Securing Routing: RPKI Overview. Mark Kosters Chief Technology Officer
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1 Securing Routing: RPKI Overview Mark Kosters Chief Technology Officer
2 Why are DNSSEC and RPKI important? Two of the most critical resources DNS Routing Hard to tell when resource is compromised Focus of increased attention globally
3 Why DNSSEC? What is it? Standard DNS (forward or reverse) responses are not secure Easy to spoof Notable malicious attacks DNSSEC attaches signatures Validates responses Can not spoof
4 Reverse DNS ARIN issues blocks without any working DNS Registrant must establish delegations after registration Then employ DNSSEC if desired Authority to manage reverse zones follows SWIP Shared Authority model
5 Reverse DNS: Querying ARIN s Whois Query for the zone directly: whois> in-addr.arpa Name: Updated: NameServer: NameServer: NameServer: Ref: in-addr.arpa AUTHNS2.DNVR.QWEST.NET AUTHNS3.STTL.QWEST.NET AUTHNS1.MPLS.QWEST.NET
6 Changes completed to make DNSSEC work at ARIN Permit by-delegation management Sign in-addr.arpa. and ip6.arpa. delegations that ARIN manages Create entry method for DS Records ARIN Online RESTful interface Not available via templates
7 Reverse DNS in ARIN Online First identify the network that you want to put Reverse DNS nameservers on
8 Reverse DNS in ARIN Online then enter the Reverse DNS nameservers
9 DNSSEC in ARIN Online then apply DS record to apply to the delegation
10 Reverse DNS Management and DNSSEC in ARIN Online Available on ARIN s website
11 What is RPKI? Resource Public Key Infrastructure Attaches digital certificates to network resources AS Numbers IP Addresses Allows ISPs to associate the two Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) Can follow the address allocation chain to the top
12 What does RPKI accomplish? Allows routers or other processes to validate route origins Simplifies validation authority information Trust Anchor Locator Distributes trusted information Through repositories
13 Resource Cert Validation Resource Allocation Hierarchy AFRINIC ICANN RIPE NCC APNIC ARIN LACNIC Issued Certificates Route Origination Authority LIR1 ISP4 permits AS65000 to originate a route for the prefix /24 Attachment: <isp4-ee-cert> ISP Signed, ISP4 <isp4-ee-key-priv> ISP ISP2 ISP ISP4 ISP ISP ISP
14 Resource Cert Validation Resource Allocation Hierarchy AFRINIC ICANN RIPE NCC APNIC ARIN LACNIC Issued Certificates Route Origination Authority LIR1 ISP4 permits AS65000 to originate a route for the prefix /24 Attachment: <isp4-ee-cert> ISP Signed, ISP4 <isp4-ee-key-priv> ISP ISP2 ISP ISP4 ISP ISP ISP 1. Did the matching private key sign this text?
15 Resource Cert Validation Resource Allocation Hierarchy AFRINIC ICANN RIPE NCC APNIC ARIN LACNIC Issued Certificates Route Origination Authority LIR1 ISP4 permits AS65000 to originate a route for the prefix /24 Attachment: <isp4-ee-cert> ISP Signed, ISP4 <isp4-ee-key-priv> ISP ISP2 ISP ISP4 ISP ISP 2. Is this certificate valid? ISP
16 Resource Cert Validation Resource Allocation Hierarchy AFRINIC ICANN RIPE NCC APNIC ARIN LACNIC Issued Certificates Route Origination Authority LIR1 ISP4 permits AS65000 to originate a route for the prefix /24 Attachment: <isp4-ee-cert> ISP Signed, ISP4 <isp4-ee-key-priv> ISP ISP2 ISP ISP4 ISP ISP ISP 3. Is there a valid certificate path from a Trust Anchor to this certificate?
17 What does RPKI Create? It creates a repository RFC 3779 (RPKI) Certificates ROAs CRLs Manifest records
18 Repository View./ba/03a5be-ddf a1f9-1ad3f2c39ee6/1:! total 40! -rw-r--r Jun ICcaIRKhGHJ-TgUZv8GRKqkidR4.roa! -rw-r--r Jun ckxlcu94ums-qd4dookak0m2us0.cer! -rw-r--r Jun dsmerm6ujglwmmqtl2esy4xyuaa.crl! -rw-r--r Jun dsmerm6ujglwmmqtl2esy4xyuaa.mnf! -rw-r--r Jun nb0gdftwffkk4vwgln-12pdfte8.roa! A Repository Directory containing an RFC3779 Certificate, two ROAs, a CRL, and a manifest
19 Repository Use Pull down these files using a manifestvalidating mechanism Validate the ROAs contained in the repository Communicate with the router marking routes valid, invalid, unknown Up to ISP to use local policy on how to route
20 Possible Flow RPKI Web interface -> Repository Repository aggregator -> Validator Validated entries -> Route Checking Route checking results -> local routing decisions (based on local policy)
21 How you can use ARIN s RPKI System Hosted Web Delegated Delegated using Up/Down Protocol
22 Hosted RPKI Pros Easier to use ARIN managed Cons No current support for downstream customers to manage their own space We hold your private key
23 Web Delegated RPKI Pros Harder than Hosted, Easier than Delegated (Up/Down) Manage your own RPKI system Control your own private keys Cons Need to setup your own RPKI environment Fairly complex
24 Delegated RPKI with Up/Down Pros Same as web delegated Follows the ietf up/down protocol Cons Extremely hard to setup Need to operate your own RPKI environment
25 Hosted RPKI in ARIN Online
26 Hosted RPKI in ARIN Online
27 Hosted RPKI in ARIN Online
28 Hosted RPKI in ARIN Online
29 Hosted RPKI in ARIN Online SAMPLE- ORG
30 Hosted RPKI in ARIN Online SAMPLE- ORG
31 Hosted RPKI in ARIN Online
32 Your ROA request is automatically processed and the ROA is placed in ARIN s repository, accompanied by its certificate and a manifest. Users of the repository can now validate the ROA using RPKI validators.
33 Delegated with Up/Down
34 Delegated with Up/Down
35 Delegated with Up/Down
36 Delegated with Up/Down You have to do all the ROA creation Need to setup a CA Have a highly available repository Create a CPS
37 Updates within RPKI outside of ARIN The four other RIRs are in production with Hosted CA services ARIN and APNIC have delegated working for the public Major routing vendor support being tested Announcement of public domain routing code support
38 ARIN Status Hosted CA deployed 15 Sept 2012 Web Delegated CA deployed 16 Feb 2013 Delegated using Up/Down protocol deployed 7 Sept 2013
39 Why is this important? Provides more credibility to identify resource holders Leads to better routing security
40 Q&A
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