A Security Analysis of the Precise Time Protocol
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1 A Security Analysis of the Precise Time Protocol Jeanette Tsang & Konstantin Beznosov December 5, 2006 Laboratory for Education and Research in Secure Systems Engineering (LERSSE) University of British Columbia
2 Outline 1. Work objectives 2. Assumptions 3. Discussion of Best Master Clock (BMC) attack 4. Results summary 5. Conclusion A Security Analysis of the Precise Time Protocol 2
3 Work Objectives 1. Identify generic security vulnerabilities 2. Identify PTP-specific vulnerabilities 3. Suggest countermeasures A Security Analysis of the Precise Time Protocol 3
4 Assumptions 1. Closed network i.e., no direct or indirect connections with the Internet 2. Insiders can mount passive & active attacks i.e., remove, modify, and inject messages 3. No IP-level data protection e.g., IPSec A Security Analysis of the Precise Time Protocol 4
5 Sample Run of the PTP Protocol Master Clock Slave Clock Record precise sending time Sync message: estimated sending time Follow_Up message: precise sending time of Sync Calculate offset A Security Analysis of the Precise Time Protocol 5
6 Attacks
7 Types of Attacks Identified 1. Modification 2. Masquerading 3. Delay 4. Replay 5. Denial of service A Security Analysis of the Precise Time Protocol 7
8 Attack 1: How to Masquerade as the Master Clock Two ways: 1) Impersonate Current Master Clock Steal current master clock identity 2) Switch the slave clock to the rogue master clock Win the Best Master Clock (BMC) election A Security Analysis of the Precise Time Protocol 8
9 How to Win Best Master Clock (BMC) Election (1/4) Sync message Legitimate Master 1. Snoop Grandmaster clock information sequenceid Uuid, etc. Rogue Master Victim Slave A Security Analysis of the Precise Time Protocol 9
10 How to Win BMC Election (2/4) 2. Send best Sync message to the slave clock Rogue Master Victim Slave A Security Analysis of the Precise Time Protocol 10
11 How to Win BMC Election (3/4) 3. Victim slave clock runs BMC and picks the rogue master Rogue Master Victim Slave A Security Analysis of the Precise Time Protocol 11
12 How to Win BMC Election (4/4) 4. Victim slave switches to the Rogue Master Rogue Master Victim Slave A Security Analysis of the Precise Time Protocol 12
13 Sample PTP Network Grandmaster Clock (GMC) Slave A1 Slave A2 Boundary Clock (Master) Boundary Clock (Slave) ETHERNET NETWORK 1 Boundary Clock (Slave) Port 1 Port 1 Switching Device A Port 2 ETHERNET NETWORK 2 Boundary Clock (Master) Boundary Clock (Master) Slave B1 Slave B2 Port 2 Port 3 Switching Device B A Security Analysis of the Precise Time Protocol 13
14 Attack 2: Depriving slave from synchronization Ways to attack: 1. Block sync messages Congestion Removal 2. Make victim slave to discard good sync messages Sync message modification Illegal update of sequenceid A Security Analysis of the Precise Time Protocol 14
15 Attack 2: Illegal update of sequenceid (1/4) Last sync sequenceid = 100 Sync Message sequenceid = 200 Rogue Master Victim Slave Current Master A Security Analysis of the Precise Time Protocol 15
16 Attack 2: Illegal update of sequenceid (2/4) Update last sync sequenceid 200 Rogue Master Victim Slave Current Master A Security Analysis of the Precise Time Protocol 16
17 Attack 2: Illegal update of sequenceid (3/4) Last sync sequenceid = 200 Sync Message sequenceid = 101 Rogue Master Victim Slave Current Master A Security Analysis of the Precise Time Protocol 17
18 Attack 2: Illegal update of sequenceid (4/4) Last sync sequenceid = sequenceid = 300 sequenceid = 400 Cannot keep up Rogue Master Victim Slave Current Master A Security Analysis of the Precise Time Protocol 18
19 Attack Type Effects Countermeasures Would IPsec help to counter this attack type? Modification Denial of Service Incorrect resynchronization Cryptographic integrity protection Yes Changing clock hierarchy Masquerading resynchronization Centralized or chained authentication mechanism No Delay Delay in timing messages Timeout of synchronization process Increase in offset calculation Algorithm to detect abnormal timestamp Back up plan using previous timing records Yes Replay Disturbance of message sequence Authentication mechanism Yes Saturate process queue Tunneled connection Congest network paths Denial of Service Small-scaled: Affect accuracy of synchronization Big-scaled: Put halt on the whole PTP system Physical protection Pay precautions to other malicious attacks Monitor traffic No A Security Analysis of the Precise Time Protocol 19
20 Conclusions Could not ensure integrity of messages and authenticity of sender Analyzed five types of attacks Incorrectly resynchronize clocks Rearrange or disrupt hierarchy Bring protocol participants into an inconsistent state Deprive victim slave clocks from synchronization in ways undetectable by generic network intrusion detection systems Proposed countermeasures for the identified attacks A Security Analysis of the Precise Time Protocol 20
21 More information available on lersse.ece.ubc.ca A Security Analysis of the Precise Time Protocol 21
A Security Analysis of the Precise Time Protocol
A Security Analysis of the Precise Time Protocol Jeanette Tsang and Konstantin Beznosov Laboratory for Education and Research in Secure Systems Engineering lersse.ece.ubc.ca University of British Columbia
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