Inter-domain Routing(BGP) Security [IP Prefix Hijacking] Akmal Khan
|
|
|
- Sharon Dawson
- 6 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Inter-domain Routing(BGP) Security [IP Hijacking] Akmal Khan
2 2 Outline Introduction Types of IP Hijacking Internet Routing Data Sources Tools of the Trade Past Research on BGP Sec Conclusion
3 3 Internet Abstractions Collection of Hosts, Routers, Point of Presence(PoP s) or Autonomous System(AS) An AS is a connected group of one or more IP prefixes run by one or more network operators which has a SINGLE and CLEARLY DEFINED routing policy(rfc 1930)
4 4 Internet Number Resources IPv4/IPv6addresses Autonomous System Numbers(ASn) 16 bit SNU has AS bit Asx.y
5 5
6 6 Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Inter-domain routing protocol(inter AS) Critical Communications and Business Infrastructure! Vulnerable to different threats Configuration/Human Errors Patches applied as threats are exploded E2E solutions require collaboration /16 p (AS_PATH, prefix) {1}, p {2, 1}, p {3, 2, 1}, p 4 5
7 7 Outline Introduction Types of IP Hijacking Internet Routing Data Sources Tools of the Trade Past Research on BGP Sec Conclusion
8 8 Types of hijacking(ph) [Type1] hijacking /Duplicate PH AS1 owns /16 but advertised by AS2 [Type2]Sub prefix hijacking AS2 advertises /24 [Type3]AS Spoofing AS5 announce [5 1] without having peering with AS1 [Type4]Independent PH AS2 use Bogons (unused address space) [Type5]Man in the middle (MITM) Attacks
9 announcements /16 4, 2, /16 : 4, 2, 1 AS /16 2, /16 : 3, 2, 1 AS /16 : 2, 1 AS /16 2, 1 Advertise /16 AS 1 AS /16 1 9
10 Type 1: Hijack a prefix Advertise / /16 path: 5 AS /16 2, 51 AS 5 MOAS (Multiple Origin AS) /16 path: 4, 5 AS /16 2, 4, 15 Advertise /16 AS 1 AS /
11 Type 2: Hijack a prefix and its AS number Advertise a path to /16 AS /16 2, 5, 1 AS 5 AS 3 NO MOAS! /16 2, 1 Advertise /16 AS 1 AS /
12 Type 3: Hijack a subnet of a prefix Advertise /24 AS / / /16 2, 2, 1 AS 5 Advertise /16 No SubMOAS! AS 1 AS 2 AS / /24 2, 4, /16 2, / /24 14, /
13 Longest prefix matching Attacker is able to attract all traffic Advertise /24 AS 4 Pefix / /16 2, 1 AS 5 AS 3 Send packet to in AS / /24 2, 4,5 1 Advertise /16 AS 1 AS /24 4, / /16 2, 1 Longest Matching 13
14 Type 4: Hijack a subnet of a prefix and AS number Advertise a path to /24 AS /24 5, /16 2, 1 AS 5 AS 3 Neither MOAS Nor SubMOAS! / /24 2, 4,5, /16 2, 1 Advertise /16 Longest AS 1 AS / /24 14,5, /16 1 Matching 14
15 BGP hijacking Incidents Did AS13214 really hijack the Internet? Cyclops detects global routing leak by AS13214 Don t be afraid of AS3130..April WorldofWarcraft.com and WoWarmory.com sub-prefix hijacked (July 2008) YouTube s prefix hijacked by Pakistan Telecom February 2008 Search NANOG/NSP-Sec mailing archives for more 15
16 16 Outline Introduction Types of IP Hijacking Internet Routing Data Sources Tools of the Trade Past Research on BGP Sec Conclusion
17 Data Sources RIR/Internet Route Registry(IRR) Registration information/policy Information RADB,RIPE,ARIN,APNIC BGP Data Collectors RouteViews, RIPE-RIS No. of BGP collector deployed around the world Trace route Datasets[Skitter/Ark,DIMES] P2P Ono, multicast data(mrinfo),router logs,acls Collect traces from Route Servers, Looking Glass servers etc. 17
18 18 Route Views(SNU AS) RIPE-RIS (SNU AS)
19 19 Outline Introduction Types of IP Hijacking Data Sources to start research Tools of the Trade Past Research on BGP Sec Conclusion
20 Cyclops..AS-Centric Visualization tool Data sources BGP routing tables + updates: Route Views, RIPE, Abilene, CERNET BGP View Route Servers: Packet Clearing House, UCR, traceroute.org, Route Server Wiki Looking Glasses: traceroute.org, NANOG, Looking Glass Wiki Others Mapnet,Otter,HERMES,VAST,FixedOrbit
21 Tools to get started Software based Router Quagga /vyata/GateD etc. RIR-Internet Routing Registry IRRd RIPE WHOIS 3.6 Irrtoolset IrrPowerTools MRT dump file manipulation toolkit(mdfmt) version 0.2 BGP4MP TableDump V2 BGP trace Analyzers PCH- Sanity Checker RIPE-MyASN Service BGPPlay BGPmon.net StraighRV analyzer Pybgpdump LinkRank Beta 02
22 22 Outline Introduction Types of IP Hijacking Data Sources to start research Tools of the Trade Past Research on BGP Sec Conclusion
23 BGP Solutions Categories Prevention S-BGP,SO-BGP,SPV Mitigation Wang et.al,pg-bgp,zhang et al.anycast Routing Detect & Alert myasn,iar,phas->cyclops,bgpmon.net Detect & Recover Probabilistic IP Hijacking(PIPA)
![Table 1 : Hijacking Solutions Detectio n System Alarm Type / Duplica te PH Subpref ix PH Super/ Independ ent PH Spoofing MITM PHAS [mohit et al] PG-BGP [J.Karlin et al] K.Sriram al.](/docs-images/77/75731238/images/24-1.jpg "[ et H H Origin, Last Hop, Sub Allocation, Sub Y Y N limited N Y Y N Y limited H+R N Y Y N Y N Nemecis R N Y Y N N N Hu et al.")
24 Table 1 : Hijacking Solutions Detectio n System Alarm Type / Duplica te PH Subpref ix PH Super/ Independ ent PH Spoofing MITM PHAS [mohit et al] PG-BGP [J.Karlin et al] K.Sriram al. [ et H H Origin, Last Hop, Sub Allocation, Sub Y Y N limited N Y Y N Y limited H+R N Y Y N Y N Nemecis R N Y Y N N N Hu et al. H N Y Y N Y N Table 1 : Taxonomy of Hijacking Solutions (PH: Hijacking, Y: yes, N: No, H: History, R: Registry, Un: Unreachability, MITM: Man In The Middle) 24
25 Major Research Groups University of California Los Angeles(Lixia Zhang) Internet Research Lab(irl) CAIDA Colorodo State University (Dan Massey) Network Security Research Group University of Princeton(Jennifer Rexford) Incrementally Deployable Secure Interdomain Routing University of Michigan(Z.Morley Mao) RobustNet Group
26 Major Research Groups National Institute of Standards and Technology(Advanced Network Technologies Division) Trustworthy Networking BGP Security and Routing Robustness University of Swinburne (Geoff Huston) CAIA UCL,Loouvain-la-Neuve,Belgium(Olivier Bonaventure) INL:IP Networking Lab
27 27 Conclusion None of the solution has been deployed? Why? Incentive to deployment,cost,politics, what not Quite difficult to differentiate between hijack or router misconfiguration Working on the full level implementation and experimental results of BGP security Solution for IP prefix Hijacking Probabilistic IP Hijacking
28 References [Ethan K. et al]studying Black holes in the Internet with Hubble [M. Lad et.al] PHAS: A Hijack Alert System, in USENIX Security Symposium [Hu et al.] Accurate Real-time Identification of IP Hijacking,I EEE Security and Privacy, Oakland, 2007 [J. Karlin, et al.] Pretty Good BGP: Improving BGP by Cautiously Adopting Routes,IEEE ICNP 2006, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, Nov Internet Alert Registry[ [G. Siganos et al.],a Blueprint for Improving the Robustness of Internet Routing,Security 06,
29 29
Evaluation of BGP Anomaly Detection and Robustness Algorithms
Trustworthy Networking Program Evaluation of BGP Anomaly Detection and Robustness Algorithms Kotikapaludi Sriram, Doug Montgomery, Oliver Borchert, Okhee Kim, and Patrick Gleichmann National Institute
AS-CRED: Reputation Service for Trustworthy Inter-domain Routing
AS-CRED: Reputation Service for Trustworthy Inter-domain Routing Krishna Venkatasubramanian Computer and Information Science University of Pennsylvania ONR MURI N00014-07-1-0907 Review Meeting June 10,
The Implementation of BGP Monitoring, Alarming, and Protecting System by a BGP-UPDATE-Based Method using ECOMMUNITY in Real Time
The Implementation of BGP Monitoring, Alarming, and Protecting System by a BGP-UPDATE-Based Method using ECOMMUNITY in Real Time Je-kuk Yun 1, Beomseok Hong 2, and Yanggon Kim 3 1 Information Technology,
Towards A Practical and Effective BGP Defense System
Towards A Practical and Effective BGP Defense System Douglas Comer, Parmjeet Singh, and Subramanian Vasudevan Abstract At the center of the Internet, major ISPs use the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) to
The Transition to BGP Security Is the Juice Worth the Squeeze?
The Transition to BGP Security Is the Juice Worth the Squeeze? RPKI Sharon Goldberg Boston University November 2013 Work with Kyle Brogle (Stanford), Danny Cooper (BU), Ethan Heilman (BU), Robert Lychev
A Configuration based Approach to Mitigating Man-inthe-Middle Attacks in Enterprise Cloud IaaS Networks running BGP
A Configuration based Approach to Mitigating Man-inthe-Middle Attacks in Enterprise Cloud IaaS Networks running BGP Stephen Brako Oti Isaac Bansah Tonny M. Adegboyega ABSTRACT Cloud IaaS service providers
BGP Security via Enhancements of Existing Practices
IEEE International Conference on Communications 2009 1 BGP Security via Enhancements of Existing Practices Xiaoliang Zhao, David T. Kao * Abstract Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the de-facto inter-domain
BGP Path Exploration Damping (PED)
BGP Path Exploration Damping (PED) Mattia Rossi mrossi@swin.edu.au Centre for Advanced Internet Architectures (CAIA) Swinburne University of Technology Outline Introduction Motivation Path Exploration
CNT Computer and Network Security: BGP Security
CNT 5410 - Computer and Network Security: BGP Security Professor Kevin Butler Fall 2015 Internet inter-as routing: BGP BGP (Border Gateway Protocol): the de facto standard BGP provides each AS a means
BGP Anomaly Detection. Bahaa Al-Musawi PhD candidate Supervisors: Dr. Philip Branch and Prof. Grenville Armitage.
BGP Anomaly Detection Bahaa Al-Musawi PhD candidate Supervisors: Dr. Philip Branch and Prof. Grenville Armitage balmusawi@swin.edu.au Centre for Advanced Internet Architectures (CAIA) Swinburne University
Detecting routing anomalies using RIPE Atlas
Detecting routing anomalies using RIPE Atlas Todor Yakimov Graduate School of Informatics University of Amsterdam Wednesday, February 5, 2014 Todor Yakimov (UvA) Detecting routing anomalies using RIPE
Securing BGP: The current state of RPKI. Geoff Huston Chief Scientist, APNIC
Securing BGP: The current state of RPKI Geoff Huston Chief Scientist, APNIC Incidents What happens when I announce your addresses in BGP? All the traffic that used to go to you will now come to me I can
Introduction to IP Routing. Geoff Huston
Introduction to IP Routing Geoff Huston Routing How do packets get from A to B in the Internet? A Internet B Connectionless Forwarding Each router (switch) makes a LOCAL decision to forward the packet
Network Forensics Prefix Hijacking Theory Prefix Hijacking Forensics Concluding Remarks. Network Forensics:
Network Forensics: Network OS Fingerprinting Prefix Hijacking Analysis Scott Hand September 30 th, 2011 Outline 1 Network Forensics Introduction OS Fingerprinting 2 Prefix Hijacking Theory BGP Background
A Survey of BGP Security Review
A Survey of BGP Security Review Network Security Instructor:Dr. Shishir Nagaraja Submitted By: Jyoti Leeka November 16, 2011 1 Introduction to the topic and the reason for the topic being interesting Border
Identifying BGP Routing Table Transfer. !Machu Picchu!
Identifying BGP Routing Table Transfer Beichuan Zhang (Univ. Of Arizona) Vamsi Kambhampati (Colorado State Univ.) Daniel Massey (Colorado State Univ.) Mohit Lad (Univ. Of California, LA) Lixia Zhang (Univ.
32-bit ASNs. Greg Hankins Chris Malayter APRICOT 2009 APRICOT /02/25
32-bit ASNs Greg Hankins ghankins@force10networks.com Chris Malayter cmalayter@switchanddata.com APRICOT 2009 APRICOT 2009 2009/02/25 ASN Terminology Soup What??? 2-octet, 2-byte, 16-bit, ASN16, and OLD
Securing BGP Networks using Consistent Check Algorithm
Securing BGP Networks using Consistent Check Algorithm C. K. Man, K.Y. Wong, and K. H. Yeung Abstract The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the critical routing protocol in the Internet infrastructure.
Measuring and Analyzing on Effection of BGP Session Hijack Attack
Measuring and Analyzing on Effection of BGP Session Hijack Attack ZHAO JINJING 1,2, LI YUANLING 1,2, LIU LI 1,2 1 National Key Laboratory of Science and Technology on Information System Security 2 Beijing
PTT Fórum 6. John Kemp
PTT Fórum 6 John Kemp kemp@routeviews.org What is it? What kinds of tools are available? What are some simple uses? What are some advanced uses? Opportunities for Research A Collaborative Router Looking
Security in inter-domain routing
DD2491 p2 2011 Security in inter-domain routing Olof Hagsand KTH CSC 1 Literature Practical BGP pages Chapter 9 See reading instructions Beware of BGP Attacks (Nordström, Dovrolis) Examples of attacks
PART III. Implementing Inter-Network Relationships with BGP
PART III Implementing Inter-Network Relationships with BGP ICNP 2002 Routing Protocols Autonomous System BGP-4 BGP = Border Gateway Protocol Is a Policy-Based routing protocol Is the de facto EGP of today
Auto-Detecting Hijacked Prefixes?
Auto-Detecting Hijacked Prefixes? Geoff Huston APNIC @RIPE 50 May 2005 1 Address Hijacking Is the unauthorized use of an address prefix as an advertised route object on the Internet It s not a bogon the
Just give me a button!
Just give me a button! The challenges of routing security RIPE NCC Members organisation founded in 1992 Manages IP and ASN allocations in Europe, Middle East and former Soviet Union - Ensure unique holdership
Update on Resource Certification. Geoff Huston, APNIC Mark Kosters, ARIN IEPG, March 2008
Update on Resource Certification Geoff Huston, APNIC Mark Kosters, ARIN IEPG, March 2008 Address and Routing Security What we have had for many years is a relatively insecure interdomain routing system
StrobeLight: Lightweight Availability Mapping and Anomaly Detection. James Mickens, John Douceur, Bill Bolosky Brian Noble
StrobeLight: Lightweight Availability Mapping and Anomaly Detection James Mickens, John Douceur, Bill Bolosky Brian Noble At any given moment, how can we tell which enterprise machines are online and
Hands-On BGP Routing. Course Description. Students Will Learn. Target Audience. Prerequisites. Page: 1 of 5. BGP Routing
Hands-On Course Description This Hands-On course on (Border Gateway Protocol), from the basics of how it works through to advanced issues such as route reflectors, policy, filtering, route selection and
On the State of the Inter-domain and Intra-domain Routing Security
On the State of the Inter-domain and Intra-domain Routing Security Mingwei Zhang April 19, 2016 Mingwei Zhang Internet Routing Security 1 / 54 Section Internet Routing Security Background Internet Routing
Introducción al RPKI (Resource Public Key Infrastructure)
Introducción al RPKI (Resource Public Key Infrastructure) Roque Gagliano rogaglia@cisco.com 4 Septiembre 2013 Quito, Equator 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. 1 Review of problem to
Pretty Good BGP: Improving BGP by Cautiously Adopting Routes
Pretty Good BGP: Improving BGP by Cautiously Adopting Routes Josh Karlin University of New Mexico karlinjf@cs.unm.edu Stephanie Forrest University of New Mexico Santa Fe Institute forrest@cs.unm.edu Jennifer
the real-time Internet routing observatory
the real-time Internet routing observatory Alessandro Improta alessandro.improta@iit.cnr.it Luca Sani luca.sani@iit.cnr.it VSIX Meeting, May 10, 2017 - Padova Our research interest: the Internet AS-level
An Operational Perspective on BGP Security. Geoff Huston February 2005
An Operational Perspective on BGP Security Geoff Huston February 2005 Disclaimer This is not a description of the approach taken by any particular service provider in securing their network. It is intended
Network Security: Routing security. Aapo Kalliola T Network security Aalto University, Nov-Dec 2012
Network Security: Routing security Aapo Kalliola T-110.5241 Network security Aalto University, Nov-Dec 2012 Outline 1. Structure of internet 2. Routing basics 3. Security issues 4. Attack 5. Solutions
Routing Security We can do better!
Routing Security We can do better! And how MANRS can help Andrei Robachevsky robachevsky@isoc.org 1 No Day Without an Incident 120 6 month of suspicious activity 90 60 Hijack Leak 30 0 1/5/17 1/16/17 1/27/17
Routing Is At Risk. Let's Secure It Together. Andrei Robachevsky 1
Routing Is At Risk. Let's Secure It Together Andrei Robachevsky robachevsky@isoc.org 1 No Day Without an Incident 120 6 month of suspicious activity 100 80 60 Hijack Leak 40 20 0 1/1/17 2/1/17 3/1/17 4/1/17
A Measurement Study of BGP Misconfiguration
A Measurement Study of BGP Misconfiguration Ratul Mahajan, David Wetherall, and Tom Anderson University of Washington Motivation Routing protocols are robust against failures Meaning fail-stop link and
Robust Inter-Domain Routing
Establishing the Technical Basis for Trustworthy Networking Robust Inter-Domain Routing Addressing Systemic Vulnerabilities in BGP Doug Montgomery (dougm@nist.gov) Manager, Internet and Scalable Systems
CSE 461 Interdomain routing. David Wetherall
CSE 461 Interdomain routing David Wetherall djw@cs.washington.edu Interdomain routing Focus: Routing across internetworks made up of different parties Route scaling Application Route policy Transport The
How Complete and Accurate is the Internet Routing Registry (IRR)?
How Complete and Accurate is the Internet Routing Registry (IRR)? Dec 5 th 2011 4th CAIDA-WIDE-CASFI Joint Measurement Workshop Akmal Khan, Hyun-chul Kim, Ted "Taekyoung" Kwon Seoul National University
Networking Review & Grand Challenges
ing Review & Grand Challenges CS 538 August 25 2011 slides 2010-2011 by Brighten Godfrey unless otherwise noted Undergraduate ing in Three Slides (including this one) Layering Application Application Transport
Security Issues of BGP in Complex Peering and Transit Networks
Technical Report IDE-0904 Security Issues of BGP in Complex Peering and Transit Networks Presented By: Supervised By: Muhammad Adnan Khalid Qamar Nazir Olga Torstensson Master of Computer network engineering
Major Project Part II. Isolating Suspicious BGP Updates To Detect Prefix Hijacks
Major Project Part II Isolating Suspicious BGP Updates To Detect Prefix Hijacks Author: Abhishek Aggarwal (IIT Delhi) Co-authors: Anukool Lakhina (Guavus Networks Inc.) Prof. Huzur Saran (IIT Delhi) !
Jumpstarting BGP Security. Yossi Gilad Joint work with: Avichai Cohen, Amir Herzberg, and Michael Schapira
Jumpstarting BGP Security Yossi Gilad Joint work with: Avichai Cohen, Amir Herzberg, and Michael Schapira Prefix hijacking Victim Path: 111 AS X AS 111 Boston University BGP Ad. AS 666 Data flow 2 Prefix
MANRS Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security
27 March 2018 MANRS Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security Kevin Meynell meynell@isoc.org Presentation title Client name Internet Society 1992 2016 1 The Problem A Routing Security Overview 2 The Basics:
Understanding Resiliency of Internet Topology Against Prefix Hijack Attacks
Understanding Resiliency of Internet Topology Against Prefix Hijack Attacks Mohit Lad Ricardo Oliveira Beichuan Zhang Lixia Zhang Abstract A prefix hijack attack involves an attacker announcing victim
Investigating occurrence of duplicate updates in BGP announcements
Investigating occurrence of duplicate updates in BGP announcements Jonathan Park, Dan Jen, Mohit Lab, Shane Amante, Danny McPherson, Lixia Zhang GROW @ IETF75 July 27, 2009 Why This Work All BGP update
TTM AS-level Traceroutes
TTM AS-level Traceroutes Matching IPs to ASes René Wilhelm New Projects Group RIPE NCC 1 Motivation TTM performs frequent traceroutes to find closest IP route for delay measurements
4-Byte AS Numbers. The view from the Old BGP world. Geoff Huston February 2007 APNIC
4-Byte AS Numbers The view from the Old BGP world Geoff Huston February 2007 APNIC AS Number Consumption AS Number Consumption IANA Pool You are here Projections Total AS Count Advertised AS Count Unadvertised
MANRS. Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security. Jan Žorž
MANRS Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security Jan Žorž The Problem A Routing Security Overview 2 No Day Without an Incident http://bgpstream.com/ 3 Routing Incidents Cause Real World
Autonomous Security for Autonomous Systems
Autonomous Security for Autonomous Systems Josh Karlin, Stephanie Forrest, and Jennifer Rexford Abstract The Internet s interdomain routing protocol, BGP, supports a complex network of Autonomous Systems
APT: A Practical Transit-Mapping Service Overview and Comparisons
APT: A Practical Transit-Mapping Service Overview and Comparisons draft-jen-apt Dan Jen, Michael Meisel, Dan Massey, Lan Wang, Beichuan Zhang, and Lixia Zhang The Big Picture APT is similar to LISP at
Detecting Internet Traffic Interception based on Route Hijacking
Detecting Internet Traffic Interception based on Route Hijacking Alberto Dainotti alberto@caida.org Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis University of California, San Diego Joint work with: Pavlos
Routing on the Internet. Routing on the Internet. Hierarchical Routing. Computer Networks. Lecture 17: Inter-domain Routing and BGP
Routing on the Internet Computer Networks Lecture 17: Inter-domain Routing and BGP In the beginning there was the ARPANET: route using GGP (Gateway-to-Gateway Protocol), a distance vector routing protocol
Region-based BGP Announcement Filtering for Improved BGP Security
Region-based BGP Announcement Filtering for Improved BGP Security Fernando Sanchez Florida State University sanchez@cs.fsu.edu Zhenhai Duan Florida State University duan@cs.fsu.edu ABSTRACT BGP prefix
RAPTOR: Routing Attacks on Privacy in Tor. Yixin Sun. Princeton University. Acknowledgment for Slides. Joint work with
RAPTOR: Routing Attacks on Privacy in Tor Yixin Sun Princeton University Joint work with Annie Edmundson, Laurent Vanbever, Oscar Li, Jennifer Rexford, Mung Chiang, Prateek Mittal Acknowledgment for Slides
ISP 1 AS 1 Prefix P peer ISP 2 AS 2 Route leak (P) propagates Prefix P update Route update P Route leak (P) to upstream 2 AS 3 Customer BGP Update messages Route update A ISP A Prefix A ISP B B leaks
Securing the Internet at the Exchange Point Fernando M. V. Ramos
Securing the Internet at the Exchange Point Fernando M. V. Ramos 18.09.2017 Securing the Internet at the Exchange Point Fernando M. V. Ramos 18.09.2017 There are vulnerabilities in the Internet architecture
Detection of Invalid Routing Announcement in the Internet Λ
Detection of Invalid Routing Announcement in the Internet Λ Xiaoliang Zhao, Dan Pei, Lan Wang, Dan Massey, Allison Mankin, S. Felix Wu,Lixia Zhang y Abstract Network measurement has shown that a specific
BGPMON.IO: THE MANY NEW FACES OF BGPMON
BGPMON.IO: THE MANY NEW FACES OF BGPMON Colorado State University Spiros Thanasoulas and Christos Papadopoulos NANOG 69, Feb 6-8 2017, Washington DC Work supported by NSF #CNS1305404, DHS #D15PC00205,
Internet Routing Protocols Lecture 03 Inter-domain Routing
Internet Routing Protocols Lecture 03 Inter-domain Routing Advanced Systems Topics Lent Term, 2008 Timothy G. Griffin Computer Lab Cambridge UK Autonomous Routing Domains A collection of physical networks
Routing Is At Risk. Let's Secure It Together. Andrei Robachevsky 1
Routing Is At Risk. Let's Secure It Together Andrei Robachevsky robachevsky@isoc.org 1 No Day Without an Incident 120 6 month of suspicious activity 100 80 60 Hijack Leak 40 20 0 1/1/17 2/1/17 3/1/17 4/1/17
Inter-domain routing security and the role of Internet Routing Registries. August 1, 2004 Larry Blunk, Merit Network, Inc.
Inter-domain routing security and the role of Internet Routing Registries IEPG meeting, IETF 60 August 1, 2004 Larry Blunk, ljb@merit.edu, Merit Network, Inc. Overview State of IDR security State of the
Interdomain routing CSCI 466: Networks Keith Vertanen Fall 2011
Interdomain routing CSCI 466: Networks Keith Vertanen Fall 2011 Overview Business relationships between ASes Interdomain routing using BGP Advertisements Routing policy Integration with intradomain routing
PHAS: A Prefix Hijack Alert System
PHAS: A Prefix Hijack Alert System Mohit Lad mohit@cs.ucla.edu Yiguo Wu yiguowu@cs.ucla.edu Dan Massey massey@cs.colostate.edu Beichuan Zhang bzhang@cs.arizona.edu Dan Pei peidan@research.att.com Lixia
Internet Protocols Fall Lectures Inter-domain routing, mobility support, multicast routing Andreas Terzis
Internet Protocols Fall 2006 Lectures 11-12 Inter-domain routing, mobility support, multicast routing Andreas Terzis Outline Inter-domain Internet Routing BGP Routing for mobile nodes Multicast routing
CS 204: BGP. Jiasi Chen Lectures: MWF 12:10-1pm Humanities and Social Sciences
CS 204: BGP Jiasi Chen Lectures: MWF 12:10-1pm Humanities and Social Sciences 1403 http://www.cs.ucr.edu/~jiasi/teaching/cs204_spring17/ 1 Overview AS relationships Inter-AS routing BGP Example Paper discussion
MANRS. Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security. Aftab Siddiqui
MANRS Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security Aftab Siddiqui siddiqui@isoc.org The Problem A Routing Security Overview 2 Routing Incidents are Increasing In 2017 alone, 14,000 routing outages or attacks
Balanced Peer Lists: Towards a Collusion-Resistant BGP
Balanced Peer Lists: Towards a Collusion-Resistant BGP Yan Li Department of Computer Sciences The University of Texas at Austin Austin, Texas 78712 Email: yanli@cs.utexas.edu Mohamed G. Gouda Department
On the Characteristics of BGP Multiple Origin AS Conflicts
1 On the Characteristics of BGP Multiple Origin AS Conflicts Kwan-Wu Chin School of Electrical, Computer and Telecommunications Engineering University of Wollongong Northfields Avenue, NSW, Australia kwanwu@uow.edu.au
Evaluation of Prefix Hijacking Impact Based on Hinge-Transmit Property of BGP Routing System
Evaluation of Prefix Hijacking Impact Based on Hinge-Transmit Property of BGP Routing System Evaluation of Prefix Hijacking Impact Based on Hinge-Transmit Property of BGP Routing System School of Computer,
Deploying RPKI An Intro to the RPKI Infrastructure
Deploying RPKI An Intro to the RPKI Infrastructure VNIX-NOG 24 November 2016 Hanoi, Vietnam Issue Date: Revision: Misdirection / Hijacking Incidents YouTube Incident Occurred 24 Feb 2008 (for about 2 hours)
bgpand - Architecting a modular BGP4 Attack & Anomalies Detection Platform
bgpand - Architecting a modular BGP4 Attack & Anomalies Detection Platform Mayank Bhatnagar TechMahindra Limited, SDF B-1, NSEZ, Noida-201305, India E-mail : mayank.bhatnagar2@techmahindra.com Abstract
A FRAMEWORK FOR DEFENDING AGAINST PREFIX HIJACK ATTACKS. A Thesis KRISHNA CHAITANYA TADI
A FRAMEWORK FOR DEFENDING AGAINST PREFIX HIJACK ATTACKS A Thesis by KRISHNA CHAITANYA TADI Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements
Accurate Real-time Identification of IP Hijacking. Presented by Jacky Mak
Accurate Real-time Identification of IP Hijacking Presented by Jacky Mak Outline Problem and Objectives Interdomain Routing and BGP Basics Attack Model of IP Hijacking Real-time Detection Techniques Implementation
Secure Routing with RPKI. APNIC44 Security Workshop
Secure Routing with RPKI APNIC44 Security Workshop Misdirection / Hijacking Incidents YouTube Incident Occurred 24 Feb 2008 (for about 2 hours) Pakistan Telecom announced YT block Google (AS15169) services
The BGP Visibility Scanner
The BGP Visibility Scanner Andra Lutu, Marcelo Bagnulo and Olaf Maennel Institute IMDEA Networks, Spain University Carlos III of Madrid, Spain Loughborough University, Loughborough, UK Abstract By tweaking
BGP ANOMALY DETECTION USING DATA MINING TECHNIQUES. Iñigo Ortiz de Urbina
BGP ANOMALY DETECTION USING DATA MINING TECHNIQUES Iñigo Ortiz de Urbina Introduction Goal Apply machine learning algorithms to mine network data and produce a preliminary offline anomaly detection system
Accurate Real-time Identification of IP Hijacking
Accurate Real-time Identification of IP Hijacking 1 Xin Hu Z. Morley Mao University of Michigan huxin@umich.edu zmao@umich.edu Abstract In this paper, we present novel and practical techniques to accurately
Module: Routing Security. Professor Patrick McDaniel Spring CMPSC443 - Introduction to Computer and Network Security
CMPSC443 - Introduction to Computer and Network Security Module: Routing Security Professor Patrick McDaniel Spring 2009 1 Routing 101 Network routing exists to provide hosts desirable paths from the source
Networking Review & Grand Challenges
ing Review & Grand Challenges Brighten Godfrey CS 538 January 22 2018 slides 2010-2018 by Brighten Godfrey unless otherwise noted Announcements Introducing Sangeetha Key dates posted Assignment release,
Resource Public Key Infrastructure
Resource Public Key Infrastructure A pilot for the Internet2 Community to secure the global route table Andrew Gallo The Basics The Internet is a self organizing network of networks. How do you find your
A PKI For IDR Public Key Infrastructure and Number Resource Certification
A PKI For IDR Public Key Infrastructure and Number Resource Certification AUSCERT 2006 Geoff Huston Research Scientist APNIC If You wanted to be Bad on the Internet And you wanted to: Hijack a site Inspect
Dynamics of Hot-Potato Routing in IP Networks
Dynamics of Hot-Potato Routing in IP Networks Jennifer Rexford AT&T Labs Research http://www.research.att.com/~jrex Joint work with Renata Teixeira (UCSD), Aman Shaikh (AT&T), and Timothy Griffin (Intel)
CSCD 433/533 Network Programming Fall Lecture 14 Global Address Space Autonomous Systems, BGP Protocol Routing
CSCD 433/533 Network Programming Fall 2012 Lecture 14 Global Address Space Autonomous Systems, BGP Protocol Routing 1 Topics Interdomain Routing BGP Interdomain Routing Benefits vs. Link State Routing
Implementation of RPKI and IRR filtering on the AMS-IX platform. Stavros Konstantaras NOC Engineer
Implementation of RPKI and IRR filtering on the AMS-IX platform Stavros Konstantaras NOC Engineer RIPE EDUCA 2018 Agenda AMS-IX Route Servers Architecture Features Filtering IRRdb RPKI BGP Communities
SENSS: Software-defined Security Service
SENSS: Software-defined Security Service Minlan Yu University of Southern California Joint work with Abdulla Alwabel, Ying Zhang, Jelena Mirkovic 1 Growing DDoS Attacks Average monthly size of DDoS attacks
32-bit ASNs. Philip Smith. AfNOG rd April 1st May Abuja, Nigeria
32-bit ASNs Philip Smith AfNOG 2007 23rd April 1st May Abuja, Nigeria Autonomous System (AS) AS 100 Collection of networks with same routing policy Single routing protocol Usually under single ownership,
MANRS: Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security Routing is at Risk Let s secure it together!
15 October 2018 Internet2 Technology Exchange MANRS: Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security Routing is at Risk Let s secure it together! Kevin Meynell Manager, Technical & Operational Engagement meynell@isoc.org
The Dark Oracle: Perspective-Aware Unused and Unreachable Address Discovery
The Dark Oracle: Perspective-Aware Unused and Unreachable Address Discovery Evan Cooke *, Michael Bailey *, Farnam Jahanian *, Richard Mortier *University of Michigan Microsoft Research - 1 - NSDI 2006
Misdirection / Hijacking Incidents
Security Tutorial @ TWNOG SECURE ROUTING WITH RPKI 1 Misdirection / Hijacking Incidents YouTube Incident Occurred 24 Feb 2008 (for about 2 hours) Pakistan Telecom announced YT block Google (AS15169) services
IPv6 Routing Table Anomalies
RIPE 46: IPv6 WG 03 September 2003 Hotel Krasnapolsky, Amsterdam Jeroen Massar jeroen@unfix.org IPv6 Routing Table Anomalies SixXS SixXS accommodates an extendible whitelabel tunnelbroker to assist LIRs
3/10/2011. Copyright Link Technologies, Inc.
Mikrotik Certified Trainer / Engineer MikroTik Certified Dude Consultant Consulting Since 1997 Enterprise Class Networks WAN Connectivity Certifications Cisco, Microsoft, MikroTik BGP/OSPF Experience Deployed
Multi-Lateral Peering Agreement
Version 1.1 July 10, 2002 Multi-Lateral Peering Agreement Parties Definitions Obligations Rules Rights Exclusions Best effort basis Establishment procedure Term and renewal Change procedure Termination
the real-time Internet routing observatory Luca Sani
the real-time Internet routing observatory Luca Sani 1 / 24 Our research topic: discovering the Internet structure Everyone knows the role of the Internet in our society, but since its commercialization
How Secure are. BGP Security Protocols? Sharon Goldberg Microsoft Research & Boston University. Michael Schapira. Pete Hummon AT&T Research
How Secure are NANOG 49, San Francisco Tuesday June 15 2010 BGP Security Protocols? Sharon Goldberg Microsoft Research & Boston University Michael Schapira Princeton University Yale & Berkeley Pete Huon
Internet Routing Protocols Lecture 01 & 02
Internet Routing Protocols Lecture 01 & 02 Advanced Systems Topics Lent Term, 2010 Timothy G. Griffin Computer Lab Cambridge UK Internet Routing Outline Lecture 1 : Inter-domain routing architecture, the
Routing Security. Daniel Karrenberg RIPE NCC.
Routing Security Daniel Karrenberg RIPE NCC Who is talking: Daniel Karrenberg 1980s: helped build Internet in Europe - EUnet, Ebone, IXes,... - RIPE 1990s: helped build RIPE
This article appeared in a journal published by Elsevier. The attached copy is furnished to the author for internal non-commercial research and
This article appeared in a journal published by Elsevier. The attached copy is furnished to the author for internal non-commercial research and education use, including for instruction at the authors institution
Measuring Adoption of RPKI Route Origin Validation and Filtering
PEERING The BGP Testbed Measuring Adoption of RPKI Route Origin Validation and Filtering Andreas Reuter (andreas.reuter@fu-berlin.de) Joint work with Randy Bush, Ethan Katz-Bassett, Italo Cunha, Thomas
the real-time Internet routing observatory Alessandro Improta
the real-time Internet routing observatory Alessandro Improta alessandro.improta@iit.cnr.it Our research focus: the Internet AS-level ecosystem Why is it important? To identify Internet topological properties