Methods for Establishing IROLs Task Force

Transcription

1 Methods for Establishing IROLs Task Force Progress Update Ryan D. Quint Senior Manager, Advanced Analytics and Modeling OC/PC Joint Meeting March 7, 2017

2 Background MEITF kicked off in December to: Address requests of Project SDT Develop recommendations for addressing IROLs Develop technical guidance material around methods for establishing IROLs MEITF consists of: PC representatives OC representatives SDT members NERC coordination staff FERC observer staff 2

3 Background SDT requested MEITF develop technical materials to: 1. Describe types of instabilities and potential impacts these instabilities may have on BPS reliability 2. Provide guidance on appropriate assessment techniques and simulation methods for studying instabilities, impact of instabilities, and demonstration of containment of instabilities 3. Identify technically sound methods for consideration when establishing IROLs for different types of instabilities 4. Evaluate reliability impacts, if any, resulting from use of different methods to establish IROLs across North America 3

4 Instability Example 4 What happens here? How do we adequately study this?

5 Statutory Definition (We don t intend to change this!) Continent- Wide Term Reliable Operation Definition Operating the elements of the bulk-power system (Bulk-Power System) within equipment and electric system thermal, voltage, and stability limits so that instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures of such system will not occur as a result of a sudden disturbance, including a cybersecurity incident, or unanticipated failure of system elements. 5

6 Reviewing Existing Definitions Continent- Wide Term Definition IROL Cascading Stability 6 A System Operating Limit that, if violated, could lead to instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading outages that adversely impact the reliability of the Bulk Electric System. The uncontrolled successive loss of System Elements triggered by an incident at any location. Cascading results in widespread electric service interruption that cannot be restrained from sequentially spreading beyond an area predetermined by studies. The ability of an electric system to maintain a state of equilibrium during normal and abnormal conditions or disturbances.

7 Proposing New Definitions Term Definition IROL Cascading Stability Instability System Stability System Instability Uncontrolled Separation Controlled Separation Drafting definitions of undefined terms Clarifying definitions of existing terms Adapting IEEE/CIGRE industry-adopted definitions Developing antonym definitions FERC Staff recommendation 7

8 Stability Framework * Adapting IEEE/CIGRE framework to fit industry needs 8

9 IROL Terminology 9

10 IROL Terminology Varies Across System Operators UTILITY X UTILITY Y IROL SOL IROL Operating Procedures * Both approaches very much valid. 10

11 M-8 Reporting M-8: # count of how many times IROL has been exceeded 10 sec < T IROL < 10 mins 10 min < T IROL < 20 mins 20 min < T IROL < 30 mins 30 min < T IROL < mins Which IROL Exceedance? Do these count real-time IROLs or only pre-determined? Should this include an IROL that includes a margin? Will provide recommendations 11

12 System vs. Local Cascading and Instability LOAD POCKET MW LOAD POCKET MW Line goes out for maintenance 12

13 System vs. Local Cascading and Instability Do You Shed Load Pre-Contingency? Yes or No? Answer: IT DEPENDS LOAD POCKET MW Overloaded 105% or 200%? Likely will take the risk Likely is a safety concern 13 RTCA says next contingency causes thermal overload ( Cascading ) - no action - take action

14 System vs. Local Cascading and Instability STRONG BES V = 1.0 pu Do You Shed Load Pre-Contingency? Yes or No? Answer: IT DEPENDS V = 0.70 pu LOAD POCKET MW Is it local or does it spread? Will relay action sever the instability to local area? Can studies show this containment? 14 RTCA says next contingency unsolved voltage collapse ( instability )

15 System vs. Local Cascading and Instability V = 0.80 pu WEAK BES Do You Shed Load Pre-Contingency? Yes or No? Answer: IT DEPENDS V = 0.70 pu LOAD POCKET MW Is it local or does it spread? Will relay action sever the instability to local area? Can studies show this containment? 15 RTCA says next contingency unsolved voltage collapse ( instability )

16 MEITF Logistics January in-person meeting Two additional conference calls thus far Next meeting scheduled this month Core group of nominated SMEs motivated to get this right this time around Balancing flexibility and the need to ensure adequate level of reliability 16

17 MEITF Scope Updates Minor changes to the following: MEITF has identified liaisons to PC and OC, rather than chairmanship Group will maintain a work plan and provide to PC and OC quarterly updates on progress 17

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19 Inverter Disconnects During Transmission Disturbances James Merlo, Director of Reliability Risk Management Ryan Quint, Senior Manager, Advanced Analytics and Modeling OC/PC Joint Meeting March 7, 2017

20 Event Background 2

21 Southern California Edison (SCE) Background Source: SCE On August 16, 2016, the Blue Cut Fire caused thirteen faults on 500 kv transmission lines No qualified events but Entities volunteered to work with the ERO to understand the occurrences 3

22 Blue Cut Fire Event #1 4

23 SCE Overview of Events Recurring issue All faults normally cleared (2-3 cycles for 500 kv) Fault voltages at locations where generation was lost almost always within no tripping zone of PRC Source: SCE 5

24 SCE Overview of Events Source: SCE 6

25 Inverter Fundamentals & Initial Analysis of Inverter Behavior 7

26 General Schematic Source: EPRI 8

27 General Schematic 9 Source: EPRI

28 Primary Issues from Initial Analysis Potential issues for cause of event: Phase jumps due to fault conditions and response of inverter (asymmetric faults) Phase Lock Loop instability and inverter response to instability Frequency detection methods and response to measured f Voltage detection and response to measured V Return from Block and/or Trip 10

29 Issue 1: Phase Jumps due to Faults Phase jumps inherent in fault conditions Generation expected to ride through these jumps to support grid reliability during and immediately following faults Cause challenges with inverter technology 11 Source: SCE

30 Issue 1a: PLL Stability Source: EPRI 12

31 Issue 1b: Frequency Detection Source: EPRI 13

32 Issue 2: Voltage Response of Inverters 14

33 Issue 2: Voltage Response of Inverters Continuous Operation Momentary Cessation = Block Trip Trip 15

34 Principles of Grid-Friendly Inverter Response 16

35 Principle 1: Shall Trip vs. No Trip Zones Source: IEEE IEEE 1547: Shall Trip vs. PRC-024-2: No Trip Zone 17

36 Principle 2: Voltage Support during Faults Within the No Trip Zone Do not disconnect ( trip ) No Momentary Cessation or Blocking Support grid needs for reactive power during low voltage 18

37 Principle 3: Frequency Detection and Ride-Through Within the No Trip Zone Do not disconnect, no Momentary Cessation Robust calculation of frequency Follow droop characteristic within limits 19

38 Next Steps NERC task force of inverter experts to investigate event and develop solutions to system problems Inverter manufacturers Solar plant operators Inverter operation experts NERC and WECC staff Focus areas: Understand causes of inverter tripping, develop potential solutions Develop guidance or clarity to necessary standards Kickoff meeting in Salt Lake on 2/28 & 3/1 to get in front of the issue quickly Seeking one representative from PC and OC respectively to help liaison to NERC technical committees 20

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40 March 7, 2017 NATF Update for PC/OC Joint Meeting Ken Keels NATF Director, Practices and Initiatives Open Distribution Copyright 2017 North American Transmission Forum. Not for sale or commercial use. All rights reserved. Open Distribution

41 Topics NATF Membership Overview Primary Program Areas and Member Interaction NATF Publications Available for Open Distribution (Public) NATF Activities and Initiatives Aligned with RISC Priority Risk Topics Open Distribution 2

42 NATF Membership Overview Members 86 member organizations SMEs Org Types Investor-owned State/Municipal Cooperative Fed/Provincial ISO/RTO Coverage (U.S./Canada) Demand: About 90% of net peak Transmission: About 80% of circuit miles 200 kv and above Open Distribution 3

43 NATF Primary Program Areas Open Distribution 4

44 NATF Member Interaction 12 active practices groups Includes more than 50 working groups and project teams Monthly practice group calls Averaging 101 attendees per call 16 workshops/summits scheduled for 2017 Joint NATF/NERC Human Performance Workshop March at Ritz Carlton Buckhead, Atlanta, GA Joint NATF/NERC Modeling Workshop June in Chicago, IL area Joint NATF/EPRI Transmission Resiliency Summit October in Denver, CO area Open Distribution 5

45 NATF Member Interaction 10 peer reviews Averaging 75 recommendations per review across 9 practice areas 76% of recommendations implemented or planned 34 targeted assistance activities Averaging 29 recommendations per assistance activity addressing one or two practices or topics 80% of recommendations implemented or planned Operating experience exchange Library of more than 280 confidential, timely, and detailed reports shared Open Distribution 6

46 NATF Publications Available for Open Distribution New! Coming soon: Follow-up document on operating scenarios during loss of situational awareness and control tools Submitted for endorsement as Compliance Implementation Guidance NERC-endorsed Compliance Implementation Guidance Open Distribution Available on 7

47 NATF Public Documents Under Development MOD-033 Methodology Reference Document March 2017* Updated CIP-014 Requirement 1 Guideline March 2017* EMS External Model Reference Document March 2017 Bulk Electric Systems Operations absent Energy Management System and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Capabilities - a Spare Tire Approach March 2017 Transient Cyber Asset Implementation White Paper June 2017 * * to be submitted to NERC for endorsement as Compliance Implementation Guidance Open Distribution 8

48 NATF Activities and Initiatives Aligned with RISC Priority Risk Topics Open Distribution Risk Profiles Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities Changing Resource Mix Bulk-Power System Planning Resource Adequacy and Performance Loss of Situational Awareness Physical Security Vulnerabilities Extreme Natural Events Asset Management and Maintenance Human Performance and Skilled Workforce 9

49 NATF Activities and Initiatives Aligned with RISC Priority Risk Topics Themes and Takeaways from Risk Profiles Resiliency and Recovery Adequate Data Visibility Accurate Models Natural Gas Deliverability Spare Equipment Strategy Open Distribution 10

50 NATF Activities and Initiatives Aligned with RISC Priority Risk Topics NATF staff and member leadership are reviewing the Risk Profile areas and the associated 120+ recommended actions to mitigate risks to see where NATF is best positioned to either: Lead Support Open Distribution 11

51 NERC RISC Priorities NATF Role: Preliminary Thinking Light green squares reflect existing or planned NATF work activities and/or focus areas Open Distribution Subject to NATF Board approval. 12

52 Questions? Open Distribution 13

53 Special Assessment Single Point of Disruption on Natural Gas Infrastructure Amir Najafzadeh, Senior Engineer, System Analysis OC/PC Joint Session March 7, 2017

54 Overview and Background Assessment Scope and Driver Advisory Group Update (subgroups) Facilities Identification Impact and Risk Analysis 2

55 Risk Risk (Probability Consequence ($ or other forms) ) Contract Physical (supply) Impact Likelihood Current Threats Historical Complete Failure Partial Failure 3

56 Assessment Data and Method Facilities Identification Facilities: UGS LNG Geographical prox. Pipeline Considerations: Existing Studies Duel Fuel Capability Contract Type Mapping and Translation Assessment Area Reserve Margin Number and Magnitude of Impact on Electric Sector Deliverability Generation availability Tie-line transfer capability Power System Analysis Operational Procedures Planning and Operations Testing and Emergency Preparedness Gas and Electric Sector Observability, coordination, information sharing and situational awareness Study expansion and data requirements Natural gas generation projections 4

57 Schedule January 2017 March 31 st 2017 June 1 st 2017 August 15 th 2017 Assessment Data Collection and Review Assessment Development - Target Release - Data Collection Period Ends - Draft report provided to PC and OC - Data Collection and Literature Review Period 5

58 Amir Najafzadeh Senior Engineer, System Analysis North American Electric Reliability Corporation 3353 Peachtree Road NE, Suite 600 North Tower Atlanta, GA office cell 6

59 Development Approach I II III IV Identify key natural gas infrastructure facilities Determine the amount of generation capacity impacted Evaluate the resource adequacy impacts Consider contribution of dual-fuel generation Conduct an assessment leveraging available power system studies Provide actionable recommendations 7

60 Assessment Scope and Drivers GW Natural Gas Capacity Growth (Year 5) 4.5% 4.0% 3.5% 3.0% 2.5% 2.0% 1.5% 1.0% 0.5% 0.0% -0.5% Capacity Growth Percentage Growth Generation impacted by fuel supply interruption Natural Gas Storage facilities identified for closer evaluation 8

61 Development Approach Defined Assessment Data: Argonne National Lab (UGS) Pipeline and geographical proximity of NG Generating Units Currently Existing Studies: Best Practices and Assumptions Areas of interest and Methods NERC Studies: Resource Adequacy Power System Studies Impacts on Gas and Electric Reliability: Earthquake, Risk factors and event frequency, Curtailment Process, Firm/Non-Firm Contracts, Compressor Stations, LNG facilities, etc. Special Assessment Report and Recommendations 9

62 Pipelines, Storage, and LNG Facilities 10

63 Operating Committee Reliability Guidelines Jim Case, OC Chair OC/PC Joint Meeting March 7, 2017

64 OC-Approved Reliability Guidelines OC-Approved Guidelines in 2016 Inadvertent Interchange (RS) Integrating Reporting ACE with NERC Reliability Standards (RS) Event Analysis Process (EAS) 2

65 OC-Approved Reference Documents OC-Approved Reference Documents in 2016 Time Monitoring (ORS) 3

66 Retire/Archived Guidelines/Ref Docs Retired/Archived in 2016 Interconnected Operations Services Reference Document March 2016 Available Transfer Capability Definitions and Determination Reference Document March 2016 NERC Backup Control Center A Reference Document June 2016 Reliability Guideline: System Operator Communications Current Industry Practices September

67 Upcoming Guidelines Upcoming Guidelines Situational Awareness for the System Operator (PS & ORS) March 2017 Operating Reserve Management (RS) June 2017 ACE Diversity Interchange (RS) June 2017 Guideline for Approving Regional and Reliability Coordinator Reliability Plans (ORS) June 2017 Generating Unit Winter Weather Readiness (EAS & NAGF) December 2017 Consideration of application of real power energy storage (ERSWG) December 2017 Loss of Real-Time Reliability Tools Capability/Loss of Equipment Significantly Affecting ICCP Data (ORS) December 2018 Generating Unit Operations During Complete Loss of Communications (RS) December 2018 Event Analysis Process (EAS) September

68 Suggestions from the Committees? Suggestions from the Committees? 6

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70 Planning Committee Reliability Guidelines David Weaver, PC Chair OC/PC Joint Meeting March 7, 2017

71 Overview and Background Assessment Scope and Driver Advisory Group Update (subgroups) Facilities Identification Impact and Risk Analysis 2

72 Risk Risk (Probability Consequence ($ or other forms) ) Contract Physical (supply) Impact Likelihood Current Threats Historical Complete Failure Partial Failure 3

73 Assessment by the Number What we know today: Existing Studies Defining terms Data Availability Impact on electric generation Pipeline connectivity, contracts Tools input Electric and Gas industry boundaries Geographical concentration GW Natural Gas Capacity Growth (Year 5) 5.0% 4.0% 3.0% 2.0% 1.0% 0.0% -1.0% 4 Capacity Growth

74 Assessment Data and Method Facilities Identification Facilities: UGS (12) LNG Geographical prox. (39) Pipeline Considerations: Existing Studies Duel Fuel Capability Contract Type Mapping and Translation Assessment Area Reserve Margin Number and Magnitude of Impact on Electric Sector Deliverability Generation availability Tie-line transfer capability Power System Analysis Operational Procedures Planning and Operations Testing and Emergency Preparedness Gas and Electric Sector Observability, coordination, information sharing and situational awareness Study expansion and data requirements Natural gas generation projections 5

75 Schedule January 2017 March 31 st 2017 June 1 st 2017 August 15 th 2017 Assessment Data Collection and Review Assessment Development - Target Release - Data Collection Period Ends - Draft report provided to PC and OC - Data Collection and Literature Review Period 6

76 Amir Najafzadeh Senior Engineer, System Analysis North American Electric Reliability Corporation 3353 Peachtree Road NE, Suite 600 North Tower Atlanta, GA office cell 7

77 Pipelines, Storage, and LNG Facilities 8

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