Android & TrustZone. Jonathan Levin (C) 2016 Jonathan Levin & Technologeeks.com - Share freely, but please cite source!
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1 Android & TrustZone Jonathan Levin
2 `whoami` Jonathan Levin, CTO of technologeeks[.com] Group of experts doing consulting/training on all things internal Author of a growing family of books: Mac OS X/iOS Internals Android Internals ( *OS Internals ( (C) 2016 Jonathan Levin Share freely, but please cite source! For more details Technologeeks.com
3 Plan TrustZone Recap of ARMv7 and ARMv8 architecture Android Implementations Samsung, Qualcomm, Others
4 TrustZone & ELx
5 TrustZone Hardware support for a trusted execution environment Provides a separate secure world Self-contained operating system Isolated from non-secure world In AArch64, integrates well with Exception Levels EL3 only exists in the secure world EL2 (hypervisor) not applicable in secure world. De facto standard for security enforcement in mobile world
6 TrustZone Regular User mode (Untrusted) TrustZone User mode, root (Untrusted, Privileged) Kernel mode (Trusted, Privileged) Hardware
7 Trust Zone Architecture (Aarch32) Source: ARM documentation
8 Android uses of TrustZone Cryptographic hardware backing (keystore, gatekeeper) Key generation, storage and validation are all in secure world Non secure world only gets tokens Public keys accessible in non-secure world Secret unlocking (e.g. Passwords) can be throttled or auto-wiped DRM - special case crypto hardware backing) Hardware backed entropy PRNG code NFC (Android Pay) Kernel and boot chain integrity
9 Samsung uses of TrustZone TrustZone is a fundamental substrate for KNOX Trusted Integrity Measurement Attestation (TIMA) provides Client Certificate Management (CCM) Extends keystore by hardware backing Periodic Kernel Measurement (PKM ) Similar to ios s KPP periodically checks kernel page hashes Realtime Kernel Protection (RKP) Intercepts events from kernel using traps to secure monitor (SMC)
10 Implementation (AArch32) Implemented by a Secure Configuration Register (SCR) NS = 1: not secure. NS = 0 not not secure secure SCR is co-processor CP15,c1 Cannot be accessed in non-secure world: Need SMC instruction to move to secure world first MMU enforces memory separation between worlds Interrupts (IRQ/FIQ) can be handled by secure world
11 Entering TrustZone (AArch32) SMC to TrustZone is like SVC/SWI to supervisor mode Control transferred to a monitor vector in secure world SMC Prefetch Abort Data Abort 0x1C IRQ FIQ
12 Voluntary Transition: SMC SMC only valid while in [super/hyper]visor mode (i.e. requires the OS to be in kernel mode or higher) D
13 Recap: Exception Handling (AArch64) EL0 (user) App 0,0... App 0,n App 1,0... App 1,n Trusted App Trusted App SVC Exceptions EL1 (kernel) OS 0 (Main) Kernel SMC HVC OS 1 Kernel SMC HVC Secure Kernel EL2 (unused) Hypervisor SMC ERET ERET EL3 (Secure Monitor) Secure Monitor ( 特权模型分离技术 )
14 ELx state maintenance CPU maintains separate SP_ELx, and set of registers* Register Purpose SCR_ELx Secure Configuration Register ESR_Elx Exception Syndrome Register VBAR_ELx Vector Based Address Register TTBRy_ELx Translation Table Base TCR_ELx Translation Control Register SCTLR_ELx System Control Register CPTR_ELx Feature Trap register (FP, SIMD) TPIDR_ELx Thread Pointer ID CPACR_Elx Architectural Feature Control (FP,SIMD) Access to lower EL registers can be trapped in higher EL. * - Partial list
15 Setting up Trustzone 32-bit: CPU boots into secure world (NS=0) Loader/kernel sets up monitor vector (SMC, IRQ or FIQ entries) Sets up SCR NS=1 and drops to Normal World 64-bit: CPU boots into EL3 Secure Monitor sets up VBAR_ELx (SError, IRQ or FIQ entries) Drops to EL2 (Hypervisor) or EL1 (kernel)
16 AArch64 Exception Handling VBAR_Elx +0x000 Currrent EL, SP0 Synchronous IRQ/vIRQ FIQ/vFIQ SError/vSError VBAR_Elx +0x200 Currrent EL, SPSel Synchronous IRQ/vIRQ FIQ/vFIQ SError/vSError VBAR_Elx +0x400 Lower EL, AArch64 Synchronous IRQ/vIRQ FIQ/vFIQ SError/vSError VBAR_Elx +0x600 Lower EL, AArch32 Synchronous IRQ/vIRQ FIQ/vFIQ SError/vSError
17 Android & TrustZone BootROM/SBL loads TZ image of secure OS Usually in a TZ partition on flash Backup (identical) usually also present Trustzone kernel usually an ELF image Actual implementation is vendor-specific Examples: Nvidia, Qualcomm Linux Kernel communicates with TZ kernel via driver Driver exports character device to user mode (Usually) dedicated daemon to communicate with kernel
18 Android & TrustZone keystore com.android.application HAL gatekeeper HAL TZ Daemon (e.g. qseecomd) SVC Kernel TZ Driver 3 rd Party Android SMC Vendor Linux TZ OS
19 Android & TrustZone: NVidia NVidia (Nexus 9):
20 Android & TrustZone: Qualcomm # ls -l lrwxrwxrwx root root :51 DDR -> /dev/block/mmcblk0p28 lrwxrwxrwx root root :51 aboot -> /dev/block/mmcblk0p8 lrwxrwxrwx root root :51 abootbak -> /dev/block/mmcblk0p14.. lrwxrwxrwx root root :51 boot -> /dev/block/mmcblk0p37.. lrwxrwxrwx root root :51 keymaster -> /dev/block/mmcblk0p32 lrwxrwxrwx root root :51 keymasterbak -> /dev/block/mmcblk0p34 lrwxrwxrwx root root :51 keystore -> /dev/block/mmcblk0p44... llrwxrwxrwx root root :51 tz -> /dev/block/mmcblk0p4 lrwxrwxrwx root root :51 tzbak -> /dev/block/mmcblk0p11 lrwxrwxrwx root root :51 userdata -> /dev/block/mmcblk0p45 lrwxrwxrwx root root :51 vendor -> /dev/block/mmcblk0p39 # dd if=tz of=/data/local/tmp/tz records in records out bytes transferred in secs ( bytes/sec)
21 Android & TrustZone: Samsung ls l dev/block/platform/ ufs/by-name lrwxrwxrwx root root :53 BOOT -> /dev/block/sda5 lrwxrwxrwx root root :53 BOTA0 -> /dev/block/sda1 lrwxrwxrwx root root :53 BOTA1 -> /dev/block/sda2 lrwxrwxrwx root root :53 CACHE -> /dev/block/sda16 lrwxrwxrwx root root :53 DNT -> /dev/block/sda10 lrwxrwxrwx root root :53 EFS -> /dev/block/sda3 lrwxrwxrwx root root :53 HIDDEN -> /dev/block/sda17 lrwxrwxrwx root root :53 OTA -> /dev/block/sda7 lrwxrwxrwx root root :53 PARAM -> /dev/block/sda4 lrwxrwxrwx root root :53 PERSDATA -> /dev/block/sda13 lrwxrwxrwx root root :53 PERSISTENT -> /dev/block/sda11 lrwxrwxrwx root root :53 RADIO -> /dev/block/sda8 lrwxrwxrwx root root :53 RECOVERY -> /dev/block/sda6 lrwxrwxrwx root root :53 SBFS -> /dev/block/sda14 lrwxrwxrwx root root :53 STEADY -> /dev/block/sda12 lrwxrwxrwx root root :53 SYSTEM -> /dev/block/sda15 lrwxrwxrwx root root :53 TOMBSTONES -> /dev/block/sda9 lrwxrwxrwx root root :53 USERDATA -> /dev/block/sda18 root@s6# cat partitions grep -v sda major minor #blocks name loop sdb # Boot loader sdc # CryptoManager vnswap0
22 Have Image, will reverse From Secure World: If you can get TZ image, start at VBAR_EL3 Find SMC/ handler (Synchronous) Find IRQ/FIQ handlers From Non-Secure World: Get kernel or bootloader disarm and look for SMC calls
23 disarm # disarm will automatically find strings when used as arguments root@s6# JCOLOR=1 disarm /dev/sdb1 less -R... 0x0003fac4 0xd00002e0 ADRP X0, 94 ; X0 = 0x9d000 0x0003fac8 0x9112e000 ADD X0, X0, #1208 ; X0 = X0 + 0x4b8 = 0x9d4b8 0x0003facc 0x BL 0x44c50 ; = 0x44c50(" This is a non-secure chip. Skip...").. # So now we know 03fac4 is called on non-secure chip.. Search back using?0x3fac4 # disarm will attempt to auto guess the arguments to SMC as well 0x0003f9f4 0x12801de0 MOVN X0, #239 0x0003f9f8 0x MOVZ W1, 0x0 0x0003f9fc 0x2a1403e2 MOV X2, X20 ; X2 = X20 (0xf7120) 0x0003fa00 0xa9bf7bfd STP X29, X30, [SP,#-16]! 0x0003fa04 0xd SMC #0 ; (X0=0xffffffffffffff10, X1=0x0, X2=0xf7120..) 0x0003fa08 0xa8c17bfd LDP X29, X30, [SP],#16 0x0003fa0c 0x f CMN W0, #1 0x0003fa10 0x2a0003e2 MOV X2, X0 ; X2 = X0 (?) 0x0003fa14 0x B.EQ 0x3fac4 # can also grep SMC... 0x0004f014 0xd SMC #0 ; (X0=0xc , X1=0x0, X2=0x22..) 0x0004f044 0xd SMC #0 ; (X0=0xc , X1=0x0, X2=0x21..) 0x0004f098 0xd SMC #0 ; (X0=0xc , X1=0x0, X2=0x20..) 0x0004f0c8 0xd SMC #0 ; (X0=0xc , X1=0x0, X2=0x1f..)... Simple but effective ARM64 disassembler (
24 Trusty Google s attempt to standardize TEE Oses Baked into Linux kernel tree: /drivers/trusty/ Used by Nvidia Based on lk (similar to aboot) and provides: gatekeeper, keymaster, NVRAM modules Kernel driver LK base Trusty OS
25 Linux Kernel Support Generic TrustZone driver integrated into 3.10 Qualcomm (msm) kernels have SCM driver Secure Channel Manager Creates a character device which qseecomd opens Driver issues SMC instructions, passes command buffers Terrible buggy driver Terrible buggy daemon - Step by step hack of QCOM TZ Amazing exploit and explanation Masterful hack, and a great read!
26 Android Vulnerabilities
27 Thank you! Questions/comments welcome we consult & train on this stuff Website: Book: (C) 2016 Jonathan Levin Share freely, but please cite source! For more details Technologeeks.com
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