Resilient Smart Grids

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Resilient Smart Grids André Teixeira Kaveh Paridari, Henrik Sandberg KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden SPARKS 2nd Stakeholder Workshop Cork, Ireland March 25th, 2015

Legacy Distribution Grids Main objectives Satisfy power demand Keep nominal voltage levels Maintain frequency at 50Hz Limited capabilities: Passive loads cannot be freely controlled Small number of measurements Feeders, transformers, end of line voltage Few control points Transformers, switches March 25, 2015 2

From Legacy Grids to Smart Grids Main objectives Satisfy power demand Keep nominal voltage levels Maintain frequency at 50Hz Enhanced capabilities: Smart controllable devices Large increase in measurements Smart meters, power inverters Large increase in control loops (devices with power inverters) Electric vehicles Solar panels Wind turbines Batteries March 25, 2015 3

Smart Grids More smart controllable devices and control loops established through power inverters Large increase in communication and data Requires standard communication protocols (IEC 61850) Leads to increasing vulnerability to cyber-physical threats March 25, 2015 4

Resilient Smart Grids The Smart Grid is a cyber-physical system Power system and IT infrastructure tightly coupled through control loops Traditional IT security provides necessary tools but not sufficient to secure cyber-physical systems Cyber threats can have physical consequences! Need for methods to understand and mitigate attacks: Which threats should we care about? What impact can we expect from attacks? How to reduce the impact of such threats? Risk Assessment Resilient Control

Resilient Smart Grids Resilience: the ability to maintain acceptable levels of operation in the presence of abnormal conditions. Operator Sources of abnormality: Disturbances Faults Cyber-threats Resilient operation requirements: Satisfy power demand Keep nominal voltage levels Maintain frequency at 50Hz Ensure state awareness Satisfy operational constraints Graceful degradation March 25, 2015 6

Resilient Control Methodology Inputs: Risk assessment Threat scenarios Resilient Control Goals: Mitigate risk to increase resilience Resilient Control Approaches: Anomaly / Intrusion Detection Distributed Resource Management Fault-Tolerant and Robust Control Desired Outputs: Mitigated risk March 25, 2015 7

Resilient Control Approaches Anomaly Detection Data-Analytics Formal Methods Distributed Resource Management What sensors / actuators to use? How to allocate control / estimation effort? Fault-Tolerant and Robust Control Ensure safety in spite of failures How can high-risk faults / attacks be mitigated? March 25, 2015 8

Attack Scenarios Operator Potential Adversary Goals: Shut-off critical power-inverters Override control loops Reconfigure controllers Falsify monitoring data Potential Consequences Component failure Cascading failure Economical losses March 25, 2015 9

Data-Driven Anomaly Detection Learn normal behaviours from historic data Network traffic Power consumption/generation Wind / solar generation profiles D D D D Include physical laws Three-phase power flows Correlations between variables Detect abnormal patterns Unusual data traffic Unusual switching commands Non-conforming data March 25, 2015 10

Formal Anomaly Detection Methods SCADA Protocol specification Allowed sequences of commands Allowed data-exchange D3 D2 DX D1 Detect non-conforming behaviors Unauthorized commands Unauthorized data exchange Non-conforming data traces March 25, 2015 11

Distributed Resource Management Threat scenario: DER device failure Safety protection (over-frequency / over-voltage) Cyber attack Distributed power compensation Compute new feasible set-points to maintain power balance Coordination between main grid and several power inverters (battery, wind turbine, electric vehicles) March 25, 2015 12

Fault-Tolerant and Robust Control Threat scenario: Critical DER device failure Disconnection from main grid Predictive Control with Contingencies Maintain a N-1 reliability level: Meet operational constraints with at most one component failure Ensure computed setpoints satisfy safety coinstraints under hypothetical failures March 25, 2015 13

SPARKS: Resilient Smart Grids Inputs: Risk assessment Threat scenarios Resilient Control Goals: Mitigate risk to increase resilience Resilient Control Approaches: Anomaly / Intrusion Detection Distributed Resource Management Fault-Tolerant and Robust Control Desired Outputs: Mitigated risk March 25, 2015 14