Concurrent Distributed Authentication Model (CDAM)

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1 Concurrent Distributed Authentication Model (CDAM) Aladdin T. Dandis Information Security Compliance Officer Jordan egovernment Program / MoICT 1

2 Agenda Introduction CDAM Ver. 1.0 Pros and Cons CDAM Ver. 2.0 Pros and Cons Conclusions 2

3 Introduction This project was originally concerned about applying security and privacy considerations in school systems. The system is a web-database application. The target client was a private school in Amman. Problem the old system lacks security and privacy considerations. 3

4 Security Vs Privacy Security Privacy A number of processes and technologies applied to prevent unauthorized parties from accessing sensitive resources The human right to control and manage data about himself, without being monitored by other parties 4

5 CDAM Ver

6 Overview What? Concurrent Distributed Authentication Model Why? To authenticate online users. How? The username and password will be checked in many separate authentication database servers rather than one. 6

7 Architecture Sender S1 Authentication Servers Farm User Comparison S2 Legitimate Login Logging The Object System False Login to 'Honey Pot' S3 False System 7

8 Characteristics Authentication model Built-in Authorization Authentication token is used: Token Role + Real User Name = Role User Name Example Student + Ahmad.d = SAhmad.d 8

9 Authentication & Authorization Algorithms Authentication Server Farm ASF Server 1 Server 2 Server 3 Take integer values for username and password and Role Calculate the Hash Enter UserName, Password and Role Extract Role from the Token Check for the requested object Y Take the first 5 characters of the hash Check the 5 characters hash Y Check ACLs for the Role N Y Authorize User N Deny user and direct to HoneyPot Authentication Module Authorization Module 9

10 Pros and Cons Pros Compromising one authentication server will not affect authentication Using Hashing Light authentication Cons Repeated Cipher patterns No proof of origin Denial of service Vulnerable to sniffers Homemade hashing algorithm 10

11 CDAM Ver

12 Overview Overcome Cons in CDAM Ver. 1.0 Still under coding and testing Scalable for web applications Multiple open standard and strong encryption algorithms M:N authentication acceptance 12

13 Architecture Sender S1 Authentication Servers Farm User Comparison S2 Legitimate Login Logging The Object System False Login to 'Honey Pot' False System S3 13

14 Architecture Sender S1 Authentication Servers Farm User Comparison S2 Legitimate Login Logging The Object System False Login to 'Honey Pot' False System S3 14

15 Architecture Hashing Algorithm 1 Sender Hashing Algorithm 2 S1 Authentication Servers Farm User Comparison S2 Hashing Algorithm 3 Legitimate Login Logging The Object System False Login to 'Honey Pot' False System S3 15

16 Evaluation Pros Compromising one authentication server will not affect authentication Using Hashing Light authentication Cons Repeated Cipher patterns No proof of origin Denial of service Vulnerable to sniffers Homemade hashing algorithm Remedy Full cipher is written SSL Certificate M:N Encrypted channels Open standard hashing algorithms 16

17 Future Work Integration with OTP Integration with Smart Card Systems 17

18 Thank You 18

ASC Chairman. Best Practice In Data Security In The Cloud. Speaker Name Dr. Eng. Bahaa Hasan

ASC Chairman. Best Practice In Data Security In The Cloud. Speaker Name Dr. Eng. Bahaa Hasan Regional Forum on Cybersecurity in the Era of Emerging Technologies & the Second Meeting of the Successful Administrative Practices -2017 Cairo, Egypt 28-29 November 2017 Best Practice In Data Security