Petros Maniatis, Devdatta Akhawe, Kevin Fall, Elaine Shi, Stephen McCamant, Dawn Song
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1 Petros Maniatis, Devdatta Akhawe, Kevin Fall, Elaine Shi, Stephen McCamant, Dawn Song
2 Secure Data HotOS2011 3
3 Secure Data HotOS2011 4
4 Secure Data HotOS2011 5
5 Secure Data HotOS2011 6
6 Secure Data HotOS2011 7
7 Diverse modes of data use and storage outside owner s control Distinct organizations, infrastructures, jurisdictions Unknown software, maintenance, trustworthiness Deep, continuous, critical sharing Today: trust everyone to do anything undetected, or die Secure Data HotOS2011 9
8 Owner sets data policy: Data Use Controls (DUCs) Policy enforced on data while out-of-custody Data provenance maintained through all change 1. Support current OSes and applications without limiting choice 2. Remove OS, applications from the TCB, verify 3. Provide good performance Legacy is the Killer App Secure Data HotOS
9 Secure Data HotOS
10 Unmodified OS Application HW Secure Data HotOS
11 Trusted Unmodified OS Application HyperVisor HW HRoT/TPM Secure Data HotOS
12 Trusted Unmodified OS SEE System Interposer Application Taint Tracker HyperVisor HW HRoT/TPM Secure Data HotOS
13 Trusted Unmodified OS DUC Engine SEE System Interposer Application DUC Provenance Auth Taint Tracker HyperVisor HW HRoT/TPM Secure Data HotOS
14 Secure Data HotOS
15 Petros s Foot MRI Mass here, mass there DUC Dr. Magneto can edit Dr. Ken can view Provenance Nurse Jackie Created Secure Data HotOS
16 Petros s Foot MRI Mass here, mass there DUC Dr. Magneto can edit Dr. Ken can view Provenance Nurse Jackie Created Dr. Magneto appended text, cropped image Secure Data HotOS
17 Trusted Unmodified OS DUC Provenance Release Keys DUC Engine Auth Secure Launch SEE System Interposer Taint Tracker HW Application HyperVisor Secure Launch HRoT/TPM Secure Data HotOS
18 Trusted Unmodified OS DUC Engine SEE System Interposer Application DUC Provenance Auth Taint Tracker HyperVisor HW HRoT/TPM Secure Data HotOS
19 Trusted Unmodified OS DUC Engine SEE My photo Before Tainted ADD After Auth Application MUL MOV JMP Secure Data HotOS
20 Trusted Unmodified OS DUC DUC Engine Auth Sandbox Application MRI X-Ray Release Taint Taint Provenance Intercept Cropped Taint Intercepted Released Other Obj No taint Secure Data HotOS
21 Flow tracking does much of the heavy lifting, slooooowly Might improve with: Restriction, Granularity, Asynchrony, Hardware How to keep as little as possible of policy evaluation and flow tracking in TCB? Why T, CB? Prove it, please! Are DUCs meaningful to humans? Composable? App-specific? Covert channels a serious threat with untrusted applications A tussle between flexibility leak-ability, what can we do in between? Aggregation/analytics? Secure Data HotOS
22 Thank You! Secure Data HotOS
23 Ampoules Caplets Flasks Pods Cocoons Sheaths Husks Bob Secure Data HotOS
24 The Enterprise Rights Management approach Everyone uses same SW platform, applications Like begging for non-compliance Tough across organization/jurisdiction boundaries Decentralized Information Flow Control New OSes: small TCB but incompatible (e.g., HiStar), or compatible but large TCB (e.g., Flume) New languages (e.g., Jif): rewrite applications, no protection at OS custody Red/Green models: Trust application, disallow sharing, coarse granularity Secure Data HotOS
25 Sandboxes can have variable semantic richness 1. Know nothing of semantics Act as a data sink, block all output except display Storage Capsules [Borders2008] 2. Understand information flow Allow output of data, sharing across apps Must track flow of sensitive bits to outputs (DIFT) 3. Understand application or data semantics Need trusted enforcers for app-specific policy For now, targeting #2 with support for #3 Secure Data HotOS
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