DNS Privacy Clients. Stubby, Mobile apps and beyond! dnsprivacy.org

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1 DNS Privacy Clients Stubby, Mobile apps and beyond! dnsprivacy.org Sara Dickinson Allison Mankin Willem Toorop OARC 27 San Jose, Sep 2017

2 Overview What do we mean here by DNS Privacy? What clients support DNS Privacy today? Comparison of features Shameless plug for Stubby Wish list 2

3 FUNCTIONALITY DNS Privacy (stub to recursive) Concentrate on DNS-over-TLS (RFC7858) No implementations of DNS-over-DTLS (RFC8094) DNSCrypt not standard, HTTPS, QUIC Good TCP (RFC7766, RFC7828) Pipeline queries over persistent connections, handle OOOR, TCP Fast open, etc. Good TLS (RFC7525, TLS 1.2, Session resumption) 3

4 FUNCTIONALITY DNS Privacy (stub to recursive) EDNS0 Padding to hide msg size (RFC7830, draft) EDNS0 Client Subnet (to prevent ECS upstream) TLS authentication of server (draft-tls-profiles) Authentication name/spki pinset DANE, TLS DNSSEC Chain Extension Strict vs Opportunistic Usage profile 4

5 Authentication in FUNCTIONALITY DNS-over-TLS Profiles draft defines 2 Usage profiles: Strict Do or do not. There is no try. Opportunistic Success is stumbling from failure to failure with no loss of enthusiasm 5

6 Authentication in FUNCTIONALITY DNS-over-TLS Profiles draft defines 2 Usage profiles: Strict (Encrypt & Authenticate) or Nothing Do or do not. There is no try. Opportunistic Success is stumbling from failure to failure with no loss of enthusiasm 5

7 Authentication in FUNCTIONALITY DNS-over-TLS Profiles draft defines 2 Usage profiles: Strict (Encrypt & Authenticate) or Nothing Do or do not. There is no try. Opportunistic Success is stumbling from failure to failure with no loss of enthusiasm Try in order: 1. Encrypt & Authenticate then 2. Encrypt then 3. Clear text 5

8 USABILITY DNS Privacy Client Usability DNS Privacy is a new paradigm for end users End users are a new paradigm for DNS people! 6

9 USABILITY DNS Privacy Client Usability DNS Privacy is a new paradigm for end users End users are a new paradigm for DNS people! Uptake critically dependant on clients being usable Usable Security : Good GUIs aren t enough - users still struggle with the basics if they don t understand what they are doing (DNSSEC, HTTPS, PGP) 6

10 Flavours of client Desktop system resolvers Command line tools/libraries/forwarders Mobile DISCLAIMER!! Not exhaustive, other DNS clients are available All data here are to the best of my knowledge! Please send corrections/updates/additions to 7

11 Desktop System resolvers TLS support Linux libc, systemd* macos Windows 8

12 Desktop System resolvers TLS support Linux libc, systemd* macos Windows But then again, think about DNSSEC support 8

13 STUB Command line tools Features getdns_query kdig delv (dig) drill DNS ECS privacy 9.12 TCP Pipelining OOOR Keepalive/DSO 9.12 TCP Fast Open 9.12 TLS TLS Authentication Strict vs Oppo EDNS0 Padding 9.12 Dark Green: Light Green: Yellow: Grey: Latest stable release supports this Patch available Patch/work in progress Not applicable or not yet planned 9

14 STUB Libraries Features getdns libknot libunbound ldns dnsmasq DNS TCP ECS Privacy Pipelining OOOR Keepalive/DSO TCP Fast Open TLS TLS Authentication Strict vs Oppo EDNS0 Padding Dark Green: Light Green: Yellow: Grey: Latest stable release supports this Patch available Patch/work in progress Not applicable or not yet planned 10

15 STUB Local forwarders Features stubby (getdns) Stub unbound proxy (stunnel) DNS TCP ECS Privacy Pipelining OOOR Keepalive/DSO TCP Fast Open TLS TLS Authentication Strict vs Oppo EDNS0 Padding Dark Green: Light Green: Yellow: Grey: Latest stable release supports this Patch available Patch/work in progress Not applicable or not yet planned 11

16 STUB Local forwarders Features stubby (getdns) Stub unbound proxy (stunnel) DNS TCP ECS Privacy Pipelining OOOR Keepalive/DSO TCP Fast Open TLS TLS Authentication Strict vs Oppo EDNS0 Padding Dark Green: Light Green: Yellow: Grey: Latest stable release supports this Patch available Patch/work in progress Not applicable or not yet planned 11 Knot resolver support coming soon!

17 Mobile Native support Apps Android IETF 99 Hackathon: WIP on Opportunistic DNS-over-TLS ios Work inprogress!! Wrapper around Stubby: dnsdisco.com, GitHub repo 12

18 CLIENTS Stubby A privacy enabling stub resolver: User Guide From getdns team, but is now a standalone application And a movie (Stg. Stubby movie) Daemon listening on localhost, TLS proxy Comes with config for experimental servers, including authentication information (Strict is easy) 13

19 CLIENTS Stubby status Command line tool - for advanced users 1.2 release: Stability improvements, YAML for config Linux Packages for getdns, not yet for Stubby macos: Homebrew formula for stubby service NEW! Windows binary NEW! macos: GUI prototype NEW! 14

20 CLIENTS Stubby status Command line tool - for advanced users 1.2 release: Stability improvements, YAML for config Linux Packages for getdns, not yet for Stubby macos: Homebrew formula for stubby service NEW! Windows binary macos: GUI prototype NEW! NEW! Funded by NLnet Foundation and Salesforce! 14

21 CLIENTS Subby GUI preview Prototype! HELP WANTED

22 RECURSIVE Experimental! Test DNS Privacy servers Details on dnsprivacy.org: DNS Test Servers

23 Wish list Windows support (targeting non-technical users) ios: Native support Large open resolver offering DNS-over-TLS Usable security research on DNS Privacy (NDSS 2018) More testing at IETF 100!! 17

24 Thank you! Any Questions? dnsprivacy.org 18

25 Additional slides

26 DNS Auth using DANE DNS Privacy client [DNSSEC] DNS Privacy server 1: Obtain a Auth Domain name & IP address (1a) Configure Auth domain name Do Opportunistic A lookup 20

27 DNS Auth using DANE DNS Privacy client [DNSSEC] DNS Privacy server 1: Obtain a Auth Domain name & IP address (1a) Configure Auth domain name Do Opportunistic A lookup 2a: Opportunistic lookup of DANE records for server Validate locally with DNSSEC 20

28 DNS Auth using DANE DNS Privacy client [DNSSEC] DNS Privacy server 1: Obtain a Auth Domain name & IP address (1a) Configure Auth domain name Do Opportunistic A lookup 2a: Opportunistic lookup of DANE records for server Validate locally with DNSSEC 20

29 DNS Auth using DANE DNS Privacy client [DNSSEC] TLS DNS Privacy server 1: Obtain a Auth Domain name & IP address (1a) Configure Auth domain name Do Opportunistic A lookup 2a: Opportunistic lookup of DANE records for server Validate locally with DNSSEC 20

30 DNS Auth using DANE DNS Privacy client [DNSSEC] TLS DNS Privacy server 1: Obtain a Auth Domain name & IP address (1a) Configure Auth domain name Do Opportunistic A lookup 2a: Opportunistic lookup of DANE records for server Validate locally with DNSSEC 20

31 TLS DNSSEC Chain Extension DNS Privacy client [DNSSEC] DNS Privacy server 1: Obtain a Auth Domain name & IP address (1a) Configure Auth domain name Do Opportunistic A lookup 21

32 TLS DNSSEC Chain Extension DNS Privacy client [DNSSEC] DNS Privacy server 1: Obtain a Auth Domain name & IP address 0 (or 2): Obtains DANE records for itself! (1a) Configure Auth domain name Do Opportunistic A lookup 21

33 TLS DNSSEC Chain Extension DNS Privacy client [DNSSEC] Client Hello: TLS DNSSEC Chain Ext DNS Privacy server 1: Obtain a Auth Domain name & IP address 0 (or 2): Obtains DANE records for itself! (1a) Configure Auth domain name Do Opportunistic A lookup 21

34 TLS DNSSEC Chain Extension DNS Privacy client [DNSSEC] Client Hello: TLS DNSSEC Chain Ext Server Hello: Server DANE records DNS Privacy server 1: Obtain a Auth Domain name & IP address 0 (or 2): Obtains DANE records for itself! (1a) Configure Auth domain name Do Opportunistic A lookup 21

35 TLS DNSSEC Chain Extension DNS Privacy client [DNSSEC] Client Hello: TLS DNSSEC Chain Ext Server Hello: Server DANE records DNS Privacy server 1: Obtain a Auth Domain name & IP address 0 (or 2): Obtains DANE records for itself! (1a) Configure Auth domain name Do Opportunistic A lookup 21

36 TLS DNSSEC Chain Extension DNS Privacy client [DNSSEC] Client Hello: TLS DNSSEC Chain Ext Server Hello: Server DANE records DNS Privacy server 1: Obtain a Auth Domain name & IP address 0 (or 2): Obtains DANE records for itself! (1a) Configure Auth domain name Do Opportunistic A lookup Reduces Latency Eliminates need for intermediate recursive 21

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