Enforcing Customizable Consistency Properties in Software-Defined Networks. Wenxuan Zhou, Dong Jin, Jason Croft, Matthew Caesar, Brighten Godfrey

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "Enforcing Customizable Consistency Properties in Software-Defined Networks. Wenxuan Zhou, Dong Jin, Jason Croft, Matthew Caesar, Brighten Godfrey"

Transcription

1 Enforcing Customizable Consistency Properties in Software-Defined Networks Wenxuan Zhou, Dong Jin, Jason Croft, Matthew Caesar, Brighten Godfrey 1

2 Network changes control applications, changes in traffic load, system upgrades, Keeping network correct consistently over time. -- Network Consistency 2

3 1. Correctness at every step 2. Customizable properties 3. With efficient update installation What is Correctness? firewall traversal, access control, balanced load, loop freedom, 3

4 Problem Statement 1. Consistency at every step 2. Customizable consistency properties 3. Efficient updates installation Is it possible to efficiently ensures customizable correctness properties as the network evolves? 4

5 Prior Work Network Verification Dionysus Fixed Consistency Property Consistent Updates

6 Ideally given arbitrary invariants, a sequence with minimized overhead is produced Controller Magic engine Stream of Updates No loop, no black hole, Resource isolation, No suboptimal routing,... 6

7 Our design: Customizable Consistency Generator Key insight: Synthesis Verification Controller Stream of Updates CCG Buffer of pending updates Network Fail Model Verification Engine Pass Confirmations No loop/black hole, Resource isolation, No suboptimal routing, No VLAN leak,... 7

8 Our design: Customizable Consistency Generator Challenges: Stream of Updates CCG Buffer of pending updates Network Fail Model Verification Engine Pass Confirmations Greedy algorithm may get stuck identify the scope of cases that guarantees no deadlock For other cases, a more heavyweight update technique as a fallback, triggered rarely in practice Distributed nature of networks (uncertainty) compact uncertain forwarding graph verification optimization 8

9 Network Uncertainty The uncertainty of an observation point tasked with instilling updates in knowing the current network state. May deviate network behavior away from desired properties. 0$2"1$%#34$%.% 5-$467$-8% ;",)#"44$#% <,&)644%#34$%/%!"#$%&' #34$%.% +'()!*%9% #34$%/% +'()!*%:% 9

10 Uncertainty-aware Modeling Basis: VeriFlow Controller VeriFlow 10

11 Uncertainty-aware Modeling Basis: VeriFlow VeriFlow Generate Generate Updates Equivalence Forwarding Run Queries Classes Graphs Equivalence class: Packets experiencing the same forwarding actions throughout the network. Forwarding graphs: 11

12 Uncertainty-aware Modeling Naively, represent every possible network state O(2^n) Uncertain graph: represent all possible combinations The model captures packets view of the network, assuming controller initiates changes. When to change uncertain to certain? How to verify the network under uncertainty? 12

13 Consistency under Uncertainty Enforcing consistency with max parallelism heuristically CCG Uncertainty -aware Model Stream of Updates Confirmations Buffer of pending updates Fail Verification Engine Pass Waypoint Properties: flows are required to traverse a set of waypoints connectivity, waypointing, access control, service chaining, Theorem: Segment independent properties is guaranteed by the heuristic. 13

14 Consistency under Uncertainty CCG Uncertaintyaware Network Model Stream of Updates Buffer of pending updates Fail Verification Engine FallBack Mechanism Confirmations Pass Even with FB triggered, CCG achieves better efficiency than using FB alone. 14

15 System Structure CCG Controller Stream of Updates Uncertainty-aware Network Model Confirmations Buffer of pending Fail Verification Engine Pass Fallback Mechanism No loop/black hole, Resource isolation, No suboptimal routing, No VLAN leak,... 15

16 Evaluation Can CCG verify network invariants in real time? Can CCG achieve performance gain during network transitions with its algorithm for maximizing the parallelism of applying updates? Segment-independent Policies Non-segment-independent Policies Emulations Testbed experiments 16

17 Speed Analysis 1 Fraction of trials Uncertain-100 Uncertain-1000 Uncertain VeriFlow e+06 Microsecond 15X less memory overhead (540MB vs. 9GB) Simulated network: BGP RIBs and update trace from RouteViews injected into 172-router AS 1755 topology, checking reachability invariant 17

18 Emulation: Segment-independent Policies Controller-switch delay = network delay + processing delay Local (4ms) Wide area (100ms) Measure: path completion time NOX (Shortest path & load balancing) CCG Mininet 18

19 Emulation: Segment-independent Policies Fraction of trials Optimal CCG CCG-waypoint Dionysus Consistent Updates Incremental CU No fallback triggered No additional memory Local Millisecond 1 Wide area Fraction of trials Optimal CCG CCG-waypoint Dionysus Consistent Updates Incremental CU Millisecond 19

20 Emulation: Non-segment-independent Policies Traces from a enterprise network with 200+ layer-3 devices. One day, one snapshot per hour, 24 transitions, 4ms delay. New rules were added first, then old rules deleted. Rules overlapped with longest prefix match, not segment-independent. Number$of$Rules$ in$the$network$ 25000$ 20000$ 15000$ 10000$ 5000$ 0$ 7/22/2014$ 22:00:00$ 7/22/2014$ 22:00:02$ //$ //$ 7/22/2014$ 23:00:00$ 7/22/2014$ 23:00:02$ //$ //$ Time$ 7/23/2014$ 0:00:00$ //$ Immediate Update GCC CCG Consistent Updates //$ 7/23/2014$ 0:00:02$ 7/23/2014$ 1:00:00$ Comple?on$ } Time$ 7/23/2014$ 1:00:02$ Fallbacks happened rarely. Overhead close to Immediate Update, with no transient connectivity violations. 20

21 Conclusion Uncertainty problem with network control Uncertainty-aware network model GCC, a system that enforces customizable network consistency properties with heuristically optimized efficiency. Ongoing work: Study the generality of segment independency Test with more data traces, and compare against the original implementation of Dionysus Handle changes initiated from the network. 21

Enforcing Customizable Consistency Properties in Software-Defined Networks

Enforcing Customizable Consistency Properties in Software-Defined Networks Enforcing Customizable Consistency Properties in Software-Defined Networks Wenxuan Zhou, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Dong Jin, Illinois Institute of Technology; Jason Croft, Matthew Caesar,

More information

A Hypothesis Testing Framework for Network Security

A Hypothesis Testing Framework for Network Security A Hypothesis Testing Framework for Network Security P. Brighten Godfrey University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign TSS Seminar, September 15, 2015 Part of the SoS Lablet with David Nicol Kevin Jin Matthew

More information

VeriFlow: Verifying Network-Wide Invariants in Real Time

VeriFlow: Verifying Network-Wide Invariants in Real Time VeriFlow: Verifying Network-Wide Invariants in Real Time Ahmed Khurshid, Xuan Zou, Wenxuan Zhou, Matthew Caesar, P. Brighten Godfrey University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign {khurshi1, xuanzou2, wzhou10,

More information

VeriFlow: Verifying Network-Wide Invariants in Real Time

VeriFlow: Verifying Network-Wide Invariants in Real Time VeriFlow: Verifying Network-Wide Invariants in Real Time Ahmed Khurshid, Wenxuan Zhou, Matthew Caesar, P. Brighten Godfrey Department of Computer Science University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 201

More information

Enabling a Cyber-Resilient and Secure Energy Infrastructure with Software-Defined Networking

Enabling a Cyber-Resilient and Secure Energy Infrastructure with Software-Defined Networking Enabling a Cyber-Resilient and Secure Energy Infrastructure with Software-Defined Networking 1 Dong (Kevin) Jin Department of Computer Science Illinois Institute of Technology SoS Lablet/R2 Monthly Meeting,

More information

Formal Verification of Computer Switch Networks

Formal Verification of Computer Switch Networks Formal Verification of Computer Switch Networks Sharad Malik; Department of Electrical Engineering; Princeton Univeristy (with Shuyuan Zhang (Princeton), Rick McGeer (HP Labs)) 1 SDN: So what changes for

More information

5 years of research on GENI: From the Future Internet Back to the Present

5 years of research on GENI: From the Future Internet Back to the Present 5 years of research on GENI: From the Future Internet Back to the Present P. Brighten Godfrey University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign GENI NICE Workshop November 10, 2015 5 years of research on GENI:

More information

Data Plane Verification and Anteater

Data Plane Verification and Anteater Data Plane Verification and Anteater Brighten Godfrey University of Illinois Work with Haohui Mai, Ahmed Khurshid, Rachit Agarwal, Matthew Caesar, and Sam King Summer School on Formal Methods and Networks

More information

Languages for SDN (Frenetic)

Languages for SDN (Frenetic) Languages for SDN (Frenetic) Software Defined Networking: The Data Centre Perspective Seminar Informatikdienste A. Pantelopoulos 20.05.2016 1 SDN is useful Direct network control. Enables new applications,

More information

Network Verification Using Atomic Predicates (S. S. Lam) 3/28/2017 1

Network Verification Using Atomic Predicates (S. S. Lam) 3/28/2017 1 Network Verification Using Atomic Predicates 1 Difficulty in Managing Large Networks Complexity of network protocols o unexpected protocol interactions o links may be physical or virtual (e.g., point to

More information

Stable Internet Route Selection

Stable Internet Route Selection Stable Internet Route Selection Brighten Godfrey Matthew Caesar Ian Haken Scott Shenker Ion Stoica UC Berkeley pbg@cs.berkeley.edu NANOG 40 June 6, 2007 BGP instability: trouble control plane data plane

More information

Programmable Networks with Synthesis

Programmable Networks with Synthesis Programmable Networks with Synthesis Ahmed ElHassany Petar Tsankov Laurent Vanbever Martin Vechev Network Misconfigurations are Common What Example Makes Network Configuration Hard? Low-level, local router

More information

Model Checking Dynamic Datapaths

Model Checking Dynamic Datapaths Model Checking Dynamic Datapaths Aurojit Panda, Katerina Argyraki, Scott Shenker UC Berkeley, ICSI, EPFL Networks: Not Just for Delivery Enforce a variety of invariants: Packet Isolation: Packets from

More information

I Know What Your Packet Did Last Hop: Using Packet Histories to Troubleshoot Networks.

I Know What Your Packet Did Last Hop: Using Packet Histories to Troubleshoot Networks. I Know What Your Packet Did Last Hop: Using Packet Histories to Troubleshoot Networks. Paper by: Nikhil Handigol, Brandon Heller, Vimalkumar Jeyakumar, David Mazières, and Nick McKeown, Stanford University

More information

Abstractions for Model Checking SDN Controllers. Divjyot Sethi, Srinivas Narayana, Prof. Sharad Malik Princeton University

Abstractions for Model Checking SDN Controllers. Divjyot Sethi, Srinivas Narayana, Prof. Sharad Malik Princeton University Abstractions for Model Checking SDN s Divjyot Sethi, Srinivas Narayana, Prof. Sharad Malik Princeton University Traditional Networking Swt 1 Swt 2 Talk OSPF, RIP, BGP, etc. Swt 3 Challenges: - Difficult

More information

FOUNDATIONS OF INTENT- BASED NETWORKING

FOUNDATIONS OF INTENT- BASED NETWORKING FOUNDATIONS OF INTENT- BASED NETWORKING Loris D Antoni Aditya Akella Aaron Gember Jacobson Network Policies Enterprise Network Cloud Network Enterprise Network 2 3 Tenant Network Policies Enterprise Network

More information

SDN abstraction and security: a database perspective

SDN abstraction and security: a database perspective June 17, 2016 SoSSDN SDN abstraction and security: a database perspective Anduo Wang * Jason Croft Xueyuan Mei Matthew Caesar Brighten Godfrey * Temple University University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign

More information

Basic Switch Organization

Basic Switch Organization NOC Routing 1 Basic Switch Organization 2 Basic Switch Organization Link Controller Used for coordinating the flow of messages across the physical link of two adjacent switches 3 Basic Switch Organization

More information

Polynomial-Time What-If Analysis for Prefix-Manipulating MPLS Networks

Polynomial-Time What-If Analysis for Prefix-Manipulating MPLS Networks Polynomial-Time What-If Analysis for Prefix-Manipulating MPLS Networks Stefan Schmid University of Vienna, Austria and Segment Routing!... Jiri Srba Aalborg University, Denmark Polynomial-Time What-If

More information

Debugging the Data Plane with Anteater

Debugging the Data Plane with Anteater Debugging the Data Plane with Anteater Haohui Mai, Ahmed Khurshid Rachit Agarwal, Matthew Caesar P. Brighten Godfrey, Samuel T. King University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Network debugging is challenging

More information

IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING, VOL. 24, NO. 2, APRIL Hongkun Yang, Student Member, IEEE, andsimons.lam, Fellow, IEEE, Fellow, ACM

IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING, VOL. 24, NO. 2, APRIL Hongkun Yang, Student Member, IEEE, andsimons.lam, Fellow, IEEE, Fellow, ACM IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING, VOL. 24, NO. 2, APRIL 2016 887 Real-Time Verification of Network Properties Using Atomic Predicates Hongkun Yang, Student Member, IEEE, andsimons.lam, Fellow, IEEE,

More information

A Measurement Study of BGP Misconfiguration

A Measurement Study of BGP Misconfiguration A Measurement Study of BGP Misconfiguration Ratul Mahajan, David Wetherall, and Tom Anderson University of Washington Motivation Routing protocols are robust against failures Meaning fail-stop link and

More information

Lecture 13: Traffic Engineering

Lecture 13: Traffic Engineering Lecture 13: Traffic Engineering CSE 222A: Computer Communication Networks Alex C. Snoeren Thanks: Mike Freedman, Nick Feamster Lecture 13 Overview Evolution of routing in the ARPAnet Today s TE: Adjusting

More information

COCONUT: Seamless Scale-out of Network Elements

COCONUT: Seamless Scale-out of Network Elements COCONUT: Seamless Scale-out of Network Elements Soudeh Ghorbani P. Brighten Godfrey University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Simple abstractions Firewall Loadbalancer Router Network operating system

More information

Practical Network-wide Packet Behavior Identification by AP Classifier

Practical Network-wide Packet Behavior Identification by AP Classifier Practical Network-wide Packet Behavior Identification by AP Classifier NETWORK-WIDE PACKET BEHAVIOR IDENTIFICATION o An control plane application identifying forwarding behaviors of packets in a flow:

More information

Design and development of the reactive BGP peering in softwaredefined routing exchanges

Design and development of the reactive BGP peering in softwaredefined routing exchanges Design and development of the reactive BGP peering in softwaredefined routing exchanges LECTURER: HAO-PING LIU ADVISOR: CHU-SING YANG (Email: alen6516@gmail.com) 1 Introduction Traditional network devices

More information

PassTorrent. Pass your actual test with our latest and valid practice torrent at once

PassTorrent.   Pass your actual test with our latest and valid practice torrent at once PassTorrent http://www.passtorrent.com Pass your actual test with our latest and valid practice torrent at once Exam : 352-011 Title : Cisco Certified Design Expert Practical Exam Vendor : Cisco Version

More information

Dynamics of Hot-Potato Routing in IP Networks

Dynamics of Hot-Potato Routing in IP Networks Dynamics of Hot-Potato Routing in IP Networks Jennifer Rexford AT&T Labs Research http://www.research.att.com/~jrex Joint work with Renata Teixeira (UCSD), Aman Shaikh (AT&T), and Timothy Griffin (Intel)

More information

set active-probe (PfR)

set active-probe (PfR) set active-probe (PfR) set active-probe (PfR) To configure a Performance Routing (PfR) active probe with a forced target assignment within a PfR map, use the set active-probe command in PfR map configuration

More information

Configure SR-TE Policies

Configure SR-TE Policies This module provides information about segment routing for traffic engineering (SR-TE) policies, how to configure SR-TE policies, and how to steer traffic into an SR-TE policy. About SR-TE Policies, page

More information

BGP. Internal and External BGP 2005/03/11. (C) Herbert Haas

BGP. Internal and External BGP 2005/03/11. (C) Herbert Haas BGP Internal and External BGP (C) Herbert Haas 2005/03/11 and 2 Internal and External BGP messages are exchanged between peers of different ASs peers should be directly connected Inside an AS this information

More information

Deadlock: Part II. Reading Assignment. Deadlock: A Closer Look. Types of Deadlock

Deadlock: Part II. Reading Assignment. Deadlock: A Closer Look. Types of Deadlock Reading Assignment T. M. Pinkston, Deadlock Characterization and Resolution in Interconnection Networks, Chapter 13 in Deadlock Resolution in Computer Integrated Systems, CRC Press 2004 Deadlock: Part

More information

Interdomain routing CSCI 466: Networks Keith Vertanen Fall 2011

Interdomain routing CSCI 466: Networks Keith Vertanen Fall 2011 Interdomain routing CSCI 466: Networks Keith Vertanen Fall 2011 Overview Business relationships between ASes Interdomain routing using BGP Advertisements Routing policy Integration with intradomain routing

More information

Provenance-aware Secure Networks

Provenance-aware Secure Networks Provenance-aware Secure Networks Wenchao Zhou Eric Cronin Boon Thau Loo University of Pennsylvania Motivation Network accountability Real-time monitoring and anomaly detection Identifying and tracing malicious

More information

Fast IP Convergence. Section 4. Period from when a topology change occurs, to the moment when all the routers have a consistent view of the network.

Fast IP Convergence. Section 4. Period from when a topology change occurs, to the moment when all the routers have a consistent view of the network. Fast IP Convergence Section 4 2899_05_2001_c1 2001, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. 1 IP Convergence Convergence Time Period from when a topology change occurs, to the moment when all the routers

More information

Interdomain Routing Design for MobilityFirst

Interdomain Routing Design for MobilityFirst Interdomain Routing Design for MobilityFirst October 6, 2011 Z. Morley Mao, University of Michigan In collaboration with Mike Reiter s group 1 Interdomain routing design requirements Mobility support Network

More information

Computer Science 461 Midterm Exam March 14, :00-10:50am

Computer Science 461 Midterm Exam March 14, :00-10:50am NAME: Login name: Computer Science 461 Midterm Exam March 14, 2012 10:00-10:50am This test has seven (7) questions, each worth ten points. Put your name on every page, and write out and sign the Honor

More information

Campus Networking Workshop CIS 399. Core Network Design

Campus Networking Workshop CIS 399. Core Network Design Campus Networking Workshop CIS 399 Core Network Design Routing Architectures Where do we route? At the point where we want to limit our layer-2 broadcast domain At your IP subnet boundary We can create

More information

Real-time Verification of Network Properties using Atomic Predicates

Real-time Verification of Network Properties using Atomic Predicates Real-time Verification of Network Properties using Atomic Predicates Hongkun Yang and Simon S. Lam Department of Computer Science, The University of Texas at Austin {yanghk, lam}@cs.utexas.edu TR-13-15

More information

Proceedings of the 2016 Winter Simulation Conference T. M. K. Roeder, P. I. Frazier, R. Szechtman, E. Zhou, T. Huschka, and S. E. Chick, eds.

Proceedings of the 2016 Winter Simulation Conference T. M. K. Roeder, P. I. Frazier, R. Szechtman, E. Zhou, T. Huschka, and S. E. Chick, eds. Proceedings of the 2016 Winter Simulation Conference T. M. K. Roeder, P. I. Frazier, R. Szechtman, E. Zhou, T. Huschka, and S. E. Chick, eds. CONVENUS: CONGESTION VERIFICATION OF NETWORK UPDATES IN SOFTWARE-DEFINED

More information

Interdomain Routing Reading: Sections K&R EE122: Intro to Communication Networks Fall 2007 (WF 4:00-5:30 in Cory 277)

Interdomain Routing Reading: Sections K&R EE122: Intro to Communication Networks Fall 2007 (WF 4:00-5:30 in Cory 277) Interdomain Routing Reading: Sections K&R 4.6.3 EE122: Intro to Communication Networks Fall 2007 (WF 4:00-5:30 in Cory 277) Guest Lecture by Brighten Godfrey Instructor: Vern Paxson TAs: Lisa Fowler, Daniel

More information

EECS 122, Lecture 17. The Distributed Update Algorithm (DUAL) Optimization Criteria. DUAL Data Structures. Selecting Among Neighbors.

EECS 122, Lecture 17. The Distributed Update Algorithm (DUAL) Optimization Criteria. DUAL Data Structures. Selecting Among Neighbors. EECS 122, Lecture 17 Kevin Fall kfall@cs.berkeley.edu edu The Distributed Update Algorithm (DUAL) J.J. Garcia-Luna Luna-Aceves [SIGCOMM 89] Aims at removing transient loops in both DV and LS routing protocols

More information

Overview. Problem: Find lowest cost path between two nodes Factors static: topology dynamic: load

Overview. Problem: Find lowest cost path between two nodes Factors static: topology dynamic: load Dynamic Routing Overview Forwarding vs Routing forwarding: to select an output port based on destination address and routing table routing: process by which routing table is built Network as a Graph C

More information

Towards a Secure and Resilient Industrial Control System with So7ware-Defined Networking

Towards a Secure and Resilient Industrial Control System with So7ware-Defined Networking Towards a Secure and Resilient Industrial Control System with So7ware-Defined Networking 1 Dong (Kevin) Jin Department of Computer Science Illinois InsEtute of Technology TSS/SoS Seminar, March 15, 2016

More information

Software-Defined Networking (SDN) Overview

Software-Defined Networking (SDN) Overview Reti di Telecomunicazione a.y. 2015-2016 Software-Defined Networking (SDN) Overview Ing. Luca Davoli Ph.D. Student Network Security (NetSec) Laboratory davoli@ce.unipr.it Luca Davoli davoli@ce.unipr.it

More information

Stroboscope: Declarative Network Monitoring on a Budget

Stroboscope: Declarative Network Monitoring on a Budget Stroboscope: Declarative Network Monitoring on a Budget https://stroboscope.ethz.ch Olivier Tilmans Université catholique de Louvain Stefano Vissicchio University College London Tobias Bühler ETH Zürich

More information

Robust validation of network designs under uncertain demands and failures

Robust validation of network designs under uncertain demands and failures Robust validation of network designs under uncertain demands and failures Yiyang Chang, Sanjay Rao, and Mohit Tawarmalani Purdue University USENIX NSDI 2017 Validating network design Network design today

More information

Routing Basics ISP/IXP Workshops

Routing Basics ISP/IXP Workshops Routing Basics ISP/IXP Workshops 1 Routing Concepts IPv4 Routing Forwarding Some definitions Policy options Routing Protocols 2 IPv4 Internet uses IPv4 addresses are 32 bits long range from 1.0.0.0 to

More information

MPLS, THE BASICS CSE 6067, UIU. Multiprotocol Label Switching

MPLS, THE BASICS CSE 6067, UIU. Multiprotocol Label Switching MPLS, THE BASICS CSE 6067, UIU Multiprotocol Label Switching Basic Concepts of MPLS 2 Contents Drawbacks of Traditional IP Forwarding Basic MPLS Concepts MPLS versus IP over ATM Traffic Engineering with

More information

Pathlet Routing. P. Brighten Godfrey, Igor Ganichev, Scott Shenker, and Ion Stoica SIGCOMM (maurizio patrignani)

Pathlet Routing. P. Brighten Godfrey, Igor Ganichev, Scott Shenker, and Ion Stoica SIGCOMM (maurizio patrignani) Pathlet Routing P. Brighten Godfrey, Igor Ganichev, Scott Shenker, and Ion Stoica SIGCOMM 2009 (maurizio patrignani) Reti di Calcolatori di Nuova Generazione http://www.dia.uniroma3.it/~rimondin/courses/rcng1011/

More information

Towards Systematic Design of Enterprise Networks

Towards Systematic Design of Enterprise Networks Towards Systematic Design of Enterprise Networks Geoffrey Xie Naval Postgraduate School In collaboration with: Eric Sung, Xin Sun, and Sanjay Rao (Purdue Univ.) David Maltz (MSR) Copyright 2008 AT&T. All

More information

Software Defined Networking Security: Security for SDN and Security with SDN. Seungwon Shin Texas A&M University

Software Defined Networking Security: Security for SDN and Security with SDN. Seungwon Shin Texas A&M University Software Defined Networking Security: Security for SDN and Security with SDN Seungwon Shin Texas A&M University Contents SDN Basic Operation SDN Security Issues SDN Operation L2 Forwarding application

More information

DDoS Protection in Backbone Networks

DDoS Protection in Backbone Networks DDoS Protection in Backbone Networks The Czech Way Pavel Minarik, Chief Technology Officer Holland Strikes Back, 3 rd Oct 2017 Backbone DDoS protection Backbone protection is specific High number of up-links,

More information

Preventing the unnecessary propagation of BGP withdraws

Preventing the unnecessary propagation of BGP withdraws Preventing the unnecessary propagation of BGP withdraws V. Van den Schrieck, P. François, C. Pelsser, O.Bonaventure http://inl.info.ucl.ac.be Networking 2009, May 13th Agenda Introduction Presentation

More information

An Assertion Language for Debugging SDN Applications

An Assertion Language for Debugging SDN Applications An Assertion Language for Debugging SDN Applications Ryan Beckett, X. Kelvin Zou, Shuyuan Zhang, Sharad Malik, Jennifer Rexford, and David Walker Princeton University {rbeckett, xuanz, shuyuanz, sharad,

More information

Leveraging Formal Verification Throughout the Entire Design Cycle

Leveraging Formal Verification Throughout the Entire Design Cycle Leveraging Formal Verification Throughout the Entire Design Cycle Verification Futures Page 1 2012, Jasper Design Automation Objectives for This Presentation Highlight several areas where formal verification

More information

Routing Basics. Routing Concepts. IPv4. IPv4 address format. A day in a life of a router. What does a router do? IPv4 Routing

Routing Basics. Routing Concepts. IPv4. IPv4 address format. A day in a life of a router. What does a router do? IPv4 Routing Routing Concepts IPv4 Routing Routing Basics ISP/IXP Workshops Forwarding Some definitions Policy options Routing Protocols 1 2 IPv4 IPv4 address format Internet uses IPv4 addresses are 32 bits long range

More information

Network Behavior Analysis

Network Behavior Analysis N E T W O R K O P E R AT I O N S. S I M P L I F I E D. FORWARD ENTERPRISE HIGHLIGHTS Forward Networks is the leader in Intent-based Networking and network assurance to automate the analysis and verification

More information

Federal Agencies and the Transition to IPv6

Federal Agencies and the Transition to IPv6 Federal Agencies and the Transition to IPv6 Introduction Because of the federal mandate to transition from IPv4 to IPv6, IT departments must include IPv6 as a core element of their current and future IT

More information

Network Verification: Reflections from Electronic Design Automation (EDA)

Network Verification: Reflections from Electronic Design Automation (EDA) Network Verification: Reflections from Electronic Design Automation (EDA) Sharad Malik Princeton University MSR Faculty Summit: 7/8/2015 $4 Billion EDA industry EDA Consortium $350 Billion Semiconductor

More information

Active BGP Measurement with BGP-Mux. Ethan Katz-Bassett (USC) with testbed and some slides hijacked from Nick Feamster and Valas Valancius

Active BGP Measurement with BGP-Mux. Ethan Katz-Bassett (USC) with testbed and some slides hijacked from Nick Feamster and Valas Valancius Active BGP Measurement with BGP-Mux Ethan Katz-Bassett (USC) with testbed and some slides hijacked from Nick Feamster and Valas Valancius 2 Before I Start Georgia Tech system, I am just an enthusiastic

More information

Real-time Blackhole Analysis with Hubble

Real-time Blackhole Analysis with Hubble Real-time Blackhole Analysis with Hubble Ethan Katz-Bassett, Harsha V. Madhyastha, John P. John, Arvind Krishnamurthy, Thomas Anderson University of Washington NANOG 40, June 2007 1 Global Reachability

More information

GARR customer triggered blackholing

GARR customer triggered blackholing GARR customer triggered blackholing Silvia d Ambrosio, Nino Ciurleo Introduction From discussions with the GARR working group on "contrast to DDoS", we understood the importance of a collaboration between

More information

OSSIR. 8 Novembre 2005

OSSIR. 8 Novembre 2005 OSSIR 8 Novembre 2005 Arbor Networks: Security Industry Leader Arbor s Peakflow products ensure the security and operational integrity of the world s most critical networks Solid Financial Base Sales have

More information

Routing Basics. Campus Network Design & Operations Workshop

Routing Basics. Campus Network Design & Operations Workshop Routing Basics Campus Network Design & Operations Workshop These materials are licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/)

More information

Chapter 4: Manipulating Routing

Chapter 4: Manipulating Routing : Manipulating Routing Updates CCNP ROUTE: Implementing IP Routing ROUTE v6 1 Objectives Describe network performance issues and ways to control routing updates and traffic (3). Describe the purpose of

More information

VeriCon: Towards Verifying Controller Programs in SDNs

VeriCon: Towards Verifying Controller Programs in SDNs VeriCon: Towards Verifying Controller Programs in SDNs Thomas Ball, Nikolaj Bjorner, Aaron Gember, Shachar Itzhaky, Aleksandr Karbyshev, Mooly Sagiv, Michael Schapira, Asaf Valadarsky 1 Guaranteeing network

More information

Network Policy Enforcement

Network Policy Enforcement CHAPTER 6 Baseline network policy enforcement is primarily concerned with ensuring that traffic entering a network conforms to the network policy, including the IP address range and traffic types. Anomalous

More information

Managing Network Bandwidth to Maximize Performance

Managing Network Bandwidth to Maximize Performance Managing Network Bandwidth to Maximize Performance With increasing bandwidth demands, network professionals are constantly looking to optimize network resources, ensure adequate bandwidth, and deliver

More information

Decentralized Consistent Updates in SDN

Decentralized Consistent Updates in SDN Decentralized Consistent Updates in SDN Thanh Dang Nguyen University of Chicago Marco Chiesa Université catholique de Louvain Marco Canini KAUST ABSTRACT We present ez-segway, a decentralized mechanism

More information

PASS4TEST. IT Certification Guaranteed, The Easy Way! We offer free update service for one year

PASS4TEST. IT Certification Guaranteed, The Easy Way!   We offer free update service for one year PASS4TEST \ http://www.pass4test.com We offer free update service for one year Exam : JN0-643 Title : Enterprise Routing and Switching, Professional (JNCIP- ENT) Vendor : Juniper Version : DEMO Get Latest

More information

Interdomain Routing Reading: Sections P&D 4.3.{3,4}

Interdomain Routing Reading: Sections P&D 4.3.{3,4} Interdomain Routing Reading: Sections P&D 4.3.{3,4} EE122: Intro to Communication Networks Fall 2006 (MW 4:00-5:30 in Donner 155) Vern Paxson TAs: Dilip Antony Joseph and Sukun Kim http://inst.eecs.berkeley.edu/~ee122/

More information

Unit 2 Packet Switching Networks - II

Unit 2 Packet Switching Networks - II Unit 2 Packet Switching Networks - II Dijkstra Algorithm: Finding shortest path Algorithm for finding shortest paths N: set of nodes for which shortest path already found Initialization: (Start with source

More information

CS BGP v4. Fall 2014

CS BGP v4. Fall 2014 CS 457 - BGP v4 Fall 2014 Autonomous Systems What is an AS? a set of routers under a single technical administration uses an interior gateway protocol (IGP) and common metrics to route packets within the

More information

Network Working Group. Redback H. Smit. Procket Networks. October Domain-wide Prefix Distribution with Two-Level IS-IS

Network Working Group. Redback H. Smit. Procket Networks. October Domain-wide Prefix Distribution with Two-Level IS-IS Network Working Group Request for Comments: 2966 Category: Informational T. Li Procket Networks T. Przygienda Redback H. Smit Procket Networks October 2000 Status of this Memo Domain-wide Prefix Distribution

More information

Routing Concepts. IPv4 Routing Forwarding Some definitions Policy options Routing Protocols

Routing Concepts. IPv4 Routing Forwarding Some definitions Policy options Routing Protocols Routing Basics 1 Routing Concepts IPv4 Routing Forwarding Some definitions Policy options Routing Protocols 2 IPv4 Internet uses IPv4 Addresses are 32 bits long Range from 1.0.0.0 to 223.255.255.255 0.0.0.0

More information

Planning for Information Network

Planning for Information Network Planning for Information Network Lecture 8: Network Routing Protocols Assistant Teacher Samraa Adnan Al-Asadi 1 Routing protocol features There are many ways to characterize routing protocols, including

More information

Lecture 11: WAN Routing Alternatives"

Lecture 11: WAN Routing Alternatives Lecture 11: WAN Routing Alternatives" CSE 222A: Computer Communication Networks Alex C. Snoeren Thanks: Brighten Godfrey Lecture 11 Overview" WAN Internet routing challenges Pathlet routing 2 Internet

More information

DYNAMIC SERVICE CHAINING DYSCO WITH. forcing packets through middleboxes for security, optimizing performance, enhancing reachability, etc.

DYNAMIC SERVICE CHAINING DYSCO WITH. forcing packets through middleboxes for security, optimizing performance, enhancing reachability, etc. DYNAMIC SERVICE CHAINING WITH DYSCO forcing packets through es for security, optimizing performance, enhancing reachability, etc. Pamela Zave AT&T Labs Research Ronaldo A. Ferreira UFMS, Brazil Xuan Kelvin

More information

Stateful Detection in High Throughput Distributed Systems

Stateful Detection in High Throughput Distributed Systems Stateful Detection in High Throughput Distributed Systems Gunjan Khanna, Ignacio Laguna, Fahad A. Arshad, Saurabh Bagchi Dependable Computing Systems Lab School of Electrical and Computer Engineering Purdue

More information

Multi Topology Routing Truman Boyes

Multi Topology Routing Truman Boyes Multi Topology Routing Truman Boyes truman@juniper.net Copyright 2008 Juniper Networks, Inc. 1 Traffic Engineering Choices Today: IGP Metric Costing RSVP TE end to end Policy based routing EROs, Offline

More information

Stroboscope: Declarative Network Monitoring on a Budget

Stroboscope: Declarative Network Monitoring on a Budget Stroboscope: Declarative Network Monitoring on a Budget Olivier Tilmans, Université Catholique de Louvain; Tobias Bühler, ETH Zürich; Ingmar Poese, BENOCS; Stefano Vissicchio, University College London;

More information

A Technique for Reducing BGP Update Announcements through Path Exploration Damping

A Technique for Reducing BGP Update Announcements through Path Exploration Damping A Technique for Reducing BGP Update Announcements through Path Exploration Damping Geoff Huston, Mattia Rossi, Grenville Armitage mrossi@swin.edu.au Centre for Advanced Internet Architectures (CAIA) Swinburne

More information

Routing Basics ISP/IXP Workshops

Routing Basics ISP/IXP Workshops Routing Basics ISP/IXP Workshops 1 Routing Concepts IPv4 Routing Forwarding Some definitions Policy options Routing Protocols 2 IPv4 Internet uses IPv4 addresses are 32 bits long range from 1.0.0.0 to

More information

From Routing to Traffic Engineering

From Routing to Traffic Engineering 1 From Routing to Traffic Engineering Robert Soulé Advanced Networking Fall 2016 2 In the beginning B Goal: pair-wise connectivity (get packets from A to B) Approach: configure static rules in routers

More information

Cisco Performance Routing

Cisco Performance Routing Cisco Performance Routing As enterprise organizations grow their businesses, the demand for real-time application performance and a better application experience for users increases. For example, voice

More information

OER uses the following default value if this command is not configured or if the no form of this command is entered: timer: 300

OER uses the following default value if this command is not configured or if the no form of this command is entered: timer: 300 holddown holddown To configure the Optimized Edge Routing (OER) prefix route dampening timer to set the minimum period of time that a new exit must be used before an alternate exit can be selected, use

More information

Connectivity FastConnect Level 200. Jamal Arif November 2018

Connectivity FastConnect Level 200. Jamal Arif November 2018 Connectivity FastConnect Level 200 Jamal Arif November 2018 Copyright Copyright 2018, Oracle 2018, and/or Oracle its and/or affiliates. its affiliates. All rights reserved. All rights reserved. 1 Safe

More information

Introduction to Software-Defined Networking UG3 Computer Communications & Networks (COMN)

Introduction to Software-Defined Networking UG3 Computer Communications & Networks (COMN) Introduction to Software-Defined Networking UG3 Computer Communications & Networks (COMN) Myungjin Lee myungjin.lee@ed.ac.uk Courtesy note: Slides from course CPS514 Spring 2013 at Duke University and

More information

Troubleshooting High CPU Caused by the BGP Scanner or BGP Router Process

Troubleshooting High CPU Caused by the BGP Scanner or BGP Router Process Troubleshooting High CPU Caused by the BGP Scanner or BGP Router Process Document ID: 107615 Contents Introduction Before You Begin Conventions Prerequisites Components Used Understanding BGP Processes

More information

Completing Interface Configuration (Transparent Mode)

Completing Interface Configuration (Transparent Mode) CHAPTER 9 Completing Interface Configuration (Transparent Mode) This chapter includes tasks to complete the interface configuration for all models in transparent firewall mode. This chapter includes the

More information

Pathlet Routing P. Brighten Godfrey Igor Ganichev, Scott Shenker, and Ion Stoica

Pathlet Routing P. Brighten Godfrey Igor Ganichev, Scott Shenker, and Ion Stoica Pathlet Routing P. Brighten Godfrey pbg@illinois.edu Igor Ganichev, Scott Shenker, and Ion Stoica {igor,shenker,istoica}@cs.berkeley.edu SIGCOMM 2009 Internet routing challenges Multipath reliability path

More information

EXAM TCP/IP NETWORKING Duration: 3 hours With Solutions

EXAM TCP/IP NETWORKING Duration: 3 hours With Solutions SCIPER: First name: Family name: EXAM TCP/IP NETWORKING Duration: 3 hours With Solutions Jean-Yves Le Boudec January 2013 INSTRUCTIONS 1. Write your solution into this document and return it to us (you

More information

Performing Path Traces

Performing Path Traces About Path Trace, page 1 Performing a Path Trace, page 13 Collecting QoS and Interface Statistics in a Path Trace, page 15 About Path Trace With Path Trace, the controller reviews and collects network

More information

Nexus 9000/3000 Graceful Insertion and Removal (GIR)

Nexus 9000/3000 Graceful Insertion and Removal (GIR) White Paper Nexus 9000/3000 Graceful Insertion and Removal (GIR) White Paper September 2016 2016 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. This document is Cisco Public Information. Page 1 of 21

More information

Cisco ASR 1000 Series Aggregation Services Routers: ISSU Deployment Guide and Case Study

Cisco ASR 1000 Series Aggregation Services Routers: ISSU Deployment Guide and Case Study Cisco ASR 1000 Series Aggregation Services Routers: ISSU Deployment Guide and Case Study In most networks, a significant cause of downtime is planned maintenance and software upgrades. The Cisco ASR 1000

More information

Topic 3 part 2 Traffic analysis; Routing Attacks &Traffic Redirection Fourth Stage

Topic 3 part 2 Traffic analysis; Routing Attacks &Traffic Redirection Fourth Stage 3-2 Routing attack To understand hoe the router works, click on http://www.mustbegeek.com/types-of-router-attacks/ Types of Router Attacks 1. Denial of Service attacks: The DoS attack is done by the attacker

More information

Evaluation Strategies. Nick Feamster CS 7260 February 26, 2007

Evaluation Strategies. Nick Feamster CS 7260 February 26, 2007 Evaluation Strategies Nick Feamster CS 7260 February 26, 2007 Evaluation Strategies Many ways to evaluate new protocols, systems, implementations Mathematical analysis Simulation (ns, SSFNet, etc.) Emulation

More information

VXLAN Overview: Cisco Nexus 9000 Series Switches

VXLAN Overview: Cisco Nexus 9000 Series Switches White Paper VXLAN Overview: Cisco Nexus 9000 Series Switches What You Will Learn Traditional network segmentation has been provided by VLANs that are standardized under the IEEE 802.1Q group. VLANs provide

More information

Securing BGP. Geoff Huston November 2007

Securing BGP. Geoff Huston November 2007 Securing BGP Geoff Huston November 2007 Agenda An Introduction to BGP BGP Security Questions Current Work Research Questions An Introduction to BGP Background to Internet Routing The routing architecture

More information