Looking Forward: Challenges in Mobile Security. John Mitchell Stanford University

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1 Looking Forward: Challenges in Mobile Security John Mitchell Stanford University

2 Outline Mobile platform security SessionJuggler Using phone as authentication token SelectiveAuth Protecting resources on the phone Stamp Project Android malware project Perspective Server side is also important for overall security

3 3

4 Attack through a malicious web site

5 Android sandboxing limits consequences of attack Possible web attacks compromise web partition on phone

of iphone and Android smartphone users into joining a

7 Android: Experimental botnet demo Two researchers at TippingPoint's Digital Vaccine Group have duped thousands of iphone and Android smartphone users into joining a mobile botnet by spreading a seemingly innocuous weather application.

8 Trends Two attack vectors: web browser, installed apps. Both are increasing in prevalence and sophistication Android malware is increasing: Estimated 500,000 to 1 million users affected by Android malware in the first half of 2011 Approx 2.5x increase in second half od 2011 Three in ten will experience web based threat /year Approx 80 apps infected with malware in Jan 2011 Increased to over 400 apps cumulative in June 2011 Attackers deploying increasingly sophisticated techniques to take control of the phone, personal data, and money source: threat report

9 Web based threats Phishing: mobile users more likely to fall to attack Drive bydownloads: circumvent markets Direct exploitation Mobile sites may lag in https, other security measures source: threat report

10 Malware infected Apps Leading categories: games, utilities, adult entertainment source: threat report

11 Malicious App Creation source: threat report

12 Research Sample: Selective Authorization Elie Bursztein, Jason Bau, Baptiste Goudin, John C. Mitchell Stanford University

13 Selective Authorization

14 Current Phone Threat Model To prevent a single physical illegitimate access a pin code is enforced for every use

15 Protect Applications Selectively?

16 User Study Browse Internet Install an App Make a Call Access Social Profile Look at picture Take a Picture Listen to a Song Play a Game Read Navigation Send a SMS Family Friends Stranger

17 Android Application Permissions Each application has its own space (uid) Application capabilities model (gid) Try to enforce a least privilege idea

18 Alternative? Instead of asking at launch time do it at capability time Intercept and block/warm for specific phone permission access

19 Android Framework

20 Our Selective Auth Framework Password Schemes Configuration Interfaces Alternative Pass Schemes Database Authentication Provider Alternative Configuration Interfaces Activity Manager Service Cache Android Application Framework Dalvik Virtual Machine Selective Authentication Framework Third Party Applications Android Framework Specific Permission Needed

21 Configuration options Wizard Start Usage Question Permissions Question

22 Research Sample: Secure Web Login From an Untrusted Terminal Using Session Hijacking Elie Bursztein, Chinmay Soman, Dan Boneh, John C. Mitchell Stanford University

23 SessionJuggler

24 SessionJuggler Insecure Terminal 1. Facebook Login Screen 6. Facebook Profile Page Mobile Device 2. SessionJuggler Start Screen 3. SessionJuggler Confirmation Dialog 4. Facebook Login Screen 5. Facebook Profile Page

25 Anti Hijacking Defenses DEFENSE Anti hijacking defenses at the Alexa top 100 sites % of Alexa100 Using HTTPS 83% Using Secure Cookies 52% Separating Mobile and Desktop Sessions 6% Binding Session to IP Address 8% Checking Local Time 1% Binding Session to User Agent Header 0% Binding Session to Local language 0% Logout Over HTTPS 1%

26 Sites with Improper Logout health.google.com healthvault.com Linkedin Yahoo Hotmail/MSN blogger.com Ebay Flicker wordpress.com IMDB ask.com cnn.com conduit.com megaupload.com mediafire.com 4shared.com cnet.com weather.com imageshack.com OpenMR View and edit record View and edit health record Editing and saving profile Accessing and sending s Accessing and sending s Posting a blog post Bidding on an auction Uploading photos Posting a blog post Editing and saving profile Editing and saving profile Editing and saving profile Editing and saving profile Uploading files Uploading files Uploading files Editing and saving profile Editing and saving profile Uploading photos Accessing, changing medical records

27 Research Sample: Android malware certification Alex Aiken, John C. Mitchell, Mayur Naik, Isil Dillig, Thomas Dillig Stanford, Georgia Tech, College of William and Mary

28 Idea #1 STAMP s static analysis will infer the spec from the app s code 28 Alex Aiken APAC Kickoff Meeting

29 An Example Consider a malicious barcode scanner that transmits phone's unique IMEI and IMSI numbers to a malicious server STAMP infers the specs: 29 Alex Aiken APAC Kickoff Meeting

30 Idea #2 Auditor inspects spec to decide if app is malware 30 Alex Aiken APAC Kickoff Meeting

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32 False Alarms There will be false alarms Code that is OK, but STAMP cannot prove is OK This is a huge problem in practice One of the major issues in using static analysis 32 Alex Aiken APAC Kickoff Meeting

33 Idea #3 Idea #3 Work with the auditor to refine specifications 33 Alex Aiken APAC Kickoff Meeting

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35 Risks Are the semantics of Android well understood? Spending time trying to understand the programming model Are source sink flows sufficient as specifications? Can we make developing specifications productive? No. But they are the first and perhaps most important class. Eat our dog food. Build a prototype, verify apps, and find out what gets in the way. 35 Alex Aiken APAC Kickoff Meeting

36 Perspective: Why Mobile Application Security Risks Will Continue Growing for Enterprise and Consumer Mobile Applications

37 Why Enterprise Mobile Apps source: [x]cube Labs

38 Mobile Applications: Server Threats Concentration of risk on back end services that s where the data is Enterprises not checking services used by mobile devices Threats are evolving even as mobile applications are downloaded Lots of hype around endpoint protection and source code scanning these solutions cannot detect Privacy escalation Boundary authentication

39 Mobile App Vulnerability Trends Vulnerability Category Input Validation Session (Authentication,Authorization) Sensitive Information Disclosure Infrastructure 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% Percentage of Apps Typical Web application security stats 80% input validation injection attacks, 20% session authentication Mobile applications from large enterprises tested via managed service 60% input validation attacks, 40% authentication related 50 to 75% of apps had vulnerabilities that cannot be detected by endpoint analysis or source code analysis source: Cenzic Application Security Intelligence: Mobile App Testing Results February 2012

40 Conclusions Mobile platform and apps widely used Several threats Browser threats, malicious apps, back end services Research progress Improving front end device security Web defenses useful against browser attack New malware characteristics and platforms Enterprise apps widely used Need to protect both end point and apps that access backend systems Significant threats to back end services bigger payoff Auto update: app security important throughout lifecycle Likely continued job security for security professionals!

IT & DATA SECURITY BREACH PREVENTION

IT & DATA SECURITY BREACH PREVENTION A PRACTICAL GUIDE Part 1: Reducing Employee and Application Risks CONTENTS EMPLOYEES: IT security hygiene best practice APPLICATIONS: Make patching a priority AS CORPORATE