Detecting routing anomalies using RIPE Atlas
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1 Detecting routing anomalies using RIPE Atlas Todor Yakimov Graduate School of Informatics University of Amsterdam Wednesday, February 5, 2014 Todor Yakimov (UvA) Detecting routing anomalies using RIPE Atlas Wednesday, February 5, / 17
2 What are routing anomalies? Introduction What are routing anomalies? Incapability of packet delivery to legitimate destinations Delivery of packets to a wrong destination Why do they occur? Out of innocent mis-configurations or bugs Government spying or Internet censorship Malicious attackers seeking blackholing, impersonation, interception Todor Yakimov (UvA) Detecting routing anomalies using RIPE Atlas Wednesday, February 5, / 17
3 What is used to detect such anomalies? Introduction Interior gateway protocol (IGP) environments: All data is under the same administrative control Core tools: ping, traceroute, dig Other tools: Icinga, Nagios Exterior Gateway protocol (EGP) environments: Datasets part of different administrative domains Regional Internet Registries (RIR) Remote Route Collectors(RRC), formerly RouteViews RIR Internet numbering assignments datasets Internet Routing Registry (IRR) - RIPE NCC, NTT, Level3, Merit network Tools: Cyclops, PHAS, ARGUS Todor Yakimov (UvA) Detecting routing anomalies using RIPE Atlas Wednesday, February 5, / 17
4 Research questions Introduction Main Is it possible to detect filtering, MitM(Man-in-the-Middle) routing attacks, eavesdropping or simply routing policy changes by using RIPE Atlas s historical archives or by using newly-defined active measurements? What other datasets are needed to complement data obtained from RIPE Atlas in the process of accurately detecting the aforementioned Internet routing anomalies? Todor Yakimov (UvA) Detecting routing anomalies using RIPE Atlas Wednesday, February 5, / 17
5 RIPE Atlas system specification The largest Internet measurement network Public access, everyone can use every probe More than 4800 probes Latest probes are TP-LINK TL-MR IPv4 ASNs covered (4.125%) 139 countries covered (68.137%) Centralized reservation, scheduling and storage of measurements IPv4/6 Measurement tools ping traceroute dig openssl curl(upcoming) Todor Yakimov (UvA) Detecting routing anomalies using RIPE Atlas Wednesday, February 5, / 17
6 RIPE Atlas system specification GUI for easy usage REST API for robust probe selection and measurement specification Automatic alerts for ongoing measurement (upcoming) Usage limitations - measurements cost credits (hosting probes generate) No more than 175K credits per day Max. 500 probes per measurement No more than 10 ongoing UDMs towards the same target Delay in reserving probes and starting measurements Slight offset in a measurements interval Todor Yakimov (UvA) Detecting routing anomalies using RIPE Atlas Wednesday, February 5, / 17
7 Experiment 1 partial results Internet censorship DNS blocking Traffic blackholing Experiment specification Determine blocking of torrent and news websites - ThePiratebay, TorrentFreak, LiveJournal Approximately 1800 EU probes from unique prefixes used No results with local resolvers considered Traceroute(ICMP echo) to URL Experiment detection mechanisms DNS IN A record does not match ip/prefix of website Probe IP, DNS server IP and last-hop IP are from the same ASN Todor Yakimov (UvA) Detecting routing anomalies using RIPE Atlas Wednesday, February 5, / 17
8 Experiment 1 ThePirateBay.org filtering Todor Yakimov (UvA) Detecting routing anomalies using RIPE Atlas Wednesday, February 5, / 17
9 Experiment 2: De-bogonising address space ranges De-bogonised IP ranges - previously reserved IPv4 ranges get released and distributed by IANA to RIRs for further assignment RIRs first launch debogon projects Control-plane implication analysis: BGP beacons Data-plane implication analysis: background radiation monitoring Latest(and last) distributed /8 IPv4 ranges in 2011: APNIC - [36, 39, 42, 49, 101, 103, 106]/8 RIPE NCC - 185/8 Todor Yakimov (UvA) Detecting routing anomalies using RIPE Atlas Wednesday, February 5, / 17
10 Experiment 2: De-bogonising address space ranges Experiment setup Approximately 3100 world-wide probes used from unique prefixes Ping as measurement Each probes pings both the de-bogonised prefix and another prefix from the same ASN and geo location 12 hours scanning of single, currently announced subprefix Subprefixes still advertised by RIRs ASNs with provided pingable targets Pings 20 minute apart from each probe to target prefix Pings 60 minute apart from each probe to reference point Successful reachability test: At least one ping reply from host in de-bogonised range At lest one ping reply from reference host Todor Yakimov (UvA) Detecting routing anomalies using RIPE Atlas Wednesday, February 5, / 17
11 Experiment 2a partial results Todor Yakimov (UvA) Detecting routing anomalies using RIPE Atlas Wednesday, February 5, / 17
12 Prefix hijacking detection Discarded measurements Each test had probes incapable of reaching either host Type 3 replies filtered (if in one set, removed from both) Type 0, 11 considered Results - probes incapable of reaching de-bogonised prefix /22: Probe (AS45050 HI-MEDIA France) /16: None! /24: Probe /22: Probes 156 (AS51127 LNET-AS GER), /24: Probes 156, 3892 (AS50473 ECO-AS RU), 4532 (ASN2818 BBC UK), Todor Yakimov (UvA) Detecting routing anomalies using RIPE Atlas Wednesday, February 5, / 17
13 Prefix hijacking Falsifying BGP advertisements with the purpose of establishing blackholing, imposture or interception for a given prefix. BGP MOAS or submoas conflicts for AS PATH advertisements with invalid origin No MOAS or submoas as invalid transit Keeping a valid route to original prefix destination forms a MitM attack! Todor Yakimov (UvA) Detecting routing anomalies using RIPE Atlas Wednesday, February 5, / 17
14 Prefix hijacking Data-plane detection Monitoring network location Measuring path disagreement with traceroute to target prefix and a reference point Best detection systems use a hybrid approach by correlating control- and data-plane monitoring With data-usage limitations, one really needs to know what to look for Todor Yakimov (UvA) Detecting routing anomalies using RIPE Atlas Wednesday, February 5, / 17
15 Experimet 3: Prefix hijacking Experiment setup Monitored prefix: OS3 Traceroute measurement Approximately 1200 world-wide probes from unique ASNs used Unique ASNs ASNn not part of SURFnet s immediate peers Reference point OS3 BSR SURFnet uplink neighbor Hijack simulation: own home probe with more-specific static routes Experiment results: data sufficient to detect both network location change and path disagreement Todor Yakimov (UvA) Detecting routing anomalies using RIPE Atlas Wednesday, February 5, / 17
16 Conclusion RIPE Atlas is a robust tool for measuring network anomalies Combined with other RIPEStat data, sophisticated vantage point selection is possible Large-scale measurement ease of use Large-scale measurement scheduling does not suffer too big offsets/delays The credit limitations of the system simply makes impossible certain tasks Todor Yakimov (UvA) Detecting routing anomalies using RIPE Atlas Wednesday, February 5, / 17
17 Questions Todor Yakimov (UvA) Detecting routing anomalies using RIPE Atlas Wednesday, February 5, / 17
Detecting routing anomalies with RIPE Atlas
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