Q: Are power supply attacks in scope for SSITH? A: The hacker team will not have physical access to the power supply.

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "Q: Are power supply attacks in scope for SSITH? A: The hacker team will not have physical access to the power supply."

Transcription

1 SSITH FAQ Questions about the Scope of SSITH Q: Is securitization of external memory in the scope for SSITH? Q: Is reverse engineering research of integrated circuits in scope for SSITH? A: No. Please refer to BAA section I-B, page 7. Q: Is the securitization of SoC applications in the scope for SSITH? Q: Are quantum computing attacks in scope for SSITH? A: No. SSITH is confined to classical computing. Q: Are power supply attacks in scope for SSITH? A: The hacker team will not have physical access to the power supply. Q: Are row hammer attacks in scope for SSITH? Q: Are electromagnetically induced side channel attacks in scope for SSITH? A: No. Please refer to BAA section I-B, page 7. Q: Are security performance monitors in scope for SSITH? However, please note that any security performance monitors should be able to run on the FPGA demonstration platform. Q: Are government recommended algorithms, such as NSA/NIST approved encryption algorithms, considered in scope for SSITH? Q: Are attacks during boot up in scope for SSITH? Q: Is data protection in scope for SSITH. Please refer to BAA section I-B, page 7. Q: Must all security solutions be formally verified? A: No, but each performer must demonstrate security assurance completeness.

2 Questions about Hardware/Software/OS Modification, Configuration, Architecture and IP Q: Within SSITH, are solutions that are implemented as a side or slave processor acceptable? A: A side processor is in scope. It would have to be possible for the slave processor to be integrated and run on the FPGA demonstration platform. Q: Can an application be recompiled to enable securitization? A: Yes, as long as the unmodified software can run on the securitized processor after being recompiled. In general, the less modification to software required to take advantage of security features, the better. Q: Within SSITH, can a performer modify the ISA? A: A performer can modify the ISA so long as the unmodified software that ran on the unmodified system still runs. Q: Will the performers be able to modify the operating systems in their system stack? A: Yes, as long as software that runs on the unmodified OS still runs successfully. Q: Can a user add a layer of software or firmware to the system to implement their security approach? PPASS impact of the intermediate layer will need to be evaluated. Q: Within SSITH, can a performer use a high level language IP such as CHISEL? Q: Will the standard applications that need to run natively be available to TA-1 performers? In general, all software that can run on the unmodified system should be executable on the securitized system. Q: How generalizable or scalable is the SSITH architecture expected to be? A: Please refer to BAA section I-D, page 8. Q: Can graceful failure be considered a design target of SSITH? It is expected that graceful degradation will be appropriately flexible for the scale and purpose of various systems. Q: Will the performers be expected to use an open source operating system? A: A fully specified OS will be provided to all performers as part of the FPGA evaluation exercise. Q: Will performers be permitted to add cache to their security architectures? A: So long as it is implementable on the FPGA demo platforms, and meets PPAS requirements, performers will be permitted to add or extend caching to their architectures. Q: Is proprietary IP allowed as part of a SSITH proposal? However, please refer to BAA section IV (page 36) for an explanation of the evaluation criteria.

3 Questions about CWE classes Q: How broad a solution does the proposer s architecture have to be? Does it have to address all seven CWE classes? A: By the last phase of the SSITH program, it expected that performers will address all seven CWE classes. Please refer to BAA Table 2. TA-1 Metrics by Phase for details. Questions about Proposing to TA-1 and/or TA-2 Q: Within SSITH, can a company propose to both TA-1 and TA-2 Please refer to BAA page 21, Section IV.B.1. Full Proposal Format. Q: Will it be possible to propose as a lead on TA-1 and a sub-contractor on TA-2? Questions about SSITH Program Structure Q: Will a required down selection be included in the SSITH Program? A: No. Q: How much visibility will a TA-2 team have within the SSITH Program? A: Please refer to BAA section III E, page 19. TA-2 Team(s) will have access to all TA-1 performer information that is required to establish/evaluate security metrics and develop hardware security representations. TA-2 Team(s) will be involved in regular TA-1 to TA-2 interactions. Q: Is security tool flow development to be included in TA-1 or TA-2. A: TA-1. Please refer to BAA section I-D, page 8. Questions about the Hacker Teams Q: If a proposer uses CHISEL or Bluespec, will the source code be presented to the hacker teams? A: During the evaluation, the hacker team will have access to the unsecuritized application, OS, and design. Any security modification to either the RTL or the FPGA bit stream will not be provided to the hacking teams. Q: Will the evaluator/hacker teams be permitted to use firmware attacks? A: Hacker teams will be permitted to use any software that is not embedded in the FPGA board/system. Q: Will the hacker/evaluator teams attack the unmodified design or the securitized design? A: The hacker teams will attack the securitized design.

4 Q: For the purposes of the hacker team testing, what will be considered a successful hack? A: When the hacker team can either exfiltrate unauthorized data, or modify the operation of the system in an unauthorized way, this will be considered a successful hack. Q: Hardware assisted secure boot would the hacker team be able to interrupt the secure boot bit stream? A: The hackers would not be permitted to interrupt the secure boot bit stream. Q: Will it be possible to add malicious code to the hacker system? Hacker teams will be able to use malicious code as long as the code is outside of the confines of the FPGA system. Q: What will the hacker teams have access to? A: The hacker team will have access to the system I/O ports and wireless connections. Hackers will not have access to anything within the FPGA box. Q: Will the hacker team have access to on-chip cryptographic keys in order to penetrate the systems under test? A: No. Q: Will clock glitching or power glitching by the hacker teams be permitted? A: Clock or power glitching will be allowed by the hacker teams as long as the glitching mechanisms are implemented through software. Questions about Tool Flow and IP Licensing Q: How should proposers deal with possible tool flow licensing and IP licensing? A: If IP or EDA tool licensing is required for SSITH development, include those costs in the proposal. Questions about the SSITH RISC V Demonstration Platforms Q: Is there going to be a tool chain that comes with the RISC V demonstration platform? A: Publically available RISC V tools (toolchain, ISA simulator) will be provided with the FPGA development kit. Q: Must performers demonstrate security function on all three RISC-V platforms that are provided? Please refer to BAA Table 1 on page 10.

5 Second FAQ for SSITH Q: The BAA currently states that the most complex design will be a full featured, multi-threaded, out of order execution RISC-V processor. Is the most complex design to be addressed within SSITH a single core but multi-threaded design, or a multi-core design A: For the proposal, assume that the most complex RISC-V design will be similar to the Berkeley BOOM RISC-V microprocessor. Q: How many PI meetings and site visits will be held over the course of the SSITH Program? A: There is no set number of such events and each proposal should use their own assumptions for budget purposes.. Q: If we change the RISC-V RTL such that it has a different number of threads (as a result of a generic technique for any processor), how will performance be evaluated, per thread or in the aggregate? A: Performance and the other metrics will be evaluated in aggregate. Q: Will the RISC-V RTL provided as GFE be made artificially weak? If performers provide their own RISC- V RTL, who would be responsible to make sure all RTLs are similarly weakened? A: The unmodified RISC-V RTL and OS will be provided as GFP. Q: For cryptography errors CWE, what are the assumptions about the two ends of encrypted communication? If the two ends are both within the same platform, something could be done to strengthen the weaknesses induced by weak keys and hashes. But if the two ends are two different platforms, what would you expect beyond detection of a weak key/weak hash exception? A: The performer should make required assumptions, and clearly state them in the proposal. Q: Do performers need to address denial of service attacks? A: Yes, SSITH solutions must address denial of service attacks. Please refer to BAA section I-D, page 9. Q: Are the power, performance and area overhead targets in SSITH BAA Table 2 relative to all digital logic on the design, or to the complete SoC? A: Power, performance, area overhead targets in SSITH BAA Table 2 pertain to the complete SoC.

6 Q: Is there a particular view in the CWE database that was used to identify the seven CWE classes of hardware based vulnerabilities discussed in the BAA? Would it be possible to provide examples of each of the seven CWE/CVE vulnerability classes? A: Please refer to the BAA Attachment 3. Q: Do the references to cryptography or crypto-errors in the BAA make any assumptions about the level of cryptography or the method of implementation of the cryptography? A: Please refer to the BAA Attachment 3. Q: For the SSITH program, is there a restriction on foreign nationals performing work in their home countries? Is there a distinction between Tier 1 and Tier 2 countries? Is there a maximum amount of work that can be performed at US universities? A: Please refer to BAA section IV, starting on page 34. Q: Is there a preference or requirement on the minimum budget or size of the team? Will the program planning to select a small number of large teams, or is it open for small teams? A: The total funding amount for the program will be approximately $50M as noted in Part 1, page 4 of the BAA. The budget and size of each team should be appropriate for the proposed technical approach. Q: Is there a preference or requirement for university teams to have an industry partner? A: No. Q: For SSITH, the performers will receive RTL as government furnished equipment. Is it in scope to recode or rework the government furnished RTL into a higher level language? Please refer to BAA section I-D, page 8. Q. Is a multi-core processor (with multiple Rocket cores or multiple BOOM cores) within the scope of the SSITH program? Or is the focus of the SSITH program primarily focused on securing single core processors? SSITH proposals should address securitized versions of a broad range of commercial and DoD applications. Please refer to BAA section I-D, page 8.

7 Q. Can two different teams with non-overlapping PIs/Co-PIs from the same university (or from the same company) submit two completely separate proposals for SSITH TA-1.

Q: Are power supply attacks in scope for SSITH? A: The hacker team will not have physical access to the power supply.

Q: Are power supply attacks in scope for SSITH? A: The hacker team will not have physical access to the power supply. SSITH FAQ Questions about the Scope of SSITH Q: Is securitization of external memory in the scope for SSITH? A: Yes. Please refer to BAA section I-B, page 6. Q: Is reverse engineering research of integrated

More information

A Perspective on the Role of Open-Source IP In Government Electronic Systems

A Perspective on the Role of Open-Source IP In Government Electronic Systems A Perspective on the Role of Open-Source IP In Government Electronic Systems Linton G. Salmon Program Manager DARPA/MTO RISC-V Workshop November 29, 2017 Distribution Statement A (Approved for Public Release,

More information

Configuration Security (ConSec) Proposers Day

Configuration Security (ConSec) Proposers Day Configuration Security (ConSec) Mr. Jacob I. Torrey Proposers Day November 17, 2017 1 ConSec objective statement Develop a system to automatically generate, deploy, and enforce secure configurations of

More information

SECURITY CRYPTOGRAPHY Cryptography Overview Brochure. Cryptography Overview

SECURITY CRYPTOGRAPHY Cryptography Overview Brochure. Cryptography Overview SECURITY CRYPTOGRAPHY Cryptography Overview Brochure Cryptography Overview DPA-resistant and Standard Cryptographic Hardware Cores DPA (Differential Power Analysis) Resistant Hardware Cores prevent against

More information

Smart Grid Embedded Cyber Security: Ensuring Security While Promoting Interoperability

Smart Grid Embedded Cyber Security: Ensuring Security While Promoting Interoperability Smart Grid Embedded Cyber Security: Ensuring Security While Promoting Interoperability Communications and Embedded Systems Department Southwest Research Institute Gary Ragsdale, Ph.D., P.E. August 24 25,

More information

Towards Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization. Lily Chen and Dustin Moody National Institute of Standards and Technology USA

Towards Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization. Lily Chen and Dustin Moody National Institute of Standards and Technology USA Towards Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Lily Chen and Dustin Moody National Institute of Standards and Technology USA First mile - Towards PQC standardization After about four years of preparation,

More information

Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) What is it? Why should you care?

Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) What is it? Why should you care? Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2 What is it? Why should you care? SECURITY IS BECOMING A GROWING CONCERN The migration from TDM to IP communication networks has drastically increased

More information

Photonics in the Package for Extreme Scalability (PIPES) Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) Document Updated 12/21/2018

Photonics in the Package for Extreme Scalability (PIPES) Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) Document Updated 12/21/2018 Photonics in the Package for Extreme Scalability (PIPES) Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) Document Updated 12/21/2018 Q1: The BAA mentions optical fiber a number of times. Is using optical fibers a mandated

More information

Industry Collaboration and Innovation

Industry Collaboration and Innovation Industry Collaboration and Innovation OpenCAPI Topics Industry Background Technology Overview Design Enablement OpenCAPI Consortium Industry Landscape Key changes occurring in our industry Historical microprocessor

More information

ADVANCED ATTACKS AGAINST MOBILE/IOT DEVICES

ADVANCED ATTACKS AGAINST MOBILE/IOT DEVICES CONTEXT- AWARE SECURIT Y THROUGH RAIN RFID ADVANCED ATTACKS AGAINST MOBILE/IOT DEVICES H A R D W A R E S O F T W A R E W I R E L E S S / N E T W O R K S Cold-Boot Attacks Chip-Extraction Side-Channel Attacks

More information

Procurement Language for Supply Chain Cyber Assurance

Procurement Language for Supply Chain Cyber Assurance Procurement Language for Supply Chain Cyber Assurance Procurement Language for Supply Chain Cyber Assurance Introduction For optimal viewing of this PDF, please view in Adobe Acrobat. This document serves

More information

Technical Brief Distributed Trusted Computing

Technical Brief Distributed Trusted Computing Technical Brief Distributed Trusted Computing Josh Wood Look inside to learn about Distributed Trusted Computing in Tectonic Enterprise, an industry-first set of technologies that cryptographically verify,

More information

Ten Reasons to Optimize a Processor

Ten Reasons to Optimize a Processor By Neil Robinson SoC designs today require application-specific logic that meets exacting design requirements, yet is flexible enough to adjust to evolving industry standards. Optimizing your processor

More information

Trustzone Security IP for IoT

Trustzone Security IP for IoT Trustzone Security IP for IoT Udi Maor CryptoCell-7xx product manager Systems & Software Group ARM Tech Forum Singapore July 12 th 2017 Why is getting security right for IoT so important? When our everyday

More information

Trustwave Managed Security Testing

Trustwave Managed Security Testing Trustwave Managed Security Testing SOLUTION OVERVIEW Trustwave Managed Security Testing (MST) gives you visibility and insight into vulnerabilities and security weaknesses that need to be addressed to

More information

Engineering Your Software For Attack

Engineering Your Software For Attack Engineering Your Software For Attack Robert A. Martin Senior Principal Engineer Cyber Security Center Center for National Security The MITRE Corporation 2013 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.

More information

Certification Report

Certification Report Certification Report EAL 4+ Evaluation of WatchGuard and Fireware XTM Operating System v11.5.1 Issued by: Communications Security Establishment Canada Certification Body Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation

More information

INTRODUCTION TO CLOAKWARE/TRS TECHNOLOGY

INTRODUCTION TO CLOAKWARE/TRS TECHNOLOGY INTRODUCTION TO CLOAKWARE/TRS TECHNOLOGY VERSION 2.2 OCTOBER 2001 SUMMARY Software is easy to tamper with and reverse engineer so unprotected software deployed on malicious hosts can t be trusted by corporations

More information

COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATION REPORT

COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATION REPORT COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATION REPORT Ixia NTO 7303 and Vision ONE v4.5.0.29 30 October 2017 383-4-409 1.0 Government of Canada. This document is the property of the Government of Canada. It shall not be

More information

EXECUTIVE REPORT ADOBE SYSTEMS, INC. COLDFUSION SECURITY ASSESSMENT

EXECUTIVE REPORT ADOBE SYSTEMS, INC. COLDFUSION SECURITY ASSESSMENT EXECUTIVE REPORT ADOBE SYSTEMS, INC. COLDFUSION SECURITY ASSESSMENT FEBRUARY 18, 2016 This engagement was performed in accordance with the Statement of Work, and the procedures were limited to those described

More information

ARM Security Solutions and Numonyx Authenticated Flash

ARM Security Solutions and Numonyx Authenticated Flash ARM Security Solutions and Numonyx Authenticated Flash How to integrate Numonyx Authenticated Flash with ARM TrustZone* for maximum system protection Introduction Through a combination of integrated hardware

More information

SIDE CHANNEL ATTACKS AGAINST IOS CRYPTO LIBRARIES AND MORE DR. NAJWA AARAJ HACK IN THE BOX 13 APRIL 2017

SIDE CHANNEL ATTACKS AGAINST IOS CRYPTO LIBRARIES AND MORE DR. NAJWA AARAJ HACK IN THE BOX 13 APRIL 2017 SIDE CHANNEL ATTACKS AGAINST IOS CRYPTO LIBRARIES AND MORE DR. NAJWA AARAJ HACK IN THE BOX 13 APRIL 2017 WHAT WE DO What we do Robust and Efficient Cryptographic Protocols Research in Cryptography and

More information

A Supply Chain Attack Framework to Support Department of Defense Supply Chain Security Risk Management

A Supply Chain Attack Framework to Support Department of Defense Supply Chain Security Risk Management A Supply Chain Attack Framework to Support Department of Defense Supply Chain Security Risk Management D r. J o h n F. M i l l e r T h e M I T R E C o r p o r a t i o n P e t e r D. K e r t z n e r T h

More information

The Honest Advantage

The Honest Advantage The Honest Advantage READY TO CHALLENGE THE STATUS QUO GSA Security Policy and PCI Guidelines The GreenStar Alliance 2017 2017 GreenStar Alliance All Rights Reserved Table of Contents Table of Contents

More information

Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard. Summary of Changes from PCI DSS Version to 2.0

Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard. Summary of Changes from PCI DSS Version to 2.0 Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard Summary of s from PCI DSS Version 1.2.1 to 2.0 October 2010 General General Throughout Removed specific references to the Glossary as references are generally

More information

DARPA-BAA Hierarchical Identify Verify Exploit (HIVE) Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) August 18, 2016

DARPA-BAA Hierarchical Identify Verify Exploit (HIVE) Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) August 18, 2016 DARPA-BAA-16-52 Hierarchical Identify Verify Exploit (HIVE) Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) August 18, 2016 DARPA-BAA-16-52 Hierarchical Identify Verify Exploit (HIVE) Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

More information

Cyber Security of ETCS

Cyber Security of ETCS 1 Addressing the challenges Cyber Security of ETCS Simon Tonks 2 Background The UK rail network is currently being upgraded to use new signalling technology (ERTMS) The ROSCOs are delivering the First

More information

Software Development Using Full System Simulation with Freescale QorIQ Communications Processors

Software Development Using Full System Simulation with Freescale QorIQ Communications Processors Patrick Keliher, Simics Field Application Engineer Software Development Using Full System Simulation with Freescale QorIQ Communications Processors 1 2013 Wind River. All Rights Reserved. Agenda Introduction

More information

System Structure. Steven M. Bellovin December 14,

System Structure. Steven M. Bellovin December 14, System Structure Steven M. Bellovin December 14, 2015 1 Designing a System We have lots of tools Tools are rarely interesting by themselves Let s design a system... Steven M. Bellovin December 14, 2015

More information

Penetration testing.

Penetration testing. Penetration testing Penetration testing is a globally recognized security measure that can help provide assurances that a company s critical business infrastructure is protected from internal or external

More information

High-Assurance Cyber Space Systems (HACSS) for Small Satellite Mission Integrity

High-Assurance Cyber Space Systems (HACSS) for Small Satellite Mission Integrity Distribution A: SSC17-V-01 High-Assurance Cyber Space Systems (HACSS) for Small Satellite Mission Integrity Daria C. Lane, Enrique S. Leon, Francisco C. Tacliad, Dexter H. Solio, Ian L. Rodney, Dmitriy

More information

TRACKVIA SECURITY OVERVIEW

TRACKVIA SECURITY OVERVIEW TRACKVIA SECURITY OVERVIEW TrackVia s customers rely on our service for many mission-critical applications, as well as for applications that have various compliance and regulatory obligations. At all times

More information

SECURITY ON AWS 8/3/17. AWS Security Standards MORE. By Max Ellsberry

SECURITY ON AWS 8/3/17. AWS Security Standards MORE. By Max Ellsberry SECURITY ON AWS By Max Ellsberry AWS Security Standards The IT infrastructure that AWS provides has been designed and managed in alignment with the best practices and meets a variety of standards. Below

More information

AUTOTASK ENDPOINT BACKUP (AEB) SECURITY ARCHITECTURE GUIDE

AUTOTASK ENDPOINT BACKUP (AEB) SECURITY ARCHITECTURE GUIDE AUTOTASK ENDPOINT BACKUP (AEB) SECURITY ARCHITECTURE GUIDE Table of Contents Dedicated Geo-Redundant Data Center Infrastructure 02 SSAE 16 / SAS 70 and SOC2 Audits 03 Logical Access Security 03 Dedicated

More information

Security and Privacy in RFID Evolving Application Spaces for Edge Security

Security and Privacy in RFID Evolving Application Spaces for Edge Security 1 Security and Privacy in RFID Evolving Application Spaces for Edge Security Chris Hanebeck, VP Product Management & Marketing Revere Security First, Allow Me to Scare Everyone And It Gets Worse Lockheed

More information

HOST Differential Power Attacks ECE 525

HOST Differential Power Attacks ECE 525 Side-Channel Attacks Cryptographic algorithms assume that secret keys are utilized by implementations of the algorithm in a secure fashion, with access only allowed through the I/Os Unfortunately, cryptographic

More information

Lab #3 Defining the Scope and Structure for an IT

Lab #3 Defining the Scope and Structure for an IT Lab #3 Defining the Scope and Structure for an IT Risk Management Plan Introduction Every company needs to take risks to thrive, but not too much risk which could be catastrophic. Finding the balanced

More information

Ming Ming Wong Jawad Haj-Yahya Anupam Chattopadhyay

Ming Ming Wong Jawad Haj-Yahya Anupam Chattopadhyay Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy (HASP 18), June 2, 2018, Los Angeles, CA, USA Ming Ming Wong Jawad Haj-Yahya Anupam Chattopadhyay Computing and Engineering (SCSE) Nanyang Technological

More information

Certification Report

Certification Report Certification Report EAL 3+ Evaluation of Xerox WorkCentre 5632/5638/5645/5655/5665/5675/5687 Multifunction Systems Issued by: Communications Security Establishment Canada Certification Body Canadian Common

More information

Professional Services Overview

Professional Services Overview Professional Services Overview Internet of Things (IoT) Security Assessment and Advisory Services IOT APPLICATION MOBILE CLOUD NETWORK Company Overview HISTORY HISTORY Founded in 2010 Headquartered in

More information

(2½ hours) Total Marks: 75

(2½ hours) Total Marks: 75 (2½ hours) Total Marks: 75 N. B.: (1) All questions are compulsory. (2) Makesuitable assumptions wherever necessary and state the assumptions made. (3) Answers to the same question must be written together.

More information

Certification Report

Certification Report Certification Report EAL 2+ Evaluation of Verdasys Issued by: Communications Security Establishment Canada Certification Body Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme Government of

More information

Security of Embedded Hardware Systems Insight into Attacks and Protection of IoT Devices

Security of Embedded Hardware Systems Insight into Attacks and Protection of IoT Devices Security of Embedded Hardware Systems Insight into Attacks and Protection of IoT Devices Dr. Johann Heyszl, Head of Hardware Security Department Fraunhofer-Institute for Applied and Integrated Security

More information

DataTraveler 5000 (DT5000) and DataTraveler 6000 (DT6000) Ultimate Security in a USB Flash Drive. Submitted by SPYRUS, Inc.

DataTraveler 5000 (DT5000) and DataTraveler 6000 (DT6000) Ultimate Security in a USB Flash Drive. Submitted by SPYRUS, Inc. Submitted by SPYRUS, Inc. Contents DT5000 and DT6000 Technology Overview...2 Why DT5000 and DT6000 Encryption Is Different...3 Why DT5000 and DT6000 Encryption Is Different - Summary...4 XTS-AES Sector-Based

More information

Skybox Product Tour. Installation and Starting Your Product Tour Tour Login Credentials: User Name: skyboxview Password: skyboxview

Skybox Product Tour. Installation and Starting Your Product Tour Tour Login Credentials: User Name: skyboxview Password: skyboxview Skybox Product Tour Installation and Starting Your Product Tour Tour Login Credentials: User Name: skyboxview Password: skyboxview The tour uses the same User Name / Password for each module This Product

More information

High-Performance, Highly Secure Networking for Industrial and IoT Applications

High-Performance, Highly Secure Networking for Industrial and IoT Applications High-Performance, Highly Secure Networking for Industrial and IoT Applications Table of Contents 2 Introduction 2 Communication Accelerators 3 Enterprise Network Lineage Features 5 Example applications

More information

Computer Architecture and Engineering. CS152 Quiz #3. March 18th, Professor Krste Asanovic. Name:

Computer Architecture and Engineering. CS152 Quiz #3. March 18th, Professor Krste Asanovic. Name: Computer Architecture and Engineering CS152 Quiz #3 March 18th, 2008 Professor Krste Asanovic Name: Notes: This is a closed book, closed notes exam. 80 Minutes 10 Pages Not all questions are of equal difficulty,

More information

Free Chips Project: a nonprofit for hosting opensource RISC-V implementations, tools, code. Yunsup Lee SiFive

Free Chips Project: a nonprofit for hosting opensource RISC-V implementations, tools, code. Yunsup Lee SiFive Free Chips Project: a nonprofit for hosting opensource RISC-V implementations, tools, code Yunsup Lee SiFive SiFive Open Source We Open-Sourced the Freedom E310 Chip! 3 We Open-Sourced the Freedom E310

More information

Secure Cryptographic Module (SCM)

Secure Cryptographic Module (SCM) Page 1 of 11 FIPS 140 2 Cryptographic Module Security Policy Secure Cryptographic Module (SCM) Document Version 3.0.4 FIPS 140 2 Non Proprietary JVC KENWOOD Corporation Page 2 of 11 Revision History Date

More information

Certification Report

Certification Report Certification Report McAfee File and Removable Media Protection 4.3.1 and epolicy Orchestrator 5.1.2 Issued by: Communications Security Establishment Certification Body Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation

More information

Industrial-Strength High-Performance RISC-V Processors for Energy-Efficient Computing

Industrial-Strength High-Performance RISC-V Processors for Energy-Efficient Computing Industrial-Strength High-Performance RISC-V Processors for Energy-Efficient Computing Dave Ditzel dave@esperanto.ai President and CEO Esperanto Technologies, Inc. 7 th RISC-V Workshop November 28, 2017

More information

Common Criteria. Xerox Advanced Multifunction Systems

Common Criteria. Xerox Advanced Multifunction Systems Xerox Security Common Criteria Evaluation Questions & Answers Xerox and Sharp Xerox Advanced Multifunction Systems WorkCentre M35/M45/M55 WorkCentre Pro 35/45/55/65/75/90 WorkCentre Pro C2128/C2636/C3545

More information

Your Data and Artificial Intelligence: Wise Athena Security, Privacy and Trust. Wise Athena Security Team

Your Data and Artificial Intelligence: Wise Athena Security, Privacy and Trust. Wise Athena Security Team Your Data and Artificial Intelligence: Wise Athena Security, Privacy and Trust Wise Athena Security Team Contents Abstract... 3 Security, privacy and trust... 3 Artificial Intelligence in the cloud and

More information

ALIENVAULT USM FOR AWS SOLUTION GUIDE

ALIENVAULT USM FOR AWS SOLUTION GUIDE ALIENVAULT USM FOR AWS SOLUTION GUIDE Summary AlienVault Unified Security Management (USM) for AWS is a unified security platform providing threat detection, incident response, and compliance management

More information

Establishing a Framework for Effective Testing and Validation of Critical Infrastructure Cyber-Security

Establishing a Framework for Effective Testing and Validation of Critical Infrastructure Cyber-Security Establishing a Framework for Effective Testing and Validation of Critical Infrastructure Cyber-Security Michael John SmartSec 2016, Amsterdam www.encs.eu European Network for Cyber Security The European

More information

White Paper. How to Write an MSSP RFP

White Paper. How to Write an MSSP RFP White Paper How to Write an MSSP RFP https://www.solutionary.com (866) 333-2133 Contents 3 Introduction 3 Why a Managed Security Services Provider? 5 Major Items to Consider Before Writing an RFP 5 Current

More information

SiFive Freedom SoCs: Industry s First Open-Source RISC-V Chips

SiFive Freedom SoCs: Industry s First Open-Source RISC-V Chips SiFive Freedom SoCs: Industry s First Open-Source RISC-V Chips Yunsup Lee Co-Founder and CTO High Upfront Cost Has Killed Innovation Our industry needs a fundamental change Total SoC Development Cost Design

More information

The lowrisc project Alex Bradbury

The lowrisc project Alex Bradbury The lowrisc project Alex Bradbury lowrisc C.I.C. 3 rd April 2017 lowrisc We are producing an open source Linux capable System-on-a- Chip (SoC) 64-bit multicore Aim to be the Linux of the Hardware world

More information

The Future of Security is in Open Silicon Linux Security Summit 2018

The Future of Security is in Open Silicon Linux Security Summit 2018 The Future of Security is in Open Silicon Linux Security Summit 2018 Joel Wittenauer - Embedded Software Architect Rambus Cryptography Research August 28, 2018 Agenda About Rambus Cryptography Research

More information

Elaine Barker and Allen Roginsky NIST June 29, 2010

Elaine Barker and Allen Roginsky NIST June 29, 2010 Elaine Barker and Allen Roginsky NIST June 29, 2010 Background: Cryptography is used to protect sensitive information Attackers are becoming smarter, and computers are becoming more powerful Many commonly

More information

PASS4TEST. IT Certification Guaranteed, The Easy Way! We offer free update service for one year

PASS4TEST. IT Certification Guaranteed, The Easy Way!  We offer free update service for one year PASS4TEST IT Certification Guaranteed, The Easy Way! \ http://www.pass4test.com We offer free update service for one year Exam : ECSS Title : EC-Council Certified Security Specialist Practice Test Vendors

More information

MICROCIRCUIT SECURITY

MICROCIRCUIT SECURITY MICROCIRCUIT SECURITY Everything begins in the chip. Sawblade Ventures, LLC Austin, Texas Chip Security Vulnerability: How to Close the Gap Between Design Software & Design Hardware CTEA Electronics Symposium

More information

Federal Mobility: A Year in Review

Federal Mobility: A Year in Review Federal Mobility: A Year in Review Link: https://www.dhs.gov/csd-mobile Link: https://www.dhs.gov/publication/csd-mobile-device-security-study Vincent Sritapan Cyber Security Division Science and Technology

More information

CIRT: Requirements and implementation

CIRT: Requirements and implementation CIRT: Requirements and implementation By : Muataz Elsadig Sudan CERT Joint ITU-ATU Workshop on Cyber-security Strategy in African Countries Khartoum, Republic of Sudan, 24 26 July 2016 There is no globally

More information

Common Crypto Circuit Card Assembly Rockwell Collins. Commercial Crypto Contract (CCC)

Common Crypto Circuit Card Assembly Rockwell Collins. Commercial Crypto Contract (CCC) Common Crypto Circuit Card Assembly Rockwell Collins Commercial Crypto Contract (CCC) FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Level 1 Validation Revision D Date: Page i This page intentionally left

More information

How to Create, Deploy, & Operate Secure IoT Applications

How to Create, Deploy, & Operate Secure IoT Applications How to Create, Deploy, & Operate Secure IoT Applications TELIT WHITEPAPER INTRODUCTION As IoT deployments accelerate, an area of growing concern is security. The likelihood of billions of additional connections

More information

COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATION REPORT

COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATION REPORT COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATION REPORT WorkCentre 7525/7530/7535/7545/7556 with FIPS 140-2 Compliance over SNMPv3 25 July 2016 v1.0 383-4-371 Government of Canada. This document is the property of the Government

More information

ProtectV StartGuard. FIPS Level 1 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

ProtectV StartGuard. FIPS Level 1 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ProtectV StartGuard FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Non-Proprietary Security Policy DOCUMENT NUMBER: 002-010841-001 AUTHOR: DEPARTMENT: LOCATION OF ISSUE: SafeNet Certification Team R & D Program Managaement Redwood

More information

SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework and self-attestation via The KYC Registry Security Attestation Application FAQ

SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework and self-attestation via The KYC Registry Security Attestation Application FAQ SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework and self-attestation via The KYC Registry Security Attestation Application FAQ 1 SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework Why has SWIFT launched new security

More information

COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATION REPORT

COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATION REPORT COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATION REPORT Lexmark CX920, CX921, CX922, CX923, CX924, XC9235, XC9245, XC9255, and XC9265 Multi-Function Printers 7 February 2018 383-4-434 V1.0 Government of Canada. This document

More information

9 GENERATION INTEL CORE DESKTOP PROCESSORS

9 GENERATION INTEL CORE DESKTOP PROCESSORS PRODUCT BRIEF 9 GENERATION INTEL CORE DESKTOP PROCESSORS TH The Most Powerful Generation of Intel Core Processors Introducing the NEW 9th Gen Intel Core desktop processors - the most powerful generation

More information

RISC-V as a basis for ASIP design A Quantum-Resistant IoT Security Implementation

RISC-V as a basis for ASIP design A Quantum-Resistant IoT Security Implementation RISC-V as a basis for ASIP design A Quantum-Resistant IoT Security Implementation Agenda Introductions RISC-V and ASIPs Implementation of Security Methods Performance results Codasip and SecureRF ASIP

More information

Update on NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization. Lily Chen National Institute of Standards and Technology USA

Update on NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization. Lily Chen National Institute of Standards and Technology USA Update on NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Lily Chen National Institute of Standards and Technology USA Where we are? Dec 2016 NIST Announcement of Call for Proposals on post-quantum cryptography

More information

Secure Development Lifecycle

Secure Development Lifecycle Secure Development Lifecycle Strengthening Cisco Products The Cisco Secure Development Lifecycle (SDL) is a repeatable and measurable process designed to increase Cisco product resiliency and trustworthiness.

More information

Designing a System. We have lots of tools Tools are rarely interesting by themselves Let s design a system... Steven M. Bellovin April 10,

Designing a System. We have lots of tools Tools are rarely interesting by themselves Let s design a system... Steven M. Bellovin April 10, Designing a System We have lots of tools Tools are rarely interesting by themselves Let s design a system... Steven M. Bellovin April 10, 2007 1 Some of Our Tools Encryption Authentication mechanisms Access

More information

Trusted Computing Group

Trusted Computing Group Trusted Computing Group Backgrounder May 2003 Copyright 2003 Trusted Computing Group (www.trustedcomputinggroup.org.) All Rights Reserved Trusted Computing Group Enabling the Industry to Make Computing

More information

ISO/IEC Common Criteria. Threat Categories

ISO/IEC Common Criteria. Threat Categories ISO/IEC 15408 Common Criteria Threat Categories 2005 Bar Biszick-Lockwood / QualityIT Redmond, WA 2003 Purpose This presentation introduces you to the threat categories contained in ISO/IEC 15408, used

More information

Seagate Supply Chain Standards and Operational Systems

Seagate Supply Chain Standards and Operational Systems DATA IS POTENTIAL Seagate Supply Chain Standards and Operational Systems Government Solutions Henry Newman May 9 2018 Supply Chain Standards and Results Agenda 1. 2. SUPPLY CHAIN REQUIREMENTS AND STANDARDS

More information

Securing IoT devices with STM32 & STSAFE Products family. Fabrice Gendreau Secure MCUs Marketing & Application Managers EMEA Region

Securing IoT devices with STM32 & STSAFE Products family. Fabrice Gendreau Secure MCUs Marketing & Application Managers EMEA Region Securing IoT devices with STM32 & STSAFE Products family Fabrice Gendreau Secure MCUs Marketing & Application Managers EMEA Region 2 The leading provider of products and solutions for Smart Driving and

More information

Connecting Securely to the Cloud

Connecting Securely to the Cloud Connecting Securely to the Cloud Security Primer Presented by Enrico Gregoratto Andrew Marsh Agenda 2 Presentation Speaker Trusting The Connection Transport Layer Security Connecting to the Cloud Enrico

More information

Synthesis of Fault-Attack Countermeasures for Cryptographic Circuits

Synthesis of Fault-Attack Countermeasures for Cryptographic Circuits Synthesis of Fault-Attack Countermeasures for Cryptographic Circuits Hassan Eldib, Meng Wu, and Chao Wang CAV, July 23, 2016 Cryptographic Algorithm: an example Plaintext Chip Ciphertext 0110 1001 1011

More information

Maximizing heterogeneous system performance with ARM interconnect and CCIX

Maximizing heterogeneous system performance with ARM interconnect and CCIX Maximizing heterogeneous system performance with ARM interconnect and CCIX Neil Parris, Director of product marketing Systems and software group, ARM Teratec June 2017 Intelligent flexible cloud to enable

More information

Dawn Song

Dawn Song 1 Virtual Machines & Security Dawn Song dawnsong@cs.berkeley.edu Virtual Machines VM: Execution environment that gives the illusion of a real machine VMM/Hypervisor: host software which provides this capability

More information

DETECTING, DETERMINING AND LOCALIZING MULTIPLE ATTACKS IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK - MALICIOUS NODE DETECTION AND FAULT NODE RECOVERY SYSTEM

DETECTING, DETERMINING AND LOCALIZING MULTIPLE ATTACKS IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK - MALICIOUS NODE DETECTION AND FAULT NODE RECOVERY SYSTEM DETECTING, DETERMINING AND LOCALIZING MULTIPLE ATTACKS IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK - MALICIOUS NODE DETECTION AND FAULT NODE RECOVERY SYSTEM Rajalakshmi 1, Umamaheswari 2 and A.Vijayaraj 3 1 Department

More information

Protect Your Organization from Cyber Attacks

Protect Your Organization from Cyber Attacks Protect Your Organization from Cyber Attacks Leverage the advanced skills of our consultants to uncover vulnerabilities our competitors overlook. READY FOR MORE THAN A VA SCAN? Cyber Attacks by the Numbers

More information

Case Study: The Evolution of EMC s Product Security Office. Dan Reddy, CISSP, CSSLP EMC Product Security Office

Case Study: The Evolution of EMC s Product Security Office. Dan Reddy, CISSP, CSSLP EMC Product Security Office Case Study: The Evolution of EMC s Product Security Office Dan Reddy, CISSP, CSSLP EMC Product Security Office 1 The Evolution of EMC Product Security 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-Beyond External Drivers Hackers

More information

Certification Report

Certification Report Certification Report EAL 2+ Evaluation of McAfee Enterprise Mobility Management 9.7 Issued by: Communications Security Establishment Canada Certification Body Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification

More information

Certification Report

Certification Report Certification Report Issued by: Communications Security Establishment Certification Body Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme Government of Canada, Communications Security Establishment,

More information

Data Encryption Standard

Data Encryption Standard ECE 646 Lecture 7 Data Encryption Standard Required Reading W. Stallings, "Cryptography and Network-Security," 5th Edition, Chapter 3: Block Ciphers and the Data Encryption Standard Chapter 6.1: Multiple

More information

Breaking Hardware Wallets

Breaking Hardware Wallets Breaking Hardware Wallets Breaking Bitcoin September 2017 Nicolas Bacca @btchip Why Hardware Wallets? - high level overview YES NO Public data Do you want to send 1.337 BTC to 1UnREADABLE Operations on

More information

MARIE: An Introduction to a Simple Computer

MARIE: An Introduction to a Simple Computer MARIE: An Introduction to a Simple Computer 4.2 CPU Basics The computer s CPU fetches, decodes, and executes program instructions. The two principal parts of the CPU are the datapath and the control unit.

More information

Top 10 Database Security Threats and How to Stop Them. Rob Rachwald Director of Security Strategy

Top 10 Database Security Threats and How to Stop Them. Rob Rachwald Director of Security Strategy Top 10 Database Security Threats and How to Stop Them Rob Rachwald Director of Security Strategy Data Has Value Data Has Value Top 7 Attacks Discussed in Hacker Forums 11% 9% 12% 12% 15% 21% 20% dos/ddos

More information

Authentication Handshakes

Authentication Handshakes AIT 682: Network and Systems Security Topic 6.2 Authentication Protocols Instructor: Dr. Kun Sun Authentication Handshakes Secure communication almost always includes an initial authentication handshake.

More information

Secure Firmware Update Lab Session

Secure Firmware Update Lab Session Secure Firmware Update Lab Session Shotaro Saito, Staff Application Engineer, Secure MCU Class ID: BL02I Renesas Electronics America Inc. Shotaro Saito, Application Engineer 24 years in Embedded Systems

More information

Combating Cyber Risk in the Supply Chain

Combating Cyber Risk in the Supply Chain SESSION ID: CIN-W10 Combating Cyber Risk in the Supply Chain Ashok Sankar Senior Director Cyber Strategy Raytheon Websense @ashoksankar Introduction The velocity of data breaches is accelerating at an

More information

fips185 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology

fips185 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION 185 1994 February 9 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology ESCROWED ENCRYPTION STANDARD CATEGORY: TELECOMMUNICATIONS

More information

CODESSEAL: Compiler/FPGA Approach to Secure Applications

CODESSEAL: Compiler/FPGA Approach to Secure Applications CODESSEAL: Compiler/FPGA Approach to Secure Applications Olga Gelbart 1, Paul Ott 1, Bhagirath Narahari 1, Rahul Simha 1, Alok Choudhary 2, and Joseph Zambreno 2 1 The George Washington University, Washington,

More information

200 IT Security Job Interview Questions The Questions IT Leaders Ask

200 IT Security Job Interview Questions The Questions IT Leaders Ask 200 IT Security Job Interview Questions The Questions IT Leaders Ask IT security professionals with the right skills are in high demand. In 2015, the unemployment rate for information security managers

More information

Messaging Overview. Introduction. Gen-Z Messaging

Messaging Overview. Introduction. Gen-Z Messaging Page 1 of 6 Messaging Overview Introduction Gen-Z is a new data access technology that not only enhances memory and data storage solutions, but also provides a framework for both optimized and traditional

More information

Course Curriculum for Master Degree in Network Engineering and Security

Course Curriculum for Master Degree in Network Engineering and Security Course Curriculum for Master Degree in Network Engineering and Security The Master Degree in Network Engineering and Security is awarded by the Faculty of Graduate Studies at Jordan University of Science

More information