Experimental Analysis of Attacks on Next Generation Air Traffic Communication

Transcription

1 Experimental Analysis of Attacks on Next Generation Air Traffic Communication Matthias Schäfer, Vincent Lenders and Ivan Martinovic June 27th, 2013

2 1. Introduction Introduction 1 Introduction 2 Attacks 3 Limitations 4 Discussion Matthias Schäfer Attacks on NextGen Air Traffic Communication S. 1/14

3 1. Introduction Current Air Traffic Surveillance ATM crucial for avoiding collisions Technologies used since World War II: Primary Surveillance Radar Secondary Surveillance Radar (Mode A/C/S) But there are some major problems: Insufficient accuracy Expensive Expected doubling of traffic until 2025 NextGen (US) and CASCADE (Europe) Matthias Scha fer Attacks on NextGen Air Traffic Communication S. 2/14

4 1. Introduction 2020: NextGen Air Traffic Surveillance Automatic: no explicit interrogation necessary Dependant: aircraft determines its precise location in space on-board Surveillance: precise and up-to-date position, velocity, identification,... Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast Aircraft continuously determine their position and velocity using GNSS Position, ID, velocity and status are broadcasted periodically GNSS ADS-B Matthias Schäfer Attacks on NextGen Air Traffic Communication S. 3/14

5 1. Introduction Security in ADS-B does not exist! ADS-B Designed for cost efficiency and accuracy Legacy compatibility for a smooth transition 20 years from development to final deployment worldwide coordination and deployment Attacker Rapid technological progress Easily accessible knowledge Cheap equipment available off-the-shelf Attacks usually local, e.g. one ground station Matthias Schäfer Attacks on NextGen Air Traffic Communication S. 4/14

6 2. Attacks Attacks 1 Introduction 2 Attacks 3 Limitations 4 Discussion Matthias Schäfer Attacks on NextGen Air Traffic Communication S. 5/14

7 2. Attacks Attacks Passive attacks are trivial due to the lack of encryption But: passive attacks may support active attacks Active attacks: Injection of ghost aircraft Modification of the position of existing aircraft Jamming attacks Deletion of existing aircraft from the screen... Matthias Schäfer Attacks on NextGen Air Traffic Communication S. 6/14

8 2. Attacks Example 1: Ghost aircraft injection Matthias Schäfer Attacks on NextGen Air Traffic Communication S. 7/14

9 2. Attacks Example 2: Ghost aircraft flooding Matthias Schäfer Attacks on NextGen Air Traffic Communication S. 8/14

10 3. Limitations Limitations 1 Introduction 2 Attacks 3 Limitations 4 Discussion Matthias Schäfer Attacks on NextGen Air Traffic Communication S. 9/14

11 3. Limitations Passive Attacks Line-of-sight link Measuring Point 70 RSS (dbw) London Matthias Schäfer Attacks on NextGen Air Traffic Communication S. 10/14

12 3. Limitations Active Attacks Message injection: P/N > δ (Selective) Message deletion: Timing: reacting time in the order of 100 µs Position: distance to attacked ground station 10 km Message modification: Timing: stricter than that of message deletion (few µs) Synchronization with the signal with a precision < 1 µs But: deletion + injection = modification Matthias Schäfer Attacks on NextGen Air Traffic Communication S. 11/14

13 4. Discussion Discussion 1 Introduction 2 Attacks 3 Limitations 4 Discussion Matthias Schäfer Attacks on NextGen Air Traffic Communication S. 12/14

14 4. Discussion Lessons learned? 1 Technological progress must be considered when designing new critical systems (especially cyber-physical systems) 2 Patches to secure the existing system needed until appropriate security measures are integrated 3 Manufacturers and authorities in the aviation sector should provide more information about infrastructure to support research 4 ATC should not rely on ADS-B exclusively Matthias Schäfer Attacks on NextGen Air Traffic Communication S. 13/14

15 4. Discussion The End Thank you very much. Matthias Schäfer Attacks on NextGen Air Traffic Communication S. 14/14