One Year of SSL Internet Measurement ACSAC 2012
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1 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement ACSAC 2012 Olivier Levillain, Arnaud Ébalard, Benjamin Morin and Hervé Debar ANSSI / Télécom SudParis December 5th 2012
2 Outline 1 SSL/TLS: a brief tour 2 Methodology of the measures 3 Analysis methodology 4 Some results 5 Conclusion and perspectives 1/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
3 Outline 1 SSL/TLS: a brief tour 2 Methodology of the measures 3 Analysis methodology 4 Some results 5 Conclusion and perspectives 2/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
4 SSL/TLS : a key component of internet security Originally, SSL/TLS is a transport layer between TCP and HTTP HTTP HTTP SSL TCP TCP 3/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
5 SSL/TLS : a key component of internet security Originally, SSL/TLS is a transport layer between TCP and HTTP HTTP HTTP SSL TCP TCP Security properties Server authentication (or mutual authentication) Data condentiality Data integrity 3/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
6 SSL/TLS : a key component of internet security Originally, SSL/TLS is a transport layer between TCP and HTTP HTTP HTTP SSL TCP TCP Security properties Server authentication (or mutual authentication) Data condentiality Data integrity Today, SSL/TLS is everywhere SMTPS, IMAPS, LDAPS... Virtual Private Networks EAP-TLS 3/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
7 A typical TLS connection Client ClientHello Server ServerHello Certificate ServerHelloDone ClientKeyExchange ChangeCipherSpec Finished ChangeCipherSpec Finished Application data 4/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
8 Protocol history SSLv2, published by Netscape (1995) SSLv3, a major update to overcome SSLv2 structural aws (1996) TLSv1.0 essentially SSLv3 with editorial changes (2001) from this point, the protocol has been maintained by IETF TLSv1.1, which patches a cryptographic aw (2006) TLSv1.2, which brings a little more exibility (2008) 5/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
9 Known issues about SSL/TLS Protocol conceptual aws no handshake integrity (SSLv2) insecure renegotiation (all versions before 2010) information leak through compression (CRIME) 6/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
10 Known issues about SSL/TLS Protocol conceptual aws no handshake integrity (SSLv2) insecure renegotiation (all versions before 2010) information leak through compression (CRIME) Cryptographic weaknesses short keys PKCS#1 v1.5 implementation Mac-Then-Encrypt implementation Implicit IV in CBC mode (BEAST) 6/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
11 Known issues about SSL/TLS Protocol conceptual aws no handshake integrity (SSLv2) insecure renegotiation (all versions before 2010) information leak through compression (CRIME) Cryptographic weaknesses short keys PKCS#1 v1.5 implementation Mac-Then-Encrypt implementation Implicit IV in CBC mode (BEAST) Certicate problems generation : lack of entropy validation : null characters, wrongly used APIs revocation : Comodo, Diginotar 6/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
12 Known issues about SSL/TLS Protocol conceptual aws no handshake integrity (SSLv2) insecure renegotiation (all versions before 2010) information leak through compression (CRIME) Cryptographic weaknesses short keys PKCS#1 v1.5 implementation Mac-Then-Encrypt implementation Implicit IV in CBC mode (BEAST) Certicate problems generation : lack of entropy validation : null characters, wrongly used APIs revocation : Comodo, Diginotar How to improve the quality of TLS connections? 6/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
13 Outline 1 SSL/TLS: a brief tour 2 Methodology of the measures 3 Analysis methodology 4 Some results 5 Conclusion and perspectives 7/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
14 How to enumerate HTTPS hosts? Enumerate every routable IPv4 address to nd open HTTPS ports 8/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
15 How to enumerate HTTPS hosts? Enumerate every routable IPv4 address to nd open HTTPS ports Contact HTTPS hosts based on a list of DNS names 8/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
16 How to enumerate HTTPS hosts? Enumerate every routable IPv4 address to nd open HTTPS ports Contact HTTPS hosts based on a list of DNS names Collect real HTTPS trac from consenting users 8/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
17 How to enumerate HTTPS hosts? Enumerate every routable IPv4 address to nd open HTTPS ports EFF Contact HTTPS hosts based on a list of DNS names Qualys SSL Pulse NetCraft Collect real HTTPS trac from consenting users Holz et al., The SSL Landscape A Thorough Analysis of the X.509 PKI Using Active and Passive Measurements (IMC '11) 8/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
18 How to enumerate HTTPS hosts? Enumerate every routable IPv4 address to nd open HTTPS ports EFF our measures Contact HTTPS hosts based on a list of DNS names Qualys SSL Pulse NetCraft Collect real HTTPS trac from consenting users Holz et al., The SSL Landscape A Thorough Analysis of the X.509 PKI Using Active and Passive Measurements (IMC '11) 8/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
19 Our two-phase program Phase 1 : nding IPs with open TCP/443 2 billion routable IPv4 addresses randomisation of the set of addresses to contact limited upstream rate to avoid links overloading trade-o to get a time-coherent snapshot : 2 weeks, rate bounded at 100 kb/s 9/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
20 Our two-phase program Phase 1 : nding IPs with open TCP/443 2 billion routable IPv4 addresses randomisation of the set of addresses to contact limited upstream rate to avoid links overloading trade-o to get a time-coherent snapshot : 2 weeks, rate bounded at 100 kb/s Phase 2 : TLS session attempt about 1 % of hosts have TCP/443 open description of the message exchanged we send a ClientHello (the stimulus) we gather the answer, at most until the ServerHelloDone we send a TCP Reset 9/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
21 The dierent types of answers Client Server 10/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
22 The dierent types of answers Client ClientHello Server 10/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
23 The dierent types of answers Client ClientHello Server ServerHello Certificate ServerHelloDone TCP Reset 10/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
24 The dierent types of answers Client ClientHello Server Alert TCP Reset TCP Reset 10/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
25 The dierent types of answers Client ClientHello Server Non TLS content TCP Reset 10/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
26 Description of the 10 campaigns Id Date SSLv2 Max version Ciphersuites Extensions NoExt1 2010/07 no TLSv1.0 Firefox None EFF /08 yes TLSv1.0 SSLv2 + TLSv1 None EFF /12 yes TLSv1.0 SSLv2 + TLSv1 None NoExt2 2011/07 no TLSv1.0 Firefox None DHE 2011/07 no TLSv1.0 DHE Suites None FF 2011/07 no TLSv1.0 Firefox EC, Reneg, Ticket EC 2011/07 no TLSv1.0 EC Suites EC SSL2 2011/07 yes SSLv2 SSLv2 None SSL /07 yes TLSv1.0 SSLv2 + TLSv1 Reneg TLS /07 no TLSv1.2 Mostly TLSv1.2 EC, Reneg, Ticket Those last 7 stimuli were sent in parallel to study in detail the server behaviour. 11/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
27 Global statistics Id IPs with Non-TLS TLS TCP/443 answers answers NoExt1 21,342, % 46 % EFF-1 15,579, % 73 % EFF-2 7,777,511 1 % 99 % NoExt2 26,218, % 43 % DHE 26,218, % 34 % FF 26,218, % 43 % EC 26,218, % 36 % SSL2 26,218, % 19 % SSL2+ 26,218, % 43 % TLS12 26,218, % 36 % 12/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
28 Outline 1 SSL/TLS: a brief tour 2 Methodology of the measures 3 Analysis methodology 4 Some results 5 Conclusion and perspectives 13/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
29 Subsets For each campaign, we consider 3 subsets : TLS hosts Trusted hosts (using Firefox certicate store) EV hosts 14/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
30 Studied critera TLS parameters protocol version chosen by the server ciphersuite selected by the server secure renegotiation support 15/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
31 Studied critera TLS parameters protocol version chosen by the server ciphersuite selected by the server secure renegotiation support Quality of the certication chain Certificate message analysis key sizes validity periods 15/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
32 Studied critera TLS parameters protocol version chosen by the server ciphersuite selected by the server secure renegotiation support Quality of the certication chain Certificate message analysis key sizes validity periods Server behaviour version intolerance ciphersuite intolerance 15/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
33 Outline 1 SSL/TLS: a brief tour 2 Methodology of the measures 3 Analysis methodology 4 Some results 5 Conclusion and perspectives 16/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
34 Protocol version For a typical campaign (NoExt1, EFF1, EFF2, NoExt2, FF), the version chosen are stable in time : TLS Trusted EV TLS1 96 % SSL3 4 % TLS1 99 % SSL3 1 % TLS1 99 % SSL3 1 % 17/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
35 Secure Renegotiation extension (RFC 5746) Only 3 stimuli proposed the extension All in 2011, so we can not observe a trend In the three cases, the proportion of servers accepting the extension is the same TLS hosts 53 % Trusted 65 % EV 80 % 18/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
36 The Certificate message The RFC indicates that all the certicates of the chain should be present in the order of the chain the root may be ommited In practice, we saw four types of chains RFC-compliant Self-contained Transvalid Incomplete 19/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
37 Evolution of the types of the chains R : 60 % R : 61 % R : 59 % R : 54 % TLS S : 9 % S : 8 % S : 10 % S : 10 % T : 4 % T : 3 % T : 6 % T : 6 % I : 27 % I : 28 % I : 25 % I : 30 % R : 69 % R : 71 % R : 67 % R : 62 % Trusted S : 21 % S : 19 % S : 21 % S : 24 % T : 10 % T : 10 % T : 12 % T : 14 % R : 11 % R : 13 % R : 16 % R : 12 % EV S : 78 % S : 76 % S : 74 % S : 83 % T : 11 % T : 11 % T : 10 % T : 5 % 20/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
38 Some gures about certicates RSA is by far the main signature algorithm used in certs Typical RSA key size was 1024 bits in 2010 but 2048 bits is now mandatory for EV certicates 21/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
39 Some gures about certicates RSA is by far the main signature algorithm used in certs Typical RSA key size was 1024 bits in 2010 but 2048 bits is now mandatory for EV certicates but we saw bits or 384 bit keys in the measures 512 bit trusted certs still found in July /28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
40 Some gures about certicates RSA is by far the main signature algorithm used in certs Typical RSA key size was 1024 bits in 2010 but 2048 bits is now mandatory for EV certicates but we saw bits or 384 bit keys in the measures 512 bit trusted certs still found in July 2011 Typical Certificate message contains at most 3 certs 21/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
41 Some gures about certicates RSA is by far the main signature algorithm used in certs Typical RSA key size was 1024 bits in 2010 but 2048 bits is now mandatory for EV certicates but we saw bits or 384 bit keys in the measures 512 bit trusted certs still found in July 2011 Typical Certificate message contains at most 3 certs but one trusted host sent 150 certicates in /28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
42 Some gures about certicates RSA is by far the main signature algorithm used in certs Typical RSA key size was 1024 bits in 2010 but 2048 bits is now mandatory for EV certicates but we saw bits or 384 bit keys in the measures 512 bit trusted certs still found in July 2011 Typical Certificate message contains at most 3 certs but one trusted host sent 150 certicates in 2010 Typical validity period is one or two years 21/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
43 Some gures about certicates RSA is by far the main signature algorithm used in certs Typical RSA key size was 1024 bits in 2010 but 2048 bits is now mandatory for EV certicates but we saw bits or 384 bit keys in the measures 512 bit trusted certs still found in July 2011 Typical Certificate message contains at most 3 certs but one trusted host sent 150 certicates in 2010 Typical validity period is one or two years but some certs are valid until 9999 and others never were (notbefore > notafter) 21/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
44 Server behaviour We now consider the 7 stimuli sent in July 2011 essentially at the same time Based on the certicates returned, we are condent the hosts contacted were stable accross the 7 answers Redene our subsets : TLS hosts are hosts that spoke TLS at least once Trusted hosts are hosts that returned a trusted chain at least once Same thing for EV hosts 22/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
45 The DHE stimulus DHE stands for Die-Hellman Ephemeral DHE provides Perfect Forward Secrecy The DHE stimulus only proposed DHE ciphersuites TLS Trusted EV Compatible Handshake 39 % 42 % 13 % Alert 38 % 28 % 71 % Intolerant servers 23 % 30 % 16 % Non-TLS answer 22 % 30 % 16 % Incompatible Handshake 1 % 0 % 0 % 23/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
46 The TLS12 stimulus The TLS12 stimulus proposed versions TLSv1.0 to TLSv1.2 Servers can answer with TLSv1.0 if they don't know TLSv1.2 (and they should, because it is part of the negotiation) TLS Trusted EV Compatible Handshake 76 % 74 % 86 % Alert 7 % 5 % 2 % Intolerant servers 17 % 21 % 12 % Non-TLS answer 16 % 21 % 12 % Incompatible Handshake 1 % 0 % 0 % 24/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
47 Outline 1 SSL/TLS: a brief tour 2 Methodology of the measures 3 Analysis methodology 4 Some results 5 Conclusion and perspectives 25/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
48 Conclusion Study of the IPv4 HTTPS landscape from July 2010 to July 2011 Simultaneous stimuli in July 2011, allowing to observe the server behaviour (more complex as it seems, Google's False Start) Dierent subsets and dierent times to show some trends Studied criteria were not only about certicates Lots of surprising answers 26/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
49 Conclusion Study of the IPv4 HTTPS landscape from July 2010 to July 2011 Simultaneous stimuli in July 2011, allowing to observe the server behaviour (more complex as it seems, Google's False Start) Dierent subsets and dierent times to show some trends Studied criteria were not only about certicates Lots of surprising answers EV is a certicate label and has a clear impact on RSA key sizes and certicate validity periods However, on all other criteria, EV hosts behave poorly (they are even worse than the global TLS statistics in some cases) Need for a label attesting the global quality of TLS connections 26/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
50 Future work More criteria to study more TLS parameters (DH groups, revocation mechanisms, other extensions) take HTTP parameters into account (mixed content) 27/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
51 Future work More criteria to study more TLS parameters (DH groups, revocation mechanisms, other extensions) take HTTP parameters into account (mixed content) New campaigns use real navigation data contact the HTTPS hosts identied and inspect them thoroughly 27/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
52 Questions? This work has been partially sponsored by the EC 7th Framework Programme as part of the ICT Vis-Sense project (grant no ) Thank you for your attention 28/28 One Year of SSL Internet Measurement - December 5th 2012
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