LIFEGUARD: Practical Repair of Persistent Route Failures
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1 LIFEGUARD: Practical Repair of Persistent Route Failures Ethan Katz-Bassett (USC) Colin Scott, David Choffnes, Italo Cunha, Valas Valancius, Nick Feamster, Harsha Madhyastha, Tom Anderson, Arvind Krishnamurthy This work is generously funded in part by Google, Cisco and the NSF.
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5 Long Outages Cause Most Unavailability! Monitor outages from Amazon s EC2! Fraction of outages of duration! X?! Fraction of unavailability due to outages of duration! X? 5
6 Long Outages Cause Most Unavailability! Monitor outages from Amazon s EC2! Fraction of outages of duration! X?! Fraction of unavailability due to outages of duration! X? 86% of outages last less than 5 minutes 5
7 Long Outages Cause Most Unavailability! Monitor outages from Amazon s EC2! Fraction of outages of duration! X?! Fraction of unavailability due to outages of duration! X? 86% of outages last less than 5 minutes 5
8 Long Outages Cause Most Unavailability! Monitor outages from Amazon s EC2! Fraction of outages of duration! X?! Fraction of unavailability due to outages of duration! X? 86% of outages last less than 5 minutes But longer outages account for 90% of the unavailability 5
9 Operators Struggle to Locate Failures Traffic attempting to pass through Level3 s network in the Washington, DC area is getting lost in the abyss. Here's a trace from Verizon residential to Level3. Outages mailing list, Dec
10 Operators Struggle to Locate Failures Traffic attempting to pass through Level3 s network in the Washington, DC area is getting lost in the abyss. Here's a trace from Verizon residential to Level3. Outages mailing list, Dec Mailing List User 1 1 Home router 2 Verizon in Baltimore 3 Verizon in Philly 4 Alter.net in DC 5 Level3 in DC 6 * * * 7 * * * 6
11 Operators Struggle to Locate Failures Traffic attempting to pass through Level3 s network in the Washington, DC area is getting lost in the abyss. Here's a trace from Verizon residential to Level3. Outages mailing list, Dec Mailing List User 1 1 Home router 2 Verizon in Baltimore 3 Verizon in Philly 4 Alter.net in DC 5 Level3 in DC 6 * * * 7 * * * 6 Mailing List User 2 1 Home router 2 Verizon in DC 3 Alter.net in DC 4 Level3 in DC 5 Level3 in Chicago 6 Level3 in Denver 7 * * * 8 * * *
12 Reasons for Long-Lasting Outages Long-term outages are:! Repaired over slow, human timescales! Not well understood! Caused by routers advertising paths that do not work! E.g., corrupted memory on line card causes black hole! E.g., bad cross-layer interactions cause failed MPLS tunnel! Complicated by lack of visibility into or control over routes in other ISPs 7
13 Our Approach and Outline LIFEGUARD: Locating Internet Failures Effectively and Generating Usable Alternate Routes Dynamically! Locate the ISP / link causing the problem! Suggest that other ISPs reroute around the problem 8
14 Our Approach and Outline LIFEGUARD: Locating Internet Failures Effectively and Generating Usable Alternate Routes Dynamically! Locate the ISP / link causing the problem! Building blocks! Example! Description of technique! Suggest that other ISPs reroute around the problem 8
15 Building blocks for failure isolation LIFEGUARD can use:! Ping to test reachability! Traceroute to measure forward path! Distributed vantage points (VPs)! PlanetLab for our experiments! Some can source spoof! Reverse traceroute to measure reverse path (NSDI 10)! Atlas of historical forward/reverse paths between VPs and targets 9
16 How does LIFEGUARD locate a failure? Before outage: Source: GMU Target: Smartkom! Historical atlas enables reasoning about changes! Traceroute yields only path from GMU to target! Reverse traceroute reveals path asymmetry 10
17 How does LIFEGUARD locate a failure? Before outage: Level3 Telia TransTelecom ZSTTK Source: GMU Target: Smartkom! Historical atlas enables reasoning about changes! Traceroute yields only path from GMU to target! Reverse traceroute reveals path asymmetry 10
18 How does LIFEGUARD locate a failure? Before outage: Level3 Telia TransTelecom ZSTTK Source: GMU Target: Smartkom NTT Rostelecom! Historical atlas enables reasoning about changes! Traceroute yields only path from GMU to target! Reverse traceroute reveals path asymmetry 10
19 How does LIFEGUARD locate a failure? During outage: Level3 Telia TransTelecom ZSTTK Source: GMU Target: Smartkom NTT Rostelecom 11
20 How does LIFEGUARD locate a failure? During outage: Level3 Telia TransTelecom ZSTTK? Source: GMU Target: Smartkom NTT Rostelecom 11
21 How does LIFEGUARD locate a failure? During outage: Problem with ZSTTK? Level3 Telia TransTelecom ZSTTK? Source: GMU Target: Smartkom NTT Rostelecom 11
22 How does LIFEGUARD locate a failure? During outage: Problem with ZSTTK? VP Level3 Telia TransTelecom ZSTTK? Source: GMU Target: Smartkom NTT Rostelecom 11
23 How does LIFEGUARD locate a failure? During outage: Problem with ZSTTK? VP Level3 Telia TransTelecom ZSTTK? Source: GMU Target: Smartkom NTT Rostelecom 11
24 How does LIFEGUARD locate a failure? During outage: Problem with ZSTTK? VP Level3 Telia TransTelecom ZSTTK Ping? Fr:VP Source: GMU? Target: Smartkom NTT Rostelecom 11
25 How does LIFEGUARD locate a failure? During outage: Problem with ZSTTK? VP Level3 Telia TransTelecom ZSTTK Source: GMU? Ping? Fr:VP Target: Smartkom NTT Rostelecom 11
26 How does LIFEGUARD locate a failure? During outage: Problem with ZSTTK? VP Level3 Telia TransTelecom ZSTTK Source: GMU? Ping? Fr:VP Target: Smartkom Ping! To:VP NTT Rostelecom 11
27 How does LIFEGUARD locate a failure? Ping! During outage: Problem with ZSTTK? To:VP VP Level3 Telia TransTelecom ZSTTK Source: GMU? Ping? Fr:VP Target: Smartkom NTT Rostelecom 11
28 How does LIFEGUARD locate a failure? Ping! During outage: Problem with ZSTTK? To:VP VP Level3 Telia TransTelecom ZSTTK Source: GMU Target: Smartkom NTT Rostelecom! Forward path works 11
29 How does LIFEGUARD locate a failure? Ping! During outage: Problem with ZSTTK? To:VP VP Level3 Telia TransTelecom ZSTTK Source: GMU Target: Smartkom NTT Rostelecom! Forward path works 11
30 How does LIFEGUARD locate a failure? During outage: Level3 Telia TransTelecom ZSTTK Source: GMU Target: Smartkom NTT Rostelecom! Forward path works 12
31 How does LIFEGUARD locate a failure? During outage: Level3 Telia TransTelecom ZSTTK Source: GMU Target: Smartkom NTT Rostelecom! Forward path works 12
32 How does LIFEGUARD locate a failure? During outage: Level3 Telia TransTelecom ZSTTK Source: GMU Target: Smartkom NTT Rostelecom! Forward path works 12
33 How does LIFEGUARD locate a failure? During outage: Level3 Telia TransTelecom ZSTTK NTT:Ping? Fr:GMU Source: GMU Target: Smartkom NTT Rostelecom! Forward path works 12
34 How does LIFEGUARD locate a failure? During outage: Level3 Telia TransTelecom ZSTTK Source: GMU Target: Smartkom GMU:Ping! NTT Fr:NTT Rostelecom! Forward path works 12
35 How does LIFEGUARD locate a failure? During outage: Level3 Telia TransTelecom ZSTTK Source: GMU Target: Smartkom NTT Rostelecom! Forward path works 12
36 How does LIFEGUARD locate a failure? During outage: Level3 Telia TransTelecom ZSTTK Source: GMU Target: Smartkom NTT Rostelecom! Forward path works 12
37 How does LIFEGUARD locate a failure? During outage: Rostele: Ping? Fr:GMU Source: GMU Level3 Telia TransTelecom ZSTTK Target: Smartkom NTT Rostelecom! Forward path works! Rostelcom is not forwarding traffic towards GMU 13
38 How does LIFEGUARD locate a failure? During outage: Level3 Telia TransTelecom ZSTTK Source: GMU Target: Smartkom NTT Rostelecom! Forward path works! Rostelcom is not forwarding traffic towards GMU 13
39 How does LIFEGUARD locate a failure? During outage: Level3 Telia TransTelecom ZSTTK Source: GMU Target: Smartkom NTT Rostelecom! Forward path works! Rostelcom is not forwarding traffic towards GMU 13
40 How does LIFEGUARD locate a failure? During outage: Level3 Telia TransTelecom ZSTTK Source: GMU Target: Smartkom NTT Rostelecom! Forward path works! Rostelcom is not forwarding traffic towards GMU 13
41 How does LIFEGUARD locate a failure? During outage: Level3 Telia TransTelecom ZSTTK Source: GMU Target: Smartkom NTT Rostelecom! Forward path works! Rostelcom is not forwarding traffic towards GMU 13
42 How LIFEGUARD Locates Failures LIFEGUARD: 1. Maintains background historical atlas 2. Isolates direction of failure, measures working direction 3. Tests historical paths in failing direction in order to prune candidate failure locations 4. Locates failure as being at the horizon of reachability 14
43 Our Approach and Outline LIFEGUARD: Locating Internet Failures Effectively and Generating Usable Alternate Routes Dynamically! Locate the ISP / link causing the problem! Suggest that other ISPs reroute around the problem 15
44 Our Approach and Outline LIFEGUARD: Locating Internet Failures Effectively and Generating Usable Alternate Routes Dynamically! Locate the ISP / link causing the problem! Suggest that other ISPs reroute around the problem! What would we like to add to BGP to enable this?! What can we deploy today, using only available protocols and router support? 15
45 Our Goal for Failure Avoidance! Enable content / service providers to repair persistent routing problems affecting them, regardless of which ISP is causing them Setting! Assume we can locate problem! Assume we are multi-homed / have multiple data centers! Assume we speak BGP! We use BGP-Mux to speak BGP to the real Internet: 5 US universities as providers 16
46 Self-Repair of Forward Paths Straightforward: Choose a path that avoids the problem. 17
47 Self-Repair of Forward Paths Straightforward: Choose a path that avoids the problem. 17
48 Self-Repair of Forward Paths Straightforward: Choose a path that avoids the problem. 17
49 Self-Repair of Forward Paths Straightforward: Choose a path that avoids the problem. 17
50 A Mechanism for Failure Avoidance Forward path: Choose route that avoids ISP or ISP-ISP link Reverse path: Want others to choose paths to my prefix P that avoid ISP or ISP-ISP link X! Want a BGP announcement AVOID(X,P):! Any ISP with a route to P that avoids X uses such a route! Any ISP not using X need only pass on the announcement 18
51 Ideal Self-Repair of Reverse Paths 19
52 Ideal Self-Repair of Reverse Paths AVOID(L3,WS) 19
53 Ideal Self-Repair of Reverse Paths AVOID(L3,WS) AVOID(L3,WS) 19
54 Ideal Self-Repair of Reverse Paths AVOID(L3,WS) AVOID(L3,WS) AVOID(L3,WS) 19
55 Ideal Self-Repair of Reverse Paths AVOID(L3,WS) AVOID(L3,WS) AVOID(L3,WS) 19
56 Do paths exist that AVOID problem? LIFEGUARD repairs outages by instructing others to avoid particular routes. Q: Do alternative routes exist? A: Alternate policy-compliant paths exist in 90% of simulated AVOID(X,P) announcements.! Simulated 10 million AVOIDs on actual measured routes. 20
57 Practical Self-Repair of Reverse Paths 21
58 Practical Self-Repair of Reverse Paths WS 21
59 Practical Self-Repair of Reverse Paths ATT! WS WS Qwest! WS 21
60 Practical Self-Repair of Reverse Paths L3! ATT! WS ATT! WS Sprint! Qwest! WS WS AISP! Qwest! WS Qwest! WS 21
61 Practical Self-Repair of Reverse Paths UW! L3! ATT! WS L3! ATT! WS ATT! WS Sprint! Qwest! WS WS AISP! Qwest! WS Qwest! WS 21
62 Practical Self-Repair of Reverse Paths UW! L3! ATT! WS L3! ATT! WS ATT! WS Sprint! Qwest! WS WS AISP! Qwest! WS Qwest! WS 21
63 Practical Self-Repair of Reverse Paths UW! L3! ATT! WS L3! ATT! WS ATT! WS Sprint! Qwest! WS WS AISP! Qwest! WS Qwest! WS 21
64 Practical Self-Repair of Reverse Paths UW! L3! ATT! WS L3! ATT! WS ATT! WS Sprint! Qwest! WS AISP! Qwest! WS Qwest! WS WS AVOID(L3,WS) 22
65 Practical Self-Repair of Reverse Paths UW! L3! ATT! WS L3! ATT! WS ATT! WS Sprint! Qwest! WS WS! L3! WS AISP! Qwest! WS Qwest! WS BGP loop prevention encourages switch to working path. 22
66 Practical Self-Repair of Reverse Paths UW! L3! ATT! WS L3! ATT! WS ATT! WS Sprint! Qwest! WS WS! L3! WS AISP! Qwest! WS Qwest! WS! L3! WS BGP loop prevention encourages switch to working path. 22
67 Practical Self-Repair of Reverse Paths UW! L3! ATT! WS L3! ATT! WS ATT! WS Sprint! Qwest! WS WS! L3! WS AISP! Qwest! WS! L3! WS Qwest! WS! L3! WS BGP loop prevention encourages switch to working path. 22
68 Practical Self-Repair of Reverse Paths UW! L3! ATT! WS L3! ATT! WS ATT! WS Sprint Sprint! Qwest! Qwest! WS! WS L3! WS WS! L3! WS Qwest! WS! L3! WS BGP loop prevention encourages switch to working path. 22
69 Practical Self-Repair of Reverse Paths UW! L3! ATT! WS L3! ATT! WS ATT! WS! L3! WS Sprint Sprint! Qwest! Qwest! WS! WS L3! WS WS! L3! WS BGP loop prevention encourages switch to working path. 22
70 Practical Self-Repair of Reverse Paths UW! L3! ATT! WS? ATT! WS! L3! WS Sprint Sprint! Qwest! Qwest! WS! WS L3! WS WS! L3! WS BGP loop prevention encourages switch to working path. 22
71 Practical Self-Repair of Reverse Paths UW! Sprint L3! ATT! Qwest! WS! WS! L3! WS? ATT! WS! L3! WS Sprint Sprint! Qwest! Qwest! WS! WS L3! WS WS! L3! WS BGP loop prevention encourages switch to working path. 22
72 Practical Self-Repair of Reverse Paths UW! Sprint L3! ATT! Qwest! WS! WS! L3! WS? ATT! WS! L3! WS Sprint Sprint! Qwest! Qwest! WS! WS L3! WS WS! L3! WS BGP loop prevention encourages switch to working path. 22
73 Stuff I Don t Have Time to Talk About Results from real poisonings! Poisoning in the wild / poisoning anomalies! Case study of restoring connectivity Making poisoning flexible! Monitoring broken path while it is disabled! Allowing ISPs w/o alternatives to use disabled route LIFEGUARD s scalability! Overhead and speed of failure location! Router update load if many ISPs deploy our approach Alternatives to poisoning! Compatibility with secure routing (BGPSEC, etc.)! Comparing to other route control mechanisms 23
74 Can poisoning approximate AVOID effects? LIFEGUARD s poisoning repairs outages by disabling routes to induce route exploration. Q: Does poisoning disrupt working routes? A: No. As I will describe: (a) Under certain circumstances, we can disable a link without disabling the full ISP. (b) We can speed BGP convergence by carefully crafting announcements. 24
75 What if some routes in an ISP still work? A C2 B1 B2 C3 Network link Transitive link Original path New path C1 D1 D2 C4 O! We only want C3 to change its route, to avoid A-B2 25
76 What if some routes in an ISP still work? A C2 B1 B2 C3 Network link Transitive link Original path New path C1 D1 D2 C4 O! We only want C3 to change its route, to avoid A-B2 25
77 What if some routes in an ISP still work? A C2 B1 B2 C3 Network link Transitive link Original path New path C1 D1 D2 C4 O! We only want C3 to change its route, to avoid A-B2! Forward direction is easy: choose a different route 26
78 What if some routes in an ISP still work? A C2 B1 B2 C3 Network link Transitive link Original path New path C1 D1 D2 C4 O! We only want C3 to change its route, to avoid A-B2! Forward direction is easy: choose a different route 26
79 What if some routes in an ISP still work? A C2 B1 B2 C3 Network link Transitive link Original path New path C1 D1 D2 C4 O! We only want C3 to change its route, to avoid A-B2! Forward direction is easy: choose a different route 27
80 What if some routes in an ISP still work? A C2 B1 B2 C3 Network link Transitive link Pre-poisoning path Post-poisoning path C1 D1 D2 C4 O O O! We only want C3 to change its route, to avoid A-B2! Poisoning seems blunt, disabling an entire ISP 28
81 What if some routes in an ISP still work? A C2 B1 B2 C3 Network link Transitive link Pre-poisoning path Post-poisoning path C1 D1 D2 C4 O O O! We only want C3 to change its route, to avoid A-B2! Poisoning seems blunt, disabling an entire ISP 28
82 What if some routes in an ISP still work? A C2 B1 B2 C3 Network link Transitive link Pre-poisoning path Post-poisoning path C1 D1 D2 C4 O-O-O O-A-O O-A-O O! We only want C3 to change its route, to avoid A-B2! Poisoning seems blunt, disabling an entire ISP 29
83 What if some routes in an ISP still work? C2 A?? B1 B2 C3 Network link Transitive link Pre-poisoning path Post-poisoning path C1 D1 D2 C4 O-O-O O-A-O O-A-O O! We only want C3 to change its route, to avoid A-B2! Poisoning seems blunt, disabling an entire ISP 30
84 What if some routes in an ISP still work? A C2 B1 B2 C3 Network link Transitive link Original path New path C1 D1 D2 C4 O O! We only want C3 to change its route, to avoid A-B2! Poisoning seems blunt, disabling an entire ISP! Selective advertising via just D1 is also blunt 31
85 What if some routes in an ISP still work? A C2 B1 B2 C3 Network link Transitive link Original path New path C1 D1 D2 C4 O O! We only want C3 to change its route, to avoid A-B2! Poisoning seems blunt, disabling an entire ISP! Selective advertising via just D1 is also blunt 31
86 What if some routes in an ISP still work? A C2 C1 B1 O D1?? D2 B2? C3 C4 Network link Transitive link Original path New path O! We only want C3 to change its route, to avoid A-B2! Poisoning seems blunt, disabling an entire ISP! Selective advertising via just D1 is also blunt 32
87 What if some routes in an ISP still work? A C2 B1 B2 C3 Network link Transitive link Pre-poisoning path Post-poisoning path C1 D1 D2 C4 O O O! We only want C3 to change its route, to avoid A-B2! Poisoning seems blunt, disabling an entire ISP! If D1 and D2 (transitively) connect to different PoPs of A, selectively poison via D2 and not D1 33
88 What if some routes in an ISP still work? A C2 B1 B2 C3 Network link Transitive link Pre-poisoning path Post-poisoning path C1 D1 D2 C4 O O O! We only want C3 to change its route, to avoid A-B2! Poisoning seems blunt, disabling an entire ISP! If D1 and D2 (transitively) connect to different PoPs of A, selectively poison via D2 and not D1 33
89 What if some routes in an ISP still work? A C2 B1 B2 C3 Network link Transitive link Pre-poisoning path Post-poisoning path C1 D1 D2 C4 O-O-O O-A-O O! We only want C3 to change its route, to avoid A-B2! Poisoning seems blunt, disabling an entire ISP! If D1 and D2 (transitively) connect to different PoPs of A, selectively poison via D2 and not D1 34
90 What if some routes in an ISP still work? A C2 B1 B2 C3 Network link Transitive link Pre-poisoning path Post-poisoning path C1 D1 D2 C4 O-O-O O-A-O O! We only want C3 to change its route, to avoid A-B2! Poisoning seems blunt, disabling an entire ISP! If D1 and D2 (transitively) connect to different PoPs of A, selectively poison via D2 and not D1 35
91 Can poisoning approximate AVOID effects? LIFEGUARD s poisoning repairs outages by disabling routes to induce route exploration. Q: Does poisoning disrupt working routes? A: No. As I will describe: (a) Selective poisoning can avoid 73% of links without disabling entire AS. Real-world results from 5 provider BGP-Mux testbed (b) We can speed BGP convergence by carefully crafting announcements. 36
92 Naive Poisoning Causes Transient Loss! Some ISPs may have working paths that avoid problem ISP X! Naively, poisoning causes path exploration even for these ISPs! Path exploration causes transient loss B-A-O E-D-A-O D-A-O F-B-A-O A-O F E D C B A O B-A-O A-O O AVOID(X,P) 37
93 Naive Poisoning Causes Transient Loss! Some ISPs may have working paths that avoid problem ISP X! Naively, poisoning causes path exploration even for these ISPs! Path exploration causes transient loss B-A-O E-D-A-O D-A-O F-B-A-O A-O F E D C B A O B-A-O A-O O-X-O AVOID(X,P) 38
94 Naive Poisoning Causes Transient Loss! Some ISPs may have working paths that avoid problem ISP X! Naively, poisoning causes path exploration even for these ISPs! Path exploration causes transient loss B-A-O E-D-A-O D-A-O F-B-A-O A-O-X-O F E D C B A O B-A-O A-O-X-O O-X-O AVOID(X,P) 39
95 Naive Poisoning Causes Transient Loss! Some ISPs may have working paths that avoid problem ISP X! Naively, poisoning causes path exploration even for these ISPs! Path exploration causes transient loss B-A-O-X-O E-D-A-O D-A-O-X-O F-B-A-O A-O-X-O F E D C B A O B-A-O-X-O A-O-X-O O-X-O AVOID(X,P) 40
96 Naive Poisoning Causes Transient Loss! Some ISPs may have working paths that avoid problem ISP X! Naively, poisoning causes path exploration even for these ISPs! Path exploration causes transient loss B-A-O-X-O E-D-A-O B-A-O-X-O E-D-A-O D-A-O-X-O F-B-A-O D-A-O-X-O F-B-A-O A-O-X-O F E D C B A O B-A-O-X-O A-O-X-O O-X-O AVOID(X,P) 41
97 Naive Poisoning Causes Transient Loss! Some ISPs may have working paths that avoid problem ISP X! Naively, poisoning causes path exploration even for these ISPs! Path exploration causes transient loss B-A-O-X-O E-D-A-O B-A-O-X-O E-D-A-O D-A-O-X-O F-B-A-O D-A-O-X-O F-B-A-O A-O-X-O F E D C B A O B-A-O-X-O A-O-X-O O-X-O AVOID(X,P) 42
98 Naive Poisoning Causes Transient Loss! Some ISPs may have working paths that avoid problem ISP X! Naively, poisoning causes path exploration even for these ISPs! Path exploration causes transient loss B-A-O-X-O E-D-A-O B-A-O-X-O E-D-A-O D-A-O-X-O F-B-A-O D-A-O-X-O F-B-A-O A-O-X-O F E D C B A O B-A-O-X-O A-O-X-O O-X-O AVOID(X,P) 43
99 Naive Poisoning Causes Transient Loss! Some ISPs may have working paths that avoid problem ISP X! Naively, poisoning causes path exploration even for these ISPs! Path exploration causes transient loss B-A-O-X-O E-D-A-O-X-O D-A-O-X-O F-B-A-O-X-O A-O-X-O F E D C B A O B-A-O-X-O A-O-X-O O-X-O AVOID(X,P) 44
100 Prepend to Reduce Path Exploration! Most routing decisions based on: (1) next hop ISP (2) path length! Keep these fixed to speed convergence! Prepending prepares ISPs for later poison B-A-O-O-O E-D-A-O-O-O D-A-O-O-O F-B-A-O-O-O A-O-O-O F E D C B A O B-A-O-O-O A-O-O-O O-O-O AVOID(X,P) 45
101 Prepend to Reduce Path Exploration! Most routing decisions based on: (1) next hop ISP (2) path length! Keep these fixed to speed convergence! Prepending prepares ISPs for later poison B-A-O-O-O E-D-A-O-O-O D-A-O-O-O F-B-A-O-O-O A-O-O-O F E D C B A O B-A-O-O-O A-O-O-O O-O-O O-X-O AVOID(X,P) 46
102 Prepend to Reduce Path Exploration! Most routing decisions based on: (1) next hop ISP (2) path length! Keep these fixed to speed convergence! Prepending prepares ISPs for later poison B-A-O-O-O E-D-A-O-O-O D-A-O-O-O F-B-A-O-O-O A-O-O-O A-O-X-O F E D C B A O B-A-O-O-O A-O-X-O A-O-O-O O-O-O O-X-O AVOID(X,P) 47
103 Prepend to Reduce Path Exploration! Most routing decisions based on: (1) next hop ISP (2) path length! Keep these fixed to speed convergence! Prepending prepares ISPs for later poison B-A-O-X-O E-D-A-O-O-O D-A-O-X-O F-B-A-O-O-O A-O-X-O F E D C B A O B-A-O-X-O A-O-X-O O-X-O AVOID(X,P) 48
104 Prepend to Reduce Path Exploration! Most routing decisions based on: (1) next hop ISP (2) path length! Keep these fixed to speed convergence! Prepending prepares ISPs for later poison B-A-O-X-O E-D-A-O-X-O D-A-O-X-O F-B-A-O-X-O A-O-X-O F E D C B A O B-A-O-X-O A-O-X-O O-X-O AVOID(X,P) 49
105 Prepending Speeds Convergence Cumulative Fraction of Convergences (CDF) Prepend, no change No prepend, no change Peer Convergence Time (minutes)! With no prepend, only 65% of unaffected ISPs converge instantly! With prepending, 95% of unaffected ISPs re-converge instantly, 98%<1/2 min.! Also speeds convergence to new paths for affected peers 50
106 Conclusion! We increasingly depend on the Internet, but availability lags! Much of Internet unavailability due to long-lasting outages! LIFEGUARD: Let edge networks reroute around failures! Location challenge: Find problem, given unidirectional failures and tools that depend on connectivity! Use reverse traceroute, isolate directions, use historical view! Avoidance challenge: Reroute without participation of transit networks! BGP poisoning gives control to the destination! Well-crafted announcements ease concerns 51
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