SECURE INTEGRATION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC SOFTWARE
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1 SECURE INTEGRATION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC SOFTWARE Speaker: Stefan Krüger Folie 1
2 When a Developer Uses a Crypto API Uses Electronic Codebook (ECB) Folie 2
3 The Average Developer is no Crypto Expert 88% of Android apps contain at least one misuse Popular vendors misuse TLS libraries 83% of crypto-related vulnerabilites result from API misuse Folie 3
4 What shall we do about it? AES, RSA, CBC Private Data, Passwords, Data Encryption Folie 4
5 What shall we do about it? AES, RSA, CBC Private Data, Passwords, Data Encryption Folie 5
6 What shall we do about it? AES, RSA, CBC Private Data, Passwords, Data Encryption Folie 6
7 What shall we do about it? AES, RSA, CBC Private Data, Passwords, Data Encryption Folie 7
8 What shall we do about it? AES, RSA, CBC Private Data, Passwords, Data Encryption Folie 8
9 What shall we do about it? AES, RSA, CBC Private Data, Passwords, Data Encryption + Folie 9
10 What shall we do about it? AES, RSA, CBC Private Data, Passwords, Data Encryption + Folie 10
11 What shall we do about it? AES, RSA, CBC Private Data, Passwords, Data Encryption + Folie 11
12 What shall we do about it? AES, RSA, CBC Private Data, Passwords, Data Encryption + Folie 12
13 What shall we do about it? AES, RSA, CBC Private Data, Passwords, Data Encryption + Folie 13
14 CogniCrypt supports Developers as an Eclipse Plugin Folie 14
15 CogniCrypt supports Developers as an Eclipse Plugin Folie 15
16 CogniCrypt s Components CogniCrypt GEN CogniCrypt SAST Folie 16
17 CogniCrypt GEN Code Generation For Crypto APIs CogniCrypt GEN Folie 17
18 CogniCrypt GEN Code Generation For Crypto APIs CogniCrypt GEN [CogniCrypt: Supporting Developers in using Cryptography. Stefan Krüger, Sarah Nadi, Michael Reif, Karim Ali, Eric Bodden, Mira Mezini,. ASE Tool Track 2017.] Folie 18
19 CogniCrypt GEN Code Generation For Crypto APIs Task Descriptions Algorithm Model Code Template [CogniCrypt: Supporting Developers in using Cryptography. Stefan Krüger, Sarah Nadi, Michael Reif, Karim Ali, Eric Bodden, Mira Mezini,. ASE Tool Track 2017.] Folie 19
20 But I have to Change My Code! CogniCrypt GEN CogniCrypt SAST Folie 20
21 CogniCrypt SAST Detection of Crypto-API Misuses CogniCrypt SAST Folie 21
22 CogniCrypt SAST Detection of Crypto-API Misuses CogniCrypt SAST [CrySL: An Extensible Approach to Validating the Correct Usage of Cryptographic APIs. Stefan Krüger, Johannes Spaeth, Karim Ali, Eric Bodden, Mira Mezini. ECOOP 2018.] Folie 22
23 within Eclipse! Save Static Analysis Error Markers Folie 23
24 Main Error Types of CogniCrypt SAST Incorrect Usage Pattern Insecure Parameters Insecure Class Composition Folie 24
25 I.E. Error Type: Insecure Parameters AES should rather be AES/{CBC/GCM} [CrySL: An Extensible Approach to Validating the Correct Usage of Cryptographic APIs. Stefan Krüger, Johannes Spaeth, Karim Ali, Eric Bodden, Mira Mezini. ECOOP 2018.] Folie 25
26 CrySL Specifiying The Use of Crypto APIs (1/2) SPEC javax.crypto.keygenerator OBJECTS EVENTS int keysize; javax.crypto.secretkey key; java.lang.string alg; g1: getinstance(alg); g2: getinstance(alg, _); Gets := g1 g2; i1: init(keysize); i2: init(keysize, _); i3: init(_); i4: init(_, _); Inits := i1 i2 i3 i4; gk: key = generatekey(); ORDER Gets, Inits?, gk CONSTRAINTS alg in {"AES"} => keysize in {128, 192, 256}; alg in {"DES"} => keysize in {56}; alg in {"Blowfish"} => keysize in {40, 44, 48, 52, 56,..., 436, 440}; [CrySL: An Extensible Approach to Validating the Correct Usage of Cryptographic APIs. Stefan Krüger, Johannes Spaeth, Karim Ali, Eric Bodden, Mira Mezini. ECOOP 2018.] Folie 26
27 CrySL Specifiying The Use of Crypto APIs (2/2) ENSURES generatedkey(key,alg); SPEC javax.crypto.cipher REQUIRES generatedkey(key, alg(transformation)); ENSURES encrypted(plaintext, ciphertext); [CrySL: An Extensible Approach to Validating the Correct Usage of Cryptographic APIs. Stefan Krüger, Johannes Spaeth, Karim Ali, Eric Bodden, Mira Mezini. ECOOP 2018.] Folie 27
28 CrySL Rules for the Java Cryptographic Architecture (JCA) Encryption & Decryption Randomness Hashing and MACs Signing & Verification Key Generation 23 Classes & Interfaces Persisting of Key Material [CrySL: An Extensible Approach to Validating the Correct Usage of Cryptographic APIs. Stefan Krüger, Johannes Spaeth, Karim Ali, Eric Bodden, Mira Mezini. ECOOP 2018.] Folie 28
29 Evaluation - Android 88% 10k Android Apps 96% of these Apps are insecure [CrySL: An Extensible Approach to Validating the Correct Usage of Cryptographic APIs. Stefan Krüger, Johannes Spaeth, Karim Ali, Eric Bodden, Mira Mezini. ECOOP 2018.] Folie 29
30 Evaluation - Maven 2.7+ Million Software Artefacts 73% 88% of these Artefacts are insecure Folie 30
31 Folie 31
32 Folie 32
33 Folie 33
34 Folie 34
35 Folie 35
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