Distributed Denial of Service
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1 Distributed Denial of Service John Ioannidis AT&T Labs Research Joint work with Steve Bellovin, Matt Blaze (AT&T), Sally Floyd, Vern Paxson, Scott Shenker (ICIR), Ratul Mahajan (University of Washington), Angelos Keromytis (Columbia University)
2 Another Talk about DDoS? Fundamentals of DDoS. Taxonomy of attacks and defenses. Pushback: a promising solution. Limits of the technology. April 24, 2002 DDoS 2
3 Security Attacks Ordinary security attacks: Exploit target vulnerabilities. Give resources to attacker. Fixing vulnerability solves the problem. Denial-of-service attacks: Prevent others from using the targetted system. Attacker gets indirect benefits. Some DoS attacks exploit vulnerabilities. Some just eat up resources. April 24, 2002 DDoS 3
4 DDoS: Distributed Denial of Service Network attacks aim at flooding the victim s link. Strong attacker against weak victim. Distributed attacks use multiple sources. Lots of weak attackers against strong victim. Usual implementation: Multiple compromised machines with zombies. Masters direct zombies to attack victim. Victim overwhelmed. April 24, 2002 DDoS 4
5 An Attack in Progress Attack 4 Looks like attack Shares links Collateral damage 2 8 D 5 1 Congested link April 24, 2002 DDoS 5
6 During the Attack Bad (attack) traffic does not obey E2ECC, floods links. Poor (looks like attack) traffic obeys E2ECC, backs off due to congestion on links 2-5 and 8-D. As does good (shares links with attack) traffic. Some unrelated (collateral damage) traffic backs off due to congestion on the 2-5 link. April 24, 2002 DDoS 6
7 Why are DDoS Attacks Hard to Defend Against? Nothing victims can do to protect themselves: Usually, attack is on connectivity. Better overall host security would help. As would source address filtering. Bandwidth management not applicable. End-to-end congestion control not applicable. Source does not obey E2E CC. Active Queue Management not applicable. Flows very short-lived. Diffserv/Intserv do not help with best-effort traffic reqs. April 24, 2002 DDoS 7
8 A Taxonomy for DDoS Attack End node Network Defense Detection of attack Response Traffic management Scope Timeliness Extent Impact April 24, 2002 DDoS 8
9 Attacks I: Target is end node. CPU attack. Cause unnecessary crypto to happen. Memory attack. SYN flood. Easier to mitigate: Proper host security. Proper protocol design (e.g., cookies). April 24, 2002 DDoS 9
10 Attacks II: Target is network link By target link: Usually access link (core network over-provisioned). Slow border links (to distant lands). By source of attack: Trin00/TFN style: master/slaves. Reflector attacks. By packet contents: Random (just bandwidth). Calculated (SYN, directed broadcasts). By cause: Deliberate attack. Flash crowd. April 24, 2002 DDoS 10
11 Characteristics of Current Attacks Several small-scale attacks a day. Fairly crude. Captured code is of abysmal quality. Have not paired up with virus writers. Anisotropic. Locality of penetrated machines. Internet too large to design an isotropic attack. Purpose seems to be ego gratification. IRC turf wars. Vandalism. We worry about tactical uses. April 24, 2002 DDoS 11
12 Design of a Perfect Attack Looks like legitimate traffic. Flash crowd. Isotropic/topology aware. Uses network mapping information. Adaptive. Responds to our attempts to quench it. Automatic propagation. Viruses or other software flaws. Why is the network still running? April 24, 2002 DDoS 12
13 Defense I: Detection Passive vs. active: Traffic monitoring. Content. Shape/characteristics. Traffic marking. ICMP TRACEBACK Packet marking (many variants). Distribution: Single point. Collaborative. April 24, 2002 DDoS 13
14 Defense I: Detection, cont d Timing: Proactive (runs at all times). Reactive (turned on in response to attack). Feedback: From response mechanisms. April 24, 2002 DDoS 14
15 Defense II: Response Traffic management: Rate limiting. Filtering. Redirection. Distribution: At specific points. Along attack path. Scope: Within an administrative domain (intra-isp). Across administrative domains. April 24, 2002 DDoS 15
16 Defense II: Response, cont d Cost/benefit: Innocent traffic. Collateral damage. Level of service. Vulnerabilities introduced? Identification of attacker? Just mitigating effects. Finding attacker and/or zombies. Punishing. Fixing! April 24, 2002 DDoS 16
17 Limits Described an N-space of attacks and defenses. Need to identify limits of solution space. Need to define metrics of success. Limiting case: flash crowd. Unexplored dimensions? Legal/social. Radically change Internet architecture. Per-packet payment? Back to virtual circuits? Active networks? April 24, 2002 DDoS 17
18 Pushback Router-based solution against bandwidth attacks. Attack: too many packet drops on a particular link. Aggregate: set of packets with a common feature. Find the most common aggregate in the drop set. Aggregate-based Congestion Control (ACC). Local ACC (LACC): Works independently on congested links. Pushback: Tell upstream routers to also drop aggregate. April 24, 2002 DDoS 18
19 Involving the Routers Detect. Which routers detect the attack? How do they do it? Inform. Are other routers informed? How? Limit. What traffic is dropped? Where? April 24, 2002 DDoS 19
20 An Attack in Progress (again) Attack 4 Looks like attack Shares links Collateral damage 2 8 D 5 1 Congested link April 24, 2002 DDoS 20
21 Local Rate-limiting Router 8 can preferentially drop bad traffic. This would allow more good traffic to flow in from 7 but would not improve things for the rest. Too much traffic coming in from 5 and 6. Collateral damage is still occurring. April 24, 2002 DDoS 21
22 Pushback Router 8 rate-limits. Detects where bad traffic is coming from. Directs upstream routers where most of traffic is coming from (5 and 6) to rate-limit on its behalf. Recurse! 5 and 6 now see congestion for bad traffic and push further back. More non-attack traffic flows. April 24, 2002 DDoS 22
23 After Pushback Attack 4 Looks like attack Shares links Collateral damage 2 8 D 5 1 April 24, 2002 DDoS 23
24 Involving the Routers Detect. Which routers detect the attack? How do they do it? Inform. Are other routers informed? How? Limit. What traffic is dropped? Where? April 24, 2002 DDoS 24
25 Setting the Evil Bit Attack signature and congestion signature. CS approximates the Evil Bit. Detect what the Aggregate should be. Collect set of dropped packets ( drop set ). Just sampling is OK. Match against forwarding table. Easy way of identifying attacks on subnets. Pick most frequent prefix(es). Update the rate limiter. April 24, 2002 DDoS 25
26 Involving the Routers Detect. Which routers detect the attack? How do they do it? Inform. Are other routers informed? How? Limit. What traffic is dropped? Where? April 24, 2002 DDoS 26
27 Pushback Messages If local rate-limiting decreases congestion, stop. Otherwise, tell upstream routers with the largest contributions to also rate-limit (pushback request). Upstream routers apply the same algorithm to decide whether to propagate (push further back). Originator sets a maximum depth. Downstream messages provide feedback. No explicit acknowledgements or crash recovery (soft state). April 24, 2002 DDoS 27
28 Involving the Routers Detect. Which routers detect the attack? How do they do it? Inform. Are other routers informed? How? Limit. What traffic is dropped? Where? April 24, 2002 DDoS 28
29 Local Rate Limiting Source can be local or downstream pushbackd. Preferentially drop packets matching aggregate(s). Implemented as IPFW pipe under FreeBSD. Will also be done with ALTQ. Commercial routers have various ways of rate-limiting. Packets admitted by the RL passed to Output Q. No preferential treatment! April 24, 2002 DDoS 29
30 Pushback Router Architecture Input Qs Output Q?CS RL Q Adjust RL Dropped packets Update CS Pushback daemon PB April 24, 2002 DDoS 30
31 Decoupling of Components pushbackd need not run on the routers. Router can sample the drop set Attached processor updates router s RL. Different machines can run different detection algorithms. But we must agree on format of pushback messages. draft-floyd-pushback-messages-0?.txt April 24, 2002 DDoS 31
32 Knobs to Adjust Congestion signature derivation. Rate-limiting aggressiveness. Upstream distribution of bandwidth rate-limiting requests. Damping of feedback control loop (between requests for limiting and results). April 24, 2002 DDoS 32
33 Simulation Results Various topologies. Small attacks. Large attacks. Flash crowds. Various bandwidth allocation algorithms. Various detection algorithms. April 24, 2002 DDoS 33
34 Small Topology April 24, 2002 DDoS 34
35 April 24, 2002 DDoS 35
36 Big Topology, Web-like Behavior April 24, 2002 DDoS 36
37 Throughput with 4 Bad Hosts April 24, 2002 DDoS 37
38 Throughput with 32 Bad Hosts April 24, 2002 DDoS 38
39 Flash Crowd Behavior April 24, 2002 DDoS 39
40 Problems Does not work for isotropic attacks. Not an issue (yet). Flash crowds. Penalizes traffic coming from fatter pipes. May need to inject artificial asymmetry. Security. TTL 255 for adjacent routers! IPsec within same ISP. Trust/policy issues at borders. Should not become source of new abuses! April 24, 2002 DDoS 40
41 Future Work Better detection. Traffic patterns. Distributed monitoring. IDS. Integration with commercial routers. Deployment in the field. Standardization efforts. April 24, 2002 DDoS 41
42 Summary DDoS treated as a congestion control problem. Handled inside the network. Three parts: Detection. Approximation of the evil bit. Rate limiting. Aggregate-based Congestion Control. Pushback. Involve upstream routers. April 24, 2002 DDoS 42
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