Android: A Security Analysis
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- Amice Ball
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1 Mythbusters! Security means different things to different people! Closed source more secure than open source! Security could be achieved by obscurity! Software-only security is good [enough]! Security folks are pain in the neck! Security is a set of components! Can protect against all attacks! Encryption equals security! Can add security later on! Hackers are clueless
2 Android: A Security Analysis Hadi Nahari Chief Security Architect NVIDIA Veni ad Android sepeliendum, non ad laudandum Bill ShakesP2P
3 Hadi s ego slide! Security, Cryptography, Complex System Analysis ID Management, Asset Protection, Information Assurance Schemes! Massively Scalable Systems design, implementation, and governance, Vulnerability Assessment, Threat Analysis (VATA)! Theory of Programming Languages, Formal Languages, Functional Languages, Semantics of Security! Enterprise & Embedded (Netscape, Sun Microsystems, United States Government, Motorola, ebay, PayPal, NVIDIA )! Author of Web Commerce Security: Design and Development book, published by John Wiley & Sons
4 Agenda! Security! Android Security! Case Studies! Conclusion
5 Agenda! Security! Android Security! Case Studies! Conclusion
6 Security is not rocket-surgery! Security is defined by two things! Assets: what you protect! Threats: what to protect against! Without assets and threats, security is meaningless! Security is a subset of QA/verification! exclusive specification verification definition! Security is hard to measure (very hard)! State-space combinatorial explosion: cannot enumerate all attacks! The secure state of a complex system is practically undefinable
7 HW vs. SW: does it matter?! A SW-only security solution is prone to system-attacks! Well, almost always! HW is a good base to address system-wide attacks! Well, most of the time! In either case, common principles apply! Authentication: strong, mutual, verifiable, frequent! Authorization: mandatory, abstracted, enforced, chained! Public vs. private key material (both should be tamper-proof)! Two requirements to satisfy! ROT! COT
8 Root Of Trust (ROT)! Root of trust is the lowest verified-entity in a [security] call stack! It relies on verification of identity! Difference between Identification & authentication! Root of trust could be in software or hardware! Where else?! Interview question:! What is the root of trust in an SSL communication?
9 Chain Of Trust (COT)! It s not sufficient to have a solid ROT! Multiple system entities participate in actions! Passing control from one entity to another: attack entry! Interview questions! What is SecureBoot (or HAB: high assurance boot)?! What problem does it solve?! What problem does it not solve?
10 Cryptography: is it, like, photography??! No, it s not (just in case you were wondering)! Although steganography is close to both! The mathematical systems for securing! Communication or DIT (data in transit)! Storage or DAR (data at rest)! Getting the cryptography right is hard. Really, really hard! The Kirchhoff s principle! Cryptography is the easiest part of securing your system! Trivia question! Why was the term decryption banned in middle ages?
11 Ring_0: got TEE?! CS101: a modern OS usually has four rings! Rings are logical representation of access control (got Authorization?)! Ring_0 entities have the highest system privileges! A modern OS is a very complex spaghetti of modules, components, devices, subsystems, etc.! Even defining the security of such a mess brings tears to grown-up eyes! Let alone implementing, proving, and verifying it
12 Ring_0: got TEE? (cont d)! There are two ways to address the problem of complex call stack (from security POV)! Verify every single call and execution path to trusted process/app (the classical CIA agent in Moscow problem)! Implement what s called secure isolation! Separation/segregation vs. secure isolation! TEE (trusted execution environment) and TCB (trusted computing base)! Both HW & SW flavors exist! TEE implementations have a S/W stack to support H/W! The stack is either a hypervisor, a monitor, or a microkernel! [almost] all implementations exist
13 Hypervisor! We use Hypervisor equivalent to VMM! Virtual machine manager! Virtual machine monitor! virtual machine(s), monitor, guest OS s: two types Type I Type II (native/bare metal) Hosted (picture courtesy Wikipedia)
14 µkernel! As opposed to monolithic! It s just that: a minimum kernel of an OS! That is, minimize the crap (technical term) in the Ring_0! Push everything northbound to user space! Why is it a good idea from security POV? Monolithic kernel µkernel (picture courtesy Wikipedia)
15 Typical TEE Implementation (TrustZone)! It s a combo approach (picture courtesy ARM)
16 Agenda! Security! Android Security! Case Studies! Conclusion
17 Android: what is it?! Linux-based software stack for mobile devices! Very divergent from typical Linux! Almost everything above the kernel is different! Dalvik VM, application frameworks! bionic C lib, system daemons! init, ueventd! Heck: even the kernel is different! Unique subsystems/drivers: Binder, Ashmem,! Hardcoded security checks
18 Binder & Ashmem! Android-specific mechanisms for IPC and shared memory! Binder! Primary IPC mechanism! Inspired by BeOS/Palm OpenBinder! Ashmem! Shared memory mechanism! Designed to overcome limitations of existing shared memory mechanisms in Linux (debatable)
19 Android Security Model! Application-level permissions model! Controls access to app components! Controls access to system resources! Specified by app writers and seen by users! Kernel-level sandboxing and isolation! Isolate apps from each other and the system! Prevent bypass of application-level controls! Relies on Linux DAC (discretionary access control)! Normally invisible to the users and app writers
20 Discretionary Access Control (DAC)! Typical form of access control in Linux! Data-access entirely at the discretion of owner/creator of data! Some processes (e.g. uid 0) can override and some objects (e.g. sockets) are unchecked! Based on user & group identity! Limited granularity, course-grained privilege
21 Android and DAC! Restrict use of system facilities by apps! e.g. Bluetooth, network, storage access! Requires kernel modifications, special group IDs! Isolate apps from each other! Unique user and group ID per installed app! Assigned to app processes and files! Hardcoded, scattered policy
22 Agenda! Security! Android Security! Case Studies! Conclusion
23 Case study: vold! vold - Android volume daemon! Runs as root! Manages mounting of disk volumes! Receives netlink messages from the kernel! CVE ! Does not verify that message came from kernel! Uses signed int from message as array index without checking for < 0! Demonstrated by the Gingerbreak exploit
24 GingerBreak: Overview! Collect information needed for exploitation! Identify the vold process! Identify addresses and values of interest! Send carefully-crafted netlink message to vold! Trigger execution of exploit binary! Create a setuid-root shell! Execute setuid-root shell! Got root?? is 0wn3d (technical term)
25 GingerBreak: Collecting Information! Identify the vold process! /proc/net/netlink to find netlink socket users! /proc/pid/cmdline to find vold PID! Identify addresses and values of interest! /system/bin/vold to obtain GOT address range! /system/lib/libc.so to find system address! /etc/vold.fstab to find valid device name! logcat to obtain fault address in vold
26 Case study: ueventd! ueventd - Android udev equivalent! Runs as root! Manages /dev directory! Receives netlink messages from the kernel! Same vulnerability as CVE for udev! Does not verify message came from kernel! Demonstrated by the Exploid exploit
27 Case study: adbd! adbd - Android debug bridge daemon! Runs as root! Provides debug interface! Switches to shell UID and executes shell! Does not check/handle setuid() failure! Can lead to a shell running as root! Demonstrated by RageAgainstTheCage
28 RageAgainstTheCage: Overview! Look up adbd process in /proc! Fork self repeatedly to reach RLIMIT_NPROC for shell identity! Re-start adbd! adbd setuid() call fails! shell runs as root
29 Case study: zygote! zygote - Android app spawner! Runs as root! Receives requests to spawn apps over a socket! Uses setuid() to switch to app UID! Does not check/handle setuid() failure! Can lead to app running as root! Demonstrated by Zimperlich exploit
30 Zimperlich: overview! Fork self repeatedly to reach RLIMIT_NPROC for app UID! Spawn app component via zygote! Zygote setuid() call fails! App runs with root UID! Re-mounts /system read-write! Creates setuid-root shell in /system
31 Case study: ashmem! ashmem - anonymous shared memory! Android-specific kernel subsystem! Used by init to implement shared mapping for system property space! CVE ! Does not restrict changes to memory protections! Actually two separate vulnerabilities in ashmem! Demonstrated by KillingInTheNameOf and psneuter exploits
32 KillingInTheNameOf: Overview! Change protections of system property space to allow writing! Modify ro.secure property value! Re-start adbd! Root shell via adb
33 psneuter: Overview! Set protection mask to 0 (no access) on property space! Re-start adbd! adbd cannot read property space! Defaults to non-secure operation! Root shell via adb
34 Agenda! Security! Android Security! Case Studies! Conclusion
35 Conclusion! Need more case studies?? I mean, REALLY???! Android is far from secure: Q.E.D! So far we're only dealing with the kernel level access controls! To fully control the apps, need application-layer access controls! Requires further study of the existing Android security model! Requires instrumentation of the application frameworks! SE Android is a step in right direction! To protect against system attacks Android should also be bolted to hardware security (e.g. TEE impl.s such as TrustZone)
36 Thank you! Q [& possibly] A Rates chart Answers: $1 Correct answers: $3 Correct answers requiring thought: $5 References: Android documentation, Stephen S. Smalley, NSA, and various free resources from the Internet, so long as they re free
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