The Geometry of Innocent Flesh on the Bone
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1 The Geometry of Innocent Flesh on the Bone Return-into-libc without Function Calls (on the x86) Hovav Shacham CCS 07
2 Technical Background Gadget: a short instructions sequence (e.x. pop %edx; ret;) Return-Oriented Programming(ROP): a technique by which an attacker can induce arbitrary behavior in a program whose control flow he has diverted, without injecting any code Return-into-libc: a buffer overflow attack which causes the vulnerable program to jump to some existing code which is already loaded into the memory
3 Background: Attacker Model Must find some way to subvert the program s control flow Overwriting a return address on the stack Must cause the program to act in the manner of his choosing Injecting code into the process image
4 Background: Defenses Non-executable stack W X: Marks all writeable( W ) locations in a process address space as non-executable( X ) Deployment: Linux (via PaX patches); OpenBSD; Windows; OS X; Hardware support: Intel XD bit, AMD NX bit
5 Background: Existing Problem Return-into-libc is considered a limited attack the attacker can execute only straight-line code calling one libc function after another the attacker can be restricted removing certain functions from libc
6 Building Blocks:Traditional vs New return-into-libc Traditional return-into-libc building blocks are functions can be removed by the maintainers of libc Our building blocks are short code sequences very difficult to eliminate
7 Building Blocks We rely on the following: x86 instructions are not aligned we can make out more words on the page x86 ISA is extremely dense random byte stream can be interpreted as a series of valid instruction with high probability Our goal Find sequences that end in a return instruction ( c3 ) libc contains many such sequences
8 Building Blocks: Example f7 c f c3 test $0x , %edi setnzb -61(%ebp) Starting one byte later c f movl $0x0f000000, (%edi) 95 xchg %ebp, %eax 45 inc %ebp c3 ret
9 Building Blocks: Defense Apply an instruction alignment scheme ( like the one MIPS uses ) Cons Code compiled for this scheme cannot call libraries not compiled for this May introduce slowdowns
10 New return-into-libc Techniques Short code sequences Calls no functions at all The code sequences have random interfaces, unlike function-call interface is standard. Called code sequences weren t placed in libc by the authors, so are not easily removed.
11 Finding Sequences: Useful Instruction Sequences Valid instructions sequences that : could be used on our gadgets end in a ret instruction None of the instructions should cause the processor to transfer execution away ( not reaching the ret ) ret causes the processor to continue to the next step
12 Finding Sequences: Recording our Findings Any suffix of an instruction sequence is also a useful instruction sequence e.g. If we find "a; b; c; ret" then "b; c; ret" also exist We care if some sequence occurs but not how often it does We chose to record sequences on a trie root of the trie is the ret
13 Finding Sequences: Producing the Trie The Idea Scan backwards from an already found sequence for valid instructions Some sequences ending with ret are ignored leave; ret; pop %ebp; ret; ret; or unconditional jump
14 Finding Sequences: Implementation
15 Implementation & Performance Results Analyzed 1,189,501 bytes of libc's executable segment yielded a trie with 15,121 nodes took 1,6 sec on 1.33GHz PowerPC G4 with 1GB RAM
16 Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) Stack pointer (%esp) determines which instruction sequence to fetch & execute Processor doesn t automatically increment %esp; but the ret at end of each instruction sequence does
17 Operations Load/Store Loading a Constant Loading from Memory Storing to Memory Control Flow Unconditional Jump Conditional Jumps Arithmetic & Logic Add Exclusive OR (XOR) And, Or, Not Shift and Rotate System Calls
18 Load a constant into a register
19 Add Operation
20 Control Flow: Unconditional Jump
21 Control Flow: Conditional Jump Strategy: Check whether a value is equal to zero by using neg clears CF if equal to zero or sets CF otherwise We have a word that contains either esp_delta (if flag is 1) or 0 (if flag is 0) esp_delta is the amount we d like to perturb %esp by Perturb %esp by the computed amount (using esp_delta or 0)
22 System Calls (1/2) Syscalls have simple wrappers in libc with the following behavior: move the arguments from the stack to the registers arguments are loaded in register %ebx, %ecx, %edx, %esi, %edi, %ebp (in this order) set the syscall number in %eax trap into the kernel check for error and translate the return value we can invoke any syscall we want by: setting up the parameters ourselves jump into a wrapper that is immediately before lcall
23 System Calls (2/2)
24 Return-Oriented Shellcode (1/2) Invokes the execve system call to run a shell. Requirements: Set the system call index in %eax to 0xb (execve) Set the path of the program to run in %ebx to the string /bin/sh Set the argument vector argv in %ecx Set the environment vector envp in %edx
25 Return-Oriented Shellcode (2/2)
26 Return-Oriented Shellcode (2/2) lacll is invoked with arguments: %ebx = /bin/sh %ecx = addr of argv %edx = addr of envp
27 Catalog of rets: Origin of c3 byte Check whether c3: belongs to a function exported in libc s SYMTAB section disassemble the function until we discover which instruction includes the c3 Out of 975,626 covered bytes, 5,483 are c3 bytes (one in every 178)
28 Catalog of rets: avoid spurious rets each procedure could have a single exit point ( early exits jump to this point ) %ebx could be avoided as an accumulator for adds moves from %eax to %ebx could be avoided (or written using instruction other than mov ) instruction placements could be adjusted (avoid offsets with c3) Drawbacks compiler would be less transparent and complicated loss of efficiency in the use of registers
29 Catalog of rets: kinds of returns c3 near return c2 imm16 near return with stack unwind cb far return ca imm16 far return with stack unwind Last three variants are more difficult to use in the exploits we described
30 Conclusion A new way of organising return-into-libc exploits on x86 Discovered short instruction sequences Showed how to combine such sequences into gadgets
31 Thank you! Questions? Παπαδόπουλος Παναγιώτης-Ηλίας Παπαδογιαννάκη Ευαγγελία Κλεφτογιώργος Κωνσταντίνος
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