Bringing Android to Secure SDRs
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1 Bringing Android to Secure SDRs David Kleidermacher Frank Vandenberg SDR 11 WinnComm - Europe
2 Agenda Overview Why Android in SDR? Android Security Proposed Architecture
3 Typical red-black architecture for military SDR HCI is mission-critical and must be trusted and certified; therefore often custom Note: Crypto usually on separate discrete but logically red
4 Why Android in SDR? More sophisticated HCIs are desired Powerful GUI for control and management Stay current on technology avoid expensive custom interfaces Open source licensing Powerful apps environment
5 Android Security Today Google Android G1 released September 22, 2008 Oct. 24: NY times reports serious browser vulnerability from open-source Nov. 6: Just this week, however, hackers discovered a way to install applications natively on the phone. ZDNet: Worst. Bug. Ever. Nov. 11: "We tried really hard to secure Android. This is definitely a big bug. The reason why we consider it a large security issue is because root access on the device breaks our application sandbox." Lots more since... CVE , -2656: allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application restart and network disconnection) CVE : allows remote attackers to access application data CVE , -0607: buffer overflows with unknown impact CVE , -0986: buffer overflows allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code
6 Android Security Today Android is built on Linux Explosive growth in complexity over time 20,000 LOC changed per day Kernel grew from 5 to 11 Million LOC in 2.6 era CVE The Proto-Ops Vulnerability Trivial user-mode app can take over the system Latent in Linux kernel for 8 years
7 Android Security Today Mobile devices represent the most porous piece of the IT infrastructure Like the early days of Web applications, people throwing code together as fast as they can, giving no thought to security The more sensitive data you store on that device, the more valuable it is to an attacker
8 What is Secure? Common Criteria Security Levels: 1-7 EAL 4: Windows, Linux, VMware protection against inadvertent or casual attempts to breach the system security not for protection against determined attempts by hostile and well funded attackers to breach system security. EAL 6+ / High Robustness Government program to protect secrets The most valuable resources exposed to the most sophisticated attackers Formal methods, NSA pen testing
9 So how do we get Android and Security? Secondary red-side processor Extra SWaP-C Better: MILS Virtualization
10 Multi-domain Android e.g. Classified and Unclassified in same radio Secondary red-side processor Extra SWaP-C Better: MILS Virtualization, with a small amount of MLS For secret and below, sensitive-but-unclassified, civil/commercial Can do all of this on one SoC (no red-black)
11 Is this practical? Yes! Intel VT Power.org Embedded Virtualization (Freescale QorIQ) ARM TrustZone and VE Most JTRS SDRs already using MILS virtualization INTEGRITY Multivisor with virtualized Linux Normal State Secure State User Guest Guest Secure Apps Super INTEGRITY Multivisor
12 Summary Challenges and Opportunities for SDR Security and real-time required Want powerful Android HCI Android security is poor MILS Virtualization provides the ideal combination Trustworthy OS for SCA Secure boot and crypto management Device authentication Secure device drivers The latest and greatest Android Practical on today s modern SDR microprocessors ARM, Power, Intel
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