A Simulation Testbed for Cascade Analysis
|
|
- Steven McDowell
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 A Simulation Testbed for Cascade Analysis Saqib Hasan, Ajay Chhokra, Abhishek Dubey, Nagabhushan Mahadevan, Gabor Karsai Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37212, USA Rishabh Jain, Srdjan Lukic rth Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC 27606, USA Abstract Electrical power systems are heavily instrumented with protection assemblies (relays and breakers) that detect anomalies and arrest failure propagation. However, failures in these discrete protection devices could have inadvertent consequences, including cascading failures resulting in blackouts. This paper aims to model the behavior of these discrete protection devices in nominal and faulty conditions and apply it towards simulation and contingency analysis of cascading failures in power transmission systems. The behavior under fault conditions are used to identify and explain conditions for blackout evolution which are not otherwise obvious. The results are demonstrated using a standard IEEE-14 Bus System. Index Terms Behavioral Models, Blackouts, Cascading Failures, Contingency Analysis, Cyber Faults. I. INTRODUCTION Electrical power systems are heavily instrumented with protection devices whose primary responsibility is to identify and isolate faulty physical components from the power system network as per deterministic protection schemes. While these devices act on local information i.e. branch power flows and bus voltages to quickly arrest the fault propagation, the lack of a system-wide perspective could lead to cascading failures. Additionally, failures or mis-operations in the protection devices (referred to cyber faults in this paper) can affect the nominal behavior of the relay and/or breakers and can contribute towards cascade progression leading to blackouts as seen in Aug 2003 USA [1], 2003 Italian [2] blackouts. For instance, in the IEEE 14 bus system shown in Figure 1, outage of line L1 5 due to physical fault (three phase to ground fault) may not cause any further failures in the system. However, presence of an additional fault in an associated protection device (stuck breaker fault in circuit breaker PA12) will lead to a cascading failure tripping all current carrying paths to the affected line. This can cause further disturbance to the system in the form of overloads and can contribute towards cascade progression. Hence it is important to understand the unintendend consequence of protection assembly failures and include these in cascading failure studies. In order to diagnose and predict cascade evolution in a better way and to perform contingency analysis, its important for the simulation models to consider the behavior models of these discrete devices with reasonable timing accuracy. These models should be able to emulate the behavior of actual hardware in both nominal and faulty modes and allow the ability to alter the model parameters, injection of missed or spurious detection faults, modification of response delays and threshold values. B1 PA10 PA28 G1 L1_2 B12 PA11 L1_5 PA9 B2 L12_13 PA29 L6_12 PA30 PA27 B6 L6_13 G5 B5 PA12 G2 L2_5 PA7 PA26 B13 PA23 PA25 T3 PA8 B11 PA21 PA14 PA40 L5_4 PA5 PA1 PA31 PA39 L11_10 L6_11 PA24 PA13 L13_14 PA22 L2_4 L2_3 B10 PA32 L10_9 B9 PA38 L7_9 T1 B7 PA37 PA2 T2 PA6 PA4 L3_4 B14 PA33 L14_9 Fig. 1: IEEE 14 Bus System [3] PA34 B8 PA16 L7_8 PA15 PA35 PA36 B4 Existing approaches for cascading failure analysis are to perform off-line simulations to assess the current state of power system and study its evolution using different cascade simulation models [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9]. Models referenced in [4], [6], [7], [8], are based on initiating faults that cause line overloads leading to cascading failures in the system but they do not consider the interaction of cyber failures in protection devices. Models in [5], [9] considers faults in protection assembly in the form of hidden failures or sympathetic tripping. But this greatly limits the cascade evolution paths as this tripping is possible only in the lines which are connected to the same bus as the line outage fault. Moreover in all these models time causality of the events is not considered. This can be very useful in initiating a failure at any desired instant, that can change the cascade evolution path as well as in analyzing the effect of a particular fault in cascade progression. Time is also helpful for the operators in detailed cascade analysis and designing better mitigation strategies. Taking these cyber failures and time causality of events into account cascade progression will evolve in a different way, which cannot be studied based on above models but is possible via this approach. PA3 G3 B3 G4
2 TABLE I: Protection Assembly- Parameters Description Parameter Name Description Distance Relay *Common parameters for over-current relay F de1*/ F de1* Presence/Absence of Missed Detection Fault F de2 zx/ F de2 zx (X =1,2,3) Presence/Absence of a zone1, zone2, zone3-spurious Detection Fault V, I* 3 phase bus voltages and line currents R, L, Len Resistance, inductance and length of the transmission line RelayTrip POTT scheme relay trip command reception c reset Resets the relay to idle state Trip* Relay status to disconnect the branch Z1, Z2, Z3 Presence of zone1, zone2, zone3 faults RelayTrip POTT scheme relay trip command issue cmd open*/cmd close* Open/Close command to circuit breaker ZxWT(x=2,3) zone2, zone3 wait times F stuck open, F stuck close Presence/Absence of Stuck open and Stuck close Faults (Stuck Faults). cmd open/cmd close Open/Close command to physical breaker PhysicalStatus Open/Close status of physical circuit breaker Trip Circuit breaker Open/Close command st open/st close Open/Close status of the circuit breaker Over-Current Relay F de2 Px/ F de2 Px (x=1,2,3) Presence/Absence of high, medium and low overloads-spurious Detection Fault P1 OL, P2 OL, P3 OL Presence of High, Medium, Low overloads CThres Max. loading value of the branch ZoneWaitTime Wait time for the relay The approach presented in this paper uses detailed behavioral model of the protection devices (distance relays, over current relays and breakers) in nominal and faulty modes of operation, taking into account cyber faults and time causality of the events. The behavioral models are used as part of a simple cascade simulation and contingency analysis framework to study the evolution of cascades in the presence of cyber faults. The results of such an analysis presents new new cascade evolution trajectory leading to blackout, which are otherwise not obvious. An example is shown with a case-study of IEEE 14 bus system. The paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses the detailed explanation of distance relay, over current relay and circuit breaker behavioral models. Section III describes cascade simulation model and proposes a new approach of contingency analysis that involves behavioral models. Experimental setup and system under test is discussed in Section IV. The results are listed in Section V followed by the conclusion in Section VI. II. PROTECTION ASSEMBLY BEHAVIORAL MODEL The devices considered as part of the protection assembly in this work include distance relays, over-current relays and circuit breakers. The relays detect the fault conditons (reduction in impedance, increase in current) and command the breaker to open. The breakers respond to the command and open the ciruit, thereby arresting the failure propagation. This nominal operation of the protection devices is affected in the presence of cyber faults. The behavioral models consider three types of cyber faults namely Missed Detection Faults, Spurious Detection Faults and Stuck Breaker Faults. As the names suggest, in the presence of a Missed Detection Fault, a relay fails to detect the anomaly. As a result, the breaker is not commaded to open and arrest the failure propagation. In case of a Spurious Detection Fault, a relay incorrectly reports the presence of an anomaly (under nominal conditions) and subsequently commands the breaker to open. With a Stuck Breaker Fault, a breaker does not operate as commanded i.e. to open or close and continue to remain in their current state. [F_de1==1] DetErr [~F_de1==1] idle [F_de2_Z3==1]/Z3 [F_de2_Z2==1]/Z2 DetErr2 (~F_de2_z2 == 1) & (~F_de2_z3 == 1) & (dl(v,i,r,l,len) == 2)]/Z2 (~F_de2_z2 ==1) & (~F_de2_z3 == 1) & (dl(v,i,r,l,len) == 3)]/Z3 DetErr3 [F_de2_Z1==1]/Z1; chkz2 chkz3 After(Z3WT)/ After(Z2WT)/ (~F_de2_z2 == 1)& (~F_de2_z3 == 1)& (dl(v,i,r,l,len) == 1)]/Z1,cmd_open,RelayTrip_,Trip=0 [haschanged(c_reset)==1] (~F_de2_z2 == 1) & (~F_de2_z3 == 1) & (dl(v,i,r,l,len) ~= 2)] After(Z2WT) After(Z3WT) (~F_de2_z2 == 1) & (~F_de2_z3 == 1)& (dl(v,i,r,l,len) ~= 3)] [haschanged(relaytrip)==1]/ waiting1 waiting2 (~F_de2_z2 == 1)&(~F_de2_z3 == 1)& (dl(v,i,r,l,len) == 2)]/ Tripped Fig. 2: Distance Relay Stateflow Behavioral Model. (~F_de2_z2 == 1)&(~F_de2_z3 == 1)& (dl(v,i,r,l,len) == 3)]/ 1. Distance Relay: A distance relay is used as the primary protection in electrical power transmission systems. Its behavioral model (Figure 2) is designed using Matlab/Stateflow [10]. Table I shows the details about the parameters used in its modeling. Three zone reaches (zone1, zone2, zone3) are modeled in the distance relay behavioral model (Figure 2), which are represented by states chkzx (where x=1, 2, 3 for zone1, zone2 and zone3 respectively). These zones mark the protection zones of the transmission line as per reference [11]. rmal mode operation: During normal operation, the distance relay remains in idle state when the load impedance seen by the relay is nominal. The load impedance seen by the relay is computed based on a simple detection algorithm (dl(v,i,r,l,len)) referenced in [11], [12]. When the relay sees a drop in impedance (probably due to a physical fault such as three phase to ground fault in a transmission line), it transitions out of idle state. When the impedance falls in the zone1 reach, the relay transitions immediately from idle to Tripped state and sends a cmd open to its associated circuit breaker. However, if the impedance falls in zone2 or zone3 regions, the relay transitions from its chkzx (x=2, 3) state to the waitingx (X= 1, 2) state after the wait time for its respective zone is elapsed. These wait times are external parameters, which can be set by the user. If fault gets cleared while the distance relay is in the waitingx (X= 1, 2) state, it transitions back to the idle state. However, if fault persists, the relay transitions to the Tripped state and sends the cmd open to the circuit breaker.
3 [F_de1==1] DetErr [~F_de1==1] [F_de2_P1==1]/P1_OL idle & (OC(I,CThres) == 3)]/P1_OL P1 DetErr1 After(2*ZoneWaitTime) & (OC(I,CThres) ~= 3)] [F_de2_P2==1]/P2_OL [F_de2_P3==1]/P3_OL & (OC(I,CThres) == 2)]/P2_OL & (OC(I,CThres) == 1)]/P3_OL After(2*ZoneWaitTime)/ P2 P3 waiting1 DetErr3 (~F_de2_P2 ==1) & (~F_de2_P3 == 1)& (OC(I,CThres) ~= 2)] (~F_de2_P2 ==1) & (~F_de2_P3 == 1)& (OC(I,CThres) ~= 1)] & (OC(I,CThres) == 3)]/ DetErr2 After(3*ZoneWaitTime) waiting2 After(7*ZoneWaitTime) After(3*ZoneWaitTime)/ After(7*ZoneWaitTime)/ waiting3 & (OC(I,CThres) == 2)]/ Tripped & (OC(I,CThres) == 1)]/ Fig. 3: Over-Current Relay Stateflow Behavioral Model. Operation under cyber faults: In case there is a Missed detection Fault while the relay is in idle state (Figure 2), it transitions to the DetErr state resulting in no detection even though there might be an active zone fault. The relay will transition back to its idle state once the fault is cleared. In the presence of Spurious Detection Fault, the relay incorrectly detects a fault and transitions from idle state to the DetErrX (where X=2,3) state and then transitions to the Tripped state based on the zone2 and zone 3 wait times. In case of a zone 1 Spurious Detection Fault, the relay immediately transitions from idle state to the Tripped state. 2. Over-Current Relay: An over-current relay is used as a backup protection in electrical power systems. Its behavioral model is shown in Figure 3 and parameters used for modeling are listed in Table I. An inverse-time over-current relay is modeled for handling different amounts of overloads. These overloads are classified as high, medium and low overloads represented by states Px (where x=1,2,3). There is a wait time associated with each overload, high overload having the least wait time and low overload having the longest wait time. rmal mode operation: During normal operation, the relay remains in the idle state (Figure 3). However, if there is an overload condition, the relay transitions from idle state to its Px state (where x=1 to 3), depending on the amount of overload. These transitions are based on a simple detection algorithm (OC(I,CThres)) used for sensing overloads [13]. Being in one of the Px states, the relay transitions to its waitingx (X =1 to 3) state after the wait time associated with the overload elapses. If overload persists, the relay transitions to the Tripped state sending a cmd open to the circuit breaker. Otherwise, the relay transitions to the idle state. Operation under cyber faults: In case of Spurious Detection Fault and Missed Detection Fault, the over-current relay behavior is similar to the distance relay. 3. : The circuit breaker behavioral model is designed using Matlab/Stateflow (Figure 4) and Table I shows the details about the parameters in its modeling. rmal mode operation: Under normal operation, the circuit breaker remains in closed state. However, if it receives a cmd open, the circuit breaker transitions from closed state to the opening state. Circuit breaker being a mechanical device takes time to open/close. Hence, we introduced a delay in the opening/closing operations of the circuit breaker for more realistic behavior. This delay is provided by the variables tto/ttc in the model. After the delay has elapsed it transitions from the opening state to the wait open state and then transitions to the open state indicating the status of the circuit breaker (as open ) using the event st open. Similar transitions takes place if the circuit breaker receives a cmd close while being in the open state. [haschanged(cmd_open)==1 & F_stuck_close==0] closed [PhysicalStatus == 1]/ st_close [F_stuck_close==1] After(tto)/Trip=0 opening Wait_open After(ttc)/Trip=1 Wait_close closing [F_stuck_open==1] [PhysicalStatus == 0]/ st_open open [haschanged(cmd_close) ==1 & F_stuck_open==0] Fig. 4: Stateflow Behavioral Model. Operation under cyber faults: If the circuit breaker is in closed state and there is a Stuck Close Fault then it remains in the closed state. However, if the same fault occurs while the circuit breaker is in the opening state then it transitions back to the closed state. Similar behavior is observed for the Stuck Open Fault as shown in Figure 4. III. TOWARDS CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS Contingency analysis in electrical power transmission systems is necessary to identify those critical sets, which can cause cascading failures and eventually lead to blackout. By critical set, we mean outage of those components that initiate the cascading failure. Tools such as MATCASC [7], CASCADE model [4] perform cascade analysis but they do not consider details about the time between contingencies and cyber faults in the protection equipments. In our simulation and contingency analysis framework, we integrate the power transmission system simulation models in Matlab/ Simulink with detailed behavioral models of protection assembly. In the phasor mode of simulation, we are able to capture the time between occurrences of different events in a contingency and also trigger cyber fault(s) in specific protection devices at specified time(s). The analysis allows us to identify contingencies which can possibly result in severe cascading outages or blackouts. The proposed contingency analysis model is shown in Figure 5(a). The inputs to the analysis framework include the initial components outage (k-components outage) set, cascade simulation model and the protection assembly blocks. The initial component outage set is a initial list of components that are supposed to fail or have faults. An initial contingency can be a combination of physical and cyber faults. The protection
4 assembly blocks will contain information about the cyber faults based on the initial component outage set. A simscape model (described later) of the power transmission system is executed taking into account the faults associated with the initial contingency set and the simulation is executed to evaluate the cascade progression through cascade simulation model. This simulation model is based on a simple cascade progression algorithm as shown in Figure 5(b). After the initial contingency, the system is checked for overloads and if it exists, the overloaded branches (transmission lines and transformers) are identified and tripped. The simulation is repeated to identify and trip new sets of overloaded branches. The process is repeated until there are no more overloads to trip or a blackout criteria is reached. If the blackout criteria is satisfied then the contingency is marked as the one causing Blackout. Otherwise, if the blackout criteria is not satisfied and there is no further overload then the contingency is considered as Safe. Currently, amount of load loss is considered as the blackout criteria in this model as referenced in [14] but it can be extended by taking into account other blackout criterion as well. At the end of the contingency analysis, a N-k (k N) contingency set that can cause blackouts is identified and reported. The N-k contingency set contains the individual combinations of those initial component outages which can lead to a blackout. Protection Assembly + Cyber Faults K- Components outage Set Simscape Model Cascade Simulation Model N-k Contingencies a) b) Initial Outage [Physical+CyberFault] Check for overloads? Trip overloaded branches Check for blackout? Blackout Overload exists? Safe Fig. 5: a) Contingency Analysis Model b) Cascade Flowchart The cascade analysis framework also has a feature of introducing random outages at specific times during the simulation. This could be of interest as it could reveal different cascade evolution trajectory and possible blackouts due to changes in system topology. Also, the same outage when triggered at different times during the progression can contribute in finding those specific points where it is highly disruptive. This type of analysis is not possible with tools where outage can be specified only as part of the initial outage set. In our tool set, currently the random injection of faults is triggered manually. Automating it is left for future work. IV. SYSTEM UNDER TEST AND EXPERIMENTAL SETUP The proposed contingency analysis has been performed on an exemplar IEEE-14 Bus System [3] shown in Figure 1. The base voltage is 138 kv and length of each line is 16 km. The system is modeled in Matlab/Simscape using Simscape library blocks. Figure 6 shows the Simulink/ Simscape model corresponding to the transmission line L2 3 in IEEE 14 bus system (Figure 1), its associated bus and protection assemblies. BUS Protection Assembly Blocks Protection Assembly Control Signal Current Measurement Block Transmission Line Fig. 6: Portion of IEEE-14 Bus System- Simscape Model As shown in Figure 6, the transmission line is broken down into segments in-order to introduce faults at different line lengths. It is protected by a pair of protection assembly on each side, which is denoted by PAn (n N). Each protection assembly includes a Distance relay (PA DRn), over-current relay (PA ORn), and circuit breaker ((PA BRn). The protection assembly is modeled as a separate subsystem therefore only the circuit breakers are shown at each end of the line (Figure 6). They receive control signals from the protection assembly subsystem. Current measurement takes place at the current measurement blocks and the voltage measurement happens at the bus. Generators are modeled as voltage sources with required base kv and MVA ratings and the loads are modeled as the constant PQ type loads. A Power GUI block is required to run the system in different modes namely phasor, discrete and continuous mode. We run the system in phasor mode for our analysis. V. RESULTS The study is done on IEEE-14 bus system assuming that the lines are loaded at 70% of their loading capacity. It shows, how presence of cyber fault along with physical fault can lead to severe cascading failures causing blackouts and how it can be used in finding N-k contingencies which are otherwise not obvious. Case 1: At time t=0.5 sec, an initial contingency (a three phase to ground fault) occurs in the transmission line L3 4 (in Figure 1). A zone 1 fault is detected by the protection assembly PA DR3, PA DR4 and the fault is cleared by sending a command open ( cmd open ) to trip the circuit breakers ( PA BR3, PA BR4 ). In the absence of any cyber fault, outage of transmission line L3 4 did not cause any further contingency and the system remained stable. Case 2: The fault scenario in case 1 is repeated. A cyber fault (Stuck close Fault) is introduced in circuit breaker ( PA BR4 ) of protection assembly PA4 (in Figure 1) in addition to the physical fault in line L3 4 at time t=0.5 sec. As a result of these initial faults, it is observed that a number of transmission lines gets overloaded and are eventually tripped and removed from the network. At time t=2 sec, another cyber fault (Spurious Detection Fault) occurred in the distance relay ( PA DR27 ) of protection assembly PA27 in transmission line L6 12 (in Figure 1). This leads to overloading in other transmission lines, which gets tripped in the process. BUS
5 TABLE II: Sequence of cascading events Time(sec) Event Description F: 3φ-G fault- Line L3 4, Stuck close fault- PA BR4. D: Z1, Z3 in PA DR{3,4}, PA DR1, P1 OL in PA OR3, P2 OL in PA OR{5,1,13}, P3 OL in PA OR{9,15,21}. CR: cmd open in PA BR S: st open-pa BR3 is opened. L: Line L3 4 tripped partially F: Spurious detection fault in PA DR27. CS/CR: cmd open in PA DR27/PA BR S: st open -PA BR27 is opened. L: Line L6 12 is removed D: P2 OL in PA OR13. CS/CR: cmd open in PA OR{5,21}/PA BR{5,21}. D: P2 OL in PA OR S: st open - PA BR{5,21} are opened. L: Lines L2 4, L11 10 removed CS/CR: cmd open in PA OR13/PA BR13. D: P1 OL in PA OR{25,33}, P2 OL in PA OR {35,40}, P3 OL in PA OR{29,37}. S: st open -PA BR13 is opened. L: Line L5 4 is disconnected D: P1 OL in PA OR CS/CR: cmd open in PA OR15/PA BR S: st open -PA BR15 is opened. L: Line L7 8 is removed CS/CR: cmd open in PA OR{25,33}/PA BR{25,33}. D: P3 OL in PA OR S: st open - PA BR{25,33} are opened. L: Lines L6 13, L14 9 are removed CS/CR: cmd open in PA OR1/PA BR S: st open - PA BR1 is opened. L: Line L2 3 is tripped. F: Occurrence of fault events, D: Detection of zone faults and overloads, CS/CR: Send/Receive commands from relays to circuit breakers, S: Status of the circuit breakers, L: Outage of lines. Occurrence of each contingency event and its impact on the system is described in detail in Table II. It shows the progression of cascade with time causing multiple failures in the system. Post analysis, it is observed that transmission lines L12 13, L13 14, L10 9, L7 9 and transformers T1, T2 are also considered disconnected. This is because they do not have a current carrying path through them due to line outages listed in Table II. These events eventually resulted in a load loss of 46.9% and hence caused a blackout based on the criteria referenced in [14]. Due to this, the initial contingency can be marked as a blackout causing contingency. Similar contingencies can be found based on this approach which could lead to severe cascading outages in electrical power transmission systems. Prior knowledge of such contingencies can help in designing effective mitigation strategies, which could prevent the progression of cascades. In order to validate the generated cascade progression paths, an independent study is performed using a different simulation platform, OpenDSS [15]. WSCC 9 bus system [16] is used as the example system. The results of contingency analysis matched for all but three cases. The 3 cases where the contingency analysis results did not match can be attributed to the different solvers resulting in about 3% difference in the voltages and currents magnitudes computed in the two platforms. VI. CONCLUSION In this paper detailed behavioral models of the protection assembly is presented along with the capability of introducing cyber faults at specific instants. Integration of these behavioral models with the simulation models in Matlab/Simscape helped us simulate and analyze severe cascading failures that eventually lead to blackout. The study on IEEE 14 bus system showed how introduction of cyber faults in addition to physical fault can lead to severe cascading failures causing blackout. Moreover, this approach can be applied in finding N-k contingencies as discussed in Section IV. In addition to that, the design provides the flexibility to easily understand and extend itself to incorporate more aspects, which could help improve the analysis of cascading failures. As part of the future work, more complex models need to be analyzed and the entire approach can be automated so as to find severe N-k contingencies that can result from a combination of physical and cyber faults. ACKNOWLEDGMENT This work is funded in part by the National Science Foundation under the award number CNS REFERENCES [1] U.-C. Force, Final report on the august 14th blackout in the united states and canada, Department of Energy and National Resources Canada, [2] A. Berizzi, The italian 2003 blackout, in Power Engineering Society General Meeting, IEEE. IEEE, 2004, pp [3] ICSEG, Illinois center for a smarter electric grid(icseg). [Online]. Available: [4] I. Dobson, B. A. Carreras, and D. E. Newman, A loading-dependent model of probabilistic cascading failure, Probability in the Engineering and Informational Sciences, vol. 19, no. 01, pp , [5] J. Chen and J. Thorp, A reliability study of transmission system protection via a hidden failure dc load flow model, in Power System Management and Control, Fifth International Conference on (Conf. Publ.. 488). IET, 2002, pp [6] P. D. H. Hines, I. Dobson, E. Cotilla-Sanchez, and M. Eppstein, dual graph and random chemistry methods for cascading failure analysis, in Proceedings of the th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, ser. HICSS 13. Washington, DC, USA: IEEE Computer Society, 2013, pp [7] Y. Koç, T. Verma, N. A. Araujo, and M. Warnier, Matcasc: A tool to analyse cascading line outages in power grids, in Intelligent Energy Systems (IWIES), 2013 IEEE International Workshop on. IEEE, 2013, pp [8] B. A. Carreras, D. E. Newman, I. Dobson, and N. S. Degala, Validating opa with wecc data. in HICSS, 2013, pp [9] D. P. Nedic, I. Dobson, D. S. Kirschen, B. A. Carreras, and V. E. Lynch, Criticality in a cascading failure blackout model, International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems, vol. 28, no. 9, pp , [10] The mathworks, Natick, MA, USA. [11] J. L. Blackburn and T. J. Domin, Protective relaying: principles and applications. CRC press, [12] J. Roberts and A. Guzman, Directional element design and evaluation, in proceedings of the 21st Annual Western Protective Relay Conference, Spokane, WA, [13] [Online]. Available: download/lecture-15.pdf [14] Ieee cascading failure working group. [Online]. Available: http: //sites.ieee.org/pes-cascading/presentations/ [15] O. P. Model and O. S. Element, Opendss manual, EPRI,[Online] Available at: net/apps/mediawiki/electricdss/index. php. [16] ICSEG, Illinois center for a smarter electric grid(icseg). [Online]. Available:
MATCASC: A tool to analyse cascading line outages in power grids
MATCASC: A tool to analyse cascading line outages in power grids arxiv:308.074v [physics.soc-ph] Aug 203 Yakup Koç Trivik Verma 2 Nuno A. M. Araujo 2 Martijn Warnier Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management,
More informationEMS / DMS. DISTRIBUTION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM- Functional Description
EMS / DMS DISTRIBUTION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM- Content 1. INTRODUCTION... 4 2. MODES OF INTERACTION WITH THE SCADA SYSTEM... 5 2.1 Simulation Mode... 5 2.2 State Estimation Mode (See functional description
More informationReal Time Monitoring of
Real Time Monitoring of Cascading Events Mladen Kezunovic Nan Zhang, Hongbiao Song Texas A&M University Tele-Seminar, March 28, 2006 Project Reports (S-19) M. Kezunovic, H. Song and N. Zhang, Detection,
More informationPRC Coordination of Protection Systems for Performance During Faults
PRC-027-1 Coordination of Protection Systems for Performance During Faults A. Introduction 1. Title: Coordination of Protection Systems for Performance During Faults 2. Number: PRC-027-1 3. Purpose: To
More informationA Novel Digital Relay Model Based on SIMULINK and Its Validation Based on Expert System
A Novel Digital Relay Model Based on SIMULINK and Its Validation Based on Expert System X. Luo, Student Member, IEEE, and M. Kezunovic, Fellow, IEEE Abstract This paper presents the development of a novel
More informationStandard Development Timeline
Standard Development Timeline This section is maintained by the drafting team during the development of the standard and will be removed when the standard becomes effective. Description of Current Draft
More informationAurora Vulnerability Mitigation Techniques using UR Technology
Technical Note Aurora Vulnerability Mitigation Techniques using UR Technology GE Publication Number: GET-20039 Copyright 2015 GE Inc. 1. Introduction The US Department of Energy s Idaho laboratory had
More informationApplication of overvoltage protection to the Peruvian Power System
Application of overvoltage protection to the Peruvian Power System Presented to Western Protective Relay Conference 2008 Spokane, Washington, USA Prepared by Yofre Jacome, and Francisco Torres, COES SINAC
More informationDynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Cascading Outages
1 Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Cascading Outages P. Henneaux J. Song E. Cotilla-Sanchez Tractebel Engineering Oregon State University Oregon State University Université libre de Bruxelles 2
More informationBlackstart Hardware-in-the-loop Relay Testing Platform
21, rue d Artois, F-75008 PARIS CIGRE US National Committee http : //www.cigre.org 2016 Grid of the Future Symposium Blackstart Hardware-in-the-loop Relay Testing Platform R. LIU R. SUN M. TANIA Washington
More informationStandard Development Timeline
Standard Development Timeline This section is maintained by the drafting team during the development of the standard and will be removed when the standard becomes effective. Description of Current Draft
More informationCyber Vulnerabilities on Agent-based Smart Grid Protection System
Cyber Vulnerabilities on Agent-based Smart Grid Protection System Md Shihanur Rahman and Hemanshu R. Pota School of Engineering and Information Technology University of New South Wales PO Box 796, Canberra
More informationImproving Real-time Fault Analysis and Validating Relay Operations to Prevent or Mitigate Cascading Blackouts
1 Improving Real-time Fault Analysis and Validating Relay Operations to Prevent or Mitigate Cascading Blackouts Nan Zhang, Student Member, IEEE, and Mladen Kezunovic, Fellow, IEEE Abstract This paper proposes
More informationThe Sequential Attack against Power Grid Networks
The Sequential Attack against Power Grid Networks Yihai Zhu, Jun Yan, Yufei Tang, Yan (Lindsay) Sun, and Haibo He Department of Electrical, Computer, and Biomedical Engineering, University of Rhode Island,
More informationAutomation of Distribution Grid with FLISR using ZigBee Communication
Automation of Distribution Grid with FLISR using ZigBee Communication 1 Ajinkya Shirdhankar, 2 Digambar Ahire, 3 B. S. Kunure, 4 Asmita Bote Department of Electrical Engineering, ZCOER, Pune, India Abstract
More informationBus Protection Application Challenges
Bus Protection Application Challenges KN Dinesh Babu - Megger JC Theron, Lubomir Sevov GE Grid Solutions 2017 Texas A&M Protective Relay Conference Content Introduction Application Challenges Increase
More informationSmart Grid Protection through Self-Healing
Smart Grid Protection through Self-Healing Chathurika Chandraratne, R.T. Naayagi, Thillainathan Logenthiran School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering Newcastle University (Singapore) Singapore 567739
More informationIJSRD - International Journal for Scientific Research & Development Vol. 3, Issue 10, 2015 ISSN (online):
IJSRD - International Journal for Scientific Research & Development Vol. 3, Issue 10, 2015 ISSN (online): 2321-0613 Comparison of Shunt Facts Devices for the Improvement of Transient Stability of Two Machine
More informationVerifying the Protection System Operation Using an Advanced Fault Analysis Tool Combined with the Event Tree Analysis
1 Verifying the Protection System Operation Using an Advanced Fault Analysis Tool Combined with the Event Tree Analysis N. Zhang, Student Member, IEEE, and M. Kezunovic, Fellow, IEEE Abstract Relay misoperations
More informationUSE CASE 14 CONTROLLED ISLANDING
I USE CASE 14 CONTROLLED ISLANDING Use Case Title Centralized application separates grid into islands to prevent blackout Use Case Summary Controlled islanding is a method that can significantly improve
More informationRationale for the Use of Local and Remote (Zone 3) Protective Relaying Backup Systems A Report On The Implications And Uses Of Zone 3 Relays
Rationale for the Use of Local and Remote (Zone 3) Protective Relaying Backup Systems A Report On The Implications And Uses Of Zone 3 Relays Prepared by the System Protection and Control Task Force of
More informationImplementing the protection and control of future DC Grids
Implementing the protection and control of future DC Grids Hengxu Ha, Sankara Subramanian Innovation and Technology Department, SAS, Alstom Grid 1. The challenge of the DC Grid protection 1 High speed
More informationPower System Protection Laboratory Electric Power and Energy Engineering
Experiment no. 5 Overcurrent Protection of Transmission Line Power System Protection Laboratory Electric Power and Energy Engineering Dr. Jamal Thalji Eng. Saddam Ratrout Eng. Mageda El-Moubarak Content
More informationIMPROVING POWER SYSTEM RELIABILITY USING MULTIFUNCTION PROTECTIVE RELAYS
IMPROVING POWER SYSTEM RELIABILITY USING MULTIFUNCTION PROTECTIVE RELAYS Armando Guzmán Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc. Pullman, WA 99163 A reliable power system maintains frequency and voltage
More informationImplementation of Reconfiguration Management in Fault-Adaptive Control Systems
IEEE Instrumentation and Measurement Technology Conference Anchorage, AK, USA, 21-23 May 2002 Implementation of Reconfiguration Management in Fault-Adaptive Control Systems Gyula Simon *#, Tamás Kovácsházy
More informationProposal for Development and Use of Node- Breaker Topology Representations for Offline and Real-time Study Models November 12, 2013
Proposal for Development and Use of Node- Breaker Topology Representations for Offline and Real-time November 12, 2013 Rationale Background Interconnection wide powerflow and dynamics cases are currently
More informationAn Artificial Intelligence Based Approach for Bus Bar Differential Protection Faults Analysis in Distribution Systems
An Artificial Intelligence Based Approach for Bus Bar Differential Protection Faults Analysis in Distribution Systems By Eng. Sameh Moustafa Mohamed Abd Elgowad Elbana A thesis submitted to The Faculty
More informationRevealing Temporal Features of Attacks Against Smart Grid
Revealing Temporal Features of Attacks Against Smart Grid Presenter: Yihai Zhu Authors: Jun Yan, Yihai Zhu, Yan Sun, Haibo He Dept. of Electrical, Computer & Biomedical Engineering University of Rhode
More informationRELAY CO-ORDINATION IN A 11KV SUBSTATION USING ETAP
International Journal of Recent Innovation in Engineering and Research Scientific Journal Impact Factor - 3.605 by SJIF e- ISSN: 2456 2084 RELAY CO-ORDINATION IN A 11KV SUBSTATION USING ETAP Ms. Serene
More informationIEEE PES Swiss Chapter Workshop: Microgrids Evolution and Integration in Modern Power Systems
Alexandre Oudalov, ABB Switzerland Ltd., Corporate Research, 2014-04-30 Microgrid Protection IEEE PES Swiss Chapter Workshop: Microgrids Evolution and Integration in Modern Power Systems Microgrid Protection
More informationAN ADVANCED APPROACH TO IDENTIFY INRUSH CURRENT AND HARMONICS USING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION
AN ADVANCED APPROACH TO IDENTIFY INRUSH CURRENT AND HARMONICS USING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION Tawheeda Yousouf 1, Raguwinder Kaur 2 1 Electrical engineering, AIET/PTU Jalandhar,
More informationFlexible High-Speed Load Shedding Using a Crosspoint Switch
Flexible High-Speed Load Shedding Using a Crosspoint Switch Will Allen and Tony Lee Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc. Published in Wide-Area Protection and Control Systems: A Collection of Technical
More informationAutomated real-time simulator testing of protection relays
Automated real-time simulator testing of protection relays by B S Rigby, School of Electrical, Electronic and Computer Engineering, University of KwaZulu-Natal This paper describes the results of a project
More informationAn Entropy-based Metric to Quantify the Robustness of Power Grids against Cascading Failures
An Entropy-based Metric to Quantify the Robustness of Power Grids against Cascading Failures Yakup Koç 1, Martijn Warnier 1 Robert E. Kooij 2,3 Frances M.T. Brazier 1 1 Systems Engineering Section Faculty
More informationVerification of Utility Requirements on Modern Numerical Busbar Protection by Dynamic Simulation
111 Verification of Utility Requirements on Modern Numerical Busbar Protection by Dynamic Simulation Z. Gajić (ABB, Sweden) JP Wang / PW Gong / YS Xu (ABB China) ZX Zhou (CERPI, China) Summary Power utilities
More informationEffective commissioning of bus bar protection systems using a dynamic simulation in the field
Effective commissioning of bus bar protection systems using a dynamic simulation in the field F Fink *, J Köppel, T Hensler *OMICRON electronics GmbH, Austria, florian.fink@omicron.at, ABB AG, Germany,
More informationSwitchgear Design Impacts the Reliability of Backup Power Systems
Switchgear Design Impacts the Reliability of Backup Power Systems December 2010/AT307 by Reza Tajali, P.E. Square D Power Systems Engineering Make the most of your energy SM Revision #1 12/10 When a cascaded
More informationDate of Publication: THREE PHASE LINE FAULT DETECTION ON DISTRIBUTION LINES USING GSM TECHNIQUE
International Journal of Emerging Technology and Innovative Volume 2, Issue 3, March 2016 (ISSN: 2394 6598) Date of Publication: 29.03.2016 THREE PHASE LINE FAULT DETECTION ON DISTRIBUTION LINES USING
More informationRequests for Clarifications And Responses Order No. 754 Data Request The Study of Single Point of Failure
Requests for Clarifications And Responses Order No. 754 Data Request The Study of Single Point of Failure Revised: July 12, 2013 Introduction The following information includes requests for clarification
More informationEvolution of Control for the Power Grid
Evolution of Control for the Power Grid Anjan Bose Washington State University Pullman, WA, USA PaiFest In Honor of Prof. M. A. Pai Urbana-Champaign, IL October 15, 2015 The Past (before 1960s) Hard
More informationMulti-Layer Interaction Graph for Analysis and Mitigation of Cascading Outages
1 Multi-Layer nteraction Graph for Analysis and Mitigation of Cascading Outages Wenyun Ju, Student Member, EEE, Kai Sun, Senior Member, EEE, and Junjian Qi, Member, EEE Abstract This paper proposes a multi-layer
More informationIt is the job of the protection system equipment to recognize and remove the fault.
Protection 1 (read section 13.0 of text) 1.0 Introduction Faults do not occur that frequently 1/year/100 miles of transmission is typical. Distribution systems may see more than this. However, when they
More informationSuccessful deployment of the OP4500 at CONECTA S.A.
Successful deployment of the OP4500 at CONECTA S.A. 1. Challenges and reasons to purchase a real-time simulation platform CONECTA is an integrated company offering monitoring, protection and control solutions
More informationRe-Dispatching Generation to Increase Power System Security Margin and Support Low Voltage Bus
496 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS, VOL 15, NO 2, MAY 2000 Re-Dispatching Generation to Increase Power System Security Margin and Support Low Voltage Bus Ronghai Wang, Student Member, IEEE, and Robert
More informationSemantic Security Analysis of SCADA Networks to Detect Malicious Control Commands in Power Grids
Semantic Security Analysis of SCADA Networks to Detect Malicious Control Commands in Power Grids Hui Lin, Adam Slagell, Zbigniew Kalbarczyk, Peter W. Sauer, and Ravishankar K. Iyer Department of Electrical
More informationMicrogrids: Building Blocks of the Smart Grid Adaptive Protection Schemes for Microgrids
Enrico Ragaini (ABB Low Voltage Products), Alexandre Oudalov (ABB Corporate Research), ISGT Europe 2012, Berlin Microgrids: Building Blocks of the Smart Grid Adaptive Protection Schemes for Microgrids
More informationEMS-LECTURE 2: WORKING OF EMS
EMS-LECTURE 2: WORKING OF EMS Introduction: Energy Management systems consists of several applications programs which are used by the operator in a control centre for effective decision making in the operation
More informationMultifunctional System Protection for Transmission Lines Based on Phasor Data
Multifunctional System Protection for Transmission Lines Based on Phasor Data Igor Ivanković Croatian transmission system operator HOPS igor.ivankovic@hops.hr Igor Kuzle University of Zagreb, Faculty of
More informationModelling Cascading Failure in Power Networks
Modelling Cascading Failure in Power Networks Sydney, July 2017 Image: IEEEXplore C. K. Michael Tse WSCC System Blackout in 1996 July 1996 WSCC: Western System Coordinating Council, now called WESC, which
More informationCyber Security of Power Grids
Cyber Security of Power Grids Chen-Ching Liu Boeing Distinguished Professor Director, Energy Systems Innovation Center Washington State University In Collaboration with M. Govindarasu, Iowa State University
More informationSimulation of Power System Faults for Protection Performance Analysis -Case Studies of Tata Power
Simulation of Power System Faults for Protection Performance Analysis -Case Studies of Tata Power By S G Patki M V Kini P K Jain G T Jawale Presented at: International Conference on Power System Protection,
More informationRobust Topology Determination Based on Additional Substation Data from IEDs
Robust Topology Determination Based on Additional Substation Data from IEDs M. Kezunovic 1, Fellow IEEE, T. Djokic, T. Kostic 2, Member IEEE Abstract This paper describes an approach for more robust power
More informationSystem Protection and Control Subcommittee
Power Plant and Transmission System Protection Coordination GSU Phase Overcurrent (51T), GSU Ground Overcurrent (51TG), and Breaker Failure (50BF) Protection System Protection and Control Subcommittee
More informationA Specification-based Intrusion Detection Framework for Cyber-physical Environment in Electric Power System
International Journal of Network Security, Vol.17, No.2, PP.174-188, Mar. 2015 174 A Specification-based Intrusion Detection Framework for Cyber-physical Environment in Electric Power System Shengyi Pan,
More informationUSE CASE 13 ADAPTIVE TRANSMISSION LINE PROTECTION
H USE CASE 13 ADAPTIVE TRANSMISSION LINE PROTECTION Use Case Title Adaptive Transmission Line Protection Use Case Summary The requirements for improvement in the performance of protection relays under
More informationSoftware for Enhanced Monitoring in Integrated Substations
Software for Enhanced Monitoring in Integrated Substations Sasa Jakovljevic, Student Member, IEEE and Mladen Kezunovic, Fellow, IEEE Abstract--Substation data integration is facilitated by existence and
More informationPresenter: Wenjin Yan. Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Course Requirements for. ECEN 689: Cyber Security of the Smart Grid, Spring 2011
Trust Management and Security in the Future Communication-Based Smart Electric Power Grid Authors: Jose Fadul1, Kenneth Hopkinson, Christopher Sheffield, James Moore and Todd Ande 44th Hawaii International
More informationImplementing an Advanced Simulation Tool for Comprehensive Fault Analysis
Implementing an Advanced Simulation Tool for Comprehensive Fault Analysis 1 Nan Zhang, Student Member, IEEE, and Mladen Kezunovic, Fellow, IEEE Abstract Many large scale system blackouts involve relay
More informationOn-line Estimation of Power System Security Limits
Bulk Power System Dynamics and Control V, August 26-31, 2001, Onomichi, Japan On-line Estimation of Power System Security Limits K. Tomsovic A. Sittithumwat J. Tong School of Electrical Engineering and
More informationCan an influence graph driven by outage data determine transmission line upgrades that mitigate cascading blackouts?
Preprint; IEEE International Conference Probabilistic Methods Applied to Power Systems (PMAPS), June 2018, Boise ID USA Can an influence graph driven by outage data determine transmission line upgrades
More informationGeomagnetic Induced Current (GIC) Mitigation System Summary for the White Paper
Geomagnetic Induced Current (GIC) Mitigation System Summary for the White Paper Grounding of power grids provides benefits to improve AC operation and to optimize the economics of transmission network
More informationAdvanced Protection and Control for a Power System Serving Industrial Customers
Advanced Protection and Control for a Power System Serving Industrial Customers Marco F. Jorge Iberdrola Energía Monterrey David Sánchez, Héctor J. Altuve, and Jorge L. Soto Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories,
More informationp. 1 p. 9 p. 26 p. 56 p. 62 p. 68
The Challenges and Opportunities Faced by Utilities using Modern Protection and Control Systems - Paper Unavailable Trends in Protection and Substation Automation Systems and Feed-backs from CIGRE Activities
More informationModeling of RAS and Relays in Power Flow Contingency Analysis. Jamie Weber
Modeling of RAS and Relays in Power Flow Contingency Analysis Jamie Weber weber@powerworld.com 217 384 6330 ext. 13 2001 South First Street Champaign, Illinois 61820 +1 (217) 384.6330 support@powerworld.com
More informationKeep the Lights on and the Informa3on Flowing
Keep the Lights on and the Informa3on Flowing Daniel Kirschen Donald W. and Ruth Mary Close Professor of Electrical Engineering University of Washington 1 Acknowledgements Prof. François Bouffard (McGill
More informationAUTOMATED ANALYSIS OF PROTECTIVE RELAY DATA
AUTOMATED ANALYSIS OF PROTECTIVE RELAY DATA M. Kezunovic, X. Luo Texas A&M University, U. S. A. kezunov@ee.tamu.edu, xuluo@ee.tamu.edu SUMMARY Validation and diagnosis of relay operation is very important
More informationAwareness of the Situation
17/11/21 Situational Awareness UPDEA - Workshop Awareness of the Situation 25,623 Alarms in 8 ours 53 Alarms / min (average) 8% Are consequential Things 1 to keep in mind during a disturbance - Analog
More informationMultidrop Ethernet for In-cabinet Applications
Multidrop Ethernet for In-cabinet Applications David D. Brandt Rockwell Automation IEEE P802.3cg 10 Mb/s Single Twisted Pair Ethernet Task Force Mar. 2017 Plenary Meeting, Vancouver, BC Canada Page 1 Purpose
More informationAutomated Analysis of Digital Relay Data Based on Expert System
Automated Analysis of Digital Relay Data Based on Expert System X. Luo, Student Member, IEEE, and M. Kezunovic, Fellow, IEEE Abstract Modern digital protective relays generate various files and reports
More informationIntegrated Centralized Substation Protection
Proceedings of the 51 st Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences 2018 Integrated Centralized Substation Protection A. P. Meliopoulos Fellow, IEEE George Cokkinides Member, IEEE Hussain F Albinali
More informationAchieving Smarter Grid Operation With On-Line DSA Technology
Achieving Smarter Grid Operation With On-Line DSA Technology Powercon 2014 October 20-22, 2014, Chengdu, China Lei Wang Powertech Labs Inc. 12388 88 th Avenue Surrey, BC, Canada A very simple version of
More informationMicro physical simulation system of electric power systems
International Journal of Smart Grid and Clean Energy Micro physical simulation system of electric power systems Xin Xu, Zongshuai Jin, Hengxu Zhang * Key Laboratory of Power System Intelligent Dispatch
More informationFailure Diagnosis and Cyber Intrusion Detection in Transmission Protection System Assets Using Synchrophasor Data
Failure Diagnosis and Cyber Intrusion Detection in Transmission Protection System Assets Using Synchrophasor Data Anurag Srivastava, Bo Cui, P. Banerjee Washington State University NASPI March 2017 Outline
More informationarxiv: v4 [physics.soc-ph] 20 Sep 2010
Do topological models provide good information about electricity infrastructure vulnerability? Paul Hines, 1, a) Eduardo Cotilla-Sanchez, 1, b) 2, c) and Seth Blumsack 1) School of Engineering, University
More informationSYMPATHETIC INRUSH PHENOMENA IN PARALLEL AND SERIES CONNECTED TRANSFORMERS USING PSCAD
SYMPATHETIC INRUSH PHENOMENA IN PARALLEL AND SERIES CONNECTED TRANSFORMERS USING PSCAD Tejpal P. Purohit 1, Prashant K. Bhavsar 2 Department of Electrical Engineering, Government Polytechnic Palanpur,
More informationRedundant Bus Protection Using High-Impedance Differential Relays. Josh LaBlanc
Redundant Bus Protection Using High-Impedance Differential Relays Josh LaBlanc Purpose Discuss the configuration of the bus under study, and touch on the needs for redundant protection on the bus. Briefly
More informationADVANCED SOFTWARE ENVIRONMENT FOR EVALUATING THE PROTECTION PERFORMANCE USING MODELING AND SIMULATION
ADVANCED SOFTWARE ENVIRONMENT FOR EVALUATING THE PROTECTION PERFORMANCE USING MODELING AND SIMULATION ABSTRACT In this paper a new interactive simulation environment is proposed for protective algorithm
More informationTOPOLOGICAL ANALYSIS AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR CASCADING FAILURES IN POWER GRID NETWORKS SAKSHI PAHWA. B.E., Mumbai University, India, 2007
TOPOLOGICAL ANALYSIS AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR CASCADING FAILURES IN POWER GRID NETWORKS by SAKSHI PAHWA B.E., Mumbai University, India, 2007 A THESIS submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
More informationDREMS: A Toolchain and Platform for the Rapid Application Development, Integration, and Deployment of Managed Distributed Real-time Embedded Systems
DREMS: A Toolchain and Platform for the Rapid Application Development, Integration, and Deployment of Managed Distributed Real-time Embedded Systems William Emfinger, Pranav Kumar, Abhishek Dubey, William
More information2015 The MathWorks, Inc. 1
2015 The MathWorks, Inc. 1 Realtime Simulation of Large- Scale Power System Using Multi- Core Realtime Machine 강효석과장 / Ph.D 2015 The MathWorks, Inc. 2 Renewable/Microgrid Series Topics Distributed and
More informationPhasor Technology Research Road Map to Improve Grid Reliability and Market Efficiency. Presented to TAC on April 5, 2005 and PAC on April 22, 2005
Phasor Technology Research Road Map to Improve Grid Reliability and Market Efficiency Presented to TAC on April 5, 2005 and PAC on April 22, 2005 Background Power Grid has evolved from a vertically integrated
More informationAdaptive Protection in Distribution power networks
1 Adaptive Protection in Distribution power networks Vasilis Kleftakis, Vasileios Papaspiliotopoulos, George Korres, Nikos Hatziargyriou vkleftakis@power.ece.ntua.gr Smart RUE: Smart grids Research Unit
More informationPGR-2601 MANUAL DC GROUND-FAULT RELAY
POWR-GARD Ungrounded DC System PGR-2601 SERIES DC Ground-Fault Relay PGR-2601 MANUAL DC GROUND-FAULT RELAY AUGUST 31, 2009 REVISION 1 POWR-GARD DC GROUND-FAULT RELAY PWR TRIP 5 4 3 2 6 - BUS 8 10 15 20
More informationExercise 2. Single Bus Scheme EXERCISE OBJECTIVE DISCUSSION OUTLINE. The single bus scheme DISCUSSION
Exercise 2 Single Bus Scheme EXERCISE OBJECTIVE When you have completed this exercise, you will be familiar with electric power substations using the single bus scheme with bus section circuit breakers.
More informationDiagnosis in the Time-Triggered Architecture
TU Wien 1 Diagnosis in the Time-Triggered Architecture H. Kopetz June 2010 Embedded Systems 2 An Embedded System is a Cyber-Physical System (CPS) that consists of two subsystems: A physical subsystem the
More informationDesigning a new IEC substation architecture
Designing a new IEC 61850 substation architecture Gerrit Dogger Senior Product and Application Specialist Cooper Power Systems gerrit.dogger@cybectec.com Garry Tennese Station Integration Specialist Manitoba
More informationChapter 2 State Estimation and Visualization
Chapter 2 State Estimation and Visualization One obvious application of GPS-synchronized measurements is the dynamic monitoring of the operating conditions of the system or the dynamic state estimation
More informationGeomagnetic Disturbances
Geomagnetic Disturbances Managing Risk to the North American Power Grid Mark Olson, Reliability Standards Developer Worcester Polytechnic Institute Energy Symposium September 25, 2013 About NERC The North
More informationi-pcgrid Workshop 2014 PG&E Order No. 754 Analysis: Protection
i-pcgrid Workshop 2014 PG&E Order No. 754 Analysis: Protection 1 Process PG&E Order No. 754 Analysis Receive Bus List from Planning that Meet the Criteria in Table A Protection Computes Actual Clearing
More informationAn Inrush Current Elimination Technique for Line-Interactive UPS Systems During Switching-in of an Auxiliary Load While Feeding a Main Load
An Inrush Current Elimination Technique for Line-Interactive UPS Systems During Switching-in of an Auxiliary Load While Feeding a Main Load Syed Sabir Hussain Bukhari*, Byung-il Kwon *, Thomas A. Lipo
More informationEnhancing the Computing Efficiency of Power System Dynamic Analysis with PSS_E
Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics San Antonio, TX, USA - October 2009 Enhancing the Computing Efficiency of Power System Dynamic Analysis with PSS_E
More informationSystem Theory, Modeling and Controls
System Theory, Modeling and Controls Y7.FS2 Leader: Iqbal Husain, NC State University Co-PIs: Aranya Chakrabortty and Alex Huang (NCSU), Raja Ayannar (ASU), Chris Edrington (FSU) and Alex Stankovic (Tufts
More informationAddressable Bus Buffer Provides Capacitance Buffering, Live Insertion and Nested Addressing in 2-WireBus Systems
Addressable Bus Buffer Provides Capacitance Buffering, Live Insertion and Nested Addressing in 2-WireBus Systems by John Ziegler Introduction The reliability of data processing, data storage and communications
More informationShort-Circuit Calculation Methods
Short-Circuit Calculation Methods Oct 1, 2004 12:00 PM, By Massimo Mitolo, Ph.D., Chu & Gassman Consulting Engineers Ref.: http:// ecmweb.com/mag/electric_shortcircuit_calculation_methods/ The task may
More informationANALYSIS OF PROTECTIVE RELAYING OPERATION AND RELATED POWER SYSTEM INTERACTION. Mladen Kezunovic, Slavko Vasilic
ANALYSIS OF PROTECTIVE RELAYING OPERATION AND RELATED POWER SYSTEM INTERACTION Mladen Kezunovic, Slavko Vasilic Texas A&M University Department of Electrical Engineering College Station, TX 77843-3128,
More informationWIDE-AREA CONTROL OF POWER SYSTEMS USING CLOUD-IN-THE-LOOP FEEDBACK
WIDE-AREA CTROL OF POWER SYSTEMS USING CLOUD-IN-THE-LOOP FEEDBACK Matthew Weiss Jianhua Zhang Aranya Chakrabortty North Carolina State University Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering Raleigh,
More informationRisk-Aware Vulnerability Analysis of Electric Grids from Attacker s Perspective
Risk-Aware Vulnerability Analysis of Electric Grids from Attacker s Perspective Yihai Zhu, Jun Yan, Yan (Lindsay) Sun, and Haibo He Department of Electrical, Computer, and Biomedical Engineering, University
More informationApplication Considerations in System Integrity Protection Schemes (SIPS)
Application Considerations in System Integrity Protection Schemes (SIPS) Vahid Madani Pacific Gas & Electric Co. Miroslave Begovic Georgia Institute of Technology Damir Novosel Quanta Technology Mark Adamiak
More informationPGR-3200 MANUAL INSULATION MONITOR
Tel: +1-800-832-3873 E-mail: techline@littelfuse.com www.littelfuse.com PGR-3200 MANUAL INSULATION MONITOR REVISION 3-E-040918 Copyright 2018 by Littelfuse, Inc. All rights reserved. Document Number: PM-1025-EN
More informationELG4125: System Protection
ELG4125: System Protection System Protection Any power system is prone to 'faults', (also called short-circuits), which occur mostly as a result of insulation failure and sometimes due to external causes.
More information