ipcgrid 2015 March 26, 2015 David Roop Director Electric Transmission Operations Dominion Virginia Power

Transcription

1 Substation Security and Resiliency Update on Accomplishments thus far ipcgrid 2015 March 26, 2015 David Roop Director Electric Transmission Operations Dominion Virginia Power

2 Dominion Profile Leading provider of energy and energy services in the Northeast and Mid Atlantic regions of the U.S. ~24,600 MW of electric generation 6,455+ miles of electric transmission 12,400 miles of natural gas transmission, gathering and storage pipeline 949billion cubic feet of natural gas storage operated Cove Point LNG Facility 2.4 million electric customers in VA and NC 1.3 million natural gas customers in OH & WV 2.1 million non-regulated retail customers in 13 states

3 Our Integrated Business Model Dominion Virginia Power Electric Distribution Electric Transmission Unregulated Retail Dominion Generation Regulated Generation Merchant Generation Dominion Energy Gas Transmission Gas Distribution Producer Services

4 Four NERC Interconnections 4

5 Dominion Electric Transmission System Over 6,400 miles of transmission line 5

6 Threats Have Fundamentally Changed February

7 New Resiliency Strategy Future Operating Conditions 7

8 Risk Assessment Substation Security System Operations Center Cyber Security 8

9 Initial Steps Taken Gap Analysis of Existing Processes to understand areas for improvement Cross functional team with Security and IT organizations within Dominion Initiated interaction with outside entities to insure rigor Models are key to understanding risk Recommendations Plan for all threats to reliability Plan for recovery Plan for improved situational awareness 9

10 Team Recommendations Potential Threats Plan for all threats to reliability Natural Hurricanes, Tornadoes, Earthquake, Derecho events Geomagnetic Disturbances Man made Electromagnetic Terrorism (Physical / Cyber) Copper theft 10

11 Team Recommendations Improving preparedness Plan for recovery Emergency Equipment Sufficient spares Strategically Staged & Protected Mobile Equipment Mobile Gas Insulated Switchgear for Transmission Transmission Mobile Transformers Plan for situational awareness Synchrophasor deployment Linear State Estimation Security Control Center enhancements 11

12 Risk Assessment Modeling 12

13 Introduction Pre CIP 014 Objective: Identify critical substations. Determined from three metrics: Load flow violations Generator response Bus voltage angle Relative ranking. CIP 014 Objective: instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading. Cascading algorithm. Physical Attack Ranking Stable Collapse NO Cascade Cascade Bounded Collapse 13

14 Methodology Implementation Available software does NOT contemplate: Instability. Uncontrolled separation. Cascading. Custom Python algorithm Core components: Hard Solution. Corrective Actions. Trip Likelihood. Cascading Algorithm. Corrective Actions Trip Likelihood Cascading Algorithm Hard Solution Voltage Indices Dynamic Simulation Contingency File Parallel Processing Protection Schemes 14

15 A Flexible Methodology All four core components designed to be tunable: Hard Solutions (Size and scope of soln. steps) Corrective Actions (Feasibility Limits) Cascading Probabilities (0% 100% tripping curve limits) Cascading Paths (Thresholds, metrics, path rules) Method designed with GUI to allow quick tuning and running This methodology does not describe a one size fits all approach Various factors are a matter of engineering judgment, risk tolerance, system operation tactics, regulations, and other enterprise policies 15

16 Dominion s Plan More than CIP 014 Physical Security Plan CIP 014 R1 CIP 014 Not R1 CIP Only Not CIP 014 Not CIP 002 Instability, Uncontrolled Separation, or Cascading Applicable in the study process. However, does not cascade. For example: Black Start stations. For example: critical loads. Likelihood(C) > Threshold Likelihood(C) < Threshold 16

17 Models Industry Challenges and Opportunities Opportunities Identifies significant stress features of network previously unidentified with N 1 analysis Helps Transmission Owners to prioritize and develop contingency plans for hardening network for major events Weather Terrorism Others? Challenges How to initiate capital funding mechanisms to address significant deficiencies / risk if outside normal planning guidance without exposing risk to individuals that want to do harm to the electrical system 17

18 Substation Physical Security 18

19 Electric Transmission Critical Substation Security Physical Dominion security has identified upgrades: potentially vulnerable sites Enhanced perimeter security Critical equipment protection Improved off site monitoring Total Capex Spend of ~$450 million Please refer to page 3 for risks and uncertainties related to projections and forward looking statements. 2/9/ Investor and Analyst Meeting 19

20 Facilities with Enhanced Security Perimeter Barriers o Anti cut o Anti climb o Anti ram Ballistic Protection Access Control Lighting Increased electronic surveillance o Shot Detection o Fence Sensors o High Definition Cameras o Thermal Imaging o Video Analytics 20

21 Key Facts Project Implementation / Execution Over 4,300 foundations installed in the past 5 months 20,150 ft of Anti climb high security fence 8,915 ft of Anti ram fence By the end of 2015 Total of 15 miles of fence New 230kV GIS mobile breaker added to fleet New 115kV GIS mobile breaker added to fleet 3 new protected regional storage facilities for emergency materials 21

22 Physical Security Countermeasures taking shape 22

23 System Operations Center 23

24 SOC Project Considerations Building construction in progress Design and performance requirements Simplicity and flexibility Standards: Uptime Tier Levels, TIA 942, LEED, physical and cyber security, EMP Considerations 2017 Project completion 24

25 Dominion s Resiliency Strategy 25

26 Questions? 26