Remix: On-demand Live Randomization
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1 Remix: On-demand Live Randomization Yue Chen, Zhi Wang, David Whalley, Long Lu* Florida State University, Stony Brook University*
2 Background Buffer Overflow -> Code Injection Attack
3 Background Buffer Overflow -> Code Injection Attack Defense: Data Execution Prevention (DEP) Write XOR Execute: a block (page) of memory cannot be marked as both writable and executable at the same time.
4 Background Buffer Overflow -> Code Injection Attack Defense: Data Execution Prevention (DEP) Write XOR Execute: a block (page) of memory cannot be marked as both writable and executable at the same time. Return-oriented Programming (ROP) Attack Discover gadgets from existing code, and chain them by ret instructions Can be Turing complete
5 Code Reuse Attack Existing Code Chained Gadgets
6 ROP Defense Strategy ROP is one example of a broad class of attacks that require attackers to know or predict the locations of binary features.
7 ROP Defense Strategy ROP is one example of a broad class of attacks that require attackers to know or predict the locations of binary features. Defense Goal Frustrate such attacks by randomizing feature space, or remove features
8 ASLR Address Space Layout Randomization Library1 Library1 Executable Executable First-time Second-time
9 ASLR - Problem Pointer Leak Library1 Executable
10 ASLR - Problem Pointer Leak De-randomized Library1 Executable
11 ASLR - Problem Brute force attacks are still possible (When the entropy is small. E.g., 32-bit systems.) Randomized only once.
12 Goal Live randomization during runtime Finer-grained randomization unit Low performance overhead Highly composable Can and should be combined with other defenses (traditional ASLR, function randomization, etc.)
13 Remix Live basic block (BB) (re-)randomization within functions A basic block is a straight-line code without jumps in or out of the middle of the block.
14 Remix Live basic block (BB) (re-)randomization within functions Advantages: No function pointer migration Good spatial locality A basic block is a straight-line code without jumps in or out of the middle of the block.
15 Function A Remix Basic Block 2 Basic Block 3 Basic Block 4 Basic Block 5 Space for Alignment Other Functions
16 Function A Basic Block 2 Basic Block 3 Basic Block 4 Basic Block 5 Space for Alignment After 0.46 seconds Remix Function A Basic Block 3 Basic Block 5 Basic Block 2 Basic Block 4 Other Functions Other Functions
17 Function A Basic Block 2 Basic Block 3 Basic Block 4 Basic Block 5 Space for Alignment Remix Function A Function A Basic Block 3 Basic Block 5 Basic Block 2 Basic Block 5 After 0.46 seconds Basic Block 2 After 2.13 seconds Basic Block 3 Basic Block 4 Basic Block 4 Other Functions Other Functions Other Functions
18 Challenges Chain randomized basic blocks together Need extra space to chain basic blocks Need to update instructions Stale pointer migration
19 Extra Space Case 1: Extra Jmp (1) At the beginning of a function Jmp to BB1 Basic Block 3 Basic Block 2
20 Extra Space Case 1: Extra Jmp (1) At the beginning of a function (2) At the end of a basic block that does not end with an instruction like jmp/ret Jmp to BB1 Basic Block 3 mov add mov Basic Block 2 mov add jle
21 Extra Space Case 2: Larger Displacement Before Remix Jump to BB3 Basic Block 2 Basic Block 3 Basic Block 4 Basic Block 5
22 Extra Space Case 2: Larger Displacement Before Remix After Remix Jump to BB3 Jump to BB3 Basic Block 2 Basic Block 2 Basic Block 3 Basic Block 4 Basic Block 4 Basic Block 5 Basic Block 5 Basic Block 3
23 Extra Space Case 2: Larger Displacement Before Remix After Remix Jump to BB3 Jump to BB3 Basic Block 2 Basic Block 3 Basic Block 2 One-byte displacement: jmp +0x10 Basic Block 4 Basic Block 5 Basic Block 4 Basic Block 5 Basic Block 3 Four-byte displacement: jmp +0x
24 With Source Code: Modify the compiler to: 1. Insert an extra 5-byte NOP instruction after each basic block 2. Only generate instructions with 4-byte displacement Enough Space Guaranteed! Extra Space Solution
25 Extra Space Solution With Source Code: Modify the compiler to: 1. Insert an extra 5-byte NOP instruction after each basic block 2. Only generate instructions with 4-byte displacement Enough Space Guaranteed! Without Source Code: Leverage existing NOP paddings: Function alignment Loop alignment Can insert random bytes into NOP space after randomization, making attack even harder.
26 Instruction Update Q: Which instructions need updating? A: Control-flow related ones, to adjust displacement
27 Instruction Update Two-step update (e.g., unconditional direct jmp): Original After BB reordering Step one: Jumps to original address of BB 3 Step two: Jumps to current address of BB 3 jmp Basic Block 2 Basic Block 3 Basic Block 3 Basic Block 3 Basic Block 2 Basic Block 2 Basic Block 2 Basic Block 3
28 Instruction Update Direct call: step-one update Indirect call: no update needed Direct jump: step-one and step-two update Indirect jump: discussed later PC-relative addressing: step-one update
29 Indirect Jump Jump to functions unchanged PLT/GOT Tail/Sibling Call Jump to basic blocks see next
30 Basic Block Pointer Conversion Why? - Migrate stale pointers to basic blocks, to ensure correctness
31 Basic Block Pointer Conversion Why? - Migrate stale pointers to basic blocks, to ensure correctness Where? - Return address - Jump table (switch/case) - Saved context (e.g., setjmp/longjmp) - Kernel exception table
32 Illustration - Return Address main Foo Call Foo Return Site
33 Illustration - Return Address main Foo Call Foo Return Site
34 Illustration - Return Address main Foo Call Foo Return Site
35 Optimization To Speed up the randomization procedure: Pre-store the required information Basic block information (e.g., locations) Code/data that need updating
36 To speed up execution: Optimization Probabilistic loop bundling Loop Basic Block 2 Basic Block 3 Basic Block 4 Basic Block 5
37 To speed up execution: Optimization Probabilistic loop bundling Basic Block 2 Loop Basic Block 3 Bundle Bundled BB Basic Block 4 Basic Block 4 Basic Block 5 Basic Block 5
38 To speed up execution: Optimization Probabilistic loop bundling Basic Block 2 Bundled BB Loop Basic Block 3 Bundle Bundled BB Randomize Basic Block 4 Basic Block 4 Basic Block 5 Basic Block 5 Basic Block 5 Basic Block 4
39 To speed up execution: Optimization Probabilistic loop bundling Basic Block 2 Bundled BB Loop Basic Block 3 Bundle Bundled BB Randomize Basic Block 4 Basic Block 4 Basic Block 5 Basic Block 5 Basic Block 5 Basic Block 4 The bundling layout is different from time to time. Unpredictable!
40 Implementation Can work on source code using a slightly modified LLVM, or work directly on binaries. Can work on Linux user-space applications, and FreeBSD kernel modules.
41 Evaluation - Security Finer-grained randomization: Adds about four bits of entropy to each instruction. Live randomization during runtime: Destroy discovered gadgets immediately after each re-randomization. Software Apache nginx lighttpd Average Basic Block Number per Function Average NOP Space (bytes) per Function Want more entropy? Insert more NOP space!
42 Evaluation - Performance SPEC CPU 2006 Performance Overhead (randomized once)
43 Evaluation - Performance SPEC CPU 2006 Size Increase
44 Evaluation - Performance Randomization Time Interval Apache Web Server Performance Overhead (by ApacheBench) Performance depends on hardware speed. Randomization time interval can be random!
45 Evaluation - Performance Randomization Time Interval ReiserFS Performance Overhead (by IOZone) Performance depends on hardware speed. Randomization time interval can be random!
46 Q&A
Remix: On-demand Live Randomization
Remix: On-demand Live Randomization Yue Chen, Zhi Wang, David Whalley Florida State University {ychen,zwang,whalley}@cs.fsu.edu Long Lu Stony Brook University long@cs.stonybrook.edu ABSTRACT Code randomization
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