Security when applications become web sites
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1 1/20 Security when applications become web sites Andrea Bittau, Arti Gupta, and David Mazières April 30, 2010
2 Web and apps perceived differently 2/20 Users know software can do bad things. Conservative: only install trusted software. Users believe web sites cannot do bad things to system. Liberal about visiting dubious web sites.
3 Web and apps converging 3/20 The Web s evolution: rich apps (e.g., Gmail, games) Ever increasing functionality and performance demand. Security problems will only get worse. Browser becoming platform for running applications Gmail Google Docs Flash game
4 NaCl: run x86 in browser Google Native Client run x86 code in browser: High performance. Easy porting of legacy code. 4/20 Quake 91,582 LoC
5 NaCl: run x86 in browser, securely 5/20 Problem: how to sandbox x86 code? /etc/passwd quake.nexe mov $0, %ecx # O_RDONLY mov "/etc/passwd", %ebx mov $5, %eax # open int $0x80 # syscall Solution: 1 Compile code to verifiable form. 2 Verify code prior to launch. quake.c nacl-gcc quake.nexe sel ldr
6 Our work: add syscalls, securely 6/20 Problem: how to securely allow syscalls? game1.sav quake.nexe Quake server
7 Our work: add syscalls, securely 6/20 Problem: how to securely allow syscalls? game1.sav quake.nexe Quake server
8 Our work: add syscalls, securely 6/20 Problem: how to securely allow syscalls? game1.sav quake.nexe /etc/passwd smtp.victim.com Quake server Challenge: figure out policy and enforce it
9 Motivating examples 7/20 Quake Online gaming. VOIP client Live support while shopping online. Peer-to-peer streaming video player No need for server bandwidth. Photo editor and publisher No need for server CPU expense.
10 Example: Hypothetical Flickr 8/20 1. Visit Flickr s NaCl web site 2. Choose file to upload 3. Edit picture 4. Upload!
11 Architecture 9/20 browser Apps Policy modules NaCl sandbox API Kernel
12 User actions specify user s intent 10/20 Security: carry out user intentions and nothing more. User wants to open pic.jpg User expects app will read pic.jpg User action: select pic.jpg via file chooser.
13 User actions grant privileges 11/20 Give applications privileges based on user actions [Karp06] Endorsement filechooser:///pic.jpg Policy module Privilege read:///pic.jpg User action File chooser Textbox Link text Button Example of possible capability granted Read file Allow connection to host Allow connection to peers specified in torrent file obtained from link Allow microphone access Policy modules: generic and small (e.g., bittorrent 100 LoC)
14 Trusted UI gives user action proof 12/20 Code add trusted(textbox, "SMTP server"); User interface displayed Endorsements ( privileges) textbox://smtp server/smtp.com tcp://smtp.com:25
15 Trusted UI gives user action proof 12/20 Code add trusted(textbox, "SMTP server"); add trusted(textbox, "Type warez.com to continue"); User interface displayed Endorsements ( privileges) textbox://smtp server/smtp.com tcp://smtp.com:25 textbox://type warez.com to continue/warez.com
16 Allow controlled sharing using IFC 13/20 flickr.com flickr.nexe pass.txt pic.jpg
17 Allow controlled sharing using IFC 13/20 How to allow sharing data, and avoid exfiltration? flickr.com stats.com flickr.nexe desksearch.nexe pass.txt pic.jpg index.db
18 Allow controlled sharing using IFC 13/20 How to allow sharing data, and avoid exfiltration? flickr.com stats.com search.com flickr.nexe desksearch.nexe websearch.nexe pass.txt pic.jpg index.db
19 Allow controlled sharing using IFC 13/20 How to allow sharing data, and avoid exfiltration? flickr.com stats.com search.com flickr.nexe desksearch.nexe websearch.nexe pass.txt pic.jpg index.db
20 Allow controlled sharing using IFC 13/20 How to allow sharing data, and avoid exfiltration? flickr.com stats.com search.com flickr.nexe desksearch.nexe websearch.nexe pass.txt pic.jpg index.db Need Information Flow Control (IFC).
21 Track data and control export 14/20 To prevent data disclosure: 1 Label data. 2 Taint processes that hold labeled data. 3 Deny tainted processes from talking to network. flickr.com stats.com search.com flickr.nexe desksearch.nexe websearch.nexe pic.jpg index.db
22 Track data and control export 14/20 To prevent data disclosure: 1 Label data. 2 Taint processes that hold labeled data. 3 Deny tainted processes from talking to network. flickr.com stats.com search.com flickr.nexe desksearch.nexe websearch.nexe pic.jpg index.db
23 Track data and control export 14/20 To prevent data disclosure: 1 Label data. 2 Taint processes that hold labeled data. 3 Deny tainted processes from talking to network. flickr.com stats.com search.com flickr.nexe desksearch.nexe websearch.nexe pic.jpg index.db
24 Track data and control export 14/20 To prevent data disclosure: 1 Label data. 2 Taint processes that hold labeled data. 3 Deny tainted processes from talking to network. flickr.com stats.com search.com flickr.nexe desksearch.nexe websearch.nexe pic.jpg index.db
25 Labels control information flow 15/20 Red on previous slide represents a category of taint. Category An arbitrary string, e.g., secret. Label A set of integrity and secrecy categories. desksearch.nexe S [flickr video], I [] pic.jpg S [flickr], I [flickr] stats.com S [], I [] Information can flow from x to y if: Secrecy categories of x y. Integrity categories of y x.
26 Category owners control data export 16/20 Category owners can export data. They can remove owned categories from their label. pic.jpg S [flickr], I [flickr] flickr.nexe S [flickr], I [flickr] O [flickr] flickr.com S [], I [] NaCl applications own the following categories: Category HTTP origin Hash of app binary Certificate that signed app Allows sharing between in same page Instances of same application from same vendor
27 Telephoning from your browser 17/20 Make and receive calls from your browser: Live phone support while shopping online. Sales callbacks. NaCl benefits: Can reuse SIP libraries: 347,501 LoC. Need performance for audio codecs.
28 Client-based video streaming 18/20 Watch and stream videos using bittorrent. No need for server bandwidth. High performance for video codecs. Security requirements: Restrict network traffic to bittorrent peers. Restrict disk access to bittorrent files. movie.torrent: tracker.com:
29 NaCl bittaurent player 19/20 Policy module tracker.nexe (100 LoC; cf. 327,000 untrusted): Connects only to trackers authorized by user. Grants privileges only for IPs returned by tracker. bitplayer.nexe S [], I [] tracker.nexe S [], I []
30 NaCl bittaurent player 19/20 Policy module tracker.nexe (100 LoC; cf. 327,000 untrusted): Connects only to trackers authorized by user. Grants privileges only for IPs returned by tracker. bitplayer.nexe S [], I [[click://rocky]] tracker.nexe S [], I []
31 NaCl bittaurent player 19/20 Policy module tracker.nexe (100 LoC; cf. 327,000 untrusted): Connects only to trackers authorized by user. Grants privileges only for IPs returned by tracker. get rocky bitplayer.nexe OK S [], I [[click://rocky], [tcp:// ], [tcp:// ], [tcp:// ]] tracker.nexe S [], I [] tracker.com:
32 NaCl bittaurent player Policy module tracker.nexe (100 LoC; cf. 327,000 untrusted): Connects only to trackers authorized by user. Grants privileges only for IPs returned by tracker. 19/20 bitplayer.nexe S [], I [[click://rocky], [tcp:// ], [tcp:// ], [tcp:// ]] get rocky OK get evil NO! tracker.nexe S [], I [] tracker.com: evil.com:
33 Summary 20/20 Convergence of applications and web sites is inevitable. Web apps need more performance and functionality. Threatens to undermine already tenuous browser security. Information flow control transcends complex module interactions. Infer user s intent from actions. 1 User action generates endorsement. 2 Policy modules translate endorsements to privileges.
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