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1 Home Projects Qualys.com Contact You are here: Home > Projects > SSL Server Test > SSL Report: ( ) Assessed on: Mon, 10 Oct :55:41 UTC Hide Clear cache Scan Another» Summary Overall Rating Certificate A+ Protocol Support Key Exchange Cipher Strength Visit our documentation page for more information, configuration guides, and books. Known issues are documented here. HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) with long duration deployed on this server. MORE INFO» Authentication Server Key and Certificate #1 Common names Alternative names Valid from Mon, 10 Oct :00:00 UTC Tue, 10 Oct :59:59 UTC (expires in 1 year) Weak key (Debian) Extended Validation Certificate Transparency OCSP Must Staple Revocation information Revocation status Trusted AIA: SHA256withRSA CRL, OCSP CRL: rsa.org/incommonrsaserverca.crl OCSP: Good (not revoked) Additional Certificates (if supplied) Certificates provided Chain issues 4 (5445 bytes) Incorrect order, Contains anchor #2 1/5
2 Additional Certification Certificates Paths (if supplied) AddTrust External CA Root In trust store Fingerprint SHA1: 02faf3e df5e45b Pin SHA256: lcppfqbkrlj3ecvfakeip0+44vaojuymbnoaeuk7teu= Sat, 30 May :48:38 UTC (expires in 3 years and 7 months) AddTrust External CA Root Self signed SHA1withRSA Weak, but no impact on root certificate #3 Fingerprint SHA1: eab040689a0d805b5d6fd654fc168cff00b78be3 Sat, 30 May :48:38 UTC (expires in 3 years and 7 months) Key RSA 4096 bits (e 65537) AddTrust External CA Root SHA384withRSA #4 Sat, 05 Oct :59:59 UTC (expires in 7 years and 11 months) SHA384withRSA Certification Paths Path #1: Trusted 1 Sent by server 2 Sent by server 3 In trust store RSA 2048 bits (e 65537) / SHA256withRSA RSA 2048 bits (e 65537) / SHA384withRSA Self signed Fingerprint SHA1: 2b8f1b57330dbba2d07a6c51f70ee90ddab9ad8e RSA 4096 bits (e 65537) / SHA384withRSA Path #2: Trusted 1 Sent by server 2 Sent by server 3 Sent by server RSA 2048 bits (e 65537) / SHA256withRSA RSA 2048 bits (e 65537) / SHA384withRSA Fingerprint SHA1: eab040689a0d805b5d6fd654fc168cff00b78be3 RSA 4096 bits (e 65537) / SHA384withRSA 4 Sent by server In trust store AddTrust External CA Root Self signed Fingerprint SHA1: 02faf3e df5e45b Pin SHA256: lcppfqbkrlj3ecvfakeip0+44vaojuymbnoaeuk7teu= RSA 2048 bits (e 65537) / SHA1withRSA Weak or insecure signature, but no impact on root certificate 2/5
3 Protocols Cipher Handshake Suites Simulation (SSL 3+ suites in server preferred order; deprecated and SSL 2 suites at the end) Configuration Protocols TLS 1.2 TLS 1.1 TLS 1.0 SSL 3 SSL 2 Cipher Suites (SSL 3+ suites in server preferred order; deprecated and SSL 2 suites at the end) TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02f) ECDH secp256r1 (eq bits RSA) FS 128 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xc030) ECDH secp256r1 (eq bits RSA) FS 256 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (0xc027) ECDH secp256r1 (eq bits RSA) FS 128 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0xc013) ECDH secp256r1 (eq bits RSA) FS 128 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 (0xc028) ECDH secp256r1 (eq bits RSA) FS 256 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0xc014) ECDH secp256r1 (eq bits RSA) FS 256 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x9c) 128 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0x9d) 256 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (0x3c) 128 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 (0x3d) 256 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x2f) 128 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x35) 256 TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA (0x84) 256 TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA (0x41) 128 TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (0xa) 112 Handshake Simulation Android SNI 2 RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.0 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA FS Android RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.0 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ECDH secp256r1 FS Android RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.0 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ECDH secp256r1 FS Android RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.0 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ECDH secp256r1 FS Android 4.3 RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.0 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ECDH secp256r1 FS Android RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDH secp256r1 FS Android RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDH secp256r1 FS Android 6.0 RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.2 > spdy/3.1 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDH secp256r1 FS Baidu Jan 2015 RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.0 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ECDH secp256r1 FS BingPreview Jan 2015 RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDH secp256r1 FS Chrome 51 / Win 7 R RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.2 > h2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDH secp256r1 FS Firefox ESR / Win 7 RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDH secp256r1 FS Firefox 46 / Win 7 R RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.2 > h2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDH secp256r1 FS Firefox 47 / Win 7 R RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.2 > h2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDH secp256r1 FS Googlebot Feb 2015 RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDH secp256r1 FS IE 6 / XP FS 1 SNI 2 Server closed connection IE 7 / Vista RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.0 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ECDH secp256r1 FS IE 8 / XP FS 1 SNI 2 RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.0 TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA IE 8 10 / Win 7 R RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.0 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ECDH secp256r1 FS IE 11 / Win 7 R RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ECDH secp256r1 FS IE 11 / Win 8.1 R RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.2 > http/1.1 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ECDH secp256r1 FS IE 10 / Win Phone 8.0 RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.0 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ECDH secp256r1 FS IE 11 / Win Phone 8.1 R RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.2 > http/1.1 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ECDH secp256r1 FS 3/5
4 Handshake Protocol Details Simulation IE 11 / Win Phone 8.1 Update R RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.2 > http/1.1 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ECDH secp256r1 FS IE 11 / Win 10 R RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.2 > h2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDH secp256r1 FS Edge 13 / Win 10 R RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.2 > h2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDH secp256r1 FS Edge 13 / Win Phone 10 R RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.2 > h2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDH secp256r1 FS Java 6u45 SNI 2 RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.0 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA FS Java 7u25 RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.0 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ECDH secp256r1 FS Java 8u31 RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDH secp256r1 FS OpenSSL 0.9.8y RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.0 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA FS OpenSSL 1.0.1l R RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDH secp256r1 FS OpenSSL 1.0.2e R RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDH secp256r1 FS Safari / OS X RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.0 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ECDH secp256r1 FS Safari 6 / ios R RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ECDH secp256r1 FS Safari / OS X R RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.0 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ECDH secp256r1 FS Safari 7 / ios 7.1 R RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ECDH secp256r1 FS Safari 7 / OS X 10.9 R RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ECDH secp256r1 FS Safari 8 / ios 8.4 R RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.2 > spdy/3.1 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ECDH secp256r1 FS Safari 8 / OS X R RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.2 > spdy/3.1 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ECDH secp256r1 FS Safari 9 / ios 9 R RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.2 > h2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDH secp256r1 FS Safari 9 / OS X R RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.2 > h2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDH secp256r1 FS Apple ATS 9 / ios 9 R RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.2 > h2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDH secp256r1 FS Yahoo Slurp Jan 2015 RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDH secp256r1 FS YandexBot Jan 2015 RSA 2048 (SHA256) TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDH secp256r1 FS (1) Clients that do not support Forward Secrecy (FS) are excluded when determining support for it. (2) support for virtual SSL hosting (SNI). Connects to the default site if the server uses SNI. (3) Only first connection attempt simulated. Browsers sometimes retry with a lower protocol version. (R) Denotes a reference browser or client, with which we expect better effective security. (All) We use defaults, but some platforms do not use their best protocols and features (e.g., Java 6 & 7, older IE). Protocol Details DROWN (experimental) Secure Renegotiation Secure Client Initiated Renegotiation Insecure Client Initiated Renegotiation BEAST attack POODLE (SSLv3) POODLE (TLS) Downgrade attack prevention SSL/TLS compression RC4 Heartbeat (extension) Heartbleed (vulnerability) OpenSSL CCS vuln. (CVE ) OpenSSL Padding Oracle vuln. (CVE ) Forward Secrecy ALPN NPN Session resumption (caching) Session resumption (tickets) OCSP stapling, server keys and hostname not seen elsewhere with SSLv2 (1) For a better understanding of this test, please read this longer explanation (2) Key usage data kindly provided by the Censys network search engine; original DROWN test here (3) Censys data is only indicative of possible key and certificate reuse; possibly out of date and not complete Supported t mitigated server side (more info) TLS 1.0: 0xc013, SSL 3 not supported (more info) (more info), TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV supported (more info) (more info) (more info) (more info) With modern browsers (more info) h2 spdy/3.1 http/ /5
5 Protocol Miscellaneous Details Strict Transport Security (HSTS) HSTS Preloading Public Key Pinning (HPKP) Public Key Pinning Report Only Long handshake intolerance TLS extension intolerance TLS version intolerance Incorrect SNI alerts Uses common DH primes DH public server param (Ys) reuse SSL 2 handshake compatibility max age= ; includesubdomains; preload t in: Chrome Edge Firefox IE Tor, DHE suites not supported, DHE suites not supported Miscellaneous Test date Test duration Mon, 10 Oct :54:07 UTC seconds HTTP status code 200 HTTP server signature Server hostname nginx/ SSL Report v Copyright Qualys, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms and Conditions 5/5
SSL Report: printware.co.uk ( )
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