City of San José 2017 Coyote Creek Flood After-Action Review & Improvement Recommendations Report SAN JOSÉ CITY COUNCIL MEETING, 08-AUG 2017 BRAD GAIR, SENIOR MANAGING DIRECTOR, WITT O BRIEN S
About Witt O Brien s
About Me 25 years of professional emergency management experience in senior leadership roles Currently Senior Managing Director at Witt O Brien s Responded to major disasters for FEMA, including World Trade Center and Hurricane Katrina Served as NYC OEM Deputy Commissioner and Mayor s Office Hurricane Sandy Recovery Manager Helped the United Arab Emirates establish a national emergency management agency
The After Action Review & Improvement Recommendations Process 50+ Workshops, Meetings & Interviews with Staff, Elected Officials & Stakeholders 3 Community Meetings 10 Major Findings 114 High Priority Recommendations
Overall Assessment: Accomplishments Hundreds of residents successfully rescued and thousands more evacuated without loss of life or serious injury. Sustained operation of three shelters which accommodated several hundred residents. More than $6.9 million in donated financial assistance raised and effectively distributed to those in most need. Establishment of a Local Assistance Center visited by nearly 2,000 residents seeking a wide variety of recovery assistance services. Mobilization of more than 4,000 volunteers to help clean out homes, parks, and neighborhoods and provide other essential recovery services. Efficient removal of several thousand tons of debris from homes, streets and other public places.
Overall Assessment: Challenges City officials relied too heavily on flood projection data from the Santa Clara Valley Water District which proved inaccurate. Institutional knowledge was lacking in the causes and impacts of the similar 1997 flooding incident on the Coyote Creek which could have helped the City make better decisions. Vital information on the impending flooding was available from staff deployed as Liaison to the SCVWD and as Field Observers to monitor the creek; however, the information sent was lost in the vast amount of information being communicated. Inadequate communications in advance of and in the early stages of the flooding event left residents uncertain as to what life safety actions should be taken. Evacuations did not start until flooding had already commenced, significantly complicating the effort and putting residents at a high degree of risk. Due to the Presidents Day holiday key staff were unavailable to support advance emergency preparations and to staff the City s Emergency Operations Center.
Finding #1: The City of San José accepted full responsibility for its failures and shortcomings throughout the crisis. Key Recommendation 1.1.1 Maintain the Commitment to Accountability in Future Disasters
2.1.1 Increase and Sustain OES Funding Finding #2: Although significant progress has been made in the past 2-3 years, the City of San José has historically not sufficiently invested in emergency preparedness, response and recovery initiatives, which limited its effectiveness during the 2017 Coyote Creek Flood. Key Recommendations (Selected) 2.1.3 Reconsider the OES Organizational Reporting Structure 2.1.5 Complete the Emergency Operations Plan Update 2.1.6 Build Community Preparedness (including CERT) 2.2.2 Fund and Initiate Emergency Operations Center Upgrades 2.3.5 Ensure EOC Staff Availability 2.4.1 Devise a Multi-Year Training & Exercise Program
Finding #3: Inundated with a vast amount of information and data, and not having adequate mechanisms in place for analyzing and prioritizing these inputs, vital information was not seen and acted upon by key decisionmakers at critical times. Key Recommendation (Selected) 3.1.1 Establish a Red Phone Protocol for Conveying Urgent Information
Finding #4: The City of San José should continue to improve its relationship with the Santa Clara Valley Water District as it relied too heavily on flood projection data to make strategic decisions, and has not systematically collaborated with the SCVWD on Coyote Creek-related issues in the past. Key Recommendations (Selected) 4.1.1 Independently Validate Flood Modeling Data 4.2.1 Develop a Comprehensive Joint Emergency Action Plan with SCVWD 4.2.4 City & SCVWD Must Take Shared Responsibility for Channel Improvements and Maintenance
Finding #5: The City of San José did not have adequate processes in place to effectively communicate accurate, reliable and timely information in the early stages of the emergency, but quickly implemented improvements, including communications capabilities in Vietnamese and Spanish. Key Recommendations (Selected) 5.1.1 Ensure Early Engagement of the Emergency Public Information Office 5.4.1 Train & Maintain City Staff Capability in Alert SCC and IPAWS 5.7.2 Translate Pre-Scripted Messaging 5.8.1 Formalize Processes for Engaging Ethnic Media during Emergencies 5.9.1 Develop an Emergency Communications Plan 5.10.1 Establish a Fully Functional 24x7 Emergency Call Center
Finding #6: After a delayed start, the City of San José mounted highly effective response and recovery operations by improvising rapidly with creativity and innovation and by efficiently integrating internal City resources and external partners into a cohesive team. Key Recommendations (Selected) 6.1.1 Revamp EOC Activation Protocols 6.4.1 Develop a Comprehensive All-Hazards Evacuation Plan 6.8.4 Develop a Comprehensive Debris Management Program 6.9.1 Execute Agreement(s) for Shelter Management Operations 6.10.1 Formalize Local Assistance Center Protocols, Train & Exercise 6.12.1 Develop a Donations Management Plan 6.13.1 Develop a Volunteer Management Plan
Finding #7: The City of San José built an impressive set of recovery programs around the guiding principle of compassion in action. Key Recommendations (Selected) 7.1.1 Document Best Practices as a National Model for Community-Based Disaster Assistance 7.3.1 Maximize FEMA Public Assistance Reimbursements
Finding #8: City Management and EOC leadership must significantly improve communications and engagement with the Mayor and Council Members during major emergencies, and better leverage both the broad capabilities of their staffs and their strong neighborhood networks, without violating key provisions of the City Charter. Key Recommendations (Selected) 8.1.1 Establish Protocols that Ensure Frequent, Consistent and Timely Communications with the Mayor and Council Members 8.3.1 Establish Protocols to Integrate Elected Official s Staffs into Neighborhood-Based Operations
Finding #9: The City of San José should adopt new technologies for use during emergencies, while also expanding its capabilities to utilize time-tested, traditional, and manual methods. Key Recommendations (Selected) 9.1.1 Adopt & Integrate Best Available Emerging Disaster Technologies 9.2.1 Maintain Capabilities Across the Technology Spectrum
Finding #10: The City of San José should learn from past disasters, while deliberately planning for future ones. Key Recommendations (Selected) 10.1.1 Institute Comprehensive After-Action Improvement Tracking 10.2.1 Develop Scalable, Actionable and Realistic Emergency Plans for the City s Most Serious Threats
Moving Forward
Q&A City of San José After Action Review & Improvement Recommendations Report BRAD GAIR, SENIOR MANAGING DIRECTOR
City of San José OES Assessment & Recommendations Report SAN JOSÉ CITY COUNCIL MEETING, 08-AUG 2017 BRAD GAIR, SENIOR MANAGING DIRECTOR, WITT O BRIEN S
The OES Assessment & Recommendations Process 13 Interviews with Senior Staff, Elected Officials & Stakeholders 3 Community Meetings 17 Compared San José OES to 17 other Big Cities in California and Nationwide 2 Case Studies: City of Philadelphia Santa Clara County 3 Areas of Assessment: OES Organizational Placement OES Structure OES Priorities
Summary of Recommendations Make substantially greater funding commitments to OES, continuing the trend of the past 3 years. Move OES from the Fire Department to the City Manager s Office, and consider a name change from Emergency Services to Emergency Management. Phase-in staffing increases from current level of 9 to approximately 20, and avoid using grants to fund staff to the maximum extent possible. OES should focus initially on the following Priorities: Rewrite the City s Emergency Operations Plan (2006) and develop a complete Emergency Communications Plan Establish a comprehensive and consistent Training & Exercises Program Significantly expand upon personal and community preparedness programs, including San José Prepared and CERT
Big Cities Comparison City Department Name Staff Reporting New York City Emergency Management 156 Executive Office Los Angeles Department of Emergency Management 25 Executive Office Chicago Office of Emergency Management & Communications 35 Executive Office Houston Office of Emergency Management 15 Executive Office Phoenix Homeland Security & Emergency Management 8 Executive Office Philadelphia Office of Emergency Management 29 Executive Office San Antonio Office of Emergency Management 16 Fire Department San Diego Office of Homeland Security 18 Executive Office Dallas Office of Emergency Management 11 Executive Office San José Office of Emergency Services 9 Fire Department Austin Office of Homeland Security & Emergency Management 15 Executive Office San Francisco Department of Emergency Management 16 Executive Office Seattle Office of Emergency Management 14 Police Department Washington, DC Homeland Security & Emergency Management Agency 16 Executive Office Sacramento Office of Emergency Services 4 Police Department Miami Division of Emergency Management 21 Fire Department New Orleans Office of Homeland Security & Emergency Preparedness 17 Executive Office
San José OES Organizational Placement Options Options #1 Keep in Fire Dept. #2 Move to Another Dept. #3 Move to City Manager s Office (RECOMMENDED) #4 Create a Dual- Reporting Structure Summary Analysis FD s core mission is very distinct from OES FD does not share significant funding, staffing or resources w/oes PD or other departments offer no advantage over FD as far as mission compatibility Higher level opportunity for an integrated Homeland Security group Gives OES the organizational stature needed to effectively coordinate across all City departments Ensures direct access to the highest levels of City government and reflects the attention given to OES over the past 2-3 years Aligns well with other big cities in California and nationwide Provides OES with its own standalone budget Allows OES Director to report to FD for normal operations and to the City Manager during emergencies Could cause confusion
Current San José OES Organizational Structure Director (Deputy Director) Program Administration (Staff Specialist) Planning Coordinator (Senior Analyst) Training Specialist (Staff Specialist) Emergency Communication Coordinator (Analyst I) Incident Management Coordinator (Analyst I) Logistics Coordinator (Analyst I) Mass Care Coordinator (Analyst I - Vacant) Grants Management Coordinator (Analyst - Vacant) Grant-funded Positions
Recommended San José OES Organizational Structure Director Office Administrator Deputy Director Emergency Operations Manager Planning & Preparedness Manager Training, Exercise & Community Program Manager Admin / Finance Manager EOC Readiness Coordinator Mitigation & Critical Infrastructure Coordinator Emergency Training Coordinator Exercise & Improvement Plan Coordinator CERT & Community Program Coordinator Grants & Budget Analyst Incident Management Coordinator Response and Recovery Coordinator Employee Training Specialist Volunteer Resource Specialist Supply & Accountability Analyst Communications Coordinator Resource & Community Planning Coordinator CERT Program Specialist Response & Recovery Coordinator *Shadowed boxes signify current positions CERT Program Specialist
Q&A City of San José OES Assessment & Recommendations Report BRAD GAIR, SENIOR MANAGING DIRECTOR
Thank You for Welcoming Us into Your Community BRAD GAIR AND THE ENTIRE WITT O BRIEN S TEAM