SECURIFY: A COMPOSITIONAL APPROACH OF BUILDING SECURITY VERIFIED SYSTEM
|
|
|
- Linette Butler
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 1 SRIFY: A COMPOSITIONAL APPROACH OF BUILDING SRITY VERIFIED SYSTEM Liu Yang, Associate Professor, NTU SG-CRC March 2018
2 2 Securify Approach Compositional Security Reasoning with Untrusted Components Securify Architecture Model-based Secure Code Generation Runtime Security Verification Hardware-aided Dynamic Security Analysis Automatic Program Verification Security- Enhanced Library Verification Secure Micro- Kernel Verification Hardware Verification Applications Libraries OS / Micro Kernel Hardware
3 3 Research Highlights Detection of errors in the ARINC-653 standard for safety of partitioning systems. Recognized by the ARINC-653 Committee and revised according to our proposed fixes. Multi-Core separation micro-kernel Verification Building demos using the verified micro-kernels Library Verification and Safe Code Generation Collaboration on generating secure libraries for Linux kernel and critical components in autonomous vehicles Runtime verification Attack detection in CANBUS and Android for malware detection Vulnerability Reported 100+ CVE reported in commercial software with 100K USD bug bounties
4 4 Defense Internet of Things Communication Devices Attack Isolation Smart Home Dynamic Monitoring Aerospace Fault Contemption Medical Devices High Assurance Systems Smart Nation Foundational Secure Architecture ITS Isolated Critical backends from Non-secure Front-ends Banking Devices Embedded Systems
5 5 Approaching Devices Security by Construction Current Non-secure Architecture Proposed Secure Architecture Processes Call to Buggy System/Library Linux (Monolithic Kernel) s (Bugs) Libraries (Bugs) Security Mechanisms (NX, ASLR, etc.) (Bugs) Control Access Mechanisms (Bugs). HW Processes Truly Isolated Functional and memory safety correctness using safe code generation from specification Security Monitor Runtime monitor for dynamic security Separation Micro-Kernel Necessary and Sufficient set of verified services providing Spatial and temporal isolation HW
6 6 Approaching Devices Security by Construction Security Monitor Runtime monitor for dynamic security Scheduling Actions Process Actions Communication Actions Verified Kernel Interface Legal System Call Illegal System Call Verified Separation Micro-Kernel Necessary and Sufficient set of verified services providing Spatial and temporal isolation HW
7 7 Monolithic Approach in AV User Interface Self-Driving System GPS CAN adaptor Camera Steering Brake Linux WiFi Bluetooth Acceleration CAN BUS
8 8 Monolithic Approach in AV Vulnerable User Interface Self-Driving System GPS CAN adaptor Camera Steering Brake Linux WiFi Bluetooth Acceleration CAN BUS CAN BUS easily accessible AV easy to hijack!!!
9 9 A separation approach for AV Security Isolated Components Malicious Agents do not have access to other domains Bluetooth WiFi Malicius User Interface Camera GPS Self-Driving System Security Monitor CAN adaptor Steering Brake Separation Micro-Kernel Acceleration CAN BUS
10 10 A separation approach for AV Security Verified Micro Kernel ensures that there are no kernel exploits able to affect the information flow. Bluetooth WiFi Malicius User Interface Camera GPS Self-Driving System Security Monitor CAN adaptor Steering Brake Separation Micro-Kernel Acceleration CAN BUS
11 11 A separation approach for AV Security Indirect access can be controlled: limited communication in the channel Security Monitor can control the information sent between domains Bluetooth WiFi GPS Malicius User Interface Self-Driving System Security Monitor Camera CAN adaptor Steering Brake Separation Micro-Kernel Acceleration CAN BUS
12 12 Summary Securify provides a secure architecture by construction with a verified secure Separation kernel and run-time monitoring for dynamic security. Separation Kernel provides a secure architecture for high assurance systems. Security can be enhanced with a trusted privileged system runtime monitor. Securify foundations can be used to provide a secure architecture for IoT devices and IST, which naturally fixes most of the problems of monolithic approaches.
13 Thanks for your attention! 13
A Secure Update Architecture for High Assurance Mixed-Criticality System Don Kuzhiyelil Dr. Sergey Tverdyshev SYSGO AG
A Secure Update Architecture for High Assurance Mixed-Criticality System Don Kuzhiyelil Dr. Sergey Tverdyshev SYSGO AG SYSGO AG 1 Secure Software Update Unified Diagnostic Services DiagnosticsSessionControl
The Remote Exploitation of Unaltered Passenger Vehicles Revisited. 20 th October 2016 Mark Pitchford, Technical Manager, EMEA
The Remote Exploitation of Unaltered Passenger Vehicles Revisited 20 th October 2016 Mark Pitchford, Technical Manager, EMEA Today s hot topic A few years ago, Lynx presentations at events such as this
PENETRATION TESTING OF AUTOMOTIVE DEVICES. Dr. Ákos Csilling Robert Bosch Kft., Budapest HUSTEF 15/11/2017
PENETRATION TESTING OF AUTOMOTIVE DEVICES Dr. Ákos Csilling Robert Bosch Kft., Budapest HUSTEF 15/11/2017 Imagine your dream car 2 Image: 2017 ESCRYPT. Exemplary attack demonstration only. This is NOT
Offense & Defense in IoT World. Samuel Lv Keen Security Lab, Tencent
Offense & Defense in IoT World Samuel Lv Keen Security Lab, Tencent Keen Security Lab of Tencent Wide coverage of software and hardware security research Mainstream PC & Mobile Operating Systems Mainstream
An Agency Under MOSTI SECURITY ASSURANCE. Securing Our Cyberspace. Copyright 2008 CyberSecurity Malaysia
An Agency Under MOSTI Understanding Mobile Phone Threat Vectors 4 th th ETSI Mobile Security Workshop Sophia Antipolis, France SECURITY ASSURANCE Creating Trust & Confidence Mohamad Nizam Kassim, GAWN
Using a Separation Kernel to Protect against the Remote Exploitation of Unaltered Passenger Vehicles
Safety & Security for the Connected World Using a Separation Kernel to Protect against the Remote Exploitation of Unaltered Passenger Vehicles 16 th June 2015 Mark Pitchford, Technical Manager, EMEA Today
in memory: an evolution of attacks Mathias Payer Purdue University
in memory: an evolution of attacks Mathias Payer Purdue University Images (c) MGM, WarGames, 1983 Memory attacks: an ongoing war Vulnerability classes according to CVE Memory
Smart Antennas and Hypervisor: Enabling Secure Convergence. July 5, 2017
Smart Antennas and : Enabling Secure Convergence July 5, 2017 About OpenSynergy OpenSynergy develops software solutions for embedded automotive systems. OpenSynergy s product portfolio includes key software
Communication Patterns in Safety Critical Systems for ADAS & Autonomous Vehicles Thorsten Wilmer Tech AD Berlin, 5. March 2018
Communication Patterns in Safety Critical Systems for ADAS & Autonomous Vehicles Thorsten Wilmer Tech AD Berlin, 5. March 2018 Agenda Motivation Introduction of Safety Components Introduction to ARMv8
Operating System Security
Operating System Security Operating Systems Defined Hardware: I/o...Memory.CPU Operating Systems: Windows or Android, etc Applications run on operating system Operating Systems Makes it easier to use resources.
Tolerating Malicious Drivers in Linux. Silas Boyd-Wickizer and Nickolai Zeldovich
XXX Tolerating Malicious Drivers in Linux Silas Boyd-Wickizer and Nickolai Zeldovich How could a device driver be malicious? Today's device drivers are highly privileged Write kernel memory, allocate memory,...
Hardening Attack Vectors to cars by Fuzzing
Hardening Attack Vectors to cars by Fuzzing AESIN 2015 Ashley Benn, Regional Sales manager 29 th October, 2015 2015 Synopsys, Inc. 1 Today, there are more than 100m lines of code in cars 2015 Synopsys,
10 th AUTOSAR Open Conference
10 th AUTOSAR Open Conference Dr. Moritz Neukirchner Elektrobit Automotive GmbH Building Performance ECUs with Adaptive AUTOSAR AUTOSAR Nov-2017 Major market trends and their impact Trends Impact on E/E
Convergence of Safety, Systems & Cybersecurity Bill StClair, Director, LDRA, US Operations
Convergence of Safety, Systems & Cybersecurity Bill StClair, Director, LDRA, US Operations Agenda Nexus of Safety and Cybersecurity Separation and Connectivity Trends in Aerospace Cybersecurity Isn t Security
Applying MILS to multicore avionics systems
Applying MILS to multicore avionics systems Eur Ing Paul Parkinson FIET Principal Systems Architect, A&D EuroMILS Workshop, Prague, 19 th January 2016 2016 Wind River. All Rights Reserved. Agenda A Brief
AN EVALUATION OF THE GOOGLE CHROME EXTENSION SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
AN EVALUATION OF THE GOOGLE CHROME EXTENSION SECURITY ARCHITECTURE Nicholas Carlini, Adrienne Porter Felt, David Wagner University of California, Berkeley CHROME EXTENSIONS CHROME EXTENSIONS servers servers
Security: The Key to Affordable Unmanned Aircraft Systems
AN INTEL COMPANY Security: The Key to Affordable Unmanned Aircraft Systems By Alex Wilson, Director of Business Development, Aerospace and Defense WHEN IT MATTERS, IT RUNS ON WIND RIVER EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
ARM Security Solutions and Numonyx Authenticated Flash
ARM Security Solutions and Numonyx Authenticated Flash How to integrate Numonyx Authenticated Flash with ARM TrustZone* for maximum system protection Introduction Through a combination of integrated hardware
Achieving safe, certified, multicore avionics systems with Separation Kernel Hypervisors
Safety & Security for the Connected World Achieving safe, certified, multicore avionics systems with Separation Kernel Hypervisors 13 October 2015 Mark Pitchford, Technical Manager, EMEA Achieving safe,
Security Concerns in Automotive Systems. James Martin
Security Concerns in Automotive Systems James Martin Main Questions 1. What sort of security vulnerabilities do modern cars face today? 2. To what extent are external attacks possible and practical? Background
Maximum Security with Minimum Impact : Going Beyond Next Gen
SESSION ID: SP03-W10 Maximum Security with Minimum Impact : Going Beyond Next Gen Wendy Moore Director, User Protection Trend Micro @WMBOTT Hyper-competitive Cloud Rapid adoption Social Global Mobile IoT
Securing the Connected Car. Eystein Stenberg Product Manager Mender.io
Securing the Connected Car Eystein Stenberg Product Manager Mender.io The software defined car Electronics Telematics Infotainment Connected Assisted driving Autonomous Hardware enabled Software enabled
THE RTOS AS THE ENGINE POWERING THE INTERNET OF THINGS
THE RTOS AS THE ENGINE POWERING THE INTERNET OF THINGS By Bill Graham and Michael Weinstein WHEN IT MATTERS, IT RUNS ON WIND RIVER EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Driven by the convergence of cloud technology, rapidly
INFLUENTIAL OPERATING SYSTEM RESEARCH: SECURITY MECHANISMS AND HOW TO USE THEM CARSTEN WEINHOLD
Faculty of Computer Science Institute of Systems Architecture, Operating Systems Group INFLUENTIAL OPERATING SYSTEM RESEARCH: SECURITY MECHANISMS AND HOW TO USE THEM CARSTEN WEINHOLD OVERVIEW Fundamental
Protection. Thierry Sans
Protection Thierry Sans Protecting Programs How to lower the risk of a program security flaw resulting from a bug? 1. Build better programs 2. Build better operating systems Build Better Programs Why are
Operating systems Architecture
Operating systems Architecture 1 Operating Systems Low level software system that manages all applications implements an interface between applications and resources manages available resources Resource
IS THERE A HOLE IN YOUR RISC-V SECURITY STACK? JOTHY ROSENBERG DOVER MICROSYSTEMS
IS THERE A HOLE IN YOUR RISC-V SECURITY STACK? JOTHY ROSENBERG DOVER MICROSYSTEMS I understand the difference in destruction is dramatic, but this has a whiff of August 1945. Someone just used a new weapon,
Honours/Master/PhD Thesis Projects Supervised by Dr. Yulei Sui
Honours/Master/PhD Thesis Projects Supervised by Dr. Yulei Sui Projects 1 Information flow analysis for mobile applications 2 2 Machine-learning-guide typestate analysis for UAF vulnerabilities 3 3 Preventing
Disclaimer This presentation may contain product features that are currently under development. This overview of new technology represents no commitme
NET3420BU Introducing VMware s Transformative Data Center Endpoint Security Solution Vijay Ganti Director, Product Management VMware Christopher Frenz Director of Infrastructure Interfaith Medical Center
Secure Software Update for ITS Communication Devices in ITU-T Standardization
Secure Software Update for ITS Communication Devices in ITU-T Standardization Masashi, Eto Senior Researcher, Cybersecurity Laboratory, Network Security Research Institute, NICT, Japan 1 Background Outline
High-Assurance Cyber Space Systems (HACSS) for Small Satellite Mission Integrity
Distribution A: SSC17-V-01 High-Assurance Cyber Space Systems (HACSS) for Small Satellite Mission Integrity Daria C. Lane, Enrique S. Leon, Francisco C. Tacliad, Dexter H. Solio, Ian L. Rodney, Dmitriy
A Big Little Hypervisor for IoT Development February 2018
A Big Little Hypervisor for IoT Development February 2018 Contents PROJECT OVERVIEW TECHNICAL OVERVIEW GOVERNANCE JOIN US! PROJECT OVERVIEW Current State of Affairs IoT Development IoT device devices requires
Computer Security Course. Midterm Review
Computer Security Course. Dawn Song Midterm Review In class: Logistics On time: 4:10-5:30pm Wed 1 8x11 page cheat sheet allowed Special requirements: see TA Part I, II, III Scope Software Security Secure
Scalable and Flexible Software Platforms for High-Performance ECUs. Christoph Dietachmayr Sr. Engineering Manager, Elektrobit November 8, 2018
Scalable and Flexible Software Platforms for High-Performance ECUs Christoph Dietachmayr Sr. Engineering Manager, November 8, Agenda A New E/E Architectures and High-Performance ECUs B Non-Functional Aspects:
Combining program verification with component-based architectures. Alexander Senier BOB 2018 Berlin, February 23rd, 2018
Combining program verification with component-based architectures Alexander Senier BOB 2018 Berlin, February 23rd, 2018 About Componolit 2 What happens when we use what's best? 3 What s Best? Mid-90ies:
Sandboxing Untrusted Code: Software-Based Fault Isolation (SFI)
Sandboxing Untrusted Code: Software-Based Fault Isolation (SFI) Brad Karp UCL Computer Science CS GZ03 / M030 9 th December 2011 Motivation: Vulnerabilities in C Seen dangers of vulnerabilities: injection
How to protect Automotive systems with ARM Security Architecture
How to protect Automotive systems with ARM Security Architecture Thanks to this app You can manoeuvre The new Forpel Using your smartphone! Too bad it s Not my car Successful products will be attacked
Securing the future of mobility
Kaspersky Transportation System Security AVL Software and Functions Securing the future of mobility www.kaspersky.com #truecybersecurity Securing the future of mobility Connected car benefits The need
Securing the Modern Data Center with Trend Micro Deep Security
Advania Fall Conference Securing the Modern Data Center with Trend Micro Deep Security Okan Kalak, Senior Sales Engineer okan@trendmicro.no Infrastructure change Containers 1011 0100 0010 Serverless Public
Web-based Attacks on Local IoT Devices. Gunes Acar Danny Huang Frank Li Arvind Narayanan Nick Feamster
Web-based Attacks on Local IoT Devices Gunes Acar Danny Huang Frank Li Arvind Narayanan Nick Feamster 1 2 3 How to reach local IoT devices? Public devices (e.g., port forwarding) Local malware Web attacks
WHITE PAPER Secure Firmware Upgrade System. June 2014
WHITE PAPER Secure Firmware Upgrade System June 2014 TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract... 3 Why Secure Firmware Upgrade?... 3 Requirements of a Firmware Upgrade System... 4 Secure Firmware Upgrade Process...
CIS 5373 Systems Security
CIS 5373 Systems Security Topic 3.1: OS Security Basics of secure design Endadul Hoque Slide Acknowledgment Contents are based on slides from Ninghui Li (Purdue), John Mitchell (Stanford), Dan Boneh (Stanford)
Securing the Connected Car. Eystein Stenberg CTO Mender.io
Securing the Connected Car Eystein Stenberg CTO Mender.io The software defined car Electronics Telematics Infotainment Connected Assisted driving Autonomous Hardware enabled Software enabled Software defined
Patching Exploits with Duct Tape: Bypassing Mitigations and Backward Steps
SESSION ID: EXP-R01 Patching Exploits with Duct Tape: Bypassing Mitigations and Backward Steps James Lyne Global Head of Security Research Sophos / SANS Institute @jameslyne Stephen Sims Security Researcher
Introducing MVISION. Cohesive Cloud-based Management of Threat Countermeasures and Devices Leveraging Built-in Device Controls. Jon Parkes.
Introducing MVISION Cohesive Cloud-based Management of Threat Countermeasures and Devices Leveraging Built-in Device Controls Jon Parkes McAfee 1 All information provided here is subject to non-disclosure
Enterprise Cybersecurity Best Practices Part Number MAN Revision 006
Enterprise Cybersecurity Best Practices Part Number MAN-00363 Revision 006 April 2013 Hologic and the Hologic Logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Hologic, Inc. Microsoft, Active Directory,
Innovation policy for Industry 4.0
Innovation policy for Industry 4.0 Remarks from Giorgio Mosca Chair of Cybersecurity Steering Committee Confindustria Digitale Director Strategy & Technologies - Security & IS Division, Leonardo Agenda
Meltdown or "Holy Crap: How did we do this to ourselves" Meltdown exploits side effects of out-of-order execution to read arbitrary kernelmemory
Meltdown or "Holy Crap: How did we do this to ourselves" Abstract Meltdown exploits side effects of out-of-order execution to read arbitrary kernelmemory locations Breaks all security assumptions given
A Software Solution for Hardware Vulnerabilities
A Software Solution for Hardware Vulnerabilities Komail Dharsee University of Rochester Ethan Johnson University of Rochester John Criswell University of Rochester 1 / 22 Hardware Bugs! AMD recently shipped
Examining future priorities for cyber security management
Examining future priorities for cyber security management Cybersecurity Focus Day Insurance Telematics 16 Andrew Miller Chief Technical Officer Thatcham Research Owned by the major UK Motor Insurers with
Automotive Anomaly Monitors and Threat Analysis in the Cloud
Automotive Anomaly Monitors and Threat Analysis in the Cloud Dr. André Weimerskirch Vector Automotive Cyber Security Symposium October 12, 2017 Cybersecurity Components Secure Internal & External Communications
Autonomous Driving needs Safety & Security. Embedded World 2018 Dr. Ciwan Gouma
Autonomous Driving needs Safety & Security Embedded World 2018 Dr. Ciwan Gouma Autonomous Driving The Vision The vision is not new. Picture left (maybe you have seen this in other presentations) but why
Security of Embedded Hardware Systems Insight into Attacks and Protection of IoT Devices
Security of Embedded Hardware Systems Insight into Attacks and Protection of IoT Devices Dr. Johann Heyszl, Head of Hardware Security Department Fraunhofer-Institute for Applied and Integrated Security
Embedded Software: Its Growing Influence on the Hardware world
Embedded Software: Its Growing Influence on the Hardware world ISA Vision Summit 2009, Bangalore 16 th FEB 09 V. R. Venkatesh Head, Product Engineering Services, Wipro Technologies. Wipro in Product Engineering
High-assurance software for autonomous ground systems
High-assurance software for autonomous ground systems Aleksey Nogin HRL Laboratories, LLC December 15, 2016 Acknowledgment: This material is based upon work supported by the United States Air Force and
Involved subjects in this presentation Security and safety in real-time embedded systems Architectural description, AADL Partitioned architectures
Introduction Problem: security and reliability Purpose: design and implementation of safe/secure systems Help system designers to describe their requirements Ensure safety and security policies enforcement
GlobalPlatform Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) for Mobile
GlobalPlatform Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) for Mobile Kevin Gillick Executive Director, GlobalPlatform @GlobalPlatform_ www.linkedin.com/company/globalplatform GlobalPlatform Overview GlobalPlatform
Sugar: Secure GPU Acceleration in Web Browsers
Sugar: Secure GPU Acceleration in Web Browsers Zhihao Yao, Zongheng Ma, Yingtong Liu, Ardalan Amiri Sani, Aparna Chandramowlishwaran Trustworthy Systems Lab, UC Irvine 1 WebGL was released in 2011 2 Source:
Getting over Ransomware - Plan your Strategy for more Advanced Threats
Getting over Ransomware - Plan your Strategy for more Advanced Threats Kaspersky Lab Hong Kong Eric Kwok General Manager Lapcom Ltd. BEYOND ANTI-VIRUS: TRUE CYBERSECURITY FROM KASPERSKY LAB 20 years ago
Security and Performance Benefits of Virtualization
Security and Performance Benefits of Virtualization Felix Baum mentor.com/embedded Android is a trademark of Google Inc. Use of this trademark is subject to Google Permissions. Linux is the registered
Last mile authentication problem
Last mile authentication problem Exploiting the missing link in end-to-end secure communication DEF CON 26 Our team Sid Rao Doctoral Candidate Aalto University Finland Thanh Bui Doctoral Candidate Aalto
Mobile Devices prioritize User Experience
Mobile Security 1 Uniqueness of Mobile Mobile Devices are Shared More Often Mobile Devices are Used in More Locations Mobile Devices prioritize User Experience Mobile Devices have multiple personas Mobile
Initial Evaluation of a User-Level Device Driver Framework
Initial Evaluation of a User-Level Device Driver Framework Stefan Götz Karlsruhe University Germany sgoetz@ira.uka.de Kevin Elphinstone National ICT Australia University of New South Wales kevine@cse.unsw.edu.au
Resilient IoT Security: The end of flat security models
Resilient IoT Security: The end of flat security models Xiao Sun Senior Application Engineer ARM Tech Symposia China 2015 November 2015 Evolution from M2M to IoT M2M Silos of Things Standards Security
Smartphone Security Overview
Smartphone Security Overview Jagdish Prasad Achara Speaker, Claude Castelluccia ENSIMAG, Grenoble 11 décembre 2013 J. P. Achara, C. Castelluccia (ENSIMAG, Grenoble) Smartphone Security Overview 11 décembre
Introduction to Adaptive AUTOSAR. Dheeraj Sharma July 27, 2017
Introduction to Adaptive AUTOSAR Dheeraj Sharma July 27, 2017 Overview Software Platform and scope of Adaptive AUTOSAR Adaptive AUTOSAR architecture and roadmap EB Adaptive Platform and Prototyping solution
Qiang Li && Zhibin Hu/Qihoo 360 Gear Team Ruxcon 2016
Qiang Li && Zhibin Hu/Qihoo 360 Gear Team Ruxcon 2016 Who are we Security researcher in Qihoo 360 Inc(Gear Team) Vulnerability discovery and analysis Specialize in QEMU currently 50+ security issues, 33
*NSTAC Report to the President on the Internet of Things.
North Carolina Highway Signs Compromised By a Foreign Hacker* Penetration of a Water Treatment Facility by a Foreign Hacker* *NSTAC Report to the President on the Internet of Things. www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
SECURING SOFTWARE AGAINST LIBRARY ATTACKS
SECURING SOFTWARE AGAINST LIBRARY ATTACKS Roland Yap School of Computing National University of Singapore ryap@comp.nus.edu.sg Session ID: DAS W05 Session Classification: Advanced Untrusted Libraries Software
IEEE-SA Internet of Things - Security & Standards
IEEE-SA Internet of Things - Security & Standards Srikanth Chandrasekaran IEEE Standards Association MOBILE WORLD CONGRESS, SHANGHAI JUNE 2018 What does the IEEE Standards Association (IEEE-SA) do? Vision:
Connected Cars & Security Challenges. Stéphane Desneux CTO at IoT.bzh
Connected Cars & Security Challenges Stéphane Desneux CTO at IoT.bzh Printemps des Entreprises IUT Vannes 15 Mars 2016 Agenda IoT.bzh & AGL Project Connected Cars Security: Issues and Solutions
Vehicle To Android Communication Mode
Technical Disclosure Commons Defensive Publications Series May 12, 2017 Vehicle To Android Communication Mode Tanmay Wadhwa Neil Dhillon Follow this and additional works at: http://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series
Bank Infrastructure - Video - 1
Bank Infrastructure - 1 05/09/2017 Threats Threat Source Risk Status Date Created Account Footprinting Web Browser Targeted Malware Web Browser Man in the browser Web Browser Identity Spoofing - Impersonation
McAfee Embedded Control for Retail
McAfee Embedded Control for Retail System integrity, change control, and policy compliance for retail point of sale systems McAfee Embedded Control for retail maintains the integrity of your point-of-sale
The Next Steps in the Evolution of Embedded Processors
The Next Steps in the Evolution of Embedded Processors Terry Kim Staff FAE, ARM Korea ARM Tech Forum Singapore July 12 th 2017 Cortex-M Processors Serving Connected Applications Energy grid Automotive
SoK: Eternal War in Memory Laszlo Szekeres, Mathias Payer, Tao Wei, and Dawn Song In: Oakland 14
SoK: Eternal War in Memory Laszlo Szekeres, Mathias Payer, Tao Wei, and Dawn Song In: Oakland 14 Presenter: Mathias Payer, EPFL http://hexhive.github.io 1 Memory attacks: an ongoing war Vulnerability classes
Retail Security in a World of Digital Touchpoint Complexity
Retail Security in a World of Digital Touchpoint Complexity Author Greg Buzek, President of IHL Services Sponsored by Cisco Systems Inc. Featuring industry research by Previously in part 1 and part 2 of
A cyber physical safety principle for autonomous and C-ITS Towards efficient traffic flow under safety conditions.
A cyber physical safety principle for autonomous and C-ITS Towards efficient traffic flow under safety conditions. For a sustainable and competitive Sweden Kenneth Östberg kenneth.otsberg@ri.se +46 (0)
Presentation's title
3 rd April 2017 B03 -In-vehicle technology enabler Presentation's title Dominique Bolignano CEO Prove & Run dominique.bolignano@provenrun.com Introducing myself and Prove & Run Dominique Bolignano, previously
EMBEDDED MAJOR PROJECTS LIST
CODE PROJECT TITLE APPLICATION TECHNOLOGY /CORE KTEMB 01 KTEMB 02 KTEMB 03 A Location Aided Flooding Mechanism In Community Based Iot Networks An Iot Based Fire Alarming And Authentication System For Workhouse
Provide you with a quick introduction to web application security Increase you awareness and knowledge of security in general Show you that any
OWASP Top 10 Provide you with a quick introduction to web application security Increase you awareness and knowledge of security in general Show you that any tester can (and should) do security testing
Securing IoT with the ARM mbed ecosystem
Securing IoT with the ARM mbed ecosystem Xiao Sun / Senior Applications Engineer / ARM ARM mbed Connect / Shenzhen, China December 5, 2016 Lots of interest in IoT security Researchers are looking into
Man-In-The-Browser Attacks. Daniel Tomescu
Man-In-The-Browser Attacks Daniel Tomescu 1 About me Work and education: Pentester @ KPMG Romania Moderator @ Romanian Security Team MSc. Eng. @ University Politehnica of Bucharest OSCP, CREST CRT Interests:
Embedded System Security. Professor Patrick McDaniel Charles Sestito Fall 2015
Embedded System Security Professor Patrick McDaniel Charles Sestito Fall 2015 Embedded System Microprocessor used as a component in a device and is designed for a specific control function within a device
Securing Untrusted Code
Securing Untrusted Code Untrusted Code May be untrustworthy Intended to be benign, but may be full of vulnerabilities These vulnerabilities may be exploited by attackers (or other malicious processes)
Windows IoT Security. Jackie Chang Sr. Program Manager
Windows IoT Security Jackie Chang Sr. Program Manager Rest Physical access to a device will not give access to data Data & Control Execution Data owner has full control over data processing Motion Transport
Sofware & System Security. Group. Davide Balzarotti Aurélien Francillon
Sofware & System Security Group S3@eurecom Davide Balzarotti Aurélien Francillon Professors The S3 Group Professors The S3 Group Embedded Systems Security The S3 Group The S3 Group Operating Systems &
TUX : Trust Update on Linux Kernel
TUX : Trust Update on Linux Kernel Suhho Lee Mobile OS Lab, Dankook university suhho1993@gmail.com -- Hyunik Kim, and Seehwan Yoo {eternity13, seehwan.yoo}@dankook.ac.kr Index Intro Background Threat Model
Safety and Security for Automotive using Microkernel Technology
Informationstag "Das Automobil als IT-Sicherheitsfall" Berlin, 11.05.2012 Safety and Security for Automotive using Microkernel Technology Dr.-Ing. Matthias Gerlach OpenSynergy TwoBirds withonestone Safety
EMBEDDED SYSTEMS 2017 IEEE PROJECT
EMBEDDED SYSTEMS 2017 IEEE PROJECT 1. Smartphone Application to evaluate the individual possibilities for the Application of Electric Vehicles 2. Face recognition System for Smartphone based on LBP 3.
Testing Exploit-Prevention Mechanisms in Anti-Malware Products
Testing Exploit-Prevention Mechanisms in Anti-Malware Products Andreas Marx & Maik Morgenstern AV-Test GmbH, Magdeburg, Germany http://www.av-test.org Presented at the CARO Workshop 2009 in Budapest, Hungary
Master of Cyber Security, Strategy and Risk Management. CECS PG Information Session April 17, 2018
Master of Cyber Security, Strategy and Risk Management CECS PG Information Session April 17, 2018 2 Program Purpose Provide a working understanding of information, network and software security, across
Cybersecurity Challenges for Connected and Automated Vehicles. Robert W. Heller, Ph.D. Program Director R&D, Southwest Research Institute
Cybersecurity Challenges for Connected and Automated Vehicles Robert W. Heller, Ph.D. Program Director R&D, Southwest Research Institute Cars are becoming complex (and CAV is only part of it) 1965: No
Virtual Machine Security
Virtual Machine Security CSE443 - Spring 2012 Introduction to Computer and Network Security Professor Jaeger www.cse.psu.edu/~tjaeger/cse443-s12/ 1 Operating System Quandary Q: What is the primary goal
Module: Return-oriented Programming. Professor Trent Jaeger. CSE543 - Introduction to Computer and Network Security
CSE543 - Introduction to Computer and Network Security Module: Return-oriented Programming Professor Trent Jaeger 1 1 Anatomy of Control-Flow Exploits Two steps in control-flow exploitation First -- attacker
ViryaOS RFC: Secure Containers for Embedded and IoT. A proposal for a new Xen Project sub-project
ViryaOS RFC: Secure Containers for Embedded and IoT A proposal for a new Xen Project sub-project Stefano Stabellini @stabellinist The problem Package applications for the target Contain all dependencies
Different attack manifestations Network packets OS calls Audit records Application logs Different types of intrusion detection Host vs network IT
Different attack manifestations Network packets OS calls Audit records Application logs Different types of intrusion detection Host vs network IT environment (e.g., Windows vs Linux) Levels of abstraction
Terra: A Virtual Machine-Based Platform for Trusted Computing by Garfinkel et al. (Some slides taken from Jason Franklin s 712 lecture, Fall 2006)
Terra: A Virtual Machine-Based Platform for Trusted Computing by Garfinkel et al. (Some slides taken from Jason Franklin s 712 lecture, Fall 2006) Trusted Computing Hardware What can you do if you have
Inline Reference Monitoring Techniques
Inline Reference Monitoring Techniques In the last lecture, we started talking about Inline Reference Monitors. The idea is that the policy enforcement code runs with the same address space as the code
Star rating driver safety behavior by the use of smart technologies
RoundTable Use of technology and its impact on road safety New York, June 14, 2016 Star rating driver safety behavior by the use of smart technologies George Yannis, Professor National Technical University