Routing Security. Daniel Karrenberg RIPE NCC.

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1 Routing Security Daniel Karrenberg RIPE NCC

2 Who is talking: Daniel Karrenberg 1980s: helped build Internet in Europe - EUnet, Ebone, IXes,... - RIPE 1990s: helped build RIPE NCC - 1st CEO: s: Chief Scientist & Public Service - Trustee of the Internet Society: IETF,... - Interests: Internet measurements, stability, trust & identity in the Internet,... 2

3 Who is talking: Daniel Karrenberg RIPE NCC - started in first Regional Internet Registry (RIR) - Association of ISPs countries in Europe & surrounding areas - operational coordination - number resource distribution - trusted source of data - Motto: Neutrality & Expertise - not a lobby group! 3

4 Outline Internet Routing - How it works - What makes it work in practice - What can go wrong today Risk Mitigation - Routing Hygiene - Resource certification & checks - Obstacles Discussion 4

5 The Internet 5

6 Part(s) of the Internet 6

7 Autonomous Systems 7

8 Packet Flow 8

9 Routing Information Flow (BGP) 9

10 Both Directions are Needed 10

11 Choice and Redundancy 11

12 Questions?

13 What makes it work 13

14 Business Relationships 14

15 Transmission Paths 15

16 Routing Engineering 16

17 Routing Engineering Methods Inbound Traffic - Selectively announce routes. - Very little control over preferences by other ASes. Outbound Traffic - Decide which of the known routes to use. Inputs - Cost - Transmission Capacity - Load - Routing State 17

18 Routing Engineering Principles Autonomous Decisions by each AS Local tools Local strategies Local knowlege Business advantages Autonomous Decisions by each AS (One of the reasons for rapid growth of the Internet) 18

19 Questions?

20 What can go wrong Misconfiguration - Announcing too many routes (unitentional transit) - Originating wrong routes Malicious Actions - Originating wrong routes (hijacking) 20

21 Hijacking 21

22 Hijacking 22

23 Hijacking 23

24 Questions?

25 Examples YouTube & Pakistan Telecom (2008) A number of full table exports Various route leaks from China (2010) YouTube Movie 25

26 Outline Internet Routing - How it works - What makes it work in practice - What can go wrong today Risk Mitigation - Routing Hygiene - Resource certification & checks - Obstacles Public Policy Considerations Discussion 26

27 Routing Hygiene Do not accept customer routes from peers or upstreams Limit number of prefixes accepted per adjacent AS Use a routing registry - no global authoritative registry exists Use own knowledge about topology - topology is constantly changing - distruptions can cause drastic changes 27

28 Routing Hygiene Is applied locally / autonomously Has a cost Subservient to routing engineering - No obstruction - Maintain Autonomy Cooperation - Trust - Community - Personal Relations 28

29 Resource Certification - Motivation Good practice: - to register routes in an IRR - to filter routes based on IRR data Problem: - only useful if the registries are complete - many IRRs exist, lacking standardisation Result: - Less than half of all prefixes are registered in an IRR - Real world filtering is difficult and limited - Accidental leaks happen, route hijacking is possible 29

30 Resource Certification Definition Resource certification is a reliable method for proving the association between resource holders and Internet resources. 30

31 Digital Resource Certificates Based on open IETF standards (sidr-wg) Issued by the RIPE NCC The certificate states that an Internet number resource has been registered by the RIPE NCC The certificate does not give any indication of the identity of the holder All further information on the resource can be found in the registry 31

32 What Certification offers Proof of holdership Secure Inter-Domain Routing - Route Origin Authorisation - Preferred certified routing Resource transfers Validation is the added value! 32

33 Proof of holdership Public Key Resources Signature 33

34 Route Origin Authorisation (ROA) IP Prefixes AS Numbers Signature 34

0.2.0/24 Please sign a ROA for that resource using my

35 Automated Provisioning using ROAs Please route this part of my network: /24 Please sign a ROA for that resource using my AS number OK, I signed and published a ROA OK, that ROA is valid. I can trust this request 35

36 Who Controls Routing? Certificates do not create additional powers for the Regional Internet Registries Certificates reflect the resource registration status - no registration no certificate - the reverse is not true! Routing decisions are made by network operators! 36

37 4 out of 5 Regional Internet Registries have RPKI in production 37

38 Obstacles Fear of loosing autonomy Cost Low threat perception Fear of loosing business advantage Fear of loosing autonomy 38

39 Questions?

40 My Messages Today Routing security needs to be improved - Accidents do happen... sometimes - Hijackings do happen... sometimes The sky is not falling - It does not happen all the time - It does not affect large areas of the Internet 40

41 My Messages Today Industry is addressing the problems - Local measures taken autonomously - RPKI being deployed by RIRs - RPKI based routing tools being developed - RPKI based routing protocols being studied in IETF 41

42 Outline Internet Routing - How it works - What makes it work in practice - What can go wrong today Risk Mitigation - Routing Hygiene - Resource certification & checks - Obstacles Discussion 42

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RPKI and Routing Security

RPKI and Routing Security Presentation September 2015 Yerevan Regional Meeting Routing Security 2 Routing Registry route objects RPKI (Resource Public Key Infrastructure) ROAs (Route Origin Authorisation) What is the Purpose of