Railroad Infrastructure Security

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Transcription:

TRB Annual Meeting January 14, 2002 Session 107 - Railroad Security William C. Thompson william.thompson@jacobs.com 402-697-5011

Thanks to: Bob Ulrich Dr. William Harris Byron Ratcliff Frank Thigpen John Ross George Biedenbender

Creating awareness of security issues Railroad History Incident Handling Process Considerations when updating your emergency response plan Threats and Mitigation of Other Risks Countermeasure Study and Research Needs

Railroads and Natural Disasters In their 175+ years of operation, US railroads have encountered many natural disasters that have damaged or destroyed track and equipment Snow & Ice Storms Floods Landslides Earthquakes Hurricanes & Tornadoes

Railroad Response to Natural Disasters Developed staff and equipment capabilities to deal with natural disasters Established opportunities for contractors to augment their internal staff Negotiated agreements to carry trains of competitive railroads under agreed conditions in case of line blockage

Railroads and Hazmat Major carriers of hazardous materials Crews are trained in response to hazmat releases in accidents Have protocols in place to call on shippers of hazmat and consignees to augment their staff in controlling and clean up after releases

Railroads and Criminal Attacks Train robberies were once common Railroads established police forces with independent police authority and with provisions for cooperation with government law enforcement offices Criminal acts against railroads are rare

Reasons for Attacks on Railroads Terrorists may seek to endanger the population by attacking trains carrying hazardous or nuclear materials Terrorists may seek to disrupt essential governmental shipments of military equipment by attacking trains or routes essential to that traffic Terrorists may seek to disrupt the US economy by disrupting commercially essential shipments

How can Terrorists Attack Railroads Railroad tracks and switches are vulnerable to attacks by unbolting of joint bars or misalignment of switches Railroad bridges are vulnerable to attack by explosives Railroad tunnels are vulnerable to attacks by explosives and chem-bio agents Railroad control and dispatching systems are vulnerable to explosive and to cyber attacks

Railroad Response to Terrorists Increase awareness of railroad management and employees to vulnerabilities and training of responders Increase surveillance of critical assets Seek inputs from government agencies on threats and responses to threats Take appropriate measures to share information between railroads as through Information Sharing and Analysis Centers

Railroad Incident Response Process Notification & secure site Advise management First step backwards Check haz-mat Employee and public exposure Send in investigation team Determine root cause * Clean-up Return to service

Derailment Investigation Process (SOP) Safety first Train, track & crew documentation Drug testing and interviews Site sketch, drawings or video Event recorder evaluation Determine point of derailment Determine first car derailed Analysis Determine cause

Continuous Improvement (also Quality Process or PDCA) Identification Analysis Determine alternative solutions Develop solutions Implementation Evaluation

Critical Lesson Learned: Everybody involved in the management, investigation and cleanup of the incident must communicate clearly and absolutely ensure that each correctly understands the other. Effective and precise communication is critical to minimizing further risk.

Considerations when updating your emergency response plan Following can be used as a checklist

Threat Assessment Vulnerability Analysis Risk Management Decision Security Countermeasures

Threat Assessment At what level are we operating? Low Moderate Significant High

Assessment Process Awareness is key

Threat Assessment From whom do you get your threat information? How do you disseminate the information? Exactly what does the information mean? Evaluate the Source Categorize the information Prioritize

Vulnerability Assessment Who? What? When? Where? How? As related to the railroad or transit.

Assessment Process Who can be called a legitimate threat? Disgruntled employees, vendors or contractors Disaffected individuals Individual with intent to commit a felony

Assessment Process What are areas of maximum regret? Mass Casualties Facility Failure Medium to long term denial of service

Assessment Process When are your assets most vulnerable Identify your most critical assets Level of control/interface with external infrastructure Interactions

Availability of Friendly Forces Internal security forces? Coordination with federal, state and local authorities? Coordination with contractors? Coordination with on-call experts? Do you have a plan in place that can be activated immediately? Command and Response Structure in place

How can a threat be carried out against your critical assets What assets do you control? What are your redundant assets? What is the status of your detection and sensor systems?

Risk Management Decisions What is the threat? Where are you vulnerable? What type of countermeasures are deployed? Who will deploy? Who is in control? Does everyone involved understand what is being communicated?

Risk Management Decisions Primary Objectives Prevent casualties Ensure integrity of assets Provide for continued operations Reduce costs

Risk Management Decisions Assess countermeasures in place How is police or internal security force trained, organized and equipped? How is security force deployed? Do you have a central communications and command system in place?

Risk Management Decisions Is your response plan coordinated among all friendly forces? Does your response plan have redundancies in systems, procedures and processes? Does your response plan allow for changes in threat level?

Security Countermeasures Systems and plans must be designed to: Deter Detect Delay Deny / defend Defeat

Security Countermeasures Security Triad Detection Assessment Response

Security Countermeasures Detection Human Assets Electronic Assets Canine Assets

Security Countermeasures Assessment Determine Extent of Incident Single event vs. multiple attacks Critical nature of event How disruptive Does your communication system allow you to make an assessment? Have you tested under stress?

Security Countermeasures Response and Reconstitution Post incident mode Accurate communication Identified multiple evacuation routes Established containment systems Known roles and responsibilities

Security Countermeasures Response and Reconstitution Crisis management plans in place Consensus building by all respondents Interdependence of responding agencies Preparedness drills

Training An effort that must be accomplished Unit level training Individual level Team level Organizational level Equipment training Organizational Equipment vendors Outside organizations

Countermeasure Study and Research Needs Staffing, planning and decision support Real-time assessment, detection & warning Systems analysis Stability Redundancy and system integration Cross-functional impacts (cyber) Personal protective equipment Air handling systems Decontamination