Background Traffic to Quarantined Network Blocks administered by APNIC
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1 Background Traffic to Quarantined Network Blocks administered by APNIC March 2011 Geoff Huston George Michaelson APNIC R&D APNIC is now regularly examining the unused state of IPv4 address blocks before they are passed over for general allocation. Experiments are undertaken with these address blocks by advertising a route to the address block, and recording all incoming traffic received in response to the routing advertisements. This document reports on the results of this experiment in the identification of the patterns of such "background" traffic that is being directed to various network blocks that are now being administered by APNIC that were previously identified by APNIC as receiving excessive levels of inbound traffic. The complete list of these network blocks is provided in Appendix A of this report. APNIC expresses its appreciation for the generous assistance provided by NTT Communications in undertaking this experiment. Experiment Details In collaboration with APNIC, AS38639 (NTT Communications) exclusively announced the set of networks listed in Appendix A for the period from 5 March 2011 until 15 March The data collector was unfiltered, and the data collection system was entirely passive, and no packets were generated in response to the incoming traffic. The following networks were NOT tested in the testing setup: / / / / / / / / / /24
2 Distribution of Traffic Across /16s Figure 1 Incoming traffic per /16 in reserved blocks The following figures shows the distribution of traffic across each of the /8 address blocks, divided up into /16 segments. Figure 2 Incoming traffic per /16 in reserved blocks of /8
3 Figure 3 Incoming traffic per /16 in reserved blocks of /8 Figure 4 Incoming traffic per /16 in reserved blocks of /8
4 Figure 5 Incoming traffic per /16 in reserved blocks of /8 Figure 6 Incoming traffic per /16 in reserved blocks of /8
5 Figure 7 Incoming traffic per /16 in reserved blocks of /8 "Busy" networks Using a threshold value of a average incoming traffic rate of more than 8Kbps per /24, corresponding to 32 bits per second per address, or approximately 1 packet on average every 24 seconds per address, then the following /24's exceed this level of traffic. Prefix Average Traffic / Kbps / Kbps / Kbps / Kbps / Kbps / Kbps / Kbps / Kbps / Kbps / Kbps / Kbps / Kbps / Kbps / Kbps / Kbps / Kbps / Kbps / Kbps / Kbps / Kbps / Kbps / Kbps / Kbps / Kbps / Kbps / Kbps Table 3 Traffic profile for high traffic /24s in the ERX blocks
6 Conclusions The following network blocks should continue be withheld from allocation at present, and rechecked in 3 months time, unless the identified source of the unwanted traffic can be isolated and switched off / / / / / / / / / /24 The following network blocks can be returned to the free pool: / intermittent high volume bursts of SNMP query traffic from /16 The following /32s should be noted as a potential problem, and should not be assigned to end customers. These addresses are attracting a high level of incoming Teredo and 6to4 connection attempts: / / / UDP traffic from addressed to UDP port UDP traffic from addressed to UDP port UDP traffic from , addressed to UDP port UDP traffic from , addressed to UDP port UDP traffic from addresses to UDP port UDP traffic from addresses to UDP port UDP traffic from addressed to UDP port UDP traffic from addressed to UDP port / UDP traffic from various sources in /16 addressed to UDP port /16
7 TCP SYN traffic from various sources TCP SYN traffic from various sources / / / There is a significant proportion of SIP traffic directed to this address, from various sources There is a significant component here of Teredo ICMP6 packets being sent to the equivalent 6to4 IPv6 address of this address, all encapsulated in IPv4 protocol 41 (IPv6-in-IPv4). The teredo packets have a diverse set of IPv4 end addresses in the Teredo packet ICMP backscatter from source address spoofing of Various sources sending to UDP port / There is a significant proportion of UDP traffic from , UDP source port directed to port There is a stream of TCP SYN packets from the single source address directed to port This is a single stream of SYSLOG packets from , possibly due to some form of malconfiguration / / / / / / / There is a significant proportion of UDP traffic from various sources directed to UDP port 4567 at this address / There is a significant proportion of UDP traffic from various sources to directed to UDP port 4605 at this address / / / /24
8 There is a significant proportion of UDP traffic from various sources to directed to UDP port 4605 at this address There is a significant proportion of UDP NetBIOS traffic from 20 sources to directed to this address / / / There is a significant proportion of TCP SYN traffic from various sources directed to TCP Port at this address / There is a significant proportion of UDP traffic from various sources directed to Port at this address This network receives a significant flow of TCP SYN packets from various sources directed to port This network receives a significant flow of TCP SYN packets from various sources directed to port This network receives a significant flow of TCP SYN packets from various sources directed to port This network receives a significant flow of TCP SYN packets from various sources directed to port / / / / / / There is a significant proportion of UDP traffic from various sources directed to various UDP ports at this address / / / There is a single stream of 1416 octet UDP packets being sent from , UDP port 9912 to , UDP port / / / / / /16
9 / / / There is a single stream of UDP packets being sent from , UDP port 1199 to UDP port This address is also attracting DNS query traffic to UDP port 53 from various sources There is a single stream of SYN+ACK packets being sent from , which may be in response to source-spoofed TCP SYN packets being sent to this address. This address is also attracting DNS query traffic to UDP port 53 from various sources There is a stream of NetBIOS UDP traffic being sent to this address. The source of these packets is and , which are spooed sources / / / / / There is a single stream of UDP SYSLOG packets being sent from / / Various sources send bursts of 3 4 UDP packets to port to this address / / / Various sources send bursts of UDP packets to port 3478 to this address. The major sources appear to be , , , and , but other sourvces were also observer / / / There is a single stream of UDP SYSLOG packets being sent from /24
10 A large number of source addresses send minimal size UDP packets to port 6693 at this address / A large number of source addresses send minimal size UDP packets to port at this address / A large number of source addresses send UDP packets to port 4605 at this address, and, in addition, DNS query packets are being sent to UDP port 53 at this address / A large number of source addresses send both UDP and TCP packets to this address, including NetBIOS and NTP UDP packets / A large number of sources use this address to direct their DNS queries A large number of sources use this address to direct their DNS queries A large number of sources use this address to direct their DNS queries.
11 Appendix A Unallocated /16 Addresses Administered by APNIC in the Various Network Blocks / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /24
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