Secure Multi-party Computation
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1 Secure Multi-party Computation What it is, and why you d care Manoj Prabhakaran University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
2 SMC
3 SMC SMC conceived more than 30 years back
4 SMC SMC conceived more than 30 years back A very general concept that subsumes the bulk of theoretical cryptography
5 SMC SMC conceived more than 30 years back A very general concept that subsumes the bulk of theoretical cryptography Largely a well-kept secret
6 SMC: the question
7 SMC: the question Collaboration without trust?
8 SMC: the question Collaboration without trust? Collaboration: compute on collective data belonging to different parties
9 SMC: the question Collaboration without trust? Collaboration: compute on collective data belonging to different parties e.g. query with me, database with you
10 SMC: the question Collaboration without trust? Collaboration: compute on collective data belonging to different parties e.g. query with me, database with you e.g. query with me, encrypted database with you, key with someone else
11 SMC: the question Collaboration without trust? Collaboration: compute on collective data belonging to different parties e.g. query with me, database with you e.g. query with me, encrypted database with you, key with someone else Goal: Nothing should be revealed beyond the result
12 SMC: the question Collaboration without trust? Collaboration: compute on collective data belonging to different parties e.g. query with me, database with you e.g. query with me, encrypted database with you, key with someone else Goal: Nothing should be revealed beyond the result Ideally : Use a trusted third party
13 SMC: the question Collaboration without trust? Collaboration: compute on collective data belonging to different parties e.g. query with me, database with you e.g. query with me, encrypted database with you, key with someone else Goal: Nothing should be revealed beyond the result Ideally : Use a trusted third party Really : Can t agree on a trusted party. So...
14 SMC: the answer
15 SMC: the answer SMC protocol: among mutually distrusting parties, to emulate the presence of a globally trusted party
16 SMC: the answer SMC protocol: among mutually distrusting parties, to emulate the presence of a globally trusted party Numerous protocols in literature for various functionalities, in various settings
17 SMC: the answer SMC protocol: among mutually distrusting parties, to emulate the presence of a globally trusted party Numerous protocols in literature for various functionalities, in various settings Tools: Verifiable secret-sharing, homomorphic encryptions, commitments, ZK proofs, oblivious transfer,...
18 SMC: the answer SMC protocol: among mutually distrusting parties, to emulate the presence of a globally trusted party Numerous protocols in literature for various functionalities, in various settings Tools: Verifiable secret-sharing, homomorphic encryptions, commitments, ZK proofs, oblivious transfer,... Simpler protocols if some trust already present
19 SMC: the answer SMC protocol: among mutually distrusting parties, to emulate the presence of a globally trusted party Numerous protocols in literature for various functionalities, in various settings Tools: Verifiable secret-sharing, homomorphic encryptions, commitments, ZK proofs, oblivious transfer,... Simpler protocols if some trust already present Honest-but-curious
20 SMC: the answer SMC protocol: among mutually distrusting parties, to emulate the presence of a globally trusted party Numerous protocols in literature for various functionalities, in various settings Tools: Verifiable secret-sharing, homomorphic encryptions, commitments, ZK proofs, oblivious transfer,... Simpler protocols if some trust already present Honest-but-curious Honest-majority
21 SMC: the answer SMC protocol: among mutually distrusting parties, to emulate the presence of a globally trusted party Numerous protocols in literature for various functionalities, in various settings Tools: Verifiable secret-sharing, homomorphic encryptions, commitments, ZK proofs, oblivious transfer,... Simpler protocols if some trust already present Honest-but-curious Honest-majority Simple (offline) trusted sources
22 SMC in GENI?
23 SMC in GENI? Where privacy is needed
24 SMC in GENI? Where privacy is needed e.g. Measurement archives held by a virtual trusted party
25 SMC in GENI? Where privacy is needed e.g. Measurement archives held by a virtual trusted party Secure distributed storage and computation (secure unless all servers corrupt)
26 SMC in GENI? Where privacy is needed e.g. Measurement archives held by a virtual trusted party Secure distributed storage and computation (secure unless all servers corrupt) May use honest majority in a federation
27 SMC in GENI? Where privacy is needed e.g. Measurement archives held by a virtual trusted party Secure distributed storage and computation (secure unless all servers corrupt) May use honest majority in a federation Provide SMC as an experiment support service?
28 SMC in GENI? Where privacy is needed e.g. Measurement archives held by a virtual trusted party Secure distributed storage and computation (secure unless all servers corrupt) May use honest majority in a federation Provide SMC as an experiment support service? SMC offers a whole range of novel applications
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