DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT Region

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1 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Project Name PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID) APPRAISAL STAGE Report No.: AB6749 (The report # is automatically generated by IDU and should not be changed) DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT Region LCR Country Republic of Haiti Sector URBAN Lending Instrument Grant Project ID P Borrower(s) Ministry of Finance Implementing Agency (i) Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communication (MTPTC); (ii) Ministry of Interior and Regional Authorities (MICT) Environmental Screening { }A {}B { }C { }FI Category Date PID Prepared August 18, 2011 Estimated Date of Appraisal July 15, 2011 Completion Estimated Date of Board October 4, 2011 Approval Decision Project authorized to proceed to negotiations upon agreement on any pending conditions and/or assessments. I. Country Context 1. Haiti is ranked 148th out of 172 Countries in the 2010 Human Development Index. It is the poorest country in Latin America and the Caribbean and among the poorest countries in the world. Over half of its population of 10 million live in absolute poverty less than US$1 per day and 78 percent live on less than US$2 per day. 2. Haiti ranks as one of the countries with the highest exposure to multiple natural hazards, according to the World Bank s Natural Disaster Hotspot study 1. With 96 percent of its population living at risk, Haiti has the highest vulnerability to hurricanes among the region s small island states (12.9 on a scale of 13) 2. In addition to hydro-meteorological hazards, Haiti is located in a seismically active zone, intersected by several major tectonic faults. The country s high population density (up to 40,000 per km 2 in Port-au-Prince), combined with the large number of informal settlements and weak infrastructure, renders Haiti and its population particularly vulnerable. 3. Over the past ten years, Haiti has been impacted by several major events. In 2004, Tropical Storm Jeanne affected over 315,000 people; in 2008, Hurricane Fay and Tropical Storms Gustav, Hannah and Ike (FGHI) affected more than 865,000 people; and in 2010, the January 1 World Bank, Natural Disaster Hotspots, A Global Risk Analysis (Washington, DC: Disaster Risk Management Series, 2005) 2 UNDP Reducing Disaster Risk: A Challenge for Development. United Nations Development Program, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery 1

2 12 earthquake affected more than three million people. The impact of these disasters on the national economy was evaluated at 7 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for Tropical Storm Jeanne (2004), 15 percent of GDP for FGHI (2008), and 120 percent of GDP for the January 12 earthquake (2010) The January 2010 earthquake resulted in the largest urban disaster in recorded history in Latin American and the Caribbean, causing massive destruction to public and private infrastructure, including hospitals, schools, government buildings, houses, and roads. Approximately 1.5 million people were displaced and 220,000 were killed. The disaster struck very close to Port-au-Prince, the country s political, economic and administrative nerve center, where an estimated 65 percent of GDP and 85 percent of government revenues are generated. II. Sectoral and Institutional Context 5. Haiti s long history of political instability has considerably weakened the institutions and governance mechanisms, which contributes to serious fiscal, regulatory and planning constraints. Given these constraints, the GoH faces challenges in the development of strategic policies and programs, coordination across line ministries, and implementation of monitoring and evaluation tools to successfully execute a comprehensive development program. Lack of institutional and absorptive capacity leads the GoH to engage in shortterm, reactive planning and actions rather than developing long-term strategies and programs. The January 2010 earthquake further deepened the existing governance challenges, by severely diminishing already weak government capacity. 6. Institutional weaknesses are most obvious during emergency situations, revealing limited government service delivery, which is exacerbated by donor dependency and low domestic investment in infrastructure and human capital. These weaknesses feature particularly prominently in disaster risk management which is multi-sectoral.. 7. In 2001, a National Disaster Risk Management System (SNGRD) was established to handle emergency operations and manage disaster risk, but its capacity is low and suffers from a lack of institutional support. For example, no single line ministry is officially responsible for disaster risk management activities and the SNGRD remains informal, with no legislative framework. These constraints limit the system s operational capacity. Haiti has no highlevel coordination mechanism that convenes line ministries and technical institutions responsible for disaster risk management. Compounding this lack of institutionalization is a continued need to raise awareness of the risks posed by adverse natural events and their impact on the country s development trajectory. Often, there is a lack of clear information on disaster risks and on structural and non-structural mitigation options. 8. After the January 2010 earthquake, understanding risk, reducing vulnerability, and improving emergency preparedness and response capacity have been key themes for the GoH and the international community. However, to date, initiatives to support disaster risk management themes have been ad-hoc, often led by donor agencies and not always integrated within the GoH s institutions. For example, significant resources were mobilized by the Bank to better understand the country s geological and hydro-meteorological hazards and structural 3 Government of Haiti, World Bank, European Commission. 2008, Post Disaster Needs Assessments 2

3 vulnerabilities in order to inform the neighborhood recovery and housing repair program in the short-term. However, the sustainability of these initiatives is limited by the technical capacity of national institutions to generate, manage, and utilize hazard risk-related information. Key decision makers in line ministries are not fully engaged and there is a disconnect between the technical experts identifying hazard risks and the ability of public officials to base development plans and investments on this analysis. 9. Despite these institutional constraints, the GoH has been improving its ability to respond to adverse natural events, particularly hydro-metrological hazards. Given the limited capacity and support at the central level, the Directorate of Civil Protection (DPC) has relied on a broad network of local level actors engaged in disaster response activities. In particular, at the local level, Municipal Civil Protection Committees (Comité Communal de Protection Civile CCPC) have been established and trained to be mobilized before, during, and immediately after disasters. Established under the Bank financed Emergency Recovery and Disaster Risk Management Project (ERDMP - P090159), 73 CCPCs in Haiti s most vulnerable regions have been engaged during recent adverse natural events, including FGHI in 2008, the January 2010 earthquake, and Hurricane Tomas in Significant continued technical support is required at the national and local level to more efficiently prepare and respond to disasters. At the national level, the DPC capacity must be built to develop protocols and a chain of command in order to lead response, and to more efficiently coordinate actions among the CCPCs. At the local level, the capacity of existing CCPCs must be enhanced and the network expanded to cover all parts of the country. 10. The effectiveness of the DPC to respond to emergency events depends directly on its ability to physically reach the population. Experience in the 2008 FGHI events, demonstrated the vulnerability of the transportation network as affected communities were cut off from assistance for extended periods of time. System weaknesses were evident anew after the passage of Hurricane Tomas in Although relatively weak, the hurricane created serious disruptions in the transport network and limited the ability of the DPC to reach affected populations. III. Project Development Objectives 11. The proposed Project development objective is to enhance Haiti's disaster response capacity and the resilience of critical transport infrastructure. IV. Project Description Component One: Natural Hazard Risk Assessment and Analysis (US$3.5 million) 12. Since the earthquake, resources have been directed to improving the national level awareness of natural hazard risk and to better understand related vulnerabilities. Given the technical nature of these activities, and the weak capacity within the GoH, a key challenge is to institutionalize increased awareness of disaster risk. This component would build on the success and results of the multi-hazard risk assessment initiative launched by the Bank by strengthening the institutional capacity of the implementing Line Ministries to incorporate natural hazard risks into development planning and collection of disaster risk data under a technical assistance program. 3

4 13. Based on the emerging needs of line ministries and an analysis of the results from the existing hazard risk assessment, new disaster risk data, focusing on some key issues, would be acquired to fill current knowledge gaps. Filling these knowledge gaps may include support and capacity building activities for the GoH, aiming to improve the understanding of hazard risk of the line Ministries so as to better inform their decision-making processes. This component would finance extensive technical assistance along with data collection and interpretation, and if necessary, small works. Component Two: Enhanced Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Response (US$14.5 million) 14. Haiti has launched several initiatives over the past five years to increase its capacity to prepare for, and respond to, adverse natural events, supported by different donors including the Bank, UNDP, IDB, EU, WFP, and IOM. In particular, the Bank financed ERDMP (P090159) has supported the establishment of CCPCs. Further investment is required to consolidate the improvement in disaster preparedness and emergency response. Identified areas of intervention include strengthening the DPC, the expansion of the CCPCs to cover the entire country, improvement of the communication network and decision-support system for early warning and emergency response, and implementation of a pilot shelter management program to identify and retrofit existing shelters. 15. This component would finance consultancies and services to strengthen the institutional capacity of the DPC and the nation-wide network of CCPCs, the acquisition of goods for the improvement of the national emergency communication network, as well as works to support the DPC training center and the pilot emergency shelter program. This component would consist of three core activities: 16. Subcomponent 2.1 Institutional Development of the DPC and Expansion of its CCPC Network: This subcomponent would finance: (i) improving the capacity of the DPC s operational efficiency; (ii) carrying out the construction of a multi-purpose center for the DPC, to serve, among other purposes, as national Civil Protection training center facility; (iii) building the capacity of the existing Comité Communal de Protection Civile (CCPC), and establishing new CCPCs; and (iv) carrying out simulation exercises to, inter alia, evaluate the operational capacity of the CCPCs, and the Departmental and Central branches of the Civil Protection System as defined by the National Response Plan. 17. Subcomponent 2.2 Communication Network and Decision-support System: This subcomponent would finance improving the communication network and decision-support system, including: (i) establishing alert and communication protocols with the national disaster response system, with a particular emphasis on the dissemination of warnings from the central level to the community level (and vice-versa); (ii) developing a civil protection communication system and procurement of alert equipment; and (iii) provision of training for the use of CCPCs early warning system or communication protocols and equipment. 18. Sub-component 2.3 Pilot Emergency Shelter Rehabilitation and Construction: This subcomponent would finance the carrying out of: (i) a comprehensive functional and structural assessment of the national shelter network, resulting in a country-wide inventory of emergency shelters; (ii) standard and functional designs for emergency shelter; and (iii) 4

5 rehabilitation and construction of priority shelters, as defined by selection criteria to be established in the shelter management plan. Component 3: Rehabilitation of Vulnerable and Damaged Critical Transport Infrastructure (US$37 million) 19. To leverage the improved understanding of risk, and to ensure sustainability of the institutional strengthening and capacity building efforts in previous and ongoing operations, the proposed Project would finance structural investments in the transport sector and other investments to protect local access to the national backbone road network. This component would focus on strengthening the institutional capacity of the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communication (MTPTC), and other relevant ministries, departments and agencies, at both the central and local level, as well as explore innovative mechanisms in which public entities, such as the National Center of Equipment (CNE), and private sector entities can be mobilized quickly by the MTPTC for small emergency reconstruction or urgent maintenance works. Activities are broken into three subcomponents that complement investments under the ongoing Bank financed EBRVRP (P114292, approved in November 2009, and closing in December 2013), and the IIERP (P120895, approved in March 2010). 20. Sub-component 3.1 Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building: This subcomponent would finance capacity building activities focused on strengthening the institutional capacity of the MTPTC for: (i) identifying vulnerabilities in the transport sector; (ii) building resiliency in the transport sector; (iii) improving emergency response capacity to restore access to isolated areas; (iv) promoting road safety; and (v) increasing the efficiency of the road maintenance system. 21. Sub-component 3.2 Critical Spot Interventions and Reconstruction Investments in Transport Infrastructure: This subcomponent would finance the carrying out of reconstruction and/or reinforcement of identified investments in the transport sector, to be prioritized based on the principle of greatest loss avoidance. Works will generally focus on rehabilitating damaged assets before they fall to a level beyond repair. The works would include, inter alia, bridge and road repairs or reconstruction, as well as riverbank and road protection works and all designs will integrate road safety best practices. Urban road repairs, including, inter alia, rehabilitation and pavestone works, would also be financed under this subcomponent, in addition to a pilot coastal road protection project. 22. Sub-component 3.3 Investments to Protect Local Access to the Main Road Network: Identifying critical investments to protect the local access to the main road network, and carrying out of the design, rehabilitation, reconstruction and/or other work as may be required to protect said investments. These investments would be identified by MTPTC in coordination with the departmental delegates, the CCPC committees, and the MTPTC s regional offices (the Departmental Directorates: DDTPs). Investments would be designed and implemented with the support of the MTPTC s regional offices. Component Four: Emergency Response and Recovery (US$1 million) 23. This component would facilitate rapid response upon occurrence of an Emergency, including, the carrying out of emergency infrastructure reconstruction, rehabilitation and associated studies (Emergency Response Activities). Following an adverse natural event that 5

6 causes a major natural disaster, the GoH may request the Bank to re-allocate project funds to support emergency response activities. This component would draw resources from the unallocated expenditure category and/or allow the GoH to request the Bank to re-categorize and reallocate financing from other project components to partially cover emergency response and recovery costs. Additional funds could also be made available through this window for the same purpose. 24. Disbursements would be made against a positive list of critical goods or the procurement of goods, works, and consultant services required to support the immediate response and recovery needs of the GoH. All expenditures under this component, should it be triggered, will be in accordance with BP/OP 8.0 and will be appraised, reviewed and found to be acceptable to the Bank before any disbursement is made. 25. If not disbursed 12 months before the closing date of the proposed Project, the amount of US$1 million can be reallocated to finance activities under the other proposed Project components. Component Five - Project Management and Implementation Support (US$4 million) 26. This component would finance the costs associated with strengthening and developing the institutional capacity for Project management, coordination, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation, as well as those costs associated with supporting the project implementing agencies compliance of the mitigation measures identified in the Operational Risk Assessment Framework (ORAF). 27. Component 5 would be divided into two subcomponents. Sub-component 5.1 would finance the strengthening of the capacity of the UCP-DPC for: (a) overall coordination of the Project including, consolidation of financial and progress reports; and (b) management, coordination, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of Components 1 and 2 of the Project. Subcomponent 5.2 would finance the strengthening of the capacity of the UCE-MTPTC for management coordination, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of Components 3 and 4 of the Project. Activities financed under this component would include training and staffing with institutional strengthening purposes, audits, equipment, vehicles, operational costs and other activities associated with project execution. V. Financing Source: ($m.) Borrower/Recipient 0 IBRD IDA Others : Total 60 VI. Implementation 28. Overall project implementation will be assured by the Ministry of Interior and Regional Authority s (MICT) Directorate of Civil Protection (DPC). The MICT s DPC is supported by a dedicated Project Coordination Unit (Unité de Coordination de Project: UCP-DPC) that 6

7 has extensive experience implementing Bank financed projects and has been appraised to have sufficient technical and human resources to effectively support the coordination of the proposed Project s implementation. In addition to coordinating the overall proposed Project s implementation, the UCP-DPC would be responsible for the implementation of Components 1, 2 and 5.1 of the project. 29. The MTPTC s Central Executing Unit (Unité Centrale d Exécution: UCE-MTPTC), would be responsible for the implementation of Components 3, 4 and 5.2 of the project. This unit has experience managing other Bank-financed infrastructure projects. While the UCE-MTPC has been successful in assuming the fiduciary responsibility associated with these operations, it has demonstrated a limited capacity in handling technically complex interventions under a tight schedule. However, the UCE-MTPTC remains the best available alternative to manage transport investments. It will be reinforced through technical assistance. VII. Safeguard Policies (including public consultation) Safeguard Policies Triggered by the Project Yes No Piloting the Use of Borrower Systems to Address Environmental and Social Issues in Bank-Supported Projects (OP/BP 4.00) Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01) Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4.04) Pest Management (OP 4.09) Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4.11) Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12) Indigenous Peoples (OP/BP 4.10) Forests (OP/BP 4.36) Safety of Dams (OP/BP 4.37) Projects in Disputed Areas (OP/BP 7.60) * Projects on International Waterways (OP/BP 7.50) VIII. Contact point at World Bank and Borrower World Bank Contact: Pierre Bonneau Title: Task Team Leader Tel: pbonneau@worldbank.org Location: Port-au-Prince, Haiti Borrower/Client/Recipient Contact: Ronald Baudin Title: Minister of Finance Palais des Ministeres * By supporting the proposed project, the Bank does not intend to prejudice the final determination of the parties' claims on the disputed areas 7

8 Port-au-Prince Haiti Fax: Implementing Agencies Contact: Dr. Yolene Surena & Garry Jean Title: Coordinator, UCP-DPC & Coordinator UCE-MTPTC Tel: ; yvsurena@gmail.com ; garijan@gmail.com I. For more information contact: The InfoShop The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington, D.C Telephone: (202) Fax: (202) Web: 8