Secure Active Network Environment (SANE) Trust, but Verify
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1 Secure Active Network Environment (SANE) Trust, but Verify Old Russian Saying Scott Alexander Bill Arbaugh Angelos Keromytis Jonathan Smith University of Pennsylvania
2 Network Infrastructures Shared, so Virtualization Matters Need Timing, Privacy and Authentication Focus Must be on Protection of the Network Elements (What will be Programmed), in Spite of Improved Flexibility Node Security, then Network Security
3 Security is not Cryptography! Is your Message secure if it Doesn t Get There? (e.g., Denial of Service) Security is Adherence to a Security Policy Unfortunately, in Many Systems Policy is Informal, Defined in ad hoc Manner, and Focused only on Selected Attacks NB: Attacker may Differ on Selection...
4 Restricting Programs Node Safe Versus Network Safe All Programs Node Safe Programs Network Safe Programs
5 How Do We Control Programs? Safety & Security: P.L., O.S. or Hybrid? Programming Language Environment O.S. Kernel, e.g., Linux Device Driver Device Driver
6 A Language-Oriented Model Switchlet Language for Users (SL) Formal Semantics Restrict Programs (e.g., Packet Filters use regexps) Wire Language for Communicating (WL) Formal Semantics Across Boundaries Infrastructure Language for Virtual Machine (IL) Formal Semantics Supported on Metal: Run-time
7 Secure Active Network Environment (SANE) Again, Trust, but Verify! Network Level Node-Node Authentication PLAN Caml/O.S. Dynamic Integrity Checks (Maybe perpacket/switchlet?) Node Level Recovery AEGIS Static Integrity Checks (Done Once)
8 Per-module/Per-packet Integrity Checking Active Bridging (Scott Alexander) Caml System Loaded modules.. Input NIC Linux Kernel Output NIC LAN #1 LAN #2 Frame Frame
9 REAL Security: Model to Actions and NOTHING ELSE! Syntax, Semantics, Node vs. Network Example: Securing a Network 1. System Model 2. Modules loaded into nodes Us Checker Them 3. Resulting in a robust Network
10 The Node Problem Every Computer System is Currently Invoked by an Untrusted Process- Even Secure Systems. This Leads to a False Sense of Security for the Users of those Systems.
11 Definition We Define the Guaranteed Secure Bootstrap of an Active Network Node in Two Parts. 1. No Code is Executed Unless Explicitly Trusted or its Integrity is Verified Prior to Use. 2. When an Integrity Failure Occurs, There Exists a Method to Recover a Suitable Replacement.
12 Approach Layer Crossing Protected by Public Key Crypto Extended Trust Level (n+1) Trust Base Case (n) Integrity and Trust Must be Grounded at the Lowest Possible Point. Chaining Layered Integrity Checks (CLIC) Extends Trust Beyond the Base Case.
13 AEGIS Architecture Trusted Repository Active Network Env. Level 4 Boot Block Level 3 Network Expansion BIOS ROMs 2 Level 2 BIOS 2 Level 1 Netcard BIOS 1 Level 0
14 Previous Work Previous research on the Secure Bootstrap Problem Yee RATBAG Lampson / Birlix Arnold / Jablon sun Bits Secure? Prototype? Yes / no no / yes no yes no / no no / yes no / no?? /?? Probably yes no yes
15 The Network Problem Network of Mutually Suspicious Active Nodes Nodes Need to Cooperate for the Network to Function Network Users Need to Interact with the NEs in a Controlled Manner Different from the Current Internet!
16 Mutually Suspicious Nodes Nodes Authenticate their Neighbors A1 A3 A4 B1 B2 B3 Establish Trust Relations with Peers (PolicyMaker?) Use Trust Relations to Solve Existing Problems (eg. Routing) A2 Active Network Optimize Authentication
17 Node to Node Authentication Once at Boot Time, Periodically Thereafter (Crypto heartbeat ) Modified STS Protocol (Well Known and Understood) Key Can be Used to Authenticate on a Hop-by-Hop Basis, Encrypt Sensitive Information Make Traffic Analysis Hard
18 User to Node Authentication Users Need to Prove Resource Usage Rights: To Install Permanent Services To have their Packets Identified for Further Processing Perform other Privileged Operations Authentication in a Telescopic Manner ( scout packets) Again, use of a Modified STS Protocol
19 Make Use of Established Trust Prove Credentials Once per Administrative Cloud Same Authentication Inside that Cloud Cross-Domain Authentication Acceptance Subject to Policy (Credential Forwarding, Session Key Sharing) We Still Need Language Safety (Accidents Happen)
20 Open Problems Public Key Infrastructure Needed Malicious Nodes and Byzantine Failures One Way Authentication Negotiation too Costly in Some Cases (?) Credential-Use Prediction? Protect Against Replay? Do We Need Synchronized Clocks?
21 SwitchWare: Accelerating SECURE Network Evolution! Active Nets: changing the tempo of network evolution from political to technological with programmable architecture Secure Active Network Environment (SANE) Architecture: Moving from Secure NODES to Secure NETWORKS Security by design, not afterthought!
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