A Novel Approach to RFID Authentication: The Vera M4H Unclonable RFID IC
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1 A Novel Approach to RFID Authentication: The Vera M4H Unclonable RFID IC Presenter: Vivek Khandelwal, Vice President of Marketing & Business Development 1
2 Agenda» Company Overview» PUF Technology Overview» Unclonable RFIDs» Summary 2
3 3 Verayo
4 Verayo» Focus: Authentication & Security Technology» Core Technology: Silicon Biometrics Technology Physical Unclonable Functions» Products: Unclonable RFIDs, Soft PUFs in FPGAs, Secure Processors» Investors: Khosla Ventures» Location: San Jose, CA, USA 4
5 History Professor Srini Devadas and Tom Ziola founded PUFCO PUFCO gains exclusive license to PUF technology from MIT Awarded contract by DARPA Funded by Khosla Ventures Awarded contracts by US DoD Agencies (DTO, US Missile Defense) Company renamed as Verayo Launched the world s first unclonable chip Vera X512H RFID IC Now Awarded contracts by US DoD (DARPA, AFRL) Launched the second unclonable chip Vera M4H RFID IC 5
6 Verayo In The News Wall Street Journal Tech Innovation Awards 2009 Verayo awarded First Runners-Up in Semiconductor Category Verayo named Cool Vendor in Supply Chain Category Finalist Verayo CTO named in Top 25 CTO s list by InfoWorld 6
7 PUF Technology 7
8 Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF) A silicon biometrics technology that makes silicon chips unclonable.»identifies and authenticates each and every chip»dynamically generates unique volatile keys for each chip 8
9 Concept» Semiconductor chip fabrication process has unavoidable variations. These variations are Unpredictable Permanent Effectively impossible to clone, even by chip manufacturers» PUFs are tiny electric circuits that exploit these variations to uniquely characterize each chip» Unique characteristics = silicon biometrics Used to authenticate chips, generate crypto keys 9
10 How PUFs Work PUF Circuit Output = function of unique & random silicon fabrication process variations Input Challenge (random number) Output Response = puf (challenge, fab.process variations) Vera X512H RFID IC» Each PUF generates virtually unlimited number of challenge response pairs that are Unique same challenge results in different responses from different chips Consistent same challenge consistently generates a very similar response from the same chip» Unique challenge response pairs = silicon biometrics used for authentication 10
11 Unclonable RFIDs 11
12 Vera X512H: World s First Unclonable RFID IC» PUF Technology» Networked Authentication» Pre-Configured Authentication Events» ISO/IEC A, Mhz» 56-bit Tag ID» 512 bit OTP Launched in Sept 2008» Operating Temperature: -25 o C to +85 o C 12
13 Vera X512H Authentication Concept Trusted Location Point of Authentication Store electronic dna samples of Vera X512H IC in a secure online DB Database Scan and compare the IC s electronic dna samples against the ones stored in the database Online Authentication Service 13
14 Vera X512H Product Authentication C/R DB Serial # RFID Tag # Challenge Response RFID Tag # Challenge = Response Result Get Response for the Challenge from PUF on RFID Tag.. Create the Challenge-Response Pair Database Compare Response Against Challenge- Response Pairs in DB 14
15 Vera M4H: Next Gen Unclonable RFID IC» PUF Technology» Local (Standalone) Authentication» Unlimited Authentication Events» ISO/IEC A, Mhz» 56-bit Tag ID» 2K bit OTP User Memory» Operating Temperature: -25 o C to +85 o C 15
16 New Vera M4H RFID IC A Novel Approach to RFID Authentication Trusted Location Point of Authentication City Transit Authority Transit Station Extract, encrypt and store the genetic code of the Vera M4H IC on the IC itself Reader decrypts the genetic code of Vera M4H IC, interrogates the IC to prove it is authentic genetic code = information on chip s unique, unclonable fabrication variations Based on silicon biometrics, a low cost alternative to cryptography based solutions 16
17 Vera M4H Provisioning Vera M4H RFID IC 1 2 Chip-unique PUF parameters information on each chip s unique fabrication process variations are extracted. Chip is disabled from emitting these parameters again On an external PC or server, PUF parameters are encrypted using user s key 3 Encrypted PUF parameters are stored back on the chip s memory (OTP). At a Trusted Location: On wafer (on tester) or RFID tag provisioning 17
18 Vera M4 Authentication Unlimited Local (Offline) Authentication Events Vera M4H Based Ticket Secure RFID Reader City Transit Ticket 1. Send encrypted PUF parameters 2. Send Q R = PUF(N R ) to reader Encrypted PUF Parameters Q R Nonce N R 1. Decrypt PUF parameters 2. Send nonce N R to M4H IC 3. Calculate Q R = f(n R, PUF data) 4. Compare Q R from M4H IC to authenticate 18
19 How is it Unclonable? Challenge RF Front End PUF Response TID: PUF Params User Memory RF Front End Challenge PUF TID: PUF Params Response User Memory TID: Challenge Response???? Copy one chip s data to another Ghost device 19
20 Comparison with Crypto Authentication RF Front End TID: PUF PUF Params User Memory RF Front End TID: Secret Key Crypto Logic User Memory» PUF Based RFIDs Unclonable effectively impossible to create clone Root of trust the silicon Authentication logic tiny PUF circuit, no secure memory simple/inexpensive» Crypto RFIDs Anti-cloning depends on security of the stored key Root of trust stored key Authentication logic - crypto logic, secure memory complex/expensive 20
21 Verayo RFID Advantages Unclonable Effectively impossible to clone the RFID chip Strong & Robust Authentication Authentication based on silicon signatures Low Cost Tiny PUF circuit consumes small die area Low Power Consumption Requires no crypto computation 21
22 New RFID Technology Landscape Authentication Strength Low High Verayo RFIDs Basic RFIDs Crypto RFIDs Low Cost & Complexity High 22
23 Unclonable RFID Product Roadmap New # Features X512H M4H M1HW 1 RF Interface HF HF HF Coming Soon 2009 Q1 10 Q Standard ISO A ISO A ISO A 3 Tag ID (or UID) 56b 56b 56b 4 User Memory 512b OTP 2K OTP 1K RW 5 Number of Authentication Events Pre- Provisioned Unlimited Unlimited 6 Type of Authentication IC only IC only Mutual 7 Mode of Operation Networked Standalone/ Networked Standalone/ Networked 23
24 PUF Based RFID Use Cases # Applications X512H M4H M1HW 1 Product Authentication 2 Access Control 3 Transit Daily Tickets 4 Transit Month/Year Passes 5 Payment Cards 6 Secure IDs 7 Supply Chain Applications 24
25 25 Summary
26 Summary PUFs enable silicon biometrics based RFID Authentication PUF based RFIDs:» Secure & Reliable Based on unclonable silicon signatures» Simple & Efficient Strong authentication protocol» Low Cost, Consume Low Power Smaller chip die area 26
27 Thank You! Contact the Verayo team» Web: 27
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