced, larger providers) 17 21 21 More education and outreach 0 5 10 15 20 25 15

Q 17. What do you think the Federal Government could do to help you share cybersecurity information more easily and faster? Pick your top 3. 400 or more beds Disclosures of confidential information shared by providers within an ISAO must be done in a way that does not jeopardize reputational harm (i.e. use of non-di2losure agreements and protections for providers participating in ISAOs against federal actions Mitigate costs of participation in ISOs/ISAOs since many providers have limited resources and costs should not be a barrier to entry (i.e. manufacturers should help share the burden of these costs in order to increase HDO participation). Establish a hotline for providers to call should they enter barriers with manufacturers who insist they cannot remedy an uncontrolled risk without additional FDA clearance. Actions to Share Easier and faster 18 22 29 Require ISOs/ISAOs to communicate threats in a common format / language 13 Require manufacturers to have to report cyber risks directly to providers, not just US- CERT. 35 Create Patient Safety-like (PSO) organizations for sharing cyber information and threats. Incentivize participation in Information Sharing Organizations(ISO) and Information Sharing Analysis Organizations (ISAO). (i.e. shielding against audits for providers who mentor / help less resourced providers) Create and distribute tools aimed at providers of different sizes and levels of resources (i.e. resources for small providers could vary from those needed by 1 resourced, larger providers) 22 31 38 More education and outreach 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 24