FEDERAL SECTOR BLACK SKY PLAYBOOK

Transcription

1 FEDERAL SECTOR BLACK SKY PLAYBOOK ABSTRACT The Federal Sector Black Sky Playbook contains the current framework for managing the risk associated with long duration, multi-region power outages associated with Black Sky Hazards. This document is designed to comprehensively address Black Sky resilience issues through all phases including Preparation/Mitigation, Response, Restoration and Recovery. James R. Kish V 2.5 Draft/Sector Reviewed on 15 June 2017.

2 Describing the need for the EPRO Federal Sector Playbooks The purpose of our Playbooks is to provide a summary of participants, priorities related to information and resource needs, how sector organizations structure for operations, what communications methods are used, operational timelines for response, and structures that exist for other sectors to gain insight into all the above as well as to provide for greater interoperability during a BS event. Providing summary documents that outline the current thoughts and concepts will directly impact the resilience initiatives that define preparedness measures, response actions, restoration activities and recovery strategies to bring the sector back to meet the community. Each sector s playbook is a constantly evolving document. For consistency and ease of sharing, EISC has undertaken an approach to standardize the documents across all sectors in outline and format. However, the information contained in each Playbook is specific to the appropriate sector. The baseline document is the Version 2.0 format. Keep in mind that playbooks are for use within the sector to build consensus and share ideas. Equally important, they are also used to build the cross-sector understanding of the issues, decisions, priorities, and information sharing needs, communications requirements and interdependencies. 1

3 Table of Contents Role of the EPRO Sector Black Sky Playbook... 4 Sector Background (V2)... 4 Sector Black Sky Environment (V2)... 4 Sector Model Overview (V2)... 5 Sector Model Graphic (V2)... 6 Sector Black Sky Strategic Mission Statement (V2/V3)... 7 Sector Black Sky Strategic Mission Priorities Matrix... 7 Black Sky Decisions Overview (V2/V2.5/V3)... 8 Sector Black Sky Situational Awareness Overview (V2/V2.5/V3)... 8 Priority Information Requirements Matrix(V2/V2.5/V3)... 9 Sector Initial Actions (V2/V2.5/V3) Sector Initial Actions Matrix (V2/V2.5/V3) Internal Sector Requirements (V2/V2.5/V3) Internal Sector Requirements Matrix External and Cross Sector Dependencies Overview (V2/V2.5/V3) External and Cross Sector Requirements Matrix (V2.5/V3) Sector Specialized Resource Requirements Overview (V2.5/V3) Sector Commodity Specific List Matrix Sector Black Sky Communications Overview (V2/V2.5/V3) Sector Communications Matrix (V2/V2.5/V3) Sector Black Sky Assessment Tool (s) Overview (V2/V2.5/V3) Sector Black Sky Planning Requirements (On-going) Sector Best Practices Matrix (On-going) Integrated and/or Shared Planning Actions (V3/3.5/V4) Planning Actions Matrix Sector Black Sky Resilience Considerations Overview (V3/3.5/V4) Resilience Initiatives Matrix Sector Black Sky Regulatory Impacts and Issues Overview (On-Going) Sector Regulatory Matrix

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5 Role of the EPRO Federal Sector Black Sky Playbook This Playbook is designed to provide an evolving framework for recommended guidelines to manage risks of long duration, multi-region power outages associated with emerging Black Sky hazards. This Playbook will be updated and reviewed using the EPRO Federal Sector Steering Committee process through consultation with sector professionals and managers. This Playbook contains the latest consolidated school of thought on the unique challenges posed by wide area, long duration outages. It provides guidelines to help individual entities strengthen their won resilience measures, develop focused operational plans and assess external support needed to address these severe hazard scenarios. Sector Background The federal sector is comprised of the executive branch organizations that provide day-to-day operational oversight of the Federal Government. In addition to ongoing activities, each organization operates under independent statutory responsibilities that support and in some cases regulate operations of other sectors. During emergency response and recovery activities, the federal sector operates under established preparedness doctrine and utilizes existing frameworks created under Presidential Policy Directive #8 National Preparedness. This doctrine specifies pre-event activities related to five mission areas: prevention (DOJ), protection (DHS), response (FEMA), recovery (FEMA), and mitigation (FEMA). Each mission area has a designated lead, as noted above. This document follows a standardized outline for all BLACK SKY sectors and catalogs the initial priorities, identifies critical situational awareness needs for information and resource allocation. Additionally the document attempts to provide a description of how the federal sector is organized so that other critical partners can have a baseline understanding of how and where to expect federal coordination to be conducted and more importantly how to plug in to those structures to aid in efforts to share timely, accurate, integrated information. Sector Black Sky Environment During a Black Sky event, normal protocols and methods of communication that are used to support a vertically integrated chain of command will be at best strained and most likely disrupted. Without a means to gather situational awareness, synthesize and share information, determine integrated time based priorities that respond to the developing situation the federal sector will need to rely on pre-event planning, standing orders or operational procedures. It will of necessity operate in a de-centralized manner with decision making similarly devolved to the highest level supported by communications. During early phase response efforts, it is therefore crucial for the various entities to have sufficiently robust, well formulated plans and procedures and to have them understood such that the personnel are capable of carrying them out during periods when information and communications are disrupted. 4

6 Sector Model Overview While the scenario of a Black Sky event begins as one that is energy sector specific, the impact will rapidly extend across all sectors due to the interdependent nature of our society. As such the ederal sector must take multiple - simultaneous actions. All Federal Departments and Agencies have statutory roles that can contribute to preparing for a Black Sky event, in the broad sense However,, the organizing construct that will guide the initial coordination has been developed through the National Response Framework. When no alternative organizational approach has been specified, the NRF serves as the baseline for initial response operations. The following graphic depicts the conceptual way in which information, decisions, and resource allocation are organized: 1 Thehe above model has been tried, tested and proven to befor identifying and adjudicating information and resources when a disaster s event involves State and some multi region integration or coordination. However, the model has not been testedt for a catastrophic event. An approach to a unified command (or coordination) structure needs to be developed, integrated into doctrine, resourced, trained and practiced. In the event of a large scale-long term power outage, CI Sectors will be impacted requiring public-private partnerships to identify causes, define requirements (including use of mutual aid), establish priorities and coordinate closely on restoration priorities and actions. The amount and level of coordination that will be required is unprecedented and will stress all levels of management and decision making. 1 Extract from CIKR Support Annex to the NRF, June

7 Sector Model Graphic Note that this sector is comprised of all three constitutionally mandated branches of the USG. This playbook will focus primarily on the executive branch with the possibility of including similar levels of detail for the legislative and judicial branches in future evolutions. Attached are high-level depictions of the federal sector. Given the scale and complexity of each of the primarily named Federal Sector Departments and Agencies we will develop further levels of detail (both in writing and graphically) as the sophistication of the Sector Playbook matures. In addition to the overall federal sector structure, there are also graphics that depict the relevant structures for the following departments Defense; Energy Homeland Security (including focus on DHS NPPD and FEMA) Transportation Health and Human Services (including ASPR, ACF, and CDC) State (including Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance and the US Agency for International Relief) Veteran s Affairs Environmental Protection Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center Treasury Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attached is a depiction of the above organizational graphic in their own form as provided by their public facing web sites. In addition, the following graphic depicts the coordination structure for the US Government when conducting operations under the National Response Framework. The primary operational coordination of federal response efforts is focused on supporting local, tribal, and state needs. The coordination of these assets occurs through the National Response Coordination Center, led by FEMA and is organized around the defined Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). Each ESF has defined missions, named lead and support departments and agencies and has developed protocols for how their particular mission coordination will occur. Each ESFs operating protocols are informed by the Department and Agency authorities and their various core capabilities. In addition to the ESF structure, the NRF also has both capability specific support annexes as well as hazard specific annex s that further define the manner and process by which the Federal Government will act to resolve disasters. For a more thorough review, refer to the National Response Framework, third edition, June

8 Sector Black Sky Strategic Mission Statement During a Black Sky event the federal sector would execute three primary missions 1 - Ensure the continuity of government. Underlying all activities undertaken by all layers of government (and similarly for the various critical infrastructure sector partners) is the need to take steps to preserve viability of their respective structures so as to ensure ongoing operational viability. 2 - Provide for defense of the United States. Whether the Black Sky event was caused by a nation state or not, defense of the United States will be a priority mission and will likely lead to prioritized actions that can impact the ongoing efforts to support citizens and restoration/recovery activities. These activities can be externally or internally focused and will necessitate coordination within the nation s internal security agencies. 3 - Supportefforts to effectively respond to and recover from the event. At its core, the federal sector s response mission focuses on actions to save lives, protect property and the environment, stabilize communities, and meet basic human needs following an incident 2. These objectives are consistent across all hazards and form the underlying criteria for gaining situational awareness; setting initial priorities; developing, coordinating and communicating informational updates for the American people and for allocating critical resources necessary to provide the most benefit to the greatest number of people. Sector Black Sky Strategic Mission Priorities Matrix Phase Priority Mission Ongoing 1 Preserve vontinuity of the US Government Departments. and Agencies, establish and operate necessary operational locations, establish and maintain communications, coordinate deployment of assets as required to meet missions #2, and #3. Ongoing 2 Provide for defense of the Unites States. Provide effective command and control over US defense assets; identify, deploy and employ assets as required to meet missions as defined by the national command authority. Phase 1 3 Support efforts necessary to effectively respond to and recover from the event. Departments. and agencies deploy and establish coordination elements necessary to identify assets that can facilitate USG response in support of prioritized missions that save lives, protect property and the environment and provide for basic human needs. 2 Response as defined by the National Response Framework, June

9 Black Sky Decisions Overview. During a Black Sky event, all aspects of the five mission areas will still need to be conducted only under much more challenging circumstances. Prevention efforts necessary to secure the nation from ongoing attacks will remaina priority. Information sharing, analysis, and prioritized application of law enforcement and defense assets will still happen. Support for those elements may necessitate sacrifice or delay of other ongoing mission priorities. Protection efforts necessary to ensure the situation created by the Black Sky incident cannot be exploited by hostile elements will require identification, deployment and support of security assets. Coordination of information essential to sound decision-making, shared across both time and space connecting all sectors of government and partner CI owners will be essential. Information sharing with citizens to ensure orderly reaction by the populace and to minimize disruptive activities will be crucial. Early considerations of recovery priorities integrated into early and ongoing response efforts must be considered with resources allocated in an efficient manner. Mitigation efforts will need to be considered in order to prevent renewal of outages that can exacerbate ongoing response/recovery operations. Black Sky Decisions Matrix. Mission Priority Decision 1, 2, 3 Allocate commodities necessary to facilitate USG operations 1 Determine status of defense installations and assets 1 Conduct operations necessary to stabilize situation and prevent further damage to national security needs of the country 1, 2, 3 Determine fuel priority between fixed nuclear power facilities, response assets, care operations, and military deployment needs 1, 2, 3 Allocate available communications assets to support health care, emergency management, public risk communications, government continuity, defense and civil defense needs 1, 2, 3 Identify and communicate modified standards of care essential to support ongoing defense and emergency management requirements 1, 2, 3 Identify lead federal agency for specified mission requirements 3 Identify areas within the US that must be supported and/or evacuated due to projected long term (>3 months) power outages Sector Black Sky Situational Awareness Overview. Gaining and maintaining situational awareness requires that all levels of government and the CI owner operators immediately institute a policy of information sharing. Protocols that currently do not exist (or have yet to be tried under a response environment) must be developed, equipped, trained and practiced. Government has the fundamental responsibility to provide for safety of the citizens as such developing integrated, timely information that can help meet the fundamental needs of communities and citizens is crucial. Systems that can operate in a power-constrained environment are essential to meet this 8

10 challenge. Without the presence of the ubiquitous internet, alternative strategies for communicating must be envisioned, developed and implemented. Priority Information Requirements Matrix. Information Source Priority Confidence Level Location and connectivity All with key leaders Cause of power disruption CI O/O Extent of power outage CI O/O Projection for restoration, CI O/O by area Status of military (bases, DOD deployed, strategic forces) Number and location of assets rendered inoperable by Black Sky ALL event catalyst Status of governmental ALL agencies (fed/state/local) Status of communications CI O/O systems (voice/data) Status interdependent CI ALL (oil/gas; water; telecommunications; cable; etc.) Transportation system status (rail, air, highway, CI O/O; State DOT; US DOT maritime) Security of critical assets (nuclear weapons, DOD reactors, pipelines, chemical facilities, etc.) Status of mass media/communications CI O/O systems Availability of emergency power generation ALL capabilities Availability of fuel required to operate emergency power systems ONG Sector 9

11 Status of health care facilities Identification of oil/chemical pollution events Status of banking and market systems (in US and abroad) Status of prisons HHS/CDC CI O/O; DHS; EPA Banking Sector; US Treasury DOJ; State DOJ Sector Initial Actions. The federal sector initial actions will be guided largely by standard operating procedures. Federal sector entities all have pre-determined plans that will guide the activation of their contingency operations including locations, personnel and emergency communications procedures. Similarly, the Department of Defense will activate necessary command, staff, and capabilities necessary to recommend actions to the 10

12 National Command Authority based on the the causes of the event or that defend against those that may seek to take advantage of the event. Federal agencies can help to gain and share situational awareness, to identify critical resource requirements, to facilitate emergency declarations, to communicate essential elements of information and to represent the sector in multi-level coordination elements. NOTE that a challenge this large has never been envisioned. Federal coordination structures may initially be overwhelmed by the impact. Understanding the scope and depth of the outage will be vital to early decisions regarding how to support impacted citizens. Clear, unambiguous information transmitted via damaged infrastructures will be essential in order to save lives. The information will begin with frank and accurate assessments of the power system that will need to come from the owner operators. Diverse information from highly decentralized, sourceswill need to be rapidly synthesized and transmitted to help affected populations. Sector Initial Actions Matrix. Priority Initial Action Desired/Required Outcome 1 (Re)establish government wide operational connectivity Ability to coordinate/act 3 Identify lead federal agency Clarity of leadership 3 Obtain status of the affected critical infrastructure systems Situational awareness; focus on gaps 2 Ensure security of vital strategic systems Ensure no loss of capability 1 Convene National Command Authority Ability to decide/act 2 Communicate known information to the public Situational awareness of public 1 Identify potential additional threats, follow on attacks Security to meet Mission #2 3 Establish field and unified coordination in affected areas Ability to identify and prioritize requirements and to coordinate actions Internal Sector Requirements. The first priority for the sector is to deploy personnel to pre-planned locations while utilizing availablemeans of communications. Establishing communications connectivity and sharing status reports provide the USG with a baseline from which to commit support assets when and where required. Internal Sector Requirements Matrix. Phase Priority Requirement 1 1 Establish/occupy operational coordination centers 1 1 Establish and test communications (internal to agency and within agencies) 1 1 Locate and connect with senior leadership 1 2 Get accountability and communicate instructions to personnel 1 1 Determine and communicate operability status as required agencies and National Command Authority) 1 2 Identify emergency power generation, fuel, communications requirements 1 1 Establish initial operating capability 1 1 Deploy personnel to planned locations 11

13 External and Cross Sector Dependencies Overview. The Federal Sector has two independent, primary missions essential to the ongoing viability of the nation continuity and defense. Both of these primary missions can only be conducted without significant interdependent support. Power, fuel, transportation, water, wastewater processing, communications, are just a few of the critically important interdependencies that must be addresed. If these are not provided or planned for, the ability of the federal sector to be successful in its primary missions (defense and continuity) will rapidly degrade. External and Cross Sector Requirements Matrix Requirement Area Priority Requirement Manpower 2 Each agency must ensure personnel status, and report for centrally managed coordination of deployment and employment. Transportation 2 Gain and maintain situational awareness over air, rail, road, seas, and rivers. Identify emergency power, fuel, and security needs required to support application of the transportation system. Backup Power 1 Targeted application of emergency power generation to operate critical facilities essential to meeting the defense, continuity and support missions, requires multi-level situational awareness and integrated decision making. Security 1 Sector assets can self-sustain for a brief period but may need to be augmented in order to ensure viability of critical facilities and capabilities in support of response and restoration efforts. Communications (Physical) 1 Identify and prioritize application of emergency power, fuel and security that provides the most significant impact on response and restoration operations. Water 2 Support emergency generator (fuel, maintenance) and deployment of essential chemicals necessary to maintain supply of potable water Waste-water 2 Support emergency generator (fuel, maintenance) and deployment of essential chemicals necessary to maintain waste water processing Food 2 Identify and prioritize emergency power, fuel, and transportation capabilities to support mass shelter operations Fuel 2 Gain and maintain situational awareness for availability and operability of oil and gas supply chains. Develop and implement priorities that support interdependent response and restoration efforts. Ensure priorities are coordinated with multiple layers of command and control. 12

14 Sector Specialized Resource Requirements Overview. The Federal sector has both internal resource needs as well as being a resource provider and/or facilitator for external whole community partners. When addressing internal needs of operating in a long-term power outage the Federal sector will require back up power generation capabilities, basic care capabilities, security, and communications for personnel necessary to provide continuous operations of essential government services. Each agency develops and maintains an essential, missiondriven plan that specifies in detail the personnel, locations, power needs (including back up power generation, fuel and projected maintenance required) for operating in a power outage. The specifics of these plans are restricted and will not be published in this document. As a participant in a whole community that are conducting response and restoration activities the federal sector focuses resources to meet shortfalls identified by state, local, and tribal governments. These S/L/T authorities are constitutionally empowered to provide for public safety and security and are typically positioned to be the first line of support to citizens and the critical infrastructure owneroperators. The needs identified by these jurisdictions make up the primary requirements the federal sector mobilizes to support. To facilitate identification, deployment, and employment of resources required for response and restoration needs, the federal sector participates with state, local, and tribal leadership in joint coordination activities. Typically these are conducted at joint field offices, emergency operations centers, and unified command centers and need the full range of power, care, security, and communications necessary to effectively gain and maintain situational awareness, track resources, and provide updates to field personnel and operating elements. The assets needed to meet the requirement identified and prioritized by these individual JFO s, EOC s and UCs are very situation specific. Providing federally directed support will require communication of the various needs to a central location, compiling the list of required assets, prioritizing the deployment of available resources, and communication of the status to the S/L/T authorities that requested the capability. Commented [Y1]: What do these initials mean? I think they need some explanation Given the anticipated scale of needs created by a long term, large scale power outage, prioritization of asset allocation will require application of the principle provide for the greatest good to the largest number of people as there will almost certainly not be enough assets to meet every requirement. Planning estimates for emergency power generation support have been compiled and are included in the draft POAI. These estimates presuppose no requirement for fuel transport for the first 72 hours following an outage, assuming that onsite fuel will support those needs. The annex estimates 132 k facilities will require emergency power generation support after 72 hours and estimates for the fuel required range from 81 to 124 million gallons per day (or 9 to 14 thousand tanker truck loads per day). A more detailed matrix that describes generator and fuel requirements by type of facility follows. Sector Commodity Specific List Matrix* 13

15 *Source, Power Outage Incident Annex to the National Response Framework DRAFT Phase Commodity Estimated Quantity Pre-event Fuel for 72 hour backup generator at thousand defined facilities million gallons Potential Source Commercial vendors under localized contract for delivery Pre-event Food supplies for emergency personnel TBE Commercial vendors under localized contract for delivery After 72 hours After 72 hours Fuel for 72 hour backup generator at 378 thousand defined facilities million gallons TBD Food supplies for emergency personnel TBE TBD Sector Black Sky Communications Overview Federal sector connectivity is vital to ensuring ongoing government, conduct of defense missions (abroad and at home) and to providing support to the response operations inside the US. To accomplish the normal day-to-day operations the sector utilizes a combination of voice and data that predominately rides over the commercially available systems. Some sector unique capabilities do exist (dedicated fiber, cable, satellite, HF, UHF) but will likely be prioritized for defense and government-wide continuity needs. For example, FEMA has a deployable emergency communications capability but it is designed to ensure that FEMA coordination elements can connect with their deployed assets and is not designed for support 14

16 of the overall response communications footprint, nor is it sufficiently robust to provide support to surviving citizens needs. In a Black Sky environment the amount of data that can be effectively shared will also restrict the use of many of the tools that have become routine during response operations. Graphics, maps, overlays, incident action plans, situational awareness reports, public messaging are all band width heavy and will have to compete with other needs that are deemed to be vital to ongoing response and restoration operations. Sector Communications Matrix Phase Communications Requirement Coordinated Cross Sector Element Voice Data Satellite Sector Black Sky Assessment Tool (s) Overview. Sector Overall Resilience Assessment Annex A -1 Sector Black Sky Planning Requirements (On-going). In addition to the aforementioned mission areas specified by Presidential Policy Directive 8, National Preparedness, the directive also mandates the creation of a national preparedness goal and a system to achieve that goal. To meet this requirement, FEMA has developed and implemented standardized preparedness doctrine, including the National Incident Management System (NIMS). The overall aim of NIMS is to enhance the nation s ability to manage the impacts of any hazard while improving the quality and speed with which responding elements can achieve their missions. Companion to the doctrine of NIMS is creation of a National Planning System that FEMA has promulgated and is utilizing to standardize howplanning in conducted. The system specifies the following six steps when developing a plan: 1. Form a Collaborative Planning Team 2. Understand the Situation 3. Determine Goals and Objectives 4. Plan Development 5. Plan Preparation, Review, and Approval 6. Plan Implementation and Maintenance The system categorizes planning at 3 distinct levels, strategic; operational; and tactical and further distinguishes planning as deliberate or incident action based. 15

17 The National Preparedness System also introduced the concept of core capabilities that are used to organize planning and preparedness efforts. For discussion purposes and to facilitate good planning the core the relevant mission areas break down capabilities in the following graphic. During Phase 1 (Pre-Incident), local, state, tribal, territorial, insular area, federal entities, and critical infrastructure owner/operators determine existing logistics and resource capabilities, develop deliberate plans and procedures, and conduct training and exercises to validate existing plans. In addition, continuity operations and planning need to be incorporated to facilitate the performance of response core capabilities during all hazards emergencies or other situations that may disrupt normal operations. Phase 1 consists of three sub-phases, which range from steady-state operations to the positioning of resources prior to the occurrence of an incident. Actions taken during Phase 1 are focused on awareness, preparedness, mitigation, and protection. During a notice incident, there may be an elevated threat (Phase 1b) and credible threat (Phase 1c) for which response actions must be taken and will be detailed in incident- specific annexes, as warranted. Phase 2 (Response) consists of the immediate response, deployment of resources and personnel, and sustained response operations. Phase 3a refers to recovery activities that occur as a part of the response mission area to facilitate the transition and support to the Recovery mission area. Phase 3a includes short-term recovery operations (e.g., repopulation of the impacted area) and long-term recovery operations (e.g., transition to ongoing recovery and mitigation activities). In many incidents, no clear transition exists from one phase to the next, and phases may run concurrently. As such, during incidents that affect multiple states and/or FEMA regions, different jurisdictions may transition through the phases at various paces depending on the impact to the respective geographical area. Response operations require collaboration across the Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery mission areas to ensure proper integration. Across all mission areas, lifesaving and lifesustaining activities remain the priority during an incident response. When possible, federal interagency partners may utilize agency resources and authorities to prepare for an incident, as well as to initiate appropriate preparatory and mitigating measures to reduce vulnerabilities. Mitigation opportunities are evaluated throughout disaster operations, as decisions made during response and recovery operations can enhance or hinder subsequent mitigation activities. Once an incident occurs, the priority shifts from preparedness activities to immediate and short-term response activities to preserve life, property, the environment, and the social, economic, and political structure of the community. Recovery operations are initiated, as appropriate and per the Recovery FIOP, based on local, state, tribal, territorial, and insular area needs. The transition from response to recovery will not impede response operations. Both operations will closely coordinate to prevent duplicative activities and promote the efficient use of resources. Activities conducted under the Response mission must be consistent with all pertinent statutes and policies, particularly those involving civil and human rights, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of

18 Sector Best Practices Matrix (On-going). Area of Operations Recommendation Expected Improvement Integrated and/or Shared Planning Actions. A federal team has been convened and has drafted a national level Power Outage Incident Annex (POIA) to the National Response Framework. This effort has been co-led by FEMA and DOE and provides an overview of priorities, facts and assumptions intended to guide federal agency efforts to prepare for, respond to and recover from a large-scale power outage. Further nearly every FEMA region has instituted a similar planning effort aimed at developing regional level planning that will identify available capabilities and project needs based on input from state, local and critical infrastructure owner operators. These planning efforts provide opportunity for pre-event preparedness as well as investment strategies that can help to mitigate the risks associated with the black sky hazard. A list of plans points of contact is at attachment XXX Planning Actions Matrix Prevention Protection Mitigation Response Recovery Intelligence and Information Sharing Interdiction and Disruption Screening, Search, and Detection Community Resilience Planning Public Information and Warning Operational Coordination Long-term Vulnerability Reduction Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment Threats and Hazards Identification Infrastructure Systems Critical Transportation Environmental Response/Health and Safety Fatality Management Services Fire Management and Suppression Logistics and Supply Chain Management Mass Care Services Economic Recovery Health and Social Services Housing Natural and Cultural Resources 17

19 Mass Search and Rescue Operations On-scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement Operational Communications Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services Situational Assessment 18

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21 Sector Black Sky Resilience Considerations Overview. Resilience Initiatives Matrix 20

22 Sector Black Sky Regulatory Impacts and Issues Overview (On-Going) The sector is largely in charge of establishing most of the impacting regulations but ongoing dialogue during ensuing planning activities with other sector partners will be essential both to understand what regulatory impacts the federal sector is responsible for and how they can ameliorate those impacts during a response operation. It will also be crucial to understanding how state and local regulations can impact the federal response and thus to streamline the response by addressing them pre-event. Sector Regulatory Matrix Area of Issue Operations Recommended Solution/Resolution 21

23 Annex A Assessments (On-going) Sector Overall Resilience Assessment There is limited, consolidated assessment information focused exclusively on the Federal Sector as such characterizations are not routinely accomplished. FEMA does conduct assessments of National Preparedness on an ongoing basis the last of which was completed in early Below is a matrix that depicts assessment of cross-cutting core capability assessments, based primarily on inputs from state and local jurisdictions, using Federal guidelines. 22

24 Annex B Regulatory Issues Detail Statements (On-Going) Under development in conjunction with Regulatory Sector Playbook development 23

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