Internet Noise: a tale of two subnets
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1 Internet Noise: a tale of two subnets Tim Obezuk Cloudflare
2 Who am I? Tim Obezuk Solutions Engineer at Cloudflare Helping Australian organisations build faster and more secure internet properties
3
4 10% HTTP Internet traffic 600b reqs/day & 38% All DNS queries 140bn/day 151+ PoPs in 74+ countries 15Tbps capacity Live Data Center In Progress/Planned
5 188+ Internet Exchanges
6 1 Volumetric DNS Flood DNS Server Bots 2 Amplification (Layer 3 & 4) Application 942Gbps Largest attack mitigated DNS Server Bots 3 HTTP Flood (Layer 7) Server 500Gbps Bots HTTP Application/Login 300M pps Common attack size
7 About Cloudflare Cloudflare makes websites faster and safer using our globally distributed network to deliver essential services to any website Performance Content Optimisation Security 3rd party services Analytics Edge Computing
8 The IP Blocks INTERESTING IP RANGES: / /24 PROP-109: APNIC allocated as research prefixes Bogon prefixes before 2010 Known to receive unwanted traffic: Misconfigurations (proxies, internal use) Misuse Partnership with Cloudflare in 2018
9 Routing History RIPE - 10Mb/s maxed RIPE, Merit Merit announced /8 from 23/02/2010 to 01/03/2010 and collected 7.9Tb of pcap GOOGLE/YOUTUBE 1slash8/1slash8.html content-pollution-18
10 FREE FAST Privacy-first recursive resolver for everyone APNIC has the IP Address Cloudflare has the network. 7.05ms in Oceania (dnsperf)
11 What s the Noise / Junk?
12 Traffic levels PREVIOUS STUDIES 2010: > 100Mb/s on / : > 100-1Gb/s on / Gb/s 1Gb/s solely on
13 Traffic levels TCP traffic (mostly HTTP proxy, services). Ports 443, 80, 8000, 8080, 8090, 8765 UDP traffic (some DNS, syslogs). Ports 53, 514, 8000, 80, 8090 TP-Link DNS tplink-routers-send-dns-queries-to whatis-that/365630
14 Traffic source Aligned with internet populations: Heavily weighted to source from China USA, Other large Internet populations.
15 Bursts and patterns Two increases: 5 Gb/s 8 Gb/s between 1600 and 1715 UTC 8 Gb/s 12.5 Gb/s between 1715 and 2300 UTC Mostly on , , and Destination 80 Increase from China No particular difference on source IP/net
16 Bursts and patterns Short bursts: Only on between 0100 and 0200 UTC for a few minutes 1-10 gigabits/sec UDP traffic source 123 (NTP) and (memcached) Misconfigured network devices?
17 Bursts and patterns Also DHCP spikes. From Macau.
18 Legitimate Traffic? Filtering to only UDP/TCP 53, receiving a substantial amount of DNS traffic even before launch.
19 What s changed? Lots of previous studies into traffic profiles: Presentation from 10 years ago at NANOG49 presentations/monday/karir-1slash8.pdf - Merit, APNIC & UMich We still see iperf traffic (port 5000/5001) Around times more traffic than previous studies. We estimate legitimate traffic to be around 7-13%
20 Availability?
21 Availability Thanks to the Atlas probes, we ve run thousands of tests: Null-routes CPE installed in ISP Suddenly an open FTP Server
22 Availability More than 30 major Internet Service Providers all around the world having Null-routes issues. CPE installed in Many null-routing /32 ISP /30 is a favorite point-to-point address But also using /24 for internal purposes (finding devices) Suddenly an open Most of the ISPs are cleaning their configurations (more than a dozen fixed FTP Server in less than a week). Few non-responses
23 Documentation
24 Documentation RFC / / /24 Exist for the soul purpose of documentation, diagrams, etc. HOWEVER... *In addition to performance improvements resulting from the CDN
25 Documentation
26 Just doing it wrong
27 Just doing it wrong Not the first time: Won t be the last...
28 Conclusions
29 Conclusions Many different types of misconfiguration Companies possibly leak their private data: Syslog DHCP data Other unknown We throw away all data, maintain privacy, but not everyone else is nice. Be vigilant about your own network and follow the best common practices.
30 Questions?
31 Thank you!
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