Mobile Security Fall 2013
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1 Mobile Security Fall 2013 Yuan Tian Class #25 Security Misuse in Mobile 2013 Patrick Tague
2 Outline Misuse of SSL in mobile development Misuse of encryption in mobile development Some slides are from Sascha Fahl and Manuel Egele, thank them for sharing the interesting content.
3 Misuse of SSL in Mobile [1]Fahl, Sascha, et al. "Why Eve and Mallory love Android: An analysis of Android SSL (in) security." Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security. ACM, [2] Fahl, Sascha, et al. "Rethinking SSL development in an appified world."proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security. ACM, 2013.
4 Background SSL is widely used in non-browser software whenever a secure Internet connection is needed Examples: (1) sending local data to cloud-based storage (2) sending customers payment details from E-Commerce servers to payment processors (ex. PayPal and Amazon) (3) logging IM clients into online services (4) authenticating servers to mobile applications on Android and ios.
5 SSL Usage on Android A server needs a certificate which is signed by a trusted party For non-trusted certificate, a workaround is needed
6 What about using a non-trusted certificate?
7 Analysis of Misuse Static Analysis for possible problems: Broken TrustManager Implements Accept all hostnames Slides from Sascha Fahl
8 Analysis Result Out of popular and free apps in Google Play, 17.28% of Apps which use SSL fails to Verify the certificate: 1070 include critical code 790 accept all certificates 284 accept all hostnames
9 Trust Manager Implementation All 22 implementations of trust manager, all fails for effective certificate verification Slides from Sascha Fahl Slides from
10 Affected Apps Slides from Sascha Fahl
11 Case Study- Zoner AV Anti-Virus App for Android Award as one of the best AV for app for Android by av-test.org Slides from Sascha Fahl
12 Zoner AV Virus signature update by HTTPS No check for the authenticity! Slides from Sascha Fahl
13 Case Study- Chase Allows a network attacker to capture username and password and rest of session customer using the app
14 How to Fix the Mess? It s all developers fault! Slides from Sascha Fahl
15 Why this is wrong- Talk to Developers The author contacted 80 developers of broken apps informed them offered further assistance asked them for an interview Slides from Sascha Fahl
16 Statement 1 This app was one of our first mobile apps and when we noticed that there were problems with the SSL certificate, we just implemented the first working solution we found on the Internet. Slides from Sascha Fahl
17 Statement 2 When I used Wireshark to look at the traffic, Wireshark said that this is a proper SSL protected data stream and I could not see any cleartext information when I manually inspected the packets. So I really cannot see what the problem is here. Slides from Sascha Fahl
![Statement 3 The app accepts all SSL certificates because some users wanted to connect to their blogs with self-signed certs and [ ] because Android](/docs-images/77/75241231/images/18-1.jpg "does not provide an easy-to-use SSL certificate warning message, it was a lot easier to simply accept all self-signed certificates.")
18 Statement 3 The app accepts all SSL certificates because some users wanted to connect to their blogs with self-signed certs and [ ] because Android does not provide an easy-to-use SSL certificate warning message, it was a lot easier to simply accept all self-signed certificates. Slides from Sascha Fahl
19 Statement 4 We use self-signed certificates for testing purposes and the easiest way to make them working is to remove certificate validation. Somehow we must have forgotten to remove that code again when we released our app. Slides from Sascha Fahl
20 Developer s Wish list Self-Signed Certificates Development Self-Signed Certificates Production Less SSL Coding Certificate Pinning / Trusted Roots Easy-to-use Warning Message Slides from Sascha Fahl
21 The Dilemma Current Situation: Developers have the freedom to customize certificate validation Developers mostly are not security experts Developers find the current situation too inflexible Future Situation: Protect the user! Make the common use cases easy Adapt certificate handling to the developers needs Solution: Improve usability of certificate handling for developers! Slides from Sascha Fahl
22 Patching Android OS Slides from Sascha Fahl
23 Self-signed Certificate enable developer options enable developer options Slides from Sascha disable Fahl SSL validation for this app only
24 Certificate Pining Slides from Sascha Fahl
25 Conclusion Eve and Mallory no longer love Android Backwards compatible no broken apps, except apps that implemented pinning (19 in tested Android apps) updating them to the new pinning sytem is very easy New features for Android Easy to use self-signed certs for development Easy to use pinning / custom CAs Central and easy to use warning messages Central place to plug in new validation strategies such as CT, TACK, etc Contacted developers got positive feedback Slides from Sascha Fahl
26 Misuse of Encryption in Mobile [3]Egele, Manuel, et al. "An empirical study of cryptographic misuse in android applications." Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security. ACM, 2013.
27 Motivation > 800,000 Android applications Apps handle sensitive information (e.g., passwords) Developers are not security experts Plaintext AES/CBC Slides from Manuel Egele AES/ECB 27
28 Crypto APIs in Android Cryptographic service providers (CSP) are interfaces to: (A-) symmetric crypto MAC algorithms Key generation TLS, OpenPGP, etc. Android uses BouncyCastle as CSP BouncyCastle is compatible to Java Sun JCP Slides from Manuel Egele 28
29 Commonly Used Crypto Primitives Symmetric encryption schemes Block ciphers: AES/[3]DES IND-CPA Encryption modes: ECB/CBC/CTR Password-based encryption Cracking resistance Deriving key material from user passwords Pseudo random number generators Random seed Secure seed Slides from Manuel Egele 29
30 Common Rules 1) Do not use ECB mode for encryption 2) Do not use a static IV for CBC mode 3) Do not use constant symmetric encryption keys 4) Do not use constant salts for PBE 5) Do not use fewer than 1,000 iterations for PBE 6) Do not use static seeds to seed SecureRandom() Slides from Manuel Egele 30
31 Cryptolint Static program analysis techniques 1. Extract a super control flow graph from app 2. Identify calls to cryptographic APIs 3. Static backward slicing to evaluate security rules Automatically detect if developers do not use crypto correctly! Slides from Manuel Egele 31
32 Rule 1: Thou Shalt Not Use ECB Transformation string specifies: Algorithm Block Cipher Mode (optional) Padding (optional) Cipher.getInstance( AES/ECB/PKCS7Padding, BC ); Default for block ciphers: ECB (undocumented) Problem: Bad defaults Slides from Manuel Egele 33
33 Rule 2: Thou Shall Use Random IVs CBC$ algorithm specifies random IV c = Cipher.getInstance( AES/CBC/PKCS7Padding ); c.getiv(); Developer can specify IV herself public final void init (int opmode, Key key, AlgorithmParameterSpec params) IvParameterSpec(byte[] iv) Problem: Insufficient Documentation Slides from Manuel Egele 34
34 Rule 3: Thou Shalt Not Use Static Symmetric Encryption Keys Key embedded in application not secret Symmetric encryption schemes often specify a randomized key generation function To instantiate a key object: SecretKeySpec(byte[] key, String algorithm) Problem: Developer Understanding Slides from Manuel Egele 35
35 Rule 4: Thou Shalt Not Use Constant Salts for Password Based Encryption RFC2898 (PKCS#5): 4.1 Salt producing a large set of keys one is selected at random according to the salt. PBEParameterSpec(byte[] salt, int iterationcount) Problem: Poor Documentation Slides from Manuel Egele 36
36 Rule 5: Thou Shalt Not Use Small Iteration Counts for PBE RFC2898 (PKCS#5): 4.2 Iteration Count: For the methods in this document, a minimum of 1,000 iterations is recommended. PBEParameterSpec(byte[] salt, int iterationcount) Problem: Poor Documentation Slides from Manuel Egele 37
37 Rule 6: Thou Shalt not Seed SecureRandom() With Static Values Android documentation for SecureRandom() PRNG: This class generates cryptographically secure pseudo-random numbers. It is best to invoke SecureRandom using the default constructor. Seeding SecureRandom may be insecure SecureRandom() vs. SecureRandom(byte[] seed) Problem: Developer Understanding Slides from Manuel Egele 38
38 Evaluation 145,095 Apps downloaded from Google Play Only Apps that use javax/crypto java/security Filter popular libraries (advertising, statistics, etc.) 11,748 Apps analyzed Slides from Manuel Egele 39
39 Evaluation 11,748 apps use crypto 65% use ECB 13% use static salt for passwords 13% use small iteration counts 14% misuse SecureRandom() 88% haveslides from Manuel Egele crypto problem 31% use static symmetric key 16% use known IV for CBC 40
40 Password Manager (+6 days) private String encrypt(byte [] key, String clear) { byte [] encrypted; byte [] salt = new byte[2];... Random rnd = new Random(); Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/CBC/PKCS7Padding", "BC"); byte [] iv = {0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0}; IvParameterSpec ivspec = new IvParameterSpec(iv); cipher.init(cipher.encrypt_mode, skeyspec, ivspec); rnd.nextbytes(salt); cipher.update(salt); encrypted = cipher.dofinal(clear.getbytes()); 41
41 Password Manager (key) public static byte [] hmacfrompassword(string password) { byte [] key = null;... Mac hmac = Mac.getInstance("HmacSHA256"); hmac.init (new SecretKeySpec ("notverysecretiv".getbytes("utf-8"), "RAW")); hmac.update(password.getbytes("utf-8")); key = hmac.dofinal();... return key; 42
42 How Do Developers Learn Crypto? 43
43 44
44 Developers should not be able to inadvertently expose key material, use weak key lengths or deprecated algorithms, or improperly use cryptographic modes. 45
45 Conclusions Developers are not security or crypto experts It is too easy to use crypto incorrectly Bad default values Lacking documentation Developer misunderstanding Improved APIs & Documentation necessary Authenticated encryption (e.g., GCM) Security discussion for crypto APIs 46
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