Andrew Shields (Toshiba Research Europe Ltd)
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1 ETSI S ROLE IN THE DEPLOYMENT OF QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION Andrew Shields (Toshiba Research Europe Ltd) Industry Specification Group in Quantum Key Distribution
2 Quantum Key Distribution optical fibre Quantum Communications -each bit encoded on a single photon Secrecy can be tested directly!! -quantum theory dictates that eavesdropping unavoidably alters encoding of single photons Detect unauthorised tapping of optical fibre networks Distribute verifiably-secret digital keys
3 Quantum Key Distribution Use Cases data centre Link Encryption back-up centre National Security Healthcare Networks Quantum Key Distribution Critical Infrastructure Mobile devices Financial Sector
4 Long Term Perspective Quantum-Safe Cryptography Large-scale Quantum Computer would have devastating effect on e-commerce, e-government, critical infrastructure security, individual privacy etc Shor s algorithm will break security of current Public Key Crypto (based on integer factorisation problem) New crypto systems take long time to deploy, so need to plan now. Two Solutions for Quantum-Safe Crypto Research on new PK methods with resilience to Shor s algorithm Quantum Crypto based on Laws of Nature not threatened by quantum computer or any conventional computer Courtesy of D-Wave Systems Inc. Address different applications BOTH are important
5 Nearer Term: Physical Layer Quantum Encryption Using installed fibre in BT network Choi et al, Optics Exp 22, (2014) 26 km, 10dB loss Commercial 10G DWDM transmission multiple 10 Gb/s data channels wire speed data encryption using AES 40 Gb/s data 4x10G DWDM encrypted ( , , , nm) field fibre 40 Gb/s data QKD ( nm) Data bandwidths over 1 Tb/s possible in the future
6 Recent Advances in QKD Technology Remarkable technological advances in recent years Secure key rates Increased from kb/s to multiple Mb/s Single link range increased to> 300 km 2Mb/s Increase of secure bit rate Security Rigorous security proofs developed Failure probability now quantified Implementation security is better understood 1Mb/s 0b/s Quantum Networks Integration in core, metro, access, mobile now demonstrated No longer necessary to use expensive dedicated dark fibre
7 Global QKD Network Installations 270M investment (Dec 2013) in Quantum Technologies UK Quantum Technologies Programme (2014-9) Metro QKD network (Toshiba, Mitsubishi, NEC, NTT, & others) led by NICT Calgary Waterloo Batelle km link from Ohio to Washington Boston SECOQC Paris Consortium Madrid Geneva Durban Tokyo QKD Network Beijing-Shanghai 2000 km link ($100M) from Beijing to Shanghai, ~50 node networks in Jinan and Hefei CQC 2 T Pilot deployments are taking place - it is meaningful to define requirements and standards now
8 Industrial Standards Industrial Standards are essential for Interoperability of systems from different manufacturers Integration into ordinary telecom networks Stimulate application development on common interfaces Stimulate a component supply chain for Quantum Technologies Security assurance Ensure that QKD is implemented securely
9 ETSI Industry Specification Group in QKD ISG-QKD established in 2008 Published Group Standardisation Documents on QKD Use Cases, Application Interfaces, Security Proofs, QKD Module specification, Ontology, Components and Internal Interfaces Membership comprises large industry, telecom operators, SMEs, NMIs, government labs, universities New members are welcome
10 Current Work Items of ETSI ISG Deployment parameters User requirements for implementing QKD Combining classical and quantum channels on a common optical fibre Quantum component specification Parameters and test procedures for quantum components Impact on system security see talk by Chris Chunnilall Implementation security Ensure that implementations are secure and robust against attack
11 Implementation Security Objective: Investigate and close security loopholes of real QKD systems Motivation Deviations between ideal and real system could be exploited by Eve through either active or passive attacks Approach Study and quantify known attacks Introduce appropriate countermeasures Modify the QKD protocol if necessary encoded single photons optical fibre Eve Exploits difference between theory and practical implementation
12 Security by Measurement Secure key rate after privacy amplification (ideal system) For given ε = prob of key failure Typically ε = (< 1 bad key per years) Modified secure key rate (real system) Info leakage due to error correction Finite key size effect Info leakage due to imperfection 1 Info leakage due to imperfection 2 etc
13 Trojan Horse Attack Eve injects bright light (µ in ) and measures back-reflection (µ out ) to determine Alice s or Bob s phase modulator settings DFB laser Pulsed 1GHz α β 0 Alice Bob 1 Eve Recent experimental studies (reported at QCrypt, Paris, Sept 14) CV QKD : Khan et al, Erlangen, Paris Telecom Tech & SecureNet two-way QKD : Sajeed et al, IQC & IdQuantique one-way QKD : considered here
14 Trojan Horse Attack Eve injects bright light (µ in ) and measures back-reflection (µ out ) to determine Alice s or Bob s phase modulator settings DFB laser Pulsed 1GHz α β 0 Alice Bob 1 Consider extreme case Eve Upper bound µ in using fibre laser damage threshold* I < 10 7 J/cm 2. Require µ out <10-4 (can be mitigated by <1% privacy amplification) optical isolation > 150 db (*) R M Wood, Laser-induced damage of optical materials, Taylor & Francis (2003).
15 Shutting out the Trojan Horse 150dB Isolation provided by spectral filtering and optical isolator(s) Filter Isolator Extinction > 80dBm (limited by dynamic range of measurement) Insertion loss < 1dB Isolation > 60dB at quantum λ Reflectivity Attenuation Isolation Total Alice 40dB 2x25dB 60dB 150dB Bob 40dB 0 110dB 150dB Trojan horse attacks blocked both at Alice & Bob using passive components
16 Summary Several large QKD network deployments underway worldwide Standards are essential for future interoperability To assure customers that technology implemented securely And to stimulate markets for components, systems and applications Thank you! Contact:
Marco Lucamarini, Martin Ward, Andrew Shields (Toshiba Research Europe Ltd)
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