HITRAC Hurricane Sandy Support

Transcription

1 HITRAC Hurricane Sandy Support Richard Alt Branch Chief Department of Homeland Security Operational Integration Branch Homeland Infrastructure Threat & Risk Analysis Center Office of Infrastructure Protection 1

2 Overview HITRAC mobilized to provide actionable analysis for decision makers, before, during and after Hurricane Sandy HITRAC operated 24/7 to provide impact analysis, high fidelity consequence modeling, and infrastructure protection priorities. HITRAC produced d over 20 analytical l timely, authoritative ti products and updates, which were disseminated to its Federal, State, and local partners. 2

3 Hurricane Sandy Analysis Before and during Hurricane Sandy, HITRAC produced: Infrastructure of Concern List (IOC): HITRAC provided incidentspecific lists of prioritized critical infrastructure in the affected region. During the course of Hurricane Sandy, the IOC list was updated based on the evolving situation to help the Protective Security Advisors and others involved in response (including FEMA) to better prioritize restoration efforts. Infrastructure Impact Summaries (IIS): HITRAC produced snapshots of the most likely affected critical infrastructure sectors and the likely severity of impacts based on Hurricane Sandy s path. During the course of the storm, the IIS were updated several times to provide leadership with a stoplight format and to focus efforts on the highest priority. 3

4 Hurricane Sandy Analysis (cont.) In Response to Your Question (IRQs): During the course of our response, HITRAC handled many questions from DHS on the likelihood of impact to critical infrastructure and impact affecting restoration efforts. For instance, HITRAC analysis in advance of the storm included impact of closures of New Jersey petroleum infrastructure and impacts to dams and nuclear power plants. Infrastructure Impact Assessments (IIAs): HITRAC provided assessment predicting the impact to critical infrastructure before Hurricane Sandy made landfall. This included an analysis of storm surge and impact to low-lying areas/critical infrastructure. 4

5 Recovery Operations Post-Hurricane Sandy, HITRAC: Continued to produce modeling on the cascading impacts from fuel shortages in the wake of Hurricane Sandy. Provided leadership with analysis of the impacts of closures of New Jersey fuel terminals and petroleum pipelines, New Jersey/New York port damage, and supported prioritization of fuel distribution for backup power generation at specific critical infrastructure facilities. HITRAC also produced: Critical Infrastructure Restoration Report (CIRR): The CIRR assessed possible impacts to critical infrastructure, including cascading effects and long-term implications from the flooding and electric power outages in the State of New Jersey. HITRAC s assessment looked at dependencies and interdependencies affecting recovery and restoration activities following the storm s passage. 5

6 Recovery Operations (cont.) Post-Hurricane Sandy Collaboration: HITRAC also supported the President s s Energy Task Force coordinated by FEMA, and provided analysis on infrastructure restoration priorities. HITRAC deployed a liaison to the United States Coast Guard to coordinate efforts on the impact to the Port of New York and New Jersey. 6

7 Joint Field Office Operations HITRAC deployed personnel supporting the New Jersey Joint Field Office and New York Joint Field Office. The two senior HITRAC representatives provided critical infrastructure analysis capabilities and support to FEMA s Infrastructure Systems Recovery Support Function as part of the National Disaster Recovery Framework in response to Hurricane Sandy. 7

8 Post-Sandy Considerations Supplementary Power Sources Pre-Hurricane Sandy Planning: Federal government planners considered the box checked if a critical infrastructure site had supplementary electrical power generation in place (e.g. generators on site) 8

9 Post-Sandy Considerations (cont). Post-Hurricane Sandy Planning Now Considers: Where are supplementary power generators stored? Oftentimes on garage bottom floors that can flood. Do owner/operators have existing refueling and repair contracts in place? How does the Federal government communicate with critical infrastructure owner/operators to assist with refueling issues when roads are restricted? Can the Federal government assist when on site generators fail for strategically important facilities? Can the Federal government assist with communication avenues to put private electrical generation companies in contact with owner/operators? 9