Focus Area: Communication and Control Protocols. Presented by Klara Nahrstedt

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1 Focus Area: Communication and Control Protocols Presented by Klara Nahrstedt Personnel Senior PIs/Personnel David Bakken (WSU) Anjan Bose (WSU) Carl Hauser (WSU) Himanshu Khurana (UIUC) Klara Nahrstedt (UIUC) William Sanders (UIUC) Anna Scaglionne (Cornell) Robert Thomas (Cornell) Zhifang Wang (Cornell) Von Welch (UIUC) Marianne Winslett (UIUC) Student Alumni Harald Gjermundrod (PhD '06) Ioanna Dionysiou (PhD '06) Venkata Irava (PhD '06) Joel Helkey (MS '07) Stian Abelsen (MS '07) Erlend Viddal (MS '07) Current Students/Other Personnel Dave Anderson (WSU) Rasika Chakravarthy (WSU) Tamal Das (UIUC) Terry Fleury (UIUC) Loren Hoffman (WSU) Shrut Kirti (Cornell) Jim Kusznir (WSU) Adam Lee (UIUC) Chris Masone (Dartmouth) Kazuhiro Minami (UIUC) Sunil Muthuswamy (WSU) Hoang Nguyen (UIUC) Raol Rivas (UIUC) Ravi Sathyam (UIUC) Nathan Schubkegel (WSU) Erik Solum (WSU) Yang Tao (WSU) Saman Aliari Zonouz (UIUC) 1

2 Problem Space Trend/Premise: Next Generation Infrastructures will deploy COTS Computing and Communication components for their process control SCADA cyber-infrastructure Needs: Cyber-infrastructure for PowerGrid needs holistic end-to-end protocol and service solutions with respect to performance and trust issues Refined Protocol/Service Challenges: End-to-end key management End-to-end authentication, access control and trust negotiation End-to-end real-time/qos guarantees Provision of real-time and reliable monitoring, detection, alert, containment and recovery solutions in case of perturbations, vulnerabilities and attacks Vision: End-to-End Trust Provisioning for Power Grid Monitoring and Control Ethernet / IP- Control Center ISO Ethernet / IP- Coordinator Backup Data Smart Gateway/Hub IED IED IED Smart Gateway/Hub Local HMI IED IED IED DFR Ethernet / IP- IED Sensor/Actuator 2

3 Threat Modeling Problem: Assess cyber threats to to Aid in defining the scope of security problems Allow for assessment of efficacy of security solutions Enable development of a taxonomy Approach: Develop modeling framework Emphasize vulnerabilities and potential damage Survey known attacks to build and populate framework Attack-Vulnerability-Damage framework Surveyed >50 known attacks Example Cyber Attacks Name/ Origin Data Storm/ Local Slammer/ Remote XA21/ Local NMAP Scan/ Remote TCP Reset/ Remote Attack Vulnerability Damage Action Target Vulnerability State Effect Perf Effect Severity Flood Specification Avail Precision Medium Copy Process Implementation Integrity Accuracy Low Terminate Process Implementation Integrity Timeliness Medium Probe, Scan Specification Conf None Low Terminate Specification Avail Timeliness High Data End-to-End Trust Provisioning for Monitoring and Control Ethernet / IP- Smart Gateway/Hub Control Center ISO Ethernet / IP- Coordinator (1) End-to-End Key Management (2) Authorization, Authentication And Access Control (AAA) (3) Secure and Real-Time Transmission Smart Gateway/Hub IED IED IED DFR Local HMI Ethernet / IP- IED IED IED IED Sensor/Actuator (4) Vulnerabilities/Attacks Monitoring, Detection, Containment, Recovery 3

4 Protocol/Service Functions Data Plane SCADA Application Data Generation, Processing And Communication Setup Plane Application Setup Control & Management Plane Application Control & Man Real-Time Encryption/ Decryption Public Key and Symmetric Key Setup Re-keying Protocols Key Man Per-Packet Authentication & Access Control Trust Negotiation & Authorization Authentication & Access Control AAA Real-time Delivery/Scheduling QoS Setup Admission Control QoS Management/ Topology Man/ Monitoring/ Adaptation Vulnerabilities/Attack Analysis, Monitoring, Detection, Containment and Recovery RT Man Attack Man (1) End-to-End Key Management Control Center SCADA Other Divisions Engineering Division DNSSEC DomainCert: Trust Establishment Certificate Entry/Deletion Certificate Usage DomainCert: Certificate access Certificate usage DomainCert SMOCK: Combinatorial Key Management For Resource Constraint/Legacy Devices Resilient to Compromised Nodes/ Sybil Attack DNSSEC Gateway Gateway Cache A SMOCK B DomainCert Wireless New IED Devices Legacy IED Devices 4

5 Trustworthy (2) End-to-End AAA Trusted Authorization of GridStat Secure Status Dissemination Problem Achieve confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) for GridStat s status dissemination in a dynamic way that can evolve with changes in the security field during the long lifecycle of information systems for the power grid Approach Design and implement e proof of concept cep modules with different functional and performance attributes such as bandwidth, latency and throughput attributes Evaluate the Data Plane Security Architecture together with developed modules in terms of their dynamics and performance and gained confidentiality, integrity and accessibility Authorization via trust negotiation; Policy compiler, high-performance runtime policy; compliance checker; Resilience to attack via careful replication Replaced modules and keys over the wire at runtime without relying on root keys/certificates Implemented encryption, authentication, etc TrustBuilder2 framework for experimenting with trust negotiation (SourceForge); Fastest policy compliance checker for Datalog-style policy languages Security Management Plane Pub-1 Pub-n A Leaf-SMS Request Answer Request Answer Leaf-SMS Root Request Answer Data Plane Retrieve Answer Update Pub/Sub Policies Cache Module Fetch Module Request Leaf-SMS N Sub-1 Sub-n Legend Publisher Subscriber Status Router Primary Replica First Backup Second Backup A subset of the data plane Security Management Servers without any publication data (3) End-to-end Real-Time Data Delivery D Power App Middleware SCADA Data Processing/Aggregation IEC Distributed Scheduling/ Coordination DSRT Gateway Device N/T IP/ WTP/EED Scheduling/FEC/TS PHY/MAC Consensus-based Distributed control Power App SCADA Data/Alarm Generation IEC RT Alarm Power App SCADA Data/Alarm Generation IEC Middleware Distributed DSRT Dynamic Soft-Real-Time CPU Middleware Distributed DSRT Scheduling/ C Using EDF and Distributed EDF Scheduling/ Coordination Coordination Function Coordination N/T WTP IP/ N/T WTP Scheduling/FEC/TS Real-time Packet IP/ Scheduling/FEC/TS Scheduling Using Waiting Time PHY/MAC Consensus-based Priority (WTP) Policy, Forward PHY/MAC Consensus-based Distributed control Error Correction, Traffic Shaping Distributed control B 1 Gossiping for distributed A fusion of net Information 2 Design distributed control IED Device IED Device 5

Project 3A: Random Topology s Problem: Develop a methodology to produce a large number of test power grids with appropriate topologies and scalable network size, in order to design, examine or verify

topologies Nodal locations Link selection Connectivity it Check Assignments of power grid parameters Impedance of transmission lines Loads and generation settings Initial operating equilibrium Model

6 Project 3A: Random Topology s Problem: Develop a methodology to produce a large number of test power grids with appropriate topologies and scalable network size, in order to design, examine or verify any proposed p implementation One example is to answer how much communication flow do I need between different parts of the network in order to manage it and control it Approach: Formation of random topologies Nodal locations Link selection Connectivity it Check Assignments of power grid parameters Impedance of transmission lines Loads and generation settings Initial operating equilibrium Model proposed is able to generate random-topology power grids which effectively approximate the topological and electrical characteristics of real power system grids Eigenvalues distribution ib ti of the generated power grids is very similar to that of IEEE standard system Between the two varieties of the model, Poisson-RT works better than Uniform-RT to approximate the selected standard model systems Project 3B: Scalable Communication Protocols for Real- Time State Estimation in Power s Project Problem 1 How to achieve decentralized state estimation (DSE)? 2 How to design communication architecture that enables DSE directly at all of the PMU s? Approach 1 DSE distributed Kalman Filter 2 Message structure - Extend the use of average consensus protocols to extended Kalman filters [Olfati-Saber CDC05] 3 Media Access Control (MAC) Coding - Data driven channel access protocols for fast average consensus [Kirti and Scaglione CDC07] 1 Designed data driven communication protocol Scalable physical layer gossiping protocol for quantized average consensus Uses node data to drive the transmission scheduling and modulation Opportunistically exploits broadcast wireless channel to perform desired computations 2 Implemented distributed Kalman filter using data driven communication figure shows distributed tracking of object s position Example of data driven channel access Q = no of slots allowed Quantized state values 6

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7 The image cannot be displayed Your computer may not have enough memory to open the image, or the image may have been corrupted Restart your computer, and then open the file again If the red x still appears, you may have to delete the image and then insert it again The image cannot be displayed Your computer may not have enough memory to open the image, or the image may have been corrupted Restart your computer, and then open the file again If the red x still appears, you may have to delete the image and then insert it again The image cannot be displayed Your computer may not have enough memory to open the image, or the image may have been corrupted Restart your computer, and then open the file again If the red x still appears, you may have to delete the image and then insert it again The image cannot be displayed Your computer may not have enough memory to open the image, or the image may have been corrupted Restart your computer, and then open the file again If the red x still appears, you may have to delete the image and then insert it again The image cannot be displayed Your computer may not have enough memory to open the image, or the image may have been corrupted Restart your computer, and then open the file again If the red x still appears, you may have to delete the image and then insert it again The image cannot be displayed Your computer may not have enough memory to open the image, or the image may have been corrupted Restart your computer, and then open the file again If the red x still appears, you may have to delete the image and then insert it again The image cannot be displayed Your computer may not have enough memory to open the image, or the image may have been corrupted Restart your computer, and then open the file again If the red x still appears, you may have to delete the image and then insert it again The image cannot be displayed Your computer may not have enough memory to open the image, or the image may have been corrupted Restart your computer, and then open the file again If the red x still appears, you may have to delete the image and then insert it again The image cannot be displayed Your computer may not have enough memory to open the image, or the image may have been corrupted Restart your computer, and then open the file again If the red x still appears, you may have to delete the image and then insert it again Trustworthy Project 3C/D Integrated CPU and Scheduling in Wireless s and QoS Routers Problem: Provide end-to-end real-time delivery over wireless and wide area networks Approach: RT-App Dynamic Soft Real-time Scheduling BITW (DSRT) with EDF policy as CPU WTP/ EED scheduling at IEDs & gateway Waiting Time Priority (WTP) as intranetwork scheduling on IEDs & Gateway End-to-end Earliest Deadline Scheduling Policy at Gateways, Routers & Control Center Coordination Protocol among DSRT(s) for allowing Distributed Scheduling End-to-end delay is in the order of milliseconds (< 10ms) Smaller jitter QoS Routers in Gridstat C/C++ implementation for faster, more predictable performance IED IED SMOCK/QoS/ ACF Management Distributed Coordination DSRT BE-App User Space Kernel Space s Cyber - side ( SCADA ) Monitoring Sensors Power - side Monitoring Sensors Data/Control Processing/ egation Data Aggre (4) Vulnerabilities/Attacks Monitoring, Detection, Containment, Recovery The image cannot be displayed Your computer may not have enough memory to open the image, or the image may have been corrupted Restart your computer, and then open the file again If the red x still appears, you may have to delete the image and then insert it again Recovery and Response Engine Aggregation Alerting to System Operator Correlation RRE DB Data/Control Info Monitor Vulnerabilities Attack Info Logs (AID) Bad Data Detection Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition s Log Summarization RRE Central Unit : Decision Making on Recovery Actions Vulnerabilities/Attack Detection Alerts Attack Containment/ Cooperative Response Recovery and Response Framework at Control Center Control Center ATTACKS Attack Containment Framework at Gateway Device ATTACKS Attack Monitoring/ OS/Net Containment Attack Monitoring/ OS/Net Containment Attack Monitoring/ OS/Net Containment IED Devices ATTACKS 7

8 Accomplishments Theory Exploration of mathematical models for scalable channel coding to achieve consensus among nodes Random Topology s Modeling of end-to-end attack monitoring, detection and containment/ recovery (Probabilistic Real-Time Intrusion Detection & Attack Containment and Attack Degree Modeling) Compliance checker Trust negotiation state consistency enforcement algorithms Software Secure Real-time End-to-end Delivery Protocol for Wireless s in s (DSRT CPU RT Scheduler & WTP RT Scheduler & SMOCK) Optimized TrustBuilder2 framework for trust negotiation Compliance Checker GridStat based Real-time Command Control (RT and Reliable Router & RPC for Actuator Control) DomainCert Prototype Evaluation Evaluation of secure real-time protocols over 80211b and 80211a wireless technologies (see Demo) Evaluation of Integrated TrustBuilder2 and GridStat (see Demo) Evaluation of other theoretical distributed algorithms and protocols via simulations (see Posters) Future Work Integration of research results within Protocols Group Gridstat AAA and End-to-End Key Management End-to-End Key Management with DomainCert and SMOCK End-to-End Attack Monitoring/Detection with RRE and ACF Integration of Attack Protection Management with Attack Characterization Integration of End-to-End Secure Real-Time Delivery from to Control Center with DSRT/SMOCK/ACF/WiFi and GridStat Collaboration on state estimator problem Integration of research results with Evaluation Group Considerations of Wireless Channels in RINSE 80211i, 80211e, Zigbee, Bluetooth, Use of RINSE for Scalable Wireless/IP/Transport/Overlay Protocols Validation Integration of research results with Device Group DomainCert/SMOCK Key Management Integration with Secure IEDs Usage of Trusted Hardware for Secure Real-time End-to-End Protocols to Protect SCADA data and Commands within and between s and Control Centers 8

TCIP: Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure for Power. Communication and Control Protocols. Presented by Klara Nahrstedt

TCIP: Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure for Power Communication and Protocols Presented by Klara Nahrstedt TCIP Year 1 Review, December 11, 2006 5 Personnel PI/Senior Staff David Bakken (WSU) Anjan Bose