Prevent DoS using IP source address spoofing
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1 Prevent DoS using IP source address spoofing MATSUZAKI maz Yoshinobu 06-Sep-2006 Copyright (C) 2006 Internet Initiative Japan Inc. 1
2 ip spoofing creation of IP packets with source addresses other than those assigned to that host 06-Sep-2006 Copyright (C) 2006 Internet Initiative Japan Inc. 2
3 Malicious uses with IP spoofing impersonation session hijack or reset hiding flooding attack reflection ip reflected attack 06-Sep-2006 Copyright (C) 2006 Internet Initiative Japan Inc. 3
4 impersonation sender ip spoofed packet src: partner dst: victim partner Oh, my partner sent me a packet. I!"l process this. victim 06-Sep-2006 Copyright (C) 2006 Internet Initiative Japan Inc. 4
5 hiding sender src: random dst: victim ip spoofed packet Oops, many packets are coming. But, who is the real source? victim 06-Sep-2006 Copyright (C) 2006 Internet Initiative Japan Inc. 5
6 reflection sender ip spoofed packet src: victim dst: reflector reflector reply packet src: reflector dst: victim Oops, a lot of replies without any request victim 06-Sep-2006 Copyright (C) 2006 Internet Initiative Japan Inc. 6
7 ip reflected attacks smurf attacks icmp echo (ping) ip spoofing(reflection) amplification(multiple replies) dns amplification attacks dns query ip spoofing(reflection) amplification(bigger reply/multiple replies) 06-Sep-2006 Copyright (C) 2006 Internet Initiative Japan Inc. 7
8 amplification 1. multiple replies Sender 2. bigger reply Sender 06-Sep-2006 Copyright (C) 2006 Internet Initiative Japan Inc. 8
9 ip reflected attacks attacker ip spoofed packets open amplifier replies victim 06-Sep-2006 Copyright (C) 2006 Internet Initiative Japan Inc. 9
10 smurf attack ip spoofed ping Attacker ICMP echo replies victim 06-Sep-2006 Copyright (C) 2006 Internet Initiative Japan Inc. 10
11 dns amplification attack Attacker ip spoofed DNS queries DNS DNS DNS DNS DNS replies victim 06-Sep-2006 Copyright (C) 2006 Internet Initiative Japan Inc. 11
12 relations dns amp attack DNS root-servers Command&Control stub-resolvers DNS full-resolvers DNS DNS IP spoofed DNS queries tld-servers DNS example-servers botnet victim 06-Sep-2006 Copyright (C) 2006 Internet Initiative Japan Inc. 12
13 solutions for ip reflected attacks attacker ip spoofed packets open amplifier prevent ip spoofing replies disable open amplifiers victim 06-Sep-2006 Copyright (C) 2006 Internet Initiative Japan Inc. 13
14 two solutions disable open amplifier disable directed-broadcast disable open recursive DNS server contents DNS server should accept queries from everyone, but service of resolver (cache) DNS server should be restricted to its customer. prevent ip spoofing!! source address validation BCP38 & BCP84 06-Sep-2006 Copyright (C) 2006 Internet Initiative Japan Inc. 14
15 Source Address Validation Check the source ip address of ip packets filter invalid source address filter close to the packets orign as possible filter precisely as possible If no networks allow ip spoofing, we can eliminate these kinds of attacks 06-Sep-2006 Copyright (C) 2006 Internet Initiative Japan Inc. 15
16 close to the origin You are spoofing!! RT.a srcip: You are spoofing! srcip: RT.b! You are spoofing!! srcip: /23 Hmm, this looks ok...but.. srcip: srcip: You are spoofing!!! You are spoofing! /24 srcip: we can check and drop the packets which have unused address everywhere, but used space can be checked before aggregation 06-Sep-2006 Copyright (C) 2006 Internet Initiative Japan Inc. 16
17 how to configure the checking ACL packet filter permit valid-source, then drop any urpf check check incoming packets using routing table look-up the return path for the source ip address loose mode can t stop ip reflected attacks use strict mode or feasible mode 06-Sep-2006 Copyright (C) 2006 Internet Initiative Japan Inc. 17
18 cisco ACL example ISP Edge Router point-to-point /30 ip access-list extended fromcustmer permit ip any permit ip any deny ip any any! interface Gigabitethernet0/0 ip access-group fromcustomer in! customer network /24 06-Sep-2006 Copyright (C) 2006 Internet Initiative Japan Inc. 18
19 juniper ACL example point-to-point /30 ISP Edge Router customer network /24 firewall family inet { filter fromcustomer { term CUSTOMER { from source-address { /16; /30; } then accept; } term Default { then discard; } } } [edit interface ge-0/0/0 unit 0 family inet] filter { input fromcustomer; } 06-Sep-2006 Copyright (C) 2006 Internet Initiative Japan Inc. 19
20 cisco urpf example ISP Edge Router point-to-point /30 interface Gigabitethernet0/0 ip verify unicast source reachable-via rx customer network /24 06-Sep-2006 Copyright (C) 2006 Internet Initiative Japan Inc. 20
21 juniper urpf example ISP Edge Router point-to-point /30 [edit interface ge-0/0/0 unit 0 family inet] rpf-check; customer network /24 06-Sep-2006 Copyright (C) 2006 Internet Initiative Japan Inc. 21
22 IIJ s policy peer ISP upstream ISP IIJ/AS2497 customer ISP single homed static customer multi homed static customer urpf strict mode urpf loose mode 06-Sep-2006 Copyright (C) 2006 Internet Initiative Japan Inc. 22
23 ACL and urpf ACL deterministic! statically configured maintenance of access-list " urpf easy to configure! care about asymmetric routing " strict mode is working well only for symmetric routing loose mode can t stop the ip reflected attack there is no good implementation of feasible mode 06-Sep-2006 Copyright (C) 2006 Internet Initiative Japan Inc. 23
24 END 06-Sep-2006 Copyright (C) 2006 Internet Initiative Japan Inc. 24
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