Securing services running over untrusted clouds : the two-tiered trust model
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1 Securing services running over untrusted clouds : the two-tiered trust model Aggelos Kiayias (U. Athens & U. Connecticut) Joint work, Juan Garay, Ran Gelles, David Johnson, Moti Yung (AT&T UCLA - AT&T - Google)
2 Outsourcing your service to the cloud
3 Outsourcing your service to the cloud
4 Outsourcing your service to the cloud
5 Outsourcing your service to the cloud
6 Outsourcing your service to the cloud what happens if your host is corrupt?
7 Outsourcing your service to the cloud what happens if your host is corrupt?
8 Outsourcing your service to the cloud what happens if your host is corrupt? encryption / signatures cannot help here
9 what is at stake? Privacy of user inputs. Guaranteed Output Delivery. Fairness. Input-independence.
10 Distributing Trust
11 Distributing Trust Spread trust across many hosts in the cloud(s)
12 Distributing Trust Spread trust across many hosts in the cloud(s)
13 Distributing Trust Spread trust across many hosts in the cloud(s) Privacy and other desirable properties may be preserved
14 Crypto Protocols for distributing trust.
15 Crypto Protocols for distributing trust. An adversary controlling any minority of the servers cannot prevent the secure computation of any efficient functionality defined over their inputs [Yao82, GMW87] Similar results hold over secure channels (and no add l crypto) with an (computationally unbounded) adversary controlling less than a third of the servers [BGW88, CCD88]
16 Crypto Protocols for distributing trust. An adversary controlling any minority of the servers cannot prevent the secure computation of any efficient functionality defined over their inputs [Yao82, GMW87] Similar results hold over secure channels (and no add l crypto) with an (computationally unbounded) adversary controlling less than a third of the servers [BGW88, CCD88]
17 Crypto Protocols for distributing trust. An adversary controlling any minority of the servers cannot prevent the secure computation of any efficient functionality defined over their inputs [Yao82, GMW87] Similar results hold over secure channels (and no add l crypto) with an (computationally unbounded) adversary controlling less than a third of the servers [BGW88, CCD88]
18 the doomsday scenario The service provider may never be entirely sure
19 the doomsday scenario The service provider may never be entirely sure
20 the doomsday scenario The service provider may never be entirely sure
21 the doomsday scenario The service provider may never be entirely sure the service may be subverted from the get-go
22 the outsourcing SP the SP is considering to start an MPC service over a cloud of servers point of view The cloud is already operational what is the trust guarantee it provides?
23 the outsourcing SP the SP is considering to start an MPC service over a cloud of servers point of view The cloud is already operational what is the trust guarantee it provides?
24 the outsourcing SP the SP is considering to start an MPC service over a cloud of servers point of view The cloud is already operational what is the trust guarantee it provides?
25 the outsourcing SP the SP is considering to start an MPC service over a cloud of servers point of view? The cloud is already operational what is the trust guarantee it provides?
26 the outsourcing SP the SP is considering to start an MPC service over a cloud of servers point of view The cloud is already operational what is the trust guarantee it provides?
27 the outsourcing SP point of view, 2 how certain are you about your the hosts provided by your cloud provider(s)? how much effort/cost is needed to become certain?
28 the outsourcing SP point of view, 2 how certain are you about your the hosts provided by your cloud provider(s)? how much effort/cost is needed to become certain?
29 abstracting it as a game : SP vs adversary 1. Introduces n servers 3. Decides to initiate an MPC service. Inspects a fraction of servers & possibly repairs 2. Corrupts an fraction of servers 4. After service commences continues to corrupt a fraction for what values of (,, ) the service can be maintained? to simplify: assume (,, ) public
30 The boundary cases are implied by standard cryptographic results corruption resiliency
31 The =0 case. corruption resiliency 1 2 theoretically available: = 1 2 achievable via standard crypto: = 1 2
32 The =0 case. corruption resiliency 1 2 theoretically available: = 1 2 achievable via standard crypto: = 1 2 a gap of 2
33 In general inspected honest (1 ) inspected corrupted (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) uninspected corrupted uninspected honest
34 The dream bound on corruption resiliency of the total system < (1 + )/2
35 A Fundamental Question How to harness the power of any remaining honest servers that are lost in a pool of corrupted ones? are the dream bounds of corruption resiliency approximable without requiring the SP to invest a lot? (i.e., using a high )
36 our new crypto protocols we show that, under reasonable system assumptions, there is a way to utilize the honest servers even though we don t know where they are!
37 The 2-tiered model Consider an SP that has two kinds of servers: cows : always good pigs : sometimes good
38 The two-tiered model for MPC Assumption: servers are indistinguishable in the eyes of the adversary
39 The two-tiered model for MPC Assumption: servers are indistinguishable in the eyes of the adversary
40 ...then Corruption is like picking balls from an urn without replacement.
41 ...then Corruption is like picking balls from an urn without replacement.
42 Main Technical Lemma & Corollary Starting with n servers (pigs + cows) it is possible via a protocol that uses anonymity to approximate the maximum corruption resiliency of the system, by utilizing only cows.!(log n) Corollary. The dream bounds of corruption resiliency are attainable asymptotically assuming server anonymization.
43 Thank you Securing services running over untrusted clouds : the two-tiered trust model Aggelos Kiayias (U. Athens & U. Conn) Joint work, Juan Garay, Ran Gelles, David Johnson, Moti Yung (AT&T UCLA AT&T Google)
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