Counter-Terrorism and the Protection of Crowded Places

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1 Counter-Terrorism and the Protection of Crowded Places Alasdair Booth Supervisors: Dr Lee Bosher and Dr Ksenia Chmutina

2 Background Information on Counter-Terrorism Security in the UK UK Counter-Terrorism Strategy split into four work steams: * Pursue (Trying to reduce the threat of terrorism and stop attacks) * Prevent (Stopping people becoming involved in terrorism) * Protect (Strengthening the protection against a terrorist attack) * Prepare (Intended to mitigate + reduce the impact of an attack)

3 NaCTSO are the national police unit responsible for supporting the UK Governments Protect and Prepare work streams. NaCTSO oversee a network of approx. 170 counter terrorism security advisors (CTSAs) across the UK. CTSAs are responsible delivering protective security advice to business and to crowded places to reduce vulnerability to terrorist threats.

4 What is a crowded place? A crowded place is a location or environment to which members of the public have access that may be considered potentially liable to a terrorist attack by virtue of its crowd density (Home Office 2012) *Shopping Centres *Further & Higher Educations *Cinemas & Theatres *Hotels & Restaurants *Sports Stadiums & Arenas *Commercial Centres *Pubs, Clubs, Bars *Health Sector *Places of Worship *Major Events

5 Research Justification Terrorism threat level in the UK severe for international terrorism substantial from Northern Ireland related Terrorism. Crowded places remain attractive targets. Lack of information on the role of the CTSA and how they provide protective security advice / tasked. Lack of information on how current protective security advice and guidance is meeting the needs to stakeholders.

6 Research Aim To critically assess the effectiveness of the current UK counter-terrorism protective security advice designed to protect crowded places from terrorism threats.

7 Research Objectives 1. To develop an understanding of the current landscape of counterterrorism security advice (advice, initiatives, threats, arrangements) 2. To establish who are the actual and potential stakeholders in relation to protecting crowded places, and to what extend they are being targeted. 3. To identify the range of both structural and non-structural protective security measures that are recommended to protect crowded places. 4. To develop an understanding of the extent to which current security advice and guidance is meeting the needs of stakeholders. 5. Suggest recommendations about how current counter-terrorism protective security advice could be revised and developed further.

8 Research Sample (Participants) *Police Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers (23) *Security Managers (range of crowded places) (26) *Architects (10) *Developers (3) *Planners (6) *Security Consultants (3)

9 Research Locations North East Region North West Region East Midlands Region West Midlands Region London Region

10 Achieving the Aims and Objectives *Literature review has been completed to identify the gaps in the knowledge including reviewing available CT security advice / guidance. *Semi-structured interviews have been utilised to carry out the rest of the data collection. *An exercise / desktop exercise was designed for CTSAs during the interview this enabled the scoping of the different range of protective security measures.

11 CTSA Crowded Place Security Exercise

12 Key Findings Concerning Architects, Planners and Developers Lack of awareness amongst the Architect, Planners and Developers of the role of CTSA and the protective security advice they provide: * 60% (architects), 100% (planners), 67% (developers) unaware of protective security advice booklet * 50% (architects), 17% (planners), 67% (developers) unaware of CTSA role

13 Standout Concerns and Challenges to CT Protective Security.. *Costs 80% (architects) 17% (planners) 67%(developers) *The appearance of the security measures 90% (architects) 100% (planners) 100% (developers) * Lack of legislation, procedure and guidance 50% (architects) * Clients needs 60% (architects) 33% (developers) *Access 10% (architects) 50% (planners)

14 Key Drivers for CT Protective Security Advice Receiving security advice at the design and concept stage 100% (architects) 100% (planners) 100% (developers) New terrorist attacks would encourage them to think more about CT security 30% (architects) 67% (planners) 100% (developers) Adopted into policy and regulation within planning 70% (architects) 50% (planners) 33% (developers) Greater promotion and advertising of CT security 50% (architects) 50% (planners) Project context and location 70% (architects)

15 Thank you for listening