Anonymous Messaging. Giulia Fanti and Peter Kairouz. Advised by Professors Sewoong Oh, Kannan Ramchandran, and Pramod Viswanath
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1 Anonymous Messaging Giulia Fanti and Peter Kairouz Advised by Professors Sewoong Oh, Kannan Ramchandran, and Pramod Viswanath
2 Some people have important, sensitive things to say.
3 Some people have important, sensitive things to say.
4 Others have less important, but sensitive things to say.
5 Others have less important, but sensitive things to say.
6 Anonymous communication
7 Anonymous communication designed for anonymous point-to-point communication
8 Existing anonymous messaging apps
9 Existing anonymous messaging apps Bob Mary
10 Existing anonymous messaging apps Bob Mary
11 Existing anonymous messaging apps Bob Mary Server
12 Existing anonymous messaging apps Bob Mary Server
13 Existing anonymous messaging apps Bob Mary Server centralized networks are not truly anonymous!
14 Compromises in anonymity
15 Compromises in anonymity
16 Compromises in anonymity anonymity loss extends beyond the network
17 Distributed messaging Bob Mary
18 Distributed messaging Bob Mary
19 Distributed messaging Bob Mary rumor source can still be identified
20 Rumor source identification
21 Rumor source identification
22 Rumor source identification
23 Rumor source identification
24 Rumor source identification
25 Rumor source identification
26 Rumor source identification
27 Rumor source identification
28 Rumor source identification
29 Rumor source identification High likelihood Low likelihood diffusion does not provide anonymity
30 Research statement
31 Research statement -message -timestamp -message -timestamp
32 Research statement -message -timestamp -message -timestamp engineer the spread to hide authorship
33 Current progress: Adaptive diffusion
34 Current progress: Adaptive diffusion
35 Current progress: Adaptive diffusion
36 Current progress: Adaptive diffusion
37 Current progress: Adaptive diffusion
38 Current progress: Adaptive diffusion
39 Current progress: Adaptive diffusion
40 Current progress: Adaptive diffusion
41 Current progress: Adaptive diffusion High likelihood Low likelihood provides provable anonymity guarantees [Spy vs. Spy: Rumor Source Obfuscation, to appear in ACM SIGMETRICS 2015]
42 Current progress: Wildfire Bob Faith Saul Like Bob Carol Mary Like Mary Faith Mike Saul Like
43 Current progress: Wildfire Bob Faith Saul Like Bob Carol Mary Like Wildfire empowers devices by removing central service providers Mary Faith Mike Saul Like
44 Current progress: Wildfire Bob Faith Saul Like Wildfire empowers devices by removing central service providers Bob Carol Mary Like Wildfire empowers devices by removing central service providers Mary Faith Mike Saul Like Wildfire empowers devices by removing central service providers
45 Current progress: Wildfire Bob Faith Saul Like Wildfire empowers devices by removing central service providers It also has stronger anonymity properties than Secret, Whisper, and Yik Yak. Bob Carol Mary Like Wildfire empowers devices by removing central service providers Mary Faith Mike Saul Like Wildfire empowers devices by removing central service providers
46 Current progress: Wildfire Bob Faith Saul Like Wildfire empowers devices by removing central service providers It also has stronger anonymity properties than Secret, Whisper, and Yik Yak. Bob Carol Mary Like Wildfire empowers devices by removing central service providers It also has stronger anonymity properties than Secret, Whisper, and Yik Yak. Mary Faith Mike Saul Like Wildfire empowers devices by removing central service providers
47 Current progress: Wildfire Bob Faith Saul Like Wildfire empowers devices by removing central service providers It also has stronger anonymity properties than Secret, Whisper, and Yik Yak. Bob Carol Mary Like Wildfire empowers devices by removing central service providers It also has stronger anonymity properties than Secret, Whisper, and Yik Yak. Mary Faith Mike Saul Like Wildfire empowers devices by removing central service providers
48 Current progress: Wildfire Bob Faith Saul Like Wildfire empowers devices by removing central service providers It also has stronger anonymity properties than Secret, Whisper, and Yik Yak. Bob Carol Mary Like Wildfire empowers devices by removing central service providers It also has stronger anonymity properties than Secret, Whisper, and Yik Yak. Mary Faith Mike Saul Like Wildfire empowers devices by removing central service providers It also has stronger anonymity properties than Secret, Whisper, and Yik Yak.
49 Current progress: Wildfire Bob Faith Saul Like Wildfire empowers devices by removing central service providers It also has stronger anonymity properties than Secret, Whisper, and Yik Yak. Bob Carol Mary Like Wildfire empowers devices by removing central service providers It also has stronger anonymity properties than Secret, Whisper, and Yik Yak. Mary Faith Mike Saul Like Wildfire empowers devices by removing central service providers It also has stronger anonymity properties than Secret, Whisper, and Yik Yak. anonymous, distributed, secure implementation
50 Upcoming research Theoretical Peer-to-peer dynamic networks Hiding relays Multiple message sources Systems Video sharing Message caching Bootstrapping contacts Wildfire Release
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