Trace Augmentation: What Can Be Done Even Before Preprocessing in a Profiled SCA?
|
|
- Michael Singleton
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Trace Augmentation: What Can Be Done Even Before Preprocessing in a Profiled SCA? Sihang Pu 1 Yu Yu 1 Weijia Wang 1 Zheng Guo 1 Junrong Liu 1 Dawu Gu 1 Lingyun Wang 2 Jie Gan 3 Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China {push.beni, yyuu, aawwjaa, guozheng, liujr, dwgu}@sjtu.edu.cn Shanghai Viewsource Information Science and Technology Company, China lingyun.wang@viewsources.com Beijing Smart-Chip Microelectronics Technology Co., Ltd. Beijing, China ganjie@sgitg.sgcc.com.cn CARDIS, 17
2 Outline 1 Introduction 2 Trace augmentation Trace augmentation Lazy-Validation 3 Simulating Experiments Software-based Experiments FPGA-based Experiments
3 Introduction Profiled SCA Profiling phase Exploitation phase Profiling device Target device Known key profiling traces exploitation traces profiling Power model exploitation result
4 Introduction Profiled SCA Profiled side-channel attack: Adds a profiling phase to the original SCA Can be considered as the powerful class of power analysis But: It presumes high similarity between profiling device and target device Otherwise, result in less desirable performance All existing solutions [1, 2] mainly focus on the dedicated designing of profiling method [1] C. Whitnall, E. Oswald and etl. Robust Profiled DPA, CHES 15. [2] W. Wang, Y. Yu, F.-X. Standaert and etl. Ridge-Based Profiled Differential Power Analysis, CT-RSA 17.
5 Introduction Preprocessing techniques Preprocessing Traces with noise Traces with less noise Good examples: Lowpass Principal component analysis (PCA) Linear discriminant analysis (LDA) Singular spectrum analysis (SSA) These techniques mainly focus on ameliorating the SNR. But: They may not work well with deviated target devices;
6 Introduction Motivation What can be done during (or even before) the preprocessing stage to make the subsequent attacks more robust? Raw data? Preprocessing Profiling Robust model
7 Trace Augmentation: What Can Be Done Even Before Preprocessing in a Profiled SCA? Introduction Data augmentation It is popular in the deep learning community It is used to mitigate overfitting and build a more robust model
8 Trace augmentation Trace augmentation Trace augmentation through random shift 1 Shift each trace horizontally at random. 2 Repeat step 1 several times to yield many perturbed traces. 3 Append these new perturbed traces to original set.
9 Trace augmentation Trace augmentation A visual illustration of trace augmentation Before augmentation Augmentation yields more traces Shift randomly then combine
10 Trace augmentation Trace augmentation Parameters Shift ratio, γ: quantifies the extent of random shift: perturb each trace with a horizontal random shift drawn uniformly from [ γ d, γ d], where d denotes the number of leakage points Augmentation ratio, C: quantifies The number of expanded traces, N new = γc N original
11 Trace augmentation Lazy-Validation Trace augmentation through random shift It is tricky to define a general rule to select the two undetermined parameters (i.e., γ and C). But we noted that: 1 The augmentation ratio, C, does not depend much on the attack scenario, thus we simply choose C = 1; 2 The shift ratio, γ, affect the improvement of trace augmentation significantly, thus we design the lazy-validation.
12 Trace augmentation Lazy-Validation Lazy-Validation Raw profiling traces split profiling traces exploitation traces Candidate γ Trace augmentation explotation profiling Power model Guessing entropy Choose the largest γwith the same Guessing entropy
13 Trace augmentation Lazy-Validation Lazy-Validation γ larger γ 1 (Almost) Same Guessing entropy Significant larger Guessing entropy γ k larger γ k+1 Intuition: it is safe to perturb traces to some certain extent as long as it does not affect the performance in the ideal setting
14 Experiments Simulation-based experiment Practical experiments: Software-based experiments FPGA-based experiments
15 Simulating Experiments Simulating Settings Leakage is subject to the multi-variant Gaussian distribution Choosing means of the distribution by picking random real numbers Generating of covariance matrix: rely on a refined method named vine Parameter β: control the correlations between leakage points; Smaller β value corresponds to the more dependencies among points of each trace Perfect case: the (simulated) traces of profiling and exploitation are subject to the similar distribution (same values of mean and parameter β). Imperfect case: perturb the (standardized) leakage function of the exploitation trace by imposing a noise of uniform distribution U( 5, 5)
16 Simulating Experiments Attack Settings 1 Trace augmentation (optional) 2 LDA to 1 point 3 Template building: Gaussian template building K-means
17 Simulating Experiments Simulating Experimental Results Gaussian template building: , =.1, = 1., = 1. = %, =.1 = %, = 1. = %, = , =.1, = 1., = 1. = %, =.1 = %, = 1. = %, = # of traget traces # of traget traces (a) perfect case (without discrepancy) (b) introducing noise as discrepancy
18 Simulating Experiments Simulating Experimental Results K-means: 35 3 = 1% = % = 3% , =.1, = 1., = 1. = %, =.1 = %, = 1. = %, = # of traget traces (c) perfect case (without discrepancy) # of traget traces (d) introducing noise as discrepancy
19 Software-based Experiments Target Settings Atmel ATMega-163 Consist of 54 leakage points. Perfect case: the points of profiling and exploitation come from the same positions. Imperfect case: adding misalignment between profiling and target traces
20 Software-based Experiments Attack Settings 1 Trace augmentation (optional) 2 PCA to 1 point 3 Gaussian template building
21 Software-based Experiments Software-based Experimental Results 35 3 = 1% = % = 3% = 35% LazyValidation: 15% 3 25 = 1% = % = 3% = 35% LazyValidation: 15% # of target traces # of target traces (e) no misalignment (f) misalignment = 5%
22 Software-based Experiments Software-based Experimental Results 6 5 = 1% = % = 3% = 35% LazyValidation: 15% = 1% = % = 3% = 35% LazyValidation: 15% # of target traces (g) misalignment = 1% # of target traces (h) misalignment = 15%
23 Software-based Experiments Software-based Experimental Results = 1% = % = 3% = 35% LazyValidation: 15% = 1% = % = 3% = 35% LazyValidation: 15% # of target traces (i) misalignment = % # of target traces (j) misalignment = 25%
24 FPGA-based Experiments Target Settings SAKURA-X board leakage points Perfect case: the points of profiling and exploitation come from the same positions. Imperfect case: adding misalignment between profiling and target traces
25 FPGA-based Experiments Attack Settings 1 Trace augmentation (optional) 2 PCA to 1 point 3 Linear-regression based profiling, ridge-based profiling
26 FPGA-based Experiments FPGA-based Experimental Results Linear-regression based profiling: 6 5 = 5% = 15% = % LazyValidation: 1% = 5% = 15% = % LazyValidation: 1% # of target traces (k) no misalignment # of target traces (l) misalignment = 5%
27 FPGA-based Experiments FPGA-based Experimental Results Linear-regression based profiling: 1 1 = 5% = 15% = % LazyValidation: 1% 1 = 5% = 15% = % LazyValidation: 1% # of target traces # of target traces (m) misalignment = 1% (n) misalignment = 15%
28 FPGA-based Experiments FPGA-based Experimental Results Linear-regression based profiling: 1 1 = 5% = 15% = % LazyValidation: 1% 14 1 = 5% = 15% = % LazyValidation: 1% # of target traces (o) misalignment = % # of target traces (p) misalignment = 25%
29 FPGA-based Experiments FPGA-based Experimental Results Ridge-based profiling: 7 = 5% 7 = 5% 6 LazyValidation: 1% = 15% 6 LazyValidation: 1% = 15% # of target traces (q) no misalignment # of target traces (r) misalignment = 5%
30 FPGA-based Experiments FPGA-based Experimental Results Ridge-based profiling: 6 = 5% LazyValidation: 1% = 15% 8 = 5% LazyValidation: 1% = 15% # of target traces # of target traces (s) misalignment = 1% (t) misalignment = 15%
31 Summary&Future Summary Trace augmentation based preprocessing can effectively improve the performance of profiled SCA, in both of the scenarios where: Profiling device behaves close to the target device Profiling device deviates significantly from the target device Lazy-validation to obtain conservative but appropriate parameters Simulation-based and practical experiments Confirm the effectiveness of our approach The improvement depends on the correlation among points of each trace.
32 Summary&Future Future works Explore other possible ways to augment the trace. Why? How much improvement? When?
33 Summary&Future Questions? Thanks for your consideration! Questions?
Lowering the Bar: Deep Learning for Side Channel Analysis. Guilherme Perin, Baris Ege, Jasper van December 4, 2018
Lowering the Bar: Deep Learning for Side Channel Analysis Guilherme Perin, Baris Ege, Jasper van Woudenberg @jzvw December 4, 2018 1 Before Signal processing Leakage modeling 2 After 3 Helping security
More informationImproved Brute Force Search Strategies for Single Trace and Few Traces Template Attacks on the DES Round Keys
Improved Brute Force Search Strategies for Single Trace and Few Traces Template Attacks on the DES Round Keys Mathias Wagner, Stefan Heyse mathias.wagner@nxp.com Abstract. We present an improved search
More informationSide channel attack: Power Analysis. Chujiao Ma, Z. Jerry Shi CSE, University of Connecticut
Side channel attack: Power Analysis Chujiao Ma, Z. Jerry Shi CSE, University of Connecticut Conventional Cryptanalysis Conventional cryptanalysis considers crypto systems as mathematical objects Assumptions:
More informationNon-Profiled Deep Learning-Based Side-Channel Attacks
Non-Profiled Deep Learning-Based Side-Channel Attacks Benjamin Timon UL Transaction Security, Singapore benjamin.timon@ul.com Abstract. Deep Learning has recently been introduced as a new alternative to
More informationThe Applicability of the Perturbation Model-based Privacy Preserving Data Mining for Real-world Data
The Applicability of the Perturbation Model-based Privacy Preserving Data Mining for Real-world Data Li Liu, Murat Kantarcioglu and Bhavani Thuraisingham Computer Science Department University of Texas
More informationA Power Attack Method Based on Clustering Ruo-nan ZHANG, Qi-ming ZHANG and Ji-hua CHEN
2017 International Conference on Computer, Electronics and Communication Engineering (CECE 2017) ISBN: 978-1-60595-476-9 A Power Attack Method Based on Clustering Ruo-nan ZHANG, Qi-ming ZHANG and Ji-hua
More informationRiscure Inspector Release Notes
Date 15 January 2018 Modified behavior Issue number INS-7594 INS-7593 INS-7709 INS-7620 INS-7427 INS-7576 Description Modified behavior: During module execution it was possible to start another module
More informationHow to Certify the Leakage of a Chip?
How to Certify the Leakage of a Chip? F. Durvaux, F.-X. Standaert, N. Veyrat-Charvillon UCL Crypto Group, Belgium EUROCRYPT 2014, Copenhagen, Denmark Problem statement Evaluation / certification of leaking
More informationUsing Machine Learning to Optimize Storage Systems
Using Machine Learning to Optimize Storage Systems Dr. Kiran Gunnam 1 Outline 1. Overview 2. Building Flash Models using Logistic Regression. 3. Storage Object classification 4. Storage Allocation recommendation
More informationStudying Leakages on an Embedded Biometric System Using Side Channel Analysis
Studying Leakages on an Embedded Biometric System Using Side Channel Analysis M. Berthier, Y. Bocktaels, J. Bringer, H. Chabanne, T. Chouta, J-L. Danger, M. Favre, T. Graba Institut Mines-Télécom Outline
More informationA Systematic Approach to the Side-Channel Analysis of ECC Implementations with Worst-Case Horizontal Attacks
A Systematic Approach to the Side-Channel Analysis of ECC Implementations with Worst-Case Horizontal Attacks Romain Poussier, François-Xavier Standaert: Université catholique de Louvain Yuanyuan Zhou:
More informationDissecting Leakage Resilient PRFs with Multivariate Localized EM Attacks
Dissecting Leakage Resilient PRFs with Multivariate Localized EM Attacks A Practical Security Evaluation on FPGA Florian Unterstein Johann Heyszl Fabrizio De Santis a Robert Specht, 13.04.2017 a Technical
More informationAn efficient face recognition algorithm based on multi-kernel regularization learning
Acta Technica 61, No. 4A/2016, 75 84 c 2017 Institute of Thermomechanics CAS, v.v.i. An efficient face recognition algorithm based on multi-kernel regularization learning Bi Rongrong 1 Abstract. A novel
More informationData Mining Chapter 3: Visualizing and Exploring Data Fall 2011 Ming Li Department of Computer Science and Technology Nanjing University
Data Mining Chapter 3: Visualizing and Exploring Data Fall 2011 Ming Li Department of Computer Science and Technology Nanjing University Exploratory data analysis tasks Examine the data, in search of structures
More informationSecond-Order Power Analysis Attacks against Precomputation based Masking Countermeasure
, pp.259-270 http://dx.doi.org/10.14257/ijsh.2016.10.3.25 Second-Order Power Analysis Attacks against Precomputation based Masking Countermeasure Weijian Li 1 and Haibo Yi 2 1 School of Computer Science,
More informationLast time... Bias-Variance decomposition. This week
Machine learning, pattern recognition and statistical data modelling Lecture 4. Going nonlinear: basis expansions and splines Last time... Coryn Bailer-Jones linear regression methods for high dimensional
More informationEM Analysis in the IoT Context: Lessons Learned from an Attack on Thread
EM Analysis in the IoT Context: Lessons Learned from an Attack on Thread Daniel Dinu 1, Ilya Kizhvatov 2 1 Virginia Tech 2 Radboud University Nijmegen CHES 2018 Outline 1 Introduction 2 Side-Channel Vulnerability
More informationSide-Channel Attack against RSA Key Generation Algorithms
Side-Channel Attack against RSA Key Generation Algorithms CHES 2014 Aurélie Bauer, Eliane Jaulmes, Victor Lomné, Emmanuel Prouff and Thomas Roche Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d Information
More informationLinear Methods for Regression and Shrinkage Methods
Linear Methods for Regression and Shrinkage Methods Reference: The Elements of Statistical Learning, by T. Hastie, R. Tibshirani, J. Friedman, Springer 1 Linear Regression Models Least Squares Input vectors
More informationMulticollinearity and Validation CIVL 7012/8012
Multicollinearity and Validation CIVL 7012/8012 2 In Today s Class Recap Multicollinearity Model Validation MULTICOLLINEARITY 1. Perfect Multicollinearity 2. Consequences of Perfect Multicollinearity 3.
More informationHeeyoul (Henry) Choi. Dept. of Computer Science Texas A&M University
Heeyoul (Henry) Choi Dept. of Computer Science Texas A&M University hchoi@cs.tamu.edu Facial Action Coding System Overview Optic Flow Analysis Local Velocity Extraction Local Smoothing Holistic Analysis
More informationLogical Templates for Feature Extraction in Fingerprint Images
Logical Templates for Feature Extraction in Fingerprint Images Bir Bhanu, Michael Boshra and Xuejun Tan Center for Research in Intelligent Systems University of Califomia, Riverside, CA 9252 1, USA Email:
More informationFace Alignment Across Large Poses: A 3D Solution
Face Alignment Across Large Poses: A 3D Solution Outline Face Alignment Related Works 3D Morphable Model Projected Normalized Coordinate Code Network Structure 3D Image Rotation Performance on Datasets
More informationEfficient DPA Attacks on AES Hardware Implementations
I. J. Communications, Network and System Sciences. 008; : -03 Published Online February 008 in SciRes (http://www.srpublishing.org/journal/ijcns/). Efficient DPA Attacks on AES Hardware Implementations
More informationA Methodology for Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis and Its Applications
A Methodology for Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis and Its Applications Jiqiang Lu Presenter: Jian Guo Institute for Infocomm Research, Agency for Science, Technology and Research, 1 Fusionopolis Way,
More informationEfficient Selection of Time Samples for Higher-Order DPA with Projection Pursuits
Efficient Selection of Time Samples for Higher-Order DPA with Projection Pursuits François Durvaux 1, François-Xavier Standaert 1, Nicolas Veyrat-Charvillon 2 Jean-Baptiste Mairy 3, Yves Deville 3. 1 ICTEAM/ELEN/Crypto
More informationA Lightweight AES Implementation Against Bivariate First-Order DPA Attacks Weize Yu and Selçuk Köse
A Lightweight AES Implementation Against Bivariate First-Order DPA Attacks Weize Yu and Selçuk Köse Department of Electrical Engineering University of South Florida 1 Presentation Flow p Side-channel attacks
More informationSide-Channel Countermeasures for Hardware: is There a Light at the End of the Tunnel?
Side-Channel Countermeasures for Hardware: is There a Light at the End of the Tunnel? 11. Sep 2013 Ruhr University Bochum Outline Power Analysis Attack Masking Problems in hardware Possible approaches
More informationCS 229 Midterm Review
CS 229 Midterm Review Course Staff Fall 2018 11/2/2018 Outline Today: SVMs Kernels Tree Ensembles EM Algorithm / Mixture Models [ Focus on building intuition, less so on solving specific problems. Ask
More informationPower Analysis Attacks
Power Analysis Attacks Elisabeth Oswald Computer Science Department Crypto Group eoswald@cs.bris.ac.uk Elisabeth.Oswald@iaik.tugraz.at Outline Working principle of power analysis attacks DPA Attacks on
More informationCS489/698: Intro to ML
CS489/698: Intro to ML Lecture 14: Training of Deep NNs Instructor: Sun Sun 1 Outline Activation functions Regularization Gradient-based optimization 2 Examples of activation functions 3 5/28/18 Sun Sun
More informationAdaptive Doppler centroid estimation algorithm of airborne SAR
Adaptive Doppler centroid estimation algorithm of airborne SAR Jian Yang 1,2a), Chang Liu 1, and Yanfei Wang 1 1 Institute of Electronics, Chinese Academy of Sciences 19 North Sihuan Road, Haidian, Beijing
More informationLearning to Recognize Faces in Realistic Conditions
000 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009 010 011 012 013 014 015 016 017 018 019 020 021 022 023 024 025 026 027 028 029 030 031 032 033 034 035 036 037 038 039 040 041 042 043 044 045 046 047 048 049 050
More informationEdge and corner detection
Edge and corner detection Prof. Stricker Doz. G. Bleser Computer Vision: Object and People Tracking Goals Where is the information in an image? How is an object characterized? How can I find measurements
More informationHOST Differential Power Attacks ECE 525
Side-Channel Attacks Cryptographic algorithms assume that secret keys are utilized by implementations of the algorithm in a secure fashion, with access only allowed through the I/Os Unfortunately, cryptographic
More informationOutline 7/2/201011/6/
Outline Pattern recognition in computer vision Background on the development of SIFT SIFT algorithm and some of its variations Computational considerations (SURF) Potential improvement Summary 01 2 Pattern
More informationData Mining - Data. Dr. Jean-Michel RICHER Dr. Jean-Michel RICHER Data Mining - Data 1 / 47
Data Mining - Data Dr. Jean-Michel RICHER 2018 jean-michel.richer@univ-angers.fr Dr. Jean-Michel RICHER Data Mining - Data 1 / 47 Outline 1. Introduction 2. Data preprocessing 3. CPA with R 4. Exercise
More informationFace recognition based on improved BP neural network
Face recognition based on improved BP neural network Gaili Yue, Lei Lu a, College of Electrical and Control Engineering, Xi an University of Science and Technology, Xi an 710043, China Abstract. In order
More informationPractical Electromagnetic Template Attack on HMAC
Practical Electromagnetic Template Attack on HMAC Pierre Alain Fouque 1 Gaétan Leurent 1 Denis Réal 2,3 Frédéric Valette 2 1ENS,75Paris,France. 2CELAR,35Bruz,France. 3INSA-IETR,35Rennes,France. September
More informationNetwork Traffic Measurements and Analysis
DEIB - Politecnico di Milano Fall, 2017 Introduction Often, we have only a set of features x = x 1, x 2,, x n, but no associated response y. Therefore we are not interested in prediction nor classification,
More informationAn Optimized Pixel-Wise Weighting Approach For Patch-Based Image Denoising
An Optimized Pixel-Wise Weighting Approach For Patch-Based Image Denoising Dr. B. R.VIKRAM M.E.,Ph.D.,MIEEE.,LMISTE, Principal of Vijay Rural Engineering College, NIZAMABAD ( Dt.) G. Chaitanya M.Tech,
More informationAuthenticating Pervasive Devices with Human Protocols
Authenticating Pervasive Devices with Human Protocols Presented by Xiaokun Mu Paper Authors: Ari Juels RSA Laboratories Stephen A. Weis Massachusetts Institute of Technology Authentication Problems It
More informationSupport Vector Machines
Support Vector Machines Chapter 9 Chapter 9 1 / 50 1 91 Maximal margin classifier 2 92 Support vector classifiers 3 93 Support vector machines 4 94 SVMs with more than two classes 5 95 Relationshiop to
More informationI How does the formulation (5) serve the purpose of the composite parameterization
Supplemental Material to Identifying Alzheimer s Disease-Related Brain Regions from Multi-Modality Neuroimaging Data using Sparse Composite Linear Discrimination Analysis I How does the formulation (5)
More informationReliable Information Extraction for Single Trace Attacks
Reliable Information Extraction for Single Trace Attacks Valentina Banciu, Elisabeth Oswald, Carolyn Whitnall Department of Computer Science, University of Bristol MVB, Woodland Road, Bristol BS8 1UB,
More informationA New Feature Local Binary Patterns (FLBP) Method
A New Feature Local Binary Patterns (FLBP) Method Jiayu Gu and Chengjun Liu The Department of Computer Science, New Jersey Institute of Technology, Newark, NJ 07102, USA Abstract - This paper presents
More information( ) =cov X Y = W PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS. Eigenvectors of the covariance matrix are the principal components
Review Lecture 14 ! PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS Eigenvectors of the covariance matrix are the principal components 1. =cov X Top K principal components are the eigenvectors with K largest eigenvalues
More informationUnsupervised Learning
Unsupervised Learning Learning without Class Labels (or correct outputs) Density Estimation Learn P(X) given training data for X Clustering Partition data into clusters Dimensionality Reduction Discover
More informationDeepIM: Deep Iterative Matching for 6D Pose Estimation - Supplementary Material
DeepIM: Deep Iterative Matching for 6D Pose Estimation - Supplementary Material Yi Li 1, Gu Wang 1, Xiangyang Ji 1, Yu Xiang 2, and Dieter Fox 2 1 Tsinghua University, BNRist 2 University of Washington
More informationFEATURE SELECTION TECHNIQUES
CHAPTER-2 FEATURE SELECTION TECHNIQUES 2.1. INTRODUCTION Dimensionality reduction through the choice of an appropriate feature subset selection, results in multiple uses including performance upgrading,
More informationCS-E3200 Discrete Models and Search
Shahab Tasharrofi Department of Information and Computer Science, Aalto University Lecture 7: Complete and local search methods for SAT Outline Algorithms for solving Boolean satisfiability problems Complete
More informationProfiled Model Based Power Simulator for Side Channel Evaluation
Profiled Model Based Power Simulator for Side Channel Evaluation Nicolas Debande 1,2, Maël Berthier 1, Yves Bocktaels 1 and Thanh-Ha Le 1 1 Morpho 18 chaussée Jules César, 95520 Osny, France firstname.familyname@morpho.com
More informationOnce upon a time... A first-order chosen-plaintext DPA attack on the third round of DES
A first-order chosen-plaintext DPA attack on the third round of DES Oscar Reparaz, Benedikt Gierlichs KU Leuven, imec - COSIC CARDIS 2017 Once upon a time... 14 November 2017 Benedikt Gierlichs - DPA on
More informationForecasting Video Analytics Sami Abu-El-Haija, Ooyala Inc
Forecasting Video Analytics Sami Abu-El-Haija, Ooyala Inc (haija@stanford.edu; sami@ooyala.com) 1. Introduction Ooyala Inc provides video Publishers an endto-end functionality for transcoding, storing,
More informationImproved Leakage Model Based on Genetic Algorithm
Improved Leakage Model Based on Genetic Algorithm Zhenbin Zhang 1, Liji Wu 2, An Wang 3, Zhaoli Mu 4 May 4, 2014 Abstract. The classical leakage model usually exploits the power of one single S-box, which
More informationData Mining: Data. Lecture Notes for Chapter 2. Introduction to Data Mining
Data Mining: Data Lecture Notes for Chapter 2 Introduction to Data Mining by Tan, Steinbach, Kumar Data Preprocessing Aggregation Sampling Dimensionality Reduction Feature subset selection Feature creation
More informationA Countermeasure Circuit for Secure AES Engine against Differential Power Analysis
A Countermeasure Circuit for Secure AES Engine against Differential Power Analysis V.S.Subarsana 1, C.K.Gobu 2 PG Scholar, Member IEEE, SNS College of Engineering, Coimbatore, India 1 Assistant Professor
More informationA New Evaluation Method of Node Importance in Directed Weighted Complex Networks
Journal of Systems Science and Information Aug., 2017, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 367 375 DOI: 10.21078/JSSI-2017-367-09 A New Evaluation Method of Node Importance in Directed Weighted Complex Networks Yu WANG
More informationOn the Practical Security of a Leakage Resilient Masking Scheme
On the Practical Security of a Leakage Resilient Masking Scheme T. Roche thomas.roche@ssi.gouv.fr Joint work with E. Prouff and M. Rivain CT-RSA 2014 Feb. 2014 Side Channel Analysis Side Channel Attacks
More informationDimension Reduction CS534
Dimension Reduction CS534 Why dimension reduction? High dimensionality large number of features E.g., documents represented by thousands of words, millions of bigrams Images represented by thousands of
More informationSIDE CHANNEL ATTACKS AGAINST IOS CRYPTO LIBRARIES AND MORE DR. NAJWA AARAJ HACK IN THE BOX 13 APRIL 2017
SIDE CHANNEL ATTACKS AGAINST IOS CRYPTO LIBRARIES AND MORE DR. NAJWA AARAJ HACK IN THE BOX 13 APRIL 2017 WHAT WE DO What we do Robust and Efficient Cryptographic Protocols Research in Cryptography and
More informationAccelerometer Gesture Recognition
Accelerometer Gesture Recognition Michael Xie xie@cs.stanford.edu David Pan napdivad@stanford.edu December 12, 2014 Abstract Our goal is to make gesture-based input for smartphones and smartwatches accurate
More informationK-means clustering Based in part on slides from textbook, slides of Susan Holmes. December 2, Statistics 202: Data Mining.
K-means clustering Based in part on slides from textbook, slides of Susan Holmes December 2, 2012 1 / 1 K-means Outline K-means, K-medoids Choosing the number of clusters: Gap test, silhouette plot. Mixture
More informationSecurity against Timing Analysis Attack
International Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering (IJECE) Vol. 5, No. 4, August 2015, pp. 759~764 ISSN: 2088-8708 759 Security against Timing Analysis Attack Deevi Radha Rani 1, S. Venkateswarlu
More informationThe Curse of Dimensionality
The Curse of Dimensionality ACAS 2002 p1/66 Curse of Dimensionality The basic idea of the curse of dimensionality is that high dimensional data is difficult to work with for several reasons: Adding more
More informationKaggle Data Science Bowl 2017 Technical Report
Kaggle Data Science Bowl 2017 Technical Report qfpxfd Team May 11, 2017 1 Team Members Table 1: Team members Name E-Mail University Jia Ding dingjia@pku.edu.cn Peking University, Beijing, China Aoxue Li
More informationLISA: Explore JMP Capabilities in Design of Experiments. Liaosa Xu June 21, 2012
LISA: Explore JMP Capabilities in Design of Experiments Liaosa Xu June 21, 2012 Course Outline Why We Need Custom Design The General Approach JMP Examples Potential Collinearity Issues Prior Design Evaluations
More informationINTRODUCTION. Model: Deconvolve a 2-D field of random numbers with a simple dip filter, leading to a plane-wave model.
Stanford Exploration Project, Report 105, September 5, 2000, pages 109 123 Short Note Test case for PEF estimation with sparse data II Morgan Brown, Jon Claerbout, and Sergey Fomel 1 INTRODUCTION The two-stage
More informationInterferogram Analysis using Active Instance-Based Learning
Interferogram Analysis using Active Instance-Based Learning Olac Fuentes and Thamar Solorio Instituto Nacional de Astrofísica, Óptica y Electrónica Luis Enrique Erro 1 Santa María Tonantzintla, Puebla,
More informationA Template Attack on Elliptic Curves using Classification methods
Technische Universiteit Eindhoven Master Thesis A Template Attack on Elliptic Curves using Classification methods Author: Elif Özgen Supervisors: Lejla Batina Berry Schoenmakers A thesis submitted in fulfillment
More informationFrom Collision To Exploitation: Unleashing Use-After-Free Vulnerabilities in Linux Kernel
From Collision To Exploitation: Unleashing Use-After-Free Vulnerabilities in Linux Kernel Wen Xu, Juanru Li, Junliang Shu, Wenbo Yang, Tianyi Xie, Yuanyuan Zhang, Dawu Gu Group of Software Security In
More informationFace Detection and Recognition in an Image Sequence using Eigenedginess
Face Detection and Recognition in an Image Sequence using Eigenedginess B S Venkatesh, S Palanivel and B Yegnanarayana Department of Computer Science and Engineering. Indian Institute of Technology, Madras
More informationFace Hallucination Based on Eigentransformation Learning
Advanced Science and Technology etters, pp.32-37 http://dx.doi.org/10.14257/astl.2016. Face allucination Based on Eigentransformation earning Guohua Zou School of software, East China University of Technology,
More informationE044 Ray-based Tomography for Q Estimation and Q Compensation in Complex Media
E044 Ray-based Tomography for Q Estimation and Q Compensation in Complex Media M. Cavalca* (WesternGeco), I. Moore (WesternGeco), L. Zhang (WesternGeco), S.L. Ng (WesternGeco), R.P. Fletcher (WesternGeco)
More informationTutorial Deep Learning : Unsupervised Feature Learning
Tutorial Deep Learning : Unsupervised Feature Learning Joana Frontera-Pons 4th September 2017 - Workshop Dictionary Learning on Manifolds OUTLINE Introduction Representation Learning TensorFlow Examples
More informationBagging Evolutionary Feature Extraction Algorithm for Classification
Bagging Evolutionary Feature Extraction Algorithm for Classification Tianwen Zhao Department of Computer Science Shanghai Jiao Tong University Shanghai, 200030, China ztw505xyz@sjtu.edu.cn Hongtao Lu Department
More informationA Framework for the Analysis and Evaluation of Algebraic Fault Attacks on Lightweight Block Ciphers
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY 1 A Framework for the Analysis and Evaluation of Algebraic Fault Attacks on Lightweight Block Ciphers Fan Zhang, Shize Guo, Xinjie Zhao, Tao Wang,
More informationPrivacy Preserving Decision Tree Mining from Perturbed Data
Privacy Preserving Decision Tree Mining from Perturbed Data Li Liu Global Information Security ebay Inc. liiliu@ebay.com Murat Kantarcioglu and Bhavani Thuraisingham Computer Science Department University
More informationCT Reconstruction with Good-Orientation and Layer Separation for Multilayer Objects
17th World Conference on Nondestructive Testing, 25-28 Oct 2008, Shanghai, China CT Reconstruction with Good-Orientation and Layer Separation for Multilayer Objects Tong LIU 1, Brian Stephan WONG 2, Tai
More informationRSM Split-Plot Designs & Diagnostics Solve Real-World Problems
RSM Split-Plot Designs & Diagnostics Solve Real-World Problems Shari Kraber Pat Whitcomb Martin Bezener Stat-Ease, Inc. Stat-Ease, Inc. Stat-Ease, Inc. 221 E. Hennepin Ave. 221 E. Hennepin Ave. 221 E.
More informationBiometrics Technology: Image Processing & Pattern Recognition (by Dr. Dickson Tong)
Biometrics Technology: Image Processing & Pattern Recognition (by Dr. Dickson Tong) References: [1] http://homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/rbf/hipr2/index.htm [2] http://www.cs.wisc.edu/~dyer/cs540/notes/vision.html
More informationTowards Robust and Flexible Low-Power Wireless Networking
Towards Robust and Flexible Low-Power Wireless Networking Philip Levis (joint work with Leonidas Guibas) Computer Systems Lab Stanford University 3.vii.2007 Low Power Wireless Low cost, numerous devices
More informationBreaking the Bitstream Decryption of FPGAs
Breaking the Bitstream Decryption of FPGAs 05. Sep. 2012 Amir Moradi Embedded Security Group, Ruhr University Bochum, Germany Acknowledgment Christof Paar Markus Kasper Timo Kasper Alessandro Barenghi
More informationCompression of RADARSAT Data with Block Adaptive Wavelets Abstract: 1. Introduction
Compression of RADARSAT Data with Block Adaptive Wavelets Ian Cumming and Jing Wang Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering The University of British Columbia 2356 Main Mall, Vancouver, BC, Canada
More informationSampling-based Planning 2
RBE MOTION PLANNING Sampling-based Planning 2 Jane Li Assistant Professor Mechanical Engineering & Robotics Engineering http://users.wpi.edu/~zli11 Problem with KD-tree RBE MOTION PLANNING Curse of dimension
More informationEfficient Fuzzy Extraction of PUF-Induced Secrets: Theory and Applications
Efficient Fuzzy Extraction of PUF-Induced Secrets: Theory and Applications Extended version: Cryptology eprint Archive, Report 2015/854 Jeroen Delvaux Ingrid Verbauwhede Mandel Yu Dawu Gu Matthias Hiller
More informationLaplacian MinMax Discriminant Projection and its Applications
Laplacian MinMax Discriminant Projection and its Applications Zhonglong Zheng and Xueping Chang Department of Computer Science, Zhejiang Normal University, Jinhua, China Email: zhonglong@sjtu.org Jie Yang
More informationFlexible Calibration of a Portable Structured Light System through Surface Plane
Vol. 34, No. 11 ACTA AUTOMATICA SINICA November, 2008 Flexible Calibration of a Portable Structured Light System through Surface Plane GAO Wei 1 WANG Liang 1 HU Zhan-Yi 1 Abstract For a portable structured
More informationExploratory data analysis for microarrays
Exploratory data analysis for microarrays Jörg Rahnenführer Computational Biology and Applied Algorithmics Max Planck Institute for Informatics D-66123 Saarbrücken Germany NGFN - Courses in Practical DNA
More informationEquation to LaTeX. Abhinav Rastogi, Sevy Harris. I. Introduction. Segmentation.
Equation to LaTeX Abhinav Rastogi, Sevy Harris {arastogi,sharris5}@stanford.edu I. Introduction Copying equations from a pdf file to a LaTeX document can be time consuming because there is no easy way
More informationFace Alignment Under Various Poses and Expressions
Face Alignment Under Various Poses and Expressions Shengjun Xin and Haizhou Ai Computer Science and Technology Department, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China ahz@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn Abstract.
More informationFactorization with Missing and Noisy Data
Factorization with Missing and Noisy Data Carme Julià, Angel Sappa, Felipe Lumbreras, Joan Serrat, and Antonio López Computer Vision Center and Computer Science Department, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona,
More informationDPA CONTEST 08/09 A SIMPLE IMPROVEMENT OF CLASSICAL CORRELATION POWER ANALYSIS ATTACK ON DES
DPA CONTEST 08/09 A SIMPLE IMPROVEMENT OF CLASSICAL CORRELATION POWER ANALYSIS ATTACK ON DES, Fakultät für Informatik Antonio Almeida Prof. Dejan Lazich Karlsruhe, 9 th June 2010 KIT Universität des Landes
More informationImage Quality Assessment Techniques: An Overview
Image Quality Assessment Techniques: An Overview Shruti Sonawane A. M. Deshpande Department of E&TC Department of E&TC TSSM s BSCOER, Pune, TSSM s BSCOER, Pune, Pune University, Maharashtra, India Pune
More informationTap Position Inference on Smart Phones
Tap Position Inference on Smart Phones Ankush Chauhan 11-29-2017 Outline Introduction Application Architecture Sensor Event Data Sensor Data Collection App Demonstration Scalable Data Collection Pipeline
More informationAndrew Shields (Toshiba Research Europe Ltd)
ETSI S ROLE IN THE DEPLOYMENT OF QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION Andrew Shields (Toshiba Research Europe Ltd) Industry Specification Group in Quantum Key Distribution Quantum Key Distribution optical fibre Quantum
More informationPartial Least Squares Regression on Grassmannian Manifold for Emotion Recognition
Emotion Recognition In The Wild Challenge and Workshop (EmotiW 2013) Partial Least Squares Regression on Grassmannian Manifold for Emotion Recognition Mengyi Liu, Ruiping Wang, Zhiwu Huang, Shiguang Shan,
More informationAdaptive Chosen-Message Side-Channel Attacks
Adaptive Chosen-Message Side-Channel Attacks Nicolas Veyrat-Charvillon, François-Xavier Standaert, Université catholique de Louvain, Crypto Group, Belgium. e-mails: nicolas.veyrat;fstandae@uclouvain.be
More informationECRYPT II Workshop on Physical Attacks November 27 th, Graz, Austria. Stefan Mangard.
Building Secure Hardware ECRYPT II Workshop on Physical Attacks November 27 th, Graz, Austria Stefan Mangard Infineon Technologies, Munich, Germany Stefan.Mangard@infineon.com Outline Assets and Requirements
More informationFeature Selection. CE-725: Statistical Pattern Recognition Sharif University of Technology Spring Soleymani
Feature Selection CE-725: Statistical Pattern Recognition Sharif University of Technology Spring 2013 Soleymani Outline Dimensionality reduction Feature selection vs. feature extraction Filter univariate
More information