Fractured Backbones Incidents Detection and Forensics in Telco Networks
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1 Dmitry Kurbatov Sergey Puzankov Vladimir Kropotov Fractured Backbones Incidents Detection and Forensics in Telco Networks ptsecurity.com
2 About us Joint research of Incident Response and Telco Security Teams
3 Introduction
4 Technologies behind telco networks Чем мы пользуемся сегодня и на основе каких технологий это работает
5 Types of Incidents Subscriber location tracking Call interception (wiretapping) SMS interception and spoofing DoS, including balance DoS Other Fraudulent activities Phone number GPS location
6 Incidents statistics. Major threats Service Disruption Data Leakage Fraud Percentage of vulnerable networks
7 Incidents statistics. Data leakage Subscriber s Balance Disclosure Subscriber s Data Leakage Terminating SMS Interception Subscriber Location Discovery Voice Call Interception Percentage of vulnerable networks
8 Incidents statistics. Fraud Terminating Call Redirection Money Transfer via USSD Subscriber Profile Change Originating Call Redirection Percentage of vulnerable networks
9 Incident victims Mobile operator subscribers Mobile operator Other Mobile operators and their subscribers Third parties (often Banks and Their clients)
10 Prerequisites of attacks Internal intruder or Staff initiated attacks Level0 (almost) Kiddies - attacks that not require deep technical knowledge SMS fraud as preliminary stage of malware based attacks Fraud with social engineering (direct target is victim) Proxified fraud with social engineering Level1(Locally initiated) - attacks that require technical knowledge about Radio Access Network protocols IMSI Catcher Bluetooth Calls and SMS from the subscriber located nearby Level2 (Global impact) - attacks that require technical knowledge about telco infrastructure and protocols
11 Lightweight scenarios (Level0)
12 Kiddies fraud examples Typosquatting works well even here You received RUB, please follow the link for confirmation Purchase. Card *1234. Ammount 600 RUB. Drugstore 2000 Available balance RUB Not legit Legit
13 Central bank not only in s... Mature player and kiddies used the same brand name /Cental Bank of Russian Federation/ Your banking cards accounts was suspended! Info: /56e97c089a794797e5b8e6b3
14 Social engineering telco staff Temporary redirect calls and SMS to another number Own victim , social networks accounts, messengers and in some cases Money (Banking OTP TBD) Fast WIN
15 Cases (Level1)
16 SMS interception
17 Voice call interception Originating call Terminating call
18 Voice call interception. MitM
19 Level2 Cases (global impact)
20 Telco infrastructure, technical view
21 Telco infrastructure, technical view
22 Telco infrastructure, technical view
23 Telco infrastructure, technical view
24 IMSI Disclosure
25 Money fraud cases Infect smartphone with malware. Use fake base station (IMSI catcher) and to make software clone of SIM card. Conduct an attack via SS7 network forging USSD request.
26 USSD manipulation Request the balance *100#. Balance is Roubles
27 USSD manipulation *145*xxxxxx81142*10# - Transfer 10 Roubles to the number xxxxxx81142
28 USSD manipulation Cool security mechanism. Just send *145*851# to confirm the transaction
29 USSD manipulation New balance is Roubles. (10 Roubles ~ 0.15 )
30 Calls or SMS on behalf particular person located anywhere SMS spoofing
31 More sophisticated attacks
32 Example
33
34 Voice call redirection with a fraudulent activity Fraud case 1
35 Voice call redirection with a fraudulent activity HLR Billing GMSC Number Zimbabwe IMSI
36 Voice call redirection with a fraudulent activity RegisterSS (IMSI, CFU, ) HLR Billing GMSC RegisterSS Zimbabwe Number IMSI
37 Voice call redirection with a fraudulent activity RegisterSS (IMSI, CFU, ) HLR Billing GMSC RegisterSS IAM (A-Number, B-Number) Zimbabwe Number IMSI
38 Voice call redirection with a fraudulent activity RegisterSS (IMSI, CFU, ) HLR Billing GMSC RegisterSS SendRoutingInfo (MSISDN) IAM (A-Number, B-Number) Zimbabwe Number IMSI
39 Voice call redirection with a fraudulent activity RegisterSS (IMSI, CFU, ) HLR Billing GMSC RegisterSS SendRoutingInfo (MSISDN) IAM (A-Number, B-Number) Zimbabwe Number IMSI
40 Voice call redirection with a fraudulent activity RegisterSS (IMSI, CFU, ) HLR Billing GMSC RegisterSS SendRoutingInfo (MSISDN) IAM (A-Number, B-Number) SendRoutingInfo (CFU, ) Zimbabwe Number IMSI
41 Voice call redirection with a fraudulent activity RegisterSS (IMSI, CFU, ) HLR Billing GMSC RegisterSS SendRoutingInfo (MSISDN) IAM (A-Number, B-Number) SendRoutingInfo (CFU, ) InitialDP (B-Number, ) ApplyCharging, Continue Zimbabwe Number IMSI
42 Voice call redirection with a fraudulent activity RegisterSS (IMSI, CFU, ) HLR Billing GMSC RegisterSS SendRoutingInfo (MSISDN) IAM (A-Number, B-Number) SendRoutingInfo (CFU, ) InitialDP (B-Number, ) ApplyCharging, Continue Cuba IAM (A-Number, ) Zimbabwe Number IMSI
43 Who pays? RegisterSS (IMSI, CFU, ) HLR Billing GMSC RegisterSS SendRoutingInfo (MSISDN) IAM (A-Number, B-Number) SendRoutingInfo (CFU, ) InitialDP (B-Number, ) ApplyCharging, Continue Cuba IAM (A-Number, ) Zimbabwe Number IMSI
44 Who pays? RegisterSS (IMSI, CFU, ) HLR Billing GMSC RegisterSS SendRoutingInfo (MSISDN) IAM (A-Number, B-Number) SendRoutingInfo (CFU, ) InitialDP (B-Number, ) ApplyCharging, Continue Cuba IAM (A-Number, ) Zimbabwe Number IMSI
45 Who pays? RegisterSS (IMSI, CFU, ) HLR Billing GMSC RegisterSS SendRoutingInfo (MSISDN) IAM (A-Number, B-Number) SendRoutingInfo (CFU, ) InitialDP (B-Number, ) ApplyCharging, Continue Cuba IAM (A-Number, ) Zimbabwe Number IMSI
46 Voice call redirection with a fraudulent activity Fraud case 2
47 Voice call redirection with a fraudulent activity HLR Billing GMSC Number Zimbabwe IMSI
48 Voice call redirection with a fraudulent activity UpdateLocation (IMSI, Fake MSC/VLR) HLR Billing GMSC InsertSubscriberData (Profile) Zimbabwe Number IMSI
49 Voice call redirection with a fraudulent activity UpdateLocation (IMSI, Fake MSC/VLR) HLR Billing GMSC InsertSubscriberData (Profile) IAM (A-Number, B-Number) Zimbabwe Number IMSI
50 Voice call redirection with a fraudulent activity UpdateLocation (IMSI, Fake MSC/VLR) HLR Billing GMSC InsertSubscriberData (Profile) SendRoutingInfo (MSISDN) IAM (A-Number, B-Number) Zimbabwe Number IMSI
51 Voice call redirection with a fraudulent activity UpdateLocation (IMSI, Fake MSC/VLR) HLR Billing GMSC InsertSubscriberData (Profile) SendRoutingInfo (MSISDN) IAM (A-Number, B-Number) Zimbabwe Number IMSI
52 Voice call redirection with a fraudulent activity UpdateLocation (IMSI, Fake MSC/VLR) HLR Billing GMSC InsertSubscriberData (Profile) ProvideSubscriberInfo (IMSI) SendRoutingInfo (MSISDN) IAM (A-Number, B-Number) Zimbabwe Number IMSI
53 Voice call redirection with a fraudulent activity UpdateLocation (IMSI, Fake MSC/VLR) HLR Billing GMSC InsertSubscriberData (Profile) ProvideSubscriberInfo (IMSI) ProvideSubscriberInfo (Location = Home) SendRoutingInfo (MSISDN) IAM (A-Number, B-Number) Zimbabwe Number IMSI
54 Voice call redirection with a fraudulent activity UpdateLocation (IMSI, Fake MSC/VLR) HLR Billing GMSC InsertSubscriberData (Profile) ProvideSubscriberInfo (IMSI) ProvideSubscriberInfo (Location = Home) SendRoutingInfo (MSISDN) SendRoutingInfo (Location = Home) IAM (A-Number, B-Number) Zimbabwe Number IMSI
55 Voice call redirection with a fraudulent activity UpdateLocation (IMSI, Fake MSC/VLR) HLR Billing GMSC InsertSubscriberData (Profile) ProvideSubscriberInfo (IMSI) ProvideSubscriberInfo (Location = Home) SendRoutingInfo (MSISDN) SendRoutingInfo (Location = Home) IAM (A-Number, B-Number) InitialDP (A-Num, B-Num, Location) ApplyCharging, Continue Zimbabwe Number IMSI
56 Voice call redirection with a fraudulent activity UpdateLocation (IMSI, Fake MSC/VLR) HLR Billing GMSC InsertSubscriberData (Profile) ProvideSubscriberInfo (IMSI) ProvideSubscriberInfo (Location = Home) SendRoutingInfo (MSISDN) SendRoutingInfo (Location = Home) IAM (A-Number, B-Number) InitialDP (A-Num, B-Num, Location) ApplyCharging, Continue SendRoutingInfo (MSISDN) Zimbabwe Number IMSI
57 Voice call redirection with a fraudulent activity UpdateLocation (IMSI, Fake MSC/VLR) HLR Billing GMSC InsertSubscriberData (Profile) ProvideSubscriberInfo (IMSI) ProvideSubscriberInfo (Location = Home) SendRoutingInfo (MSISDN) SendRoutingInfo (Location = Home) IAM (A-Number, B-Number) InitialDP (A-Num, B-Num, Location) ApplyCharging, Continue SendRoutingInfo (MSISDN) Zimbabwe Number IMSI
58 Voice call redirection with a fraudulent activity UpdateLocation (IMSI, Fake MSC/VLR) HLR Billing GMSC InsertSubscriberData (Profile) ProvideSubscriberInfo (IMSI) ProvideSubscriberInfo (Location = Home) SendRoutingInfo (MSISDN) SendRoutingInfo (Location = Home) IAM (A-Number, B-Number) ProvideRoaminNumber (IMSI) InitialDP (A-Num, B-Num, Location) ApplyCharging, Continue SendRoutingInfo (MSISDN) Zimbabwe Number IMSI
59 Voice call redirection with a fraudulent activity UpdateLocation (IMSI, Fake MSC/VLR) HLR Billing GMSC InsertSubscriberData (Profile) ProvideSubscriberInfo (IMSI) ProvideSubscriberInfo (Location = Home) SendRoutingInfo (MSISDN) SendRoutingInfo (Location = Home) IAM (A-Number, B-Number) ProvideRoaminNumber (IMSI) ProvideRoamingNumber (MSRN = ) InitialDP (A-Num, B-Num, Location) ApplyCharging, Continue SendRoutingInfo (MSISDN) Zimbabwe Number IMSI
60 Voice call redirection with a fraudulent activity UpdateLocation (IMSI, Fake MSC/VLR) HLR Billing GMSC InsertSubscriberData (Profile) ProvideSubscriberInfo (IMSI) ProvideSubscriberInfo (Location = Home) SendRoutingInfo (MSISDN) SendRoutingInfo (Location = Home) IAM (A-Number, B-Number) ProvideRoaminNumber (IMSI) ProvideRoamingNumber (MSRN = ) InitialDP (A-Num, B-Num, Location) ApplyCharging, Continue SendRoutingInfo (MSISDN) SendRoutingInfo (MSRN = ) Zimbabwe Number IMSI
61 Voice call redirection with a fraudulent activity UpdateLocation (IMSI, Fake MSC/VLR) HLR Billing GMSC InsertSubscriberData (Profile) ProvideSubscriberInfo (IMSI) ProvideSubscriberInfo (Location = Home) SendRoutingInfo (MSISDN) SendRoutingInfo (Location = Home) IAM (A-Number, B-Number) ProvideRoaminNumber (IMSI) InitialDP (A-Num, B-Num, Location) ApplyCharging, Continue SendRoutingInfo (MSISDN) ProvideRoamingNumber (MSRN = ) SendRoutingInfo (MSRN = ) Cuba IAM (A-Number, ) Number Zimbabwe IMSI
62 Who pays? UpdateLocation (IMSI, Fake MSC/VLR) HLR Billing GMSC InsertSubscriberData (Profile) ProvideSubscriberInfo (IMSI) ProvideSubscriberInfo (Location = Home) SendRoutingInfo (MSISDN) SendRoutingInfo (Location = Home) IAM (A-Number, B-Number) ProvideRoaminNumber (IMSI) InitialDP (A-Num, B-Num, Location) ApplyCharging, Continue SendRoutingInfo (MSISDN) ProvideRoamingNumber (MSRN = ) SendRoutingInfo (MSRN = ) Cuba IAM (A-Number, ) Number Zimbabwe IMSI
63 Who pays? UpdateLocation (IMSI, Fake MSC/VLR) HLR Billing GMSC InsertSubscriberData (Profile) ProvideSubscriberInfo (IMSI) ProvideSubscriberInfo (Location = Home) SendRoutingInfo (MSISDN) SendRoutingInfo (Location = Home) IAM (A-Number, B-Number) ProvideRoaminNumber (IMSI) InitialDP (A-Num, B-Num, Location) ApplyCharging, Continue SendRoutingInfo (MSISDN) ProvideRoamingNumber (MSRN = ) SendRoutingInfo (MSRN = ) Cuba IAM (A-Number, ) Number Zimbabwe IMSI
64 Who pays? UpdateLocation (IMSI, Fake MSC/VLR) HLR Billing GMSC InsertSubscriberData (Profile) ProvideSubscriberInfo (IMSI) ProvideSubscriberInfo (Location = Home) SendRoutingInfo (MSISDN) SendRoutingInfo (Location = Home) IAM (A-Number, B-Number) ProvideRoaminNumber (IMSI) InitialDP (A-Num, B-Num, Location) ApplyCharging, Continue SendRoutingInfo (MSISDN) ProvideRoamingNumber (MSRN = ) SendRoutingInfo (MSRN = ) Cuba IAM (A-Number, ) Number Zimbabwe IMSI
65 Thank you! ptsecurity.com
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